Various recent studies' have confirmed the suspicion that courts continue to find it necessary to approve and rely heavily on the principle of "legislative jurisdiction" residing in some one state, even though they do not often admit it in so many words. Since the discussion of the problem by courts generally assumes that the single question in conflicts is choice of law, and since one of the most influential writers on the subject in recent times has denied the validity of the jurisdictional principle at the common law as a means of solving a conflicts problem, a study giving further attention both to that principle's validity and to its possible usefulness in solving the many problems arising in the conflicts field may be in order. That there are at least two basically different kinds of conflicts rules, and that the courts use both regularly, though describing them by the single term "choice of law," may be demonstrated by the simplest possible illustration. Let us consider F, a forum without any other substantial interest in the litigation than as the forum, and S, another state and possible forum having such decisive contacts with the litigation as to leave no doubt that its legislative policy must ultimately control the litigation.
Edwin W. Briggs,
Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws,
6 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/11