The concept of values is central to the explanation of judicial decision-making. Indeed, Clark L. Hull has gone so far as to say that any fairly detailed and sound dynamic theory of behavior must contain an empirical theory of values. Although students of judicial behavior have used values, or some equivalent concept, in their studies, there has been as yet no thorough, systematic exploration of values with a view toward using it as the central concept in building an empirical theory of judicial decision-making. This paper is a modest step in that direction. It is not, however, a presentation of the empirical theory of values to which Hull referred. Rather, it is a presentation of some notes toward such a theory in the hope that they will be useful in the eventual development of a fairly detailed and sound dynamic theory of judicial decision-making.
David I. Danelski,
Values as Variables in Judicial Decision-Making: Notes Toward a Theory,
19 Vanderbilt Law Review
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/5