The present Article offers a defense of deprogramming and a reply to its critics, particularly Shapiro. Part II reviews what hap-pens in many instances of cult joining and offers a conceptual account that justifies deprogramming of cult members who are unable to comprehend or surmount the coercive and deceptive influences that led to their commitment. Part III addresses constitutional problems that are triggered in the event that deprogramming should affect religious belief-an event that is by no means inevitable. Part IV discusses deprogramming and whether some variant of it is capable of remedying the type of situation ad-dressed in part II without violating the constitutional strictures identified in part III. The Article concludes with an analysis of objections to my thesis and answers to those objections.
When Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional Status of Coercively Induced Belief,
37 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/2