Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?

Authors

C.M.A. McCauliff

First Page

1293

Abstract

This Article analyzes the whole range of burdens of proof as well as their constitutional implications. Part H of the Article discusses the traditional burdens of proof and the use of probability theory in legal fact finding. Part HI of the Article studies the decision making processes of law enforcement officers, the judges that review their decisions, and the decision making processes in appellate and administrative review. Part IV of the Article returns to the trial process and analyzes burdens of proof, not as degrees of belief, but as reflections of constitutional due process that mandate a required degree of belief for the trial of certain important rights.Part V of the Article reports the results of a survey of judges on the meaning of various burdens of proof. Finally, the Article concludes that the objective-subjective dichotomy is an attempt to ex-press at pretrial and post trial stages the same policy concern that the Supreme Court has set forth at the trial level: the importance of the interests at stake. The proliferation of new burdens of proof,however, obscures and endangers these interests by confusing the decisionmakers who must apply them.

Recommended Citation

C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1293 (1982)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/1