Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Arizona Law Review
Publication Date
1996
ISSN
0004-153X
Page Number
331
Keywords
corporate law, shareholder monitoring, equity ownership, access to information
Disciplines
Commercial Law | Law
Abstract
A central issue in contemporary corporate law is the effectiveness of shareholders as monitors of corporate management. For example, in a series of recent articles, legal scholars have debated whether the rapid growth in the equity ownership positions of institutional investors, the relative stability of their shareholdings in each company, and their increased activism in corporate governance matters, will lead to better monitoring by shareholders and improved corporate performance. However, two predicates to effective shareholder monitoring are that dispersed investors have information about the companies they invest in and that they can communicate this information to other investors so that they can act collectively.
Recommended Citation
Randall Thomas,
Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 Arizona Law Review. 331
(1996)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/196