Constitutional Law--Criminal Procedure-Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation"
James H. Lokey, Jr.
In Stone v. Powell,' the third 1976 decision, the Supreme Court made a limited but distinct break with precedent. Stone held that a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial as long as the state has provided an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his fourth amendment claim." The Court, as noted previously, did not define what kind of "opportunity" is required, and again it neglected to indicate what impact Stone, Estelle, and Francis would have on habeas corpus precedents such as Fay v.Noia.
Military Law--The Role of the Military Judiciary-- The United States Court of Military Appeals Strengthens Judicial Control of Courts-Martial and Expands Its Scope of Appellate Review
Stephen D. Goodwin
The Uniform Code of Military Justice' attempts to strike a delicate balance between traditional civilian concepts of an impartial, independent judicial system and the military's reliance on the court-martial as an effective method by which a commander maintains discipline. Two recent decisions by the United States Court of Military Appeals (COMA)' strengthen the authority of military trial judges and expand relief powers at the appellate level.
Securities Law-Investment Adviser Fraud--A Private Damages Remedy Is Implied Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Charles L. Jarik
Plaintiffs, limited partners in an investment partnership,'sought damages under section 2062 and rule 206(4)-11 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 from the partnership, its accountants,and its general partners for failure to disclose in financial reports substantial investment of partnership assets in unregistered securities. Plaintiffs contended that the nondisclosure constituted fraudulent conduct under the Act by contravening the partnership's averred low risk investment policy and caused substantial financial loss to plaintiffs by delaying their withdrawal from the partnership. Defendants responded that they were not investment advisers within the meaning of the Act and that plaintiffs realized no losses compensable under the Act." On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court, which previously had recognized a private damages action under section 206, dismissed the complaint for failure to allege compensable damages.' On appeal, the Second Circuit requested the parties to brief the threshold issue whether a private damages action is implicit under section 206 of the Act," and held, reversed and remanded for determination of damages.
James H. Lokey, Jr.; Stephen D. Goodwin; and Charles L. Jarik,
30 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol30/iss4/6