This Recent Development suggests that the Court erroneously decided Jones. Part II examines the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of commitment procedures and discusses postacquittal commitment in state and lower federal courts. Part III analyzes the Jones decision and the exception that it allows for the commitment of insanity acquittees. Part IV contends that prior to involuntary and indefinite commitment an insanity acquittee deserves the same standard of proof as a civil commitment candidate-proof of mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Part IV also argues that absent proof by clear and convincing evidence of the acquittee's need for confinement,the insanity acquittee is entitled to release or recommitment through civil commitment procedures at the expiration of the underlying maximum sentence for the offense. In addition, part IV submits that Jones should not control in jurisdictions in which the criminal defendant need create only a reasonable doubt of his insanity at the time of the offense to obtain acquittal.
John B. Scherling,
Automatic and Indefinite Commitment of Insanity Acquittees: A Procedural Straitjacket,
37 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/6