Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Supreme Court Economic Review

Publication Date

2001

ISSN

2156-6208

Page Number

171

Keywords

United States Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist, en banc cases

Disciplines

Courts | Law | Supreme Court of the United States

Abstract

This article considers systematically whether the Supreme Court is more likely to review an en banc court of appeals decision than a panel decision. First, we consider Supreme Court review of en banc cases during the Rehnquist Court. Then, in a multivariate empirical analysis of a three-circuit subset of those cases, we control for other variables found to influence the Court's certiorari decision, such as Solicitor General or amicus curiae support for the certiorari petition, a dissent from the court of appeal's opinion, an outcome contrary to the Court's ideological composition, and an intercircuit conflict. The discussion is situated in a larger context of how legal scholars and political scientists have addressed the Rehnquist Court's shrunken caseload from both empirical and policy perspectives.

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