The present paper has been concerned to stress that jurisprudence, insofar as it is not limited to analytical jurisprudence, dare not overlook the distinctive qualities either of common language, or of the special language of lawyers. For what its authors deny above all is the utility of so defining a field--like the justice-field--which is a segment of common language, in terms of a special language or logical structuring similar to those used by lawyers. Nor do we think that the presence of considerations of justice (and therefore of common language statements) in the process of the operation of law, either requires or warrants the attempt to merge two language-fields so different in structure and so differentiated in usage as those, respectively, of law and justice.
Julius Stone and G. Tarello,
Justice, Language and Communication,
14 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/16