Paul H. Edelman

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Supreme Court Economic Review

Publication Date

2015

Page Number

207

Keywords

public choice, Condorcet winner, majority voting

Disciplines

Law | Legal Remedies | Public Law and Legal Theory

Abstract

There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives.

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