Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Journal of Theoretical Politics
Publication Date
1-2008
ISSN
0951-6298
Page Number
527
Keywords
partisan policy, legislative median, majority party median
Disciplines
Law | Law and Politics
Abstract
We show that the median legislator in the US House is unambiguously closer to the majority party median than to the minority party median. An important implication of this finding is that the median legislator is predisposed to support the majority party's policy agenda. Thus, in the event that the majority party organization exerts no influence over the legislative process, and in the event that all policies then default to the legislative median, policy outcomes will still substantially favor the majority party over the minority. We demonstrate that the legislative median moves predictably toward the majority party in response to changes in majority control and the size and ideological homogeneity of the two parties. Consequently, the median legislators' partisan predisposition increases and decreases in response to electoral change. We conclude that partisan and floor majority, or median, theories of lawmaking are more often complementary than conflicting, and that party activities in the electoral arena have implications for legislative partisanship.
Recommended Citation
Alan E. Wiseman and John R. Wright,
The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy, 20 Journal of Theoretical Politics. 527
(2008)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1589