Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Wisconsin Law Review
Publication Date
8-1994
ISSN
0043-650X
Page Number
763
Keywords
Administrative law, judicial review, ossification, energy policy, FERC
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Energy and Utilities Law | Law
Abstract
Recent policy-effect studies denounce judicial review for its adverse effects on agency decision-making. In its strong version, the policy-effect thesis suggests that judicial review has paralyzed innovative agency decision-making. Professor Rossi reacts to policy-effect studies, particularly as they have been used to attack the hard look doctrine in administrative law. He revisits Professor Richard Pierce's policy-effect description of the effects of judicial review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Professor Rossi's survey of recent FERC decision-making provides some support for an attenuated version of the policy-effect thesis but leads him to reject the strong version of the thesis. Much of the policy-effect literature hastily condemns judicial review because it is costly, unpredictable, and counter-majoritarian. However, Professor Rossi defends judicial review against the policy-effect attack as a protector of deliberative democratic values. He suggests that reforms to agency adjudicative mechanisms could alleviate the problems identified by policy-effect critics, while also allowing judicial review an opportunity to achieve its benefits.
Recommended Citation
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1098360022006761