This Article presents a critical analysis of the Linkline case that refuses to recognize price squeeze claims as antitrust claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Linkline gives a distorted reading of Trinko without giving proper attention to the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Linkline decision takes a dogmatic position and thus, while refuting the Alcoa decision, appears to be a missed opportunity to more precisely define price squeezing.
This Article offers a comparison between the U.S. Supreme Court's decision and the recent European decisions delivered in broadband access cases that are pointing in a completely different direction. As U.S. antitrust law and E.U. competition law converge by seeking to protect consumer welfare through the application of law based on sound economic analysis, price squeezing illustrates the most acute difference between the U.S. and E.U.: the fear of introducing regulatory principles through antitrust law in the U.S. as opposed to a more tolerant perception of state intervention in the E.U.
Caroline C. Rudaz,
Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?,
43 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol43/iss4/4