The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy"

Authors

Gerald G. Ashdown

First Page

1289

Abstract

This Article does not endeavor to engage in a debate over the efficacy or deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.' Nevertheless, it should be noted that these decisions appear questionable. It seems clear that a refusal to apply the rule in cases of particular fourth amendment transgressions will produce no incremental deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and inconsistent application of the rule arguably could diminish whatever deterrent value does exist.Therefore, if deterrence is viewed as the primary--if not only-function of the exclusionary rule, that goal should be promoted through thorough and consistent application of the rule.The Supreme Court, however, has refused to adopt this policy and instead has isolated the rule's deterrent aspect as a means to circumvent the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.

Recommended Citation

Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 Vanderbilt Law Review 1289 (1981)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/2