Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Georgetown Law Journal
Publication Date
5-2025
ISSN
0016-8092
Page Number
1041
Keywords
law enforcement, sheriffs, criminal justice, non-enforcement discretion
Disciplines
Criminal Law | Law | Law Enforcement and Corrections
Abstract
The county sheriff is unique among our nation's law enforcers, with an ancient pedigree, elected status, and special protections as a state constitu- tional officer. But these factors combine to cause a recurrent problem elected sheriffs often assert for themselves the power to refuse to enforce criminal laws of their choosing. Today's constitutional sheriffs-a group of sheriffs who view themselves as the highest authority in their county, answerable only to their electorate-are the latest manifestation of this ethos, declaring opposition to gun control measures, pandemic restric- tions, environmental protections, and more. Lest one think these nonen- forcement decisions are entirely one-sided, other sheriffs have declared opposition to immigration and abortion restrictions. This challenge to the rule of law has flourished in part because our modern criminal system embraces enforcement discretion, offering only the thinnest of constitutional backstops. In lieu of legal limits, even blan- ket nonenforcement of certain crimes is managed primarily through political checks, such as elections or intervention by other levels of government. But these constraints have serious shortcomings. This Article proposes reviving judicially-enforceable limits on nonen- forcement discretion modeled on a now-forgotten understanding of the sheriff s duties to investigate and enforce. For much of our history, state courts played an important role in supervising nonenforcement discretion.
Recommended Citation
Farhang Heydari,
The Sheriff's Constitution, 113 Georgetown Law Journal. 1041
(2025)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1702