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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY—A CAPTIVE OF ITS OWN PROCEDURES

ERLE COCKE, JR.*

I. SUMMARY¹

The work of the Assembly is hindered by its tedious parliamentary procedures. Its procedures should be expedited.

A thorough review of these procedures and practices has been had only twice. Consideration of the procedures of the Main Committees where most of the work is done has not been had since the Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The laggard work of the Assembly increases the cost, places a great burden on the Foreign Offices of member Nations, and hinders the Assembly's efficiently discharging its functions. These *functions* have grown far beyond those originally intended, and the *membership* of the General Assembly in the foreseeable future will probably increase to 100 members, thus causing further delay.

Most of the work of the General Assembly is done in its seven Main Committees, and their work can be expedited by setting up in a slightly different manner the agenda and procedures of these Committees. The Session should be limited to eight weeks by expediting the procedures of the Main Committees, by limiting statements, and by encouraging the Chairmen of the Main Committees to act decisively.

A sequence of items should be set up for consideration and a target date should be announced by the Chairman after consultation with the Secretariat, and the list of speakers on each item should be closed at the end of the first day of consideration of each agenda item. If the list of speakers were scheduled, debate would be continuous until ended. The Chairman should suggest a time limit on speakers in general debate and on resolutions, and these with amendments should not be mimeographed and distributed until the end of the general debate.

Explanations of how and why certain votes were cast or would be cast should be extended in the record instead of the Assembly's time being consumed in listening to their oral presentation. Reasons, recommendations and authorities follow this summary.

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1. The author expresses his thanks to Hon. James W. Barco, Minister and Counselor of Mission, United States Mission to the United Nations; Hon. Granville S. Ridley, Former Special Justice, Supreme Court of Tennessee; and Ernest L. Kerley, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, for reading the manuscript of this article and making helpful suggestions.

II. THE PROBLEM DEFINED

In reporting to the President on the work of the United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius described the responsibility of the United Nations General Assembly as the performance of "the healthful and ventilating functions of a free deliberative body, without the right or duty to enact or legislate."² A parliamentary body meeting that description would be a unique one. Whether or not the General Assembly fully meets that description today, the uniqueness, even to those familiar with American legislative bodies, is indisputable. As a member of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth General Assembly, I was privileged to carry out, and sometimes to help make, United States policies in the United Nations. This was at once a reassuring and a frustrating experience. By and large, I found the men and women who walk the corridors of the United Nations Headquarters to be intelligent, dedicated persons, but I think their work is often hindered, prolonged or made tedious by parliamentary practices which would not be followed in legislative bodies throughout the world. Granted the General Assembly is unique, it is not a legislature; I think its procedures, even by the standards of its own functions and objectives, are not as expeditious as they could and should be.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly were adopted at the Second Session on November 17, 1947,³ studies have twice been made in an effort to expedite the work of the Assembly. At the Fourth Session the General Assembly approved a number of changes in the practice, and in the Rules of Procedure, which had been proposed by a Special Committee on Methods and Procedures appointed by it at the previous session.⁴ At the Seventh Session the General Assembly further revised its practices both with regard to the handling of legal and drafting questions⁵ and with regard to limitation of the length of its sessions.⁶ Other amendments of a less fundamental character have also been made from time to time. A comprehensive consideration of the procedures followed within the Main Committees, where most of the work of the General Assembly is done, has not been undertaken since the Fourth Session.

In 1958, the General Assembly met from September 16 to December 13, a total of twelve and a half weeks, and adopted 109 resolutions. The texts of all resolutions adopted have been printed in 58 double-column pages.⁷ By contrast, the United States Congress during its

2. U. S. Dept. of State Publ. No. 2349, *Charter of the United Nations. Report to the President of the Results of the San Francisco Conference* 14 (1945).

3. Res. 173 (II), U.N. Doc. No. A/519 at 104-5 (1947).

4. Res. 362 (IV), U.N. Doc. No. A/1251 at 59-63 (1949).

5. Res. 684 (VII), U.N. Doc. No. A/2361 at 61-62 (1952).

6. Res. 689B (VII), U.N. Doc. No. A/2361 at 63-64 (1952).

7. U.N. Doc. No. A/4090 (1958).

1958 session, a period of 231 days, adopted a number of private bills as well as statutes and proclamations totalling 1792 pages.⁸ In 1958 the New York Legislature adopted 992 statutes of a total length of 2375 pages during a session of 77 days;⁹ in 1958 the Legislature of Georgia adopted statutes of a total length of 717 pages¹⁰ during a session of 40 days.

Obviously, these statistics give the merest approximation of comparative efficiency in the case of parliamentary bodies of such diverse mission, composition and function. An uncritical quantitative evaluation would be absurd under these circumstances. The figures are cited merely for what support they may provide for my previously stated personal impressions.

Several liabilities arise from the undue prolongation of General Assembly Sessions. In addition to the expenses common to all large parliamentary groups, extra costs are involved in General Assembly meetings because they are multilingual. Simultaneous translations during the meetings and preparation of records and documents in several languages¹¹ requires a staff of translators and interpreters to attend each meeting and to prepare the records and documents. The cost of a three hour Committee meeting has been estimated at \$6,000.00.

Moreover, a protracted General Assembly session places an undue burden on the Foreign Offices of Member States. For senior Foreign Office personnel and their most able subordinates to be away from their desks for a twelve weeks period necessarily reduces the effectiveness of the foreign policy of many Members in topics not connected with the United Nations. Only a few Member States have a sufficient quantity of "top-rank" Foreign Office personnel to avoid this problem; the others must either suffer impairment of their Foreign Office operations during Assembly sessions, or put less able officers on their delegations to the United Nations, or interrupt the operation of their delegations by sending personnel for only part of a session.

But the most important consideration raised by the cumbersome procedures of the General Assembly is neither the expense nor the burden which prolonged sessions place on the Foreign Offices of

8. 72 Stat. pt. 1 (1958).

9. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1958.

10. Ga. Laws 1958.

11. Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish are the official languages of the United Nations; English, French and Spanish are the working languages. Rule 51, Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. No. A/3660 at 10 (Sales No. 1957.I.24) (1957). All statements at meetings are translated into the working languages. Rules 52, 53, 54, *Ibid.* Verbatim records of meetings are prepared in the working languages. Rule 55, *Ibid.* Summary records of meetings and documents are available in the official languages. Rules 56, 58. *Id.* at 10-11.

Member States; it is the limitation which these practices impose on the capacity of the Assembly for the effective discharge of its functions. However accurately the quoted statement of Secretary of State Stettinius may have described the functions of the projected General Assembly in 1945, it is clear that the role of the Assembly today is much more than mere free deliberation. For a decade and a half the United Nations has been confronted with a Security Council paralyzed by the Soviet abuse of the veto power. This has resulted not only in the formal assumption by the Assembly of functions assigned by the Charter to the Security Council,¹² but also in a more specific and political approach on the part of the Assembly than appears originally to have been intended. Moreover, the General Assembly has grown year by year to a present size of eighty-two Members; as new, independent states emerge in the once "colonial" areas of the world, a membership of one hundred can be foreseen. Efficient procedure in the General Assembly is necessary, therefore, merely to maintain its present effectiveness; in addition, it is highly desirable that it be capable of assuming new activities should we conclude that it would promote the maintenance of peace and security for the General Assembly to do so.

Before considering further the procedures of the General Assembly, let us look briefly at its structure. The Assembly is composed of representatives of all Member States, each having one vote. It decides questions by a simple majority of the members present and voting, or, in the relatively infrequent case of certain questions deemed "important questions," by a two-thirds majority.¹³ The Assembly has

12. *E.g.*, Res. 377A(V), "Uniting for Peace," U.N. Doc. No. A/1775 at 10-11 (1950). This resolution provides for the calling of a special session of the General Assembly when the veto prevents Security Council action for the maintenance of peace and security and sets up a commission to investigate at the scene of international tension. Its rationale is evident in the following excerpts from the preamble:

"The General Assembly,

...
"Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale

...
"Reaffirming the importance of the exercise of by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

...
"Conscious that the failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities . . . does not relieve member states of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

...
"Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security . . ."

13. Rules 84-87, U.N. Doc. No. A/3660 at 15 (Sales No.: 157.I.24) (1957). See Kerley, *Voting on Important Questions in the United Nations General*

appointed seven Main Committees, each with a given area of competence. In defining these areas of competence, Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly provides as follows:

The Main Committees of the General Assembly are:

- (a) Political and Security Committee (including the regulation of armaments) (First Committee);
- (b) Special Political Committee;
- (c) Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee);
- (d) Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee);
- (e) Trusteeship Committee (including Non-Self-Governing Territories) (Fourth Committee);
- (f) Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee);
- (g) Legal Committee (Sixth Committee)¹⁴

The Main Committees, like the General Assembly in plenary session, are composed of representatives of all Member States; decisions are taken by a simple majority.¹⁵

Most of the work of the General Assembly is done in the Main Committees. Agenda items are assigned to the various Committees by the General Assembly in plenary session at the beginning of each session. While the Main Committees are considering the agenda items assigned to them, and determining resolutions which will be proposed to the plenum for adoption, the plenum does not meet, or meets to hear general statements directed to the matters before the General Assembly as a whole. Late in the session, the Main Committees report to the plenum regarding the items on their agenda, proposing one or more resolutions on each item. Since the representation in the Main Committees and the plenum is identical, the adoption of a resolution in committee foretells its adoption in the plenum except in cases where further negotiations have led to a change in the position of delegations, or where a different voting majority is required. As a result, debate in the plenum is often brief or nonexistent; an agenda item which consumed a number of committee meetings may be disposed of in a few minutes in the plenum. Thus, efforts to expedite the work of the Assembly should concentrate mainly on the operation of the Main Committees.

III. COMPLICATING FACTORS

Several aspects of the General Assembly are in part responsible for its present slow pace. These would have to be taken into account in

Assembly, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 324 (1959).

14. U.N. Doc. No. A/3660 at 18 (Sales No.: 1957.I.24) (1957).

15. Rule 126, *id.* at 22. An exception to this requirement is made in the case of decisions to reconsider proposals after adoption or rejection, which requires a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Rule 124, *ibid.*

considering any corrective measures. In the first place, the very functions of the United Nations are incompatible with the expedition sought in domestic legislatures. The practices of every legislative body arises from the interplay between two considerations: (1) The representatives in such bodies need to satisfy the desires of their constituents for a full exposition of their views in problems especially important to them; and (2) In order to attend to all questions on the agenda in a limited period of time a legislative body must curb discussion. It is inherent in one of the basic purposes of the United Nations—to maintain international peace and security—that predominant weight must be given to the first consideration. In the present state of international organization, the restraints against armed conflict are far from decisive. The limited resources of the United Nations are frequently hard put to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. One of the most important contributions of the United Nations to the maintenance of peace is the reduction of domestic political pressures which might otherwise force national leaders to take actions they realize endanger the maintenance of peace. The ability of national leaders to satisfy their excited public that “something is being done” about a problem in the United Nations may enable those leaders to avoid more inflammatory actions. It is precisely because some debates in the United Nations assume the aspect of a *cause célèbre* that the partisans in a Member State can be satisfied merely by the adoption of a favorable resolution. For this reason, a reduction of the debate, especially by the limitation of the length of statements, might be a serious mistake in some situations. However, not every issue before the United Nations is of great political intensity; nor is it necessary in even the more heated political questions that all delegations be permitted to make long speeches.

A second cause of delay is the relatively low degree of informal organization within the General Assembly. Except for the Communist bloc, whose uniformity of voting often betrays its members' pretensions of independence, there are no organized political parties, in the domestic sense, within the General Assembly. Regional groups caucus from time to time in an effort to reach agreed positions on questions of common interest. These caucuses are quite often successful in agreeing on candidates for office; they are much less successful in agreeing on other issues. On “security” issues the Free World delegations can usually agree on substance and tactics, but even this relatively informal arrangement does not exist on all issues in the political committees, nor does it extend to the technical committees. The political party as we know it, an established organization taking decisions on all or most issues, and enforcing those decisions on its members by threat of party discipline, is not com-

patible with the attitude of representatives of Member-States in the General Assembly, and with the conceptions of national independence and national status held by those representatives.

A result of this lack of party structure is that there is little submerging of individual positions, along the lines of a caucus decision, in the consideration of most issues in the General Assembly. Rather than being fixed in advance, the positions of delegates gradually become known during the course of debate and in discussions among delegates in the corridors. These positions may change as the debate progresses, according to the delegates' estimates of voting strength. This is especially true in the not infrequent case of those delegations which are not concerned with the substance of the question under discussion, and which consequently respond readily to political considerations. As a result, the action to be taken by the Committees tends to "develop" during the course of debate; even the most energetic canvassing early in the debate might produce a misleading estimate of the probable decision of the Committee.

It does not seem that this characteristic can be avoided at the present stage of organization of the international community. Decisions will probably continue to "develop" during the course of the debate for many years to come. However, this does not mean that the debate cannot be organized and expedited. Here there is ample room for improvement.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that committee chairmen of the General Assembly are, as a rule, less likely to exercise vigorously the powers of the chair than are comparable officers of domestic legislative bodies. Rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure provides: "Each committee shall elect its own Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur. These officers shall be elected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, experience and personal competence. These elections shall be held by secret ballot."¹⁶

Thus, chairmen in the General Assembly do not acquire office through seniority, and, once acquiring it, hold it until retirement or a change of administration, as is the case in domestic legislative bodies. They hold office for a single session, and are naturally disinclined to initiate practices as chairmen which would prove frustrating to them when they return to the ranks of the committee. Of course, there are exceptions, but the usual practice in the General Assembly is for the chairmen to preside less firmly and decisively than their experience and ability would enable them to do. It should be emphasized that the problem here is not the abilities of the chairmen, since the usual practice is for a state to appoint a relatively senior person to represent it in a committee where it is to receive a chairmanship; on the

16. *Id.* at 19.

contrary, the problem is that the chairman is by established practice not expected to preside decisively. While it is possible that this attitude could be altered, so long as it exists expedition must be sought elsewhere than merely by giving additional powers to the chairman.

IV. A PROPOSAL

From what has been said it is obvious that I believe it is time for the General Assembly to review its procedures. On much of its work the General Assembly is spending more time and money than it needs to, more than it should. This review of its procedures should be undertaken in the General Assembly at its next session. Since revision of the Rules of Procedure would be involved in many cases, it would seem appropriate that this study be undertaken in the Legal Committee. It is not realistic to expect that Assembly procedures should be brought at this time to a degree of dispatch comparable with our domestic legislatures. The composition and structure of the United Nations renders this an unlikely attainment; the function of the Organization makes it an undesirable one. But a session of eight weeks duration is an attainable and yet commendable objective. Once it has been achieved, there will be time enough to consider whether further reductions can and should be made.

The study of this question should base its work on three premises: (1) Expedition can most effectively be sought in the practices of the Main Committees; (2) While exerting pressure in the direction of shortened and more expeditious statements, the changes should not preclude or unduly complicate the holding of protracted debate when the political aspects of an agenda item require it; (3) While new functions may be given to the chairmen of the committees, those whose exercise would require great firmness or decisiveness should be avoided as unlikely to achieve the result sought. There follows a set of specific proposals which illustrate the approach that I think should be followed in this study, and which have, in my opinion, sufficient provisional validity to justify their being considered in such a study.

A. Sequence of Items

At present, the usual practice in the Main Committees in accordance with Rule 100,¹⁷ is to debate, as the initial question following the election of committee officers, the sequence in which the agenda

17. "Each Main Committee, taking into account the closing date for the session fixed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the General Committee, shall adopt its own priorities and meet as may be necessary to complete the consideration of the items referred to it." *Id.* at 18. This rule is itself a part of an earlier effort to expedite the work of the Assembly; it was one of the rules adopted by the General Assembly by Resolution 363 (IV).

items should be considered. On occasion this debate extends to several meetings. It is not the practice to fix, at the outset, a target date for the conclusion of each item; this is sometimes done by the chairman informally later in the session.

The debate on the sequence of items could be shortened materially if it were to be held on the basis of a specific recommendation by the chairman. This recommendation would be preceded by consultation between the chairman and the Secretariat, and would include both the sequence of items and the target dates for their conclusion. The consultation between the chairman and the Secretariat could take place during the several days which usually intervene between the election of the chairman and the first deliberative meeting of the Committee, and would be preceded by consultation between the Secretariat and delegations which might work out an agreed sequence of items, just as the question of officers is worked out now. If no agreed sequence of items was possible, a recommendation in the alternative might be made, with a resultant clarification of interest so that a decision on the sequence of items would be expedited. The fixing of target dates would also be done on the basis of consultation by the Secretariat. Even though these dates might have to be revised during the session, the consultation would serve to reveal potentially time-consuming items, and the target dates would prevent committee lethargy during the early part of its session.

B. List of Speakers

The usual practice in the Main Committees pursuant to Rule 116,¹⁸ is to defer closing the list of delegates wishing to speak on an agenda item for several meetings after the initiation of discussion. Often several meetings are consumed in desultory debate before the list of speakers is closed. Consideration might be given to revising Rule 116 to provide that the list of speakers should be closed at the end of the first day after the beginning of the consideration of a new agenda item. It would appear unwise, however, to close it any earlier than that. Many delegations are not large enough to cover all concurrent committee meetings. Thus, if the speakers list were closed at the end of the first day of debate on an agenda item, some delegations might be unaware that consideration of the item had begun until after the time for going on the speakers list had passed. However, the Journal of the General Assembly, a daily publication listing the meetings and events scheduled for the day, contains a summary of the action in each committee and the Assembly on the preceding meeting

18. "During the course of a debate, the Chairman may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the committee, declare the list closed. He may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if a speech delivered after he declared the list closed makes this desirable." *Id.* at 20.

day. Thus, a delegate can be aware at the beginning of an agenda item in a committee he has not attended by reading the Journal for the following day, and has the opportunity to inscribe himself on the speakers list at that time. To provide for the closing of the speakers list at the end of the day after the beginning of discussion on a new agenda item would impose on delegations no other obligation than that of reading the Journal each morning; this is not too high a price to pay for expedition.

An additional change of procedure of even greater effectiveness would involve merely a strict construction of Rule 116, which refers to a *list*, rather than a *schedule*, of speakers. The present practice is to permit delegates to inscribe themselves on the speakers list for a specific day or meeting. As a result, meetings may be called off, or adjourned early, merely because no, or just a few speakers, are scheduled to speak at that meeting. The waste of time arising from this practice is substantial, especially during the first meetings on a new item. This waste could be corrected by permitting delegates to indicate merely the order in which they wish to speak. No change in the Rules of Procedure would be required; such a procedure is already implied in Rule 116, and in Rule 111 which provides that "the chairman shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak."¹⁹ As an aid to small delegations, the speakers remaining on the list at the end of each meeting might be included in the report of that meeting in the Journal of the next day.

C. *Time Limit of Speeches*

While the regular use of the power granted the chairman by Rule 115²⁰ to limit the length of statements could do much to expedite the work of the Assembly, in practice it is rarely used. The limitation is cast as an extraordinary measure, and courtesy thus limits its use. Statements in the Committees are often of unnecessary, and sometimes of excessive, length. Moreover, some delegates frequently speak more than once during the general debate on an issue. While it would be possible to revise Rule 115 to fix a time limit—say 20 minutes—for statements in the general debate, with a shorter limit—say 10 minutes—for statements on the resolutions once introduced and for the exercise of the right of reply granted by Rule 116, it seems unadvisable to do so. The length of time needed for a complete but concise statement necessarily varies with the complexity of the item being considered. Better procedure would be to leave Rule 115 as it

19. *Id.* at 21.

20. "The committee may limit the time to be allowed to each speaker and the number of times each representative may speak on any question. When the debate is limited and a representative has spoken his allotted time, the Chairman shall call him to order without delay." *Id.* at 20.

is now drafted, but to recommend a practice whereby the Chairman would propose to the Committee a time limit at the beginning of debate on each new item. This would allow the time limit to vary with the question under discussion, and would take allowance of the occasional case where it may be advisable, for the reasons indicated earlier, to have no time limit. In any case, it should be recognized that the Committee may, on request of a speaker, extend the time limit. This might well be necessary to recognize the special interests of some states in an agenda item even when the Committee considered it advisable not to extend the time limit generally.

It is obvious that this change would not preclude long statements. In terms of necessary effect, there is no difference between giving the Committee the right to impose a time limit and imposing a time limit but giving the Committee the right to extend it. In either case, the determining factor is the will of the Committee. But the emphasis is different in the two cases. If the time limit were automatically proposed at the beginning of debate on an item, most speakers would be prepared to conform to it merely because of the pressure in any body to meet norms of conduct which have been stated. Moreover, the regular use of time limits would do much to change the present conception of the time limit as an unusual or extreme measure.

D. Introduction of Proposals

As has been indicated, items in Committees are considered first in a general debate, during which positions are stated; following that is held a debate on the specific proposals and amendments thereto introduced by the members of the Committee. This latter stage culminates in the adoption of one or more resolutions expressing the views of a majority of the Committee.

The present practice is that proposed resolutions, and amendments to them, are mimeographed by the Secretariat and distributed as Committee documents as soon as submitted, whether or not the general debate has concluded. Contrary to what might be expected, the distribution of proposals and amendments before the end of the general debate on an item may delay, rather than expedite, the work of the committee because it leads to hasty draftmanship and inadequately considered proposals, and because such proposals are necessarily submitted while the positions in the committee are still developing, since the general debate is not yet complete.

For these reasons consideration should be given to the question whether the work of the committees might not be expedited if the Committee Secretariat were to hold proposals and resolutions until the end of the general debate, and to distribute them in the committee concurrently with a statement of explanation by their sponsors.

Such a change could be done by an addition to Rule 121,²¹ which concerns proposals and amendments, or merely by a revision in the practice followed.

E. Explanation of Votes

Following a vote, a considerable period, sometimes more than a single meeting, is consumed by explanations of delegates as to the reason how and why they will vote or have voted. Such statements are permitted by Rule 124.²² Unless these statements are intended to influence the vote of other delegations, in which case they obviously repeat arguments which could have been made during the debate, they serve no purpose but to record how²³ and why a delegation voted as it did.

The practice of extension of remarks for the record, in which a legislator may insert in the record a statement not actually given on the floor, is common in domestic legislatures. In its full form it would probably not be acceptable to delegates at the present stage of the parliamentary development of the General Assembly. However, I submit that this practice would not be too drastic in connection with the explanation of votes. Consideration should therefore be given to the revision of Rule 129 to provide that, at the conclusion of voting, delegates should be given permission to file with the Secretariat, a written statement of limited length explaining their vote. These statements would then be appended to the record of the meeting at which the voting occurred.

V. CONCLUSION

It has been the burden of this article that the procedure in the United Nations General Assembly is more cumbersome, and thus more wasteful of the time and resources of the Organization, than it needs to be. A study of ways to expedite the work of the Assembly, with emphasis on the operations of the committees, should be undertaken at the next session. The specific suggestions made seem worthy of inclusion in such a study, and, in any event, serve to illustrate the type of proposal which is, in my view, most likely to be useful.

21. *Ibid.*

22. "After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting. The Chairman may permit members to explain their votes, either before or after the voting, except when the vote is taken by secret ballot. The Chairman may limit the time to be allowed for such explanations. The Chairman shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment." *Id.* at 23.

23. In cases where the voting is taken, pursuant to Rule 128, by roll-call rather than by show of hands, even this purpose would not be present, since the record would show how each delegation had voted.