Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Publication Date
2011
ISSN
0041-9907
Page Number
87
Keywords
securities fraud||corporate governance
Disciplines
Law
Abstract
This is a response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). Bratton and Wachter argue that fraud-on-the-market class actions (FOTM) should be eliminated and replaced with stepped-up public enforcement efforts targeted at individual wrongdoers (rather than the corporate enterprise, the FOTM target of choice). In this Response, I do not disagree: My own scholarship has similarly emphasized the benefits of shifting away from FOTM to greater reliance on public enforcement mechanisms. Instead, I take the opportunity to elaborate on the deterrence and corporate governance shortcomings of FOTM, strengthening further the case Bratton and Wachter make for an enhanced public enforcement role.
Recommended Citation
Amanda Rose,
Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 87
(2011)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/598