Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Chicago Law Review
Publication Date
2000
ISSN
0041-9494
Page Number
163
Keywords
frivolous suits, psychological leverage, low probability, risk-seeing behavior
Disciplines
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | Law
Abstract
This Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive theory of frivolous or low-probability litigation. The proposed Frivolous Framing Theory posits that the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk averse behavior in defendants. Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have a greater tolerance for risk than the defendants they have sued, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have "psychological leverage" in settlement negotiations, which is likely to lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements or bargaining impasse. This in turn, suggests that reformers concerned about frivolous litigation should target reform efforts at plaintiffs' decisionmaking in frivolous suits. e
Recommended Citation
Chris Guthrie,
Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 University of Chicago Law Review. 163
(2000)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/814