

1970

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Recommended Citation

Charles G. Burr, United States Foreign Policy toward South Africa: An Appraisal, 3 *Vanderbilt Law Review* 168 (2021)

Available at: <https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol3/iss2/6>

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA:

AN APPRAISAL

In recent years there have been notable cases in which United States involvement in African affairs has had a serious bearing on the United States' general international position, affecting its relations with the United Nations and other states, both African and non-African. The foremost of these cases is South Africa. In the view of many observers of the situation, the actions of the South African government cause reactions that jeopardize United States interests throughout the remainder of independent black Africa, undermine United States influence in the United Nations, and stimulate the nationalist movements within and outside South Africa to seek support from various communist sources. In sum, the apartheid policies of South Africa present a direct irritant to peaceful conditions in the area and a barrier to satisfactory coexistence between the great powers.¹

I. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

To analyze the bases of United States policy toward South Africa and the possible directions of that policy, it is essential to understand precisely what stakes the United States has in that country. This is especially important since critics of United States policy in the Republic often contend that various interests prevent politically vulnerable United States policymakers from undertaking a thorough re-evaluation of our commitment. Basically, the extent of United States involvement in South Africa, and hence the stakes underlying a discussion of United States alternatives, can be divided into two broad areas: strategic-military and economic.

¹See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-610, 91st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

A. Strategic Interests

For fairly obvious geographic reasons, the continent of Africa is of less importance to the United States than are Europe, Asia or Latin America, and the area of southern Africa is of relatively minor importance to United States security interests.² South Africa's position on the Cape sea routes between Europe and the Far East does give it some strategic significance. This position is considered to be of potential importance to the United States and Great Britain during any crisis in which the use of the Suez Canal might be denied. Should widespread military operations develop in the Indian Ocean area, South Africa on the west and Australia on the east remain the only available alternate advance bases. This is a factor more likely to affect the United Kingdom than the United States because of greater United States capability in long-range air transport.³

In addition, both the United States and the United Kingdom have an interest in the availability of the Simonstown Naval Base in South Africa in time of hostilities. Simonstown's naval repair operations are presently the only such facilities within more than 5,000 miles. Yet the United States has long sought an alternative to the relatively remote and vulnerable base. Also of some importance are the NASA missile-tracking and deep space probe stations which the United States maintains in South Africa. As indicated, these facilities have some strategic utility to the United States and its allies, but certainly not so great that were it deemed politically wise to abandon them, there could be no replacement. If such abandonment were part of a program of actions taken against South Africa, then undoubtedly black African governments north of the Zambezi River could be called upon to make alternative sites available. Many of the communications and trading facilities could be located at sea.

²McKay, Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Policy, in SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 25 (W. Hance ed. 1968).

³Leiss, Efforts to Alter the Future: Military Measures, in APARTHEID AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE MEASURES 133 (A. Leiss ed. 1965).

Aside from these factors, perhaps the single greatest military consideration for the United States is that pointed out by Rupert Emerson:

It may well be that the greatest potential military significance of Africa for the United States is neither the strength of its armed forces nor its utility as a base of operations and source of supply but the danger that racial or Cold War complications might cause the involvement of American forces on the continent as they have already become involved in Korea or Vietnam.⁴

Indeed, the prospect of a racial confrontation between anti-Communist whites (for whom there would exist considerable sympathy in the United States) on the one hand and African nationalists accepting Communist assistance on the other is one in which it is very difficult to see how the United States --not to mention Africans--could do anything but lose.

B. Economic Interests

If the present military-strategic concerns of the United States in South Africa are minimal and largely negative in character, the United States' economic stake in that country is larger and more positive, though it represents only a very small proportion of the total United States foreign economic interests.

More than 260 American firms, through affiliates or branch offices, are doing business in South Africa. The total private direct investment is 601 million dollars, according to a 1968 State Department estimate. With indirect investment added, the total is somewhat over 800 million dollars. This represents 1.1 per cent of total United States foreign investments, though the 19.5 per cent rate of return has been consistently higher than the world-wide average. It is estimated that the 260 American firms earn more than 100 million dollars yearly from these investments.⁵

While the importance of United States investments in and financial transactions with South Africa is quite minor in

⁴R. EMERSON, AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY 31 (1967).

⁵Figures based on Department of State estimates, in HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 98-99, 123-25.

relation to total United States foreign investments, they play a more significant role for South Africa. At the end of 1967 the United States ranked second among holders of South Africa's foreign liabilities with 13.8 per cent of the total, behind the United Kingdom with 61.8 per cent.

So far as trade is concerned, in 1966 the Republic took 1.3 per cent of the total United States exports, or approximately 30 per cent of United States exports to Africa as a whole. United States imports from South Africa are only about 1 per cent of total imports by value, with some decline having occurred in their relative significance since 1962. On the other hand, trade with the United States is considerably more important to South Africa, accounting for 17.7 per cent of total South African imports. (For instance, American companies produce approximately 60 per cent of South Africa's cars and trucks.) Finally, the United States received about 11.6 per cent of the Republic's exports in 1967, excluding gold sales.

Experts on United States-South African economic relations predict that if trade between the two countries were interrupted, the impact on the United States economic system would "not be particularly important."⁶ Alternative markets could be found without great difficulty for many United States products. The loss of imports from South Africa would be most important for certain grades of asbestos, platinum, industrial diamonds and uranium oxide, but in no case would it result in serious difficulties for the United States. It is predicted that even if a unilateral cessation of trade occurred, many minerals and metals from South Africa would find their way to the United States via third-party countries.

The unilateral cessation of economic relations between South Africa and the United States, including all trade and direct investment, would undoubtedly have a greater impact on South Africa than the United States, since American economic investment to some extent aids South Africa in its drive toward self-sufficiency. American oil companies have been particularly active in aiding South Africa in prospecting for oil. Eight American oil companies, one French, and a South African company have been granted concessions to prospect for oil and gas on South Africa's continental shelf. The New York Times has reported that these concessions are a part of the South African government's intensified search for oil to strengthen its hand

⁶Hance, The Case For and Against United States Disengagement from South Africa, in W. Hance ed., supra note 2, at 124.

in the event that international sanctions are applied because of the government's apartheid policies.⁷ Standard Oil and Mobil Oil, through subsidiaries, handle 48 per cent of South Africa's oil refining capacity.⁸ In addition, Gulf Oil is presently engaged in exploration in Zululand. Certainly these efforts contribute to what has become a top priority in South Africa's security interests: viz., diminished vulnerability to international oil sanctions and the related political pressures. Yet few observers conclude that a cessation of this United States economic involvement would be sufficient to undermine the South African economy or to bring serious pressure to bear on the domestic political structure.

Potentially much more serious than any direct impact of economic disengagement on the United States (or even upon South Africa) would be the indirect effects if the United Kingdom were to be drawn into similar economic disengagement following any United States actions. The dependence of Britain on its economic relations with South Africa is much greater than that of the United States, accounting for about 5 per cent of United Kingdom exports and 3 per cent of imports. For instance, it is estimated that an economic break between these two countries would result in worsening the United Kingdom's balance of payments by 840 million dollars in the first year.⁹ A survey of British interests in South Africa undertaken under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs concluded that a total disruption of commerce would cause the immediate loss of a twentieth of Britain's export trade, the disappearance of a traditional source of supply for a number of items, and the sudden drying up of 144 million dollars annually in foreign exchange.¹⁰ The loss of from 150,000 to 225,000 jobs in Britain would result. Furthermore, the earnings derived from trade in gold would cease and British shipping, banking and insurance operations would be heavily affected.

Since the present priorities of British policy are centered around (1) economic stability, (2) a reasonably balanced foreign exchange, and (3) institutional entry into the European

⁷N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1966, at 17, col. 1.

⁸HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 99.

⁹Hance, supra note 6, at 123.

¹⁰D. AUSTIN, BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA 160 (1966).

Common Market, any measures which jeopardize British-South African economic ties may be considered basically counter-productive to British objectives, at least in the short run. These facts are not significantly altered by the general British outlook and traditions which impel a sense of responsibility for regrettable conditions in southern Africa. Since one of the unwavering tenets of contemporary United States foreign policy is the need for close alliance with a strong and secure Great Britain, it is highly unlikely that any United States government would undertake a policy that would force Britain into such a compromised situation. There is a sense, then, in which United States policy toward South Africa can be seen as an attempt to balance the uncertain liabilities of its South African policy against the long-term, clearly-defined interest of Britain's role in the European security system.

II. FORCE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

In any effort to arrive at a comprehensive and realistic United States policy toward South Africa, serious consideration must be given to the likelihood of generalized internal violence in South Africa. The feasibility of unilateral or collective efforts to alter the status quo in South Africa depends largely on the state of internal security in the Republic and the degree of unrest among the Bantu population. On the one hand it is frequently argued that unless the United Nations (or the United States and the United Kingdom, acting unilaterally) moves quickly to bring about a change in South African racial relations, violence within the country will soon become so widespread that it will lead from a general political and social breakdown to a bloody racial war that could not be confined within the borders of South Africa.¹¹ Others suggest that while there is clearly widespread resentment of the apartheid policies of the South African government, and while violence and terrorism appear to be increasing, the opposition is too disorganized, dispersed, and effectively repressed to make large-scale hostilities possible. Therefore, in examining whether the government of South Africa can be forced to grant political, social, and economic equality to its black African population, three separate factors become relevant: (1) the extent of South African repressive force, both political and military; (2) the nature and extent of African opposition to the government of the Republic, the degree of its organization, and the resources at

¹¹See, e.g., Gross, The Coalescing Problem of Southern Africa, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 1968).

its disposal; (3) the likelihood that outside assistance to black nationalist groups within South Africa, either from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, or any nation acting unilaterally, would be sufficient to overthrow the government of the Republic or force it to change its domestic racial policies.

A. Repressive Force

Since the wave of sabotage and African nationalist guerrilla actions in 1960-61, the South African government has engaged in a massive build-up of counter-insurgency and political repression forces. Especially significant has been the unprecedented application of arbitrary police power to large numbers of the population, African and white. Its actions include mass arrests, the "sabotage acts," the "90-day" and "180-day" laws, and other rigorous legislation. In addition, there has been a large expansion of various police and defense forces, the importation of arms and the building of munitions factories, the establishment of police reserves and home guards, and the development of a radio network to link the country's nearly 1,200 police stations. It is presently possible for the police to detain a state witness for up to 6 months. Between 1960 and 1966 nearly 10,000 persons were detained or arrested for offenses or charges of a political character. The size of the daily prison population, which is generally felt to be an effective indicator of the level of coercion of a government, nearly doubled from 39,920 to 76,227 in 1965, though the total population of the country increased by less than one quarter during this same period.

In addition to the police units, there are the permanent forces of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Citizen's Force, all of which have been not only greatly expanded in numbers in recent years, but also reorganized to work more efficiently with each other. At the present time, the government contends that it can instantly mobilize a more or less trained army of 250,000 whites to defend their terrain. The defense budget has increased drastically, reaching approximately 460 million dollars in 1968.¹² Experiments continue with a domestically-produced SAM. There is also some research on nuclear weaponry, although this would be virtually useless in a situation

¹²THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1969, at 32.

of internal belligerency. South African government officials have frequently said that this defense build-up is designed to protect the country from possible foreign invaders, but it is clear, according to most observers of the situation, that the government intends to use these defense forces against any domestic insurgent actions.

The extraordinary powers granted to the police by recent legislation have greatly strengthened its ability to prevent mass political organization. The Minister of Justice can ban meetings, and the presence of police and informers at those which are held discourages attendance. The confiscation of the files of protest groups has multiplied their planning problems. The latest legislation controlling the movement of Africans in urban areas further increases the ability of the police to curtail political organizing and agitation. The urban townships in which black Africans live must be separated from white areas by an unoccupied buffer strip at least 500 yards wide (the huge black African area of Soweto is located a full 15 miles from Johannesburg). Electricity and water in the black African townships are controlled from the white areas. Furthermore, unlike most other areas of the world in which major insurgencies have developed, the South African landscape is open and not heavily wooded, making the terrain largely unsuitable to the tactics of modern guerrilla warfare and particularly to the development of any significant supply lines from outside the country. Finally, it should be noted that the administrative features of apartheid have been designed in a manner that greatly facilitates surveillance and control of the non-white population. The entire system of identification passes and its rigid enforcement, the separation of Bantus into small, isolated groups, the educational system that stresses vernacular languages which make communication among native groups increasingly difficult--all these inhibit the development of an effective mass movement among the Bantu population.

B. Opposition to Apartheid

The net effect of these factors and the mobilization of the South African military and police forces has been a virtual paralysis of overt opposition to the regime within the Republic. Contrary to the predictions of those who have left the country, it seems that South Africa is not on the verge of violent revolution. Among the third of the black South Africans who live on the Bantustans, only a few have gained a degree of political consciousness. That which is being felt is being dealt

with to some extent by the forms of local political autonomy granted to the Bantustan populations.¹³ Furthermore, the political elites which are developing within the Bantustans have an emotional as well as political interest in the survival of the present system, and are not likely to sympathize with any attempt at revolutionary organization. The third of the Bantus who live in the white agricultural districts are too widely scattered and geographically isolated to be able to resort to effective joint action. The remaining third of the black Africans who live in the urban areas can be restrained fairly easily as a result of the new townships' being fully equipped for the suppression of insurrections and street fighting. Nor do the South African authorities have much to fear from the foreign laborers who are employed largely in the mining operations in the North. Not only are they readily subject to deportation for any political activity, but also their earnings are quite high in relation to earnings in other African countries. In short, the white South African elite is dedicated to the proposition that revolution is never inevitable. Given a ruthless and efficient repression (something that the Portuguese attitude has never fully permitted in their African territories), involving the physical destruction of leading revolutionaries and their lines of communication, it is not unthinkable that South Africa could control any incipient revolutionary movement indefinitely. Few governments in history have been willing to pay the price for absolute repression. It remains to be seen if the economic and political climate in South Africa will permit that country's white population to persist in such morally repugnant policies.

C. Prospects for Intervention

In contrast to the build-up of South Africa's police and military power, the independent states to the north not only lack the military ability to cope with South Africa but do not have the facilities to transport their forces to the southern end of the continent. Next to South Africa itself, the United Arab Republic has the largest ground force on the continent--approximately 130,000; Algeria, with 70,000 troops, and Morocco, with 36,000 are next in rank. Only two other African states, Ethiopia and Tunisia, have ground forces over 10,000 and many sub-Saharan African states have 5,000 or fewer.¹⁴ The disparity

¹³Munger, South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 379 (Jan. 1969).

¹⁴Leiss, supra note 3, at 142.

between the strength of South Africa and the other African states is even more marked when the equipment and training of forces is compared. The problem is further complicated by the fact that many of the black African states have need of their forces at home to deal with internal situations such as the recently thwarted Biafran secession in Nigeria. Finally, factionalism within the OAU had become so intense by 1966 that several countries had completely cut off their financial contributions to the OAU committee for the liberation of southern Africa, and the activities of the committee had virtually ceased. These difficulties, together with the lack of training and the enormous logistical problems that be involved in any combined operations against South Africa make it very doubtful that the African states alone could bring their forces to bear against South Africa.

Nor is it likely that any Communist country will soon become involved in the liberation movements in southern Africa in sufficient strength to alter the military balance. In spite of the fact that insurgent groups in Angola, Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, South Africa receive arms and technical training from Communist China, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the Eastern European bloc, the Communist countries are restrained from deeper involvement by the same organizational and logistical problems that plague the Western powers.

There is considerable discussion from time to time about the feasibility of United Nations collective military actions against South Africa. Such collective military measures, considered from a purely military point of view, are practical in spite of the fact that they would probably entail a sizable loss of life of United Nations troops and of both the white and black populations of South Africa.¹⁵

According to an extensive study of the types and costs of United Nations military intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter, there is "no doubt" that, although the South African forces are large, well equipped, and highly trained, "the resources of the major members of the United Nations are more than adequate to overcome any resistance they might offer."¹⁶

¹⁵It is estimated that the cost of operations each month would be about \$95 million, and casualties on the attacking side would run from 19,000 to 38,000 killed and wounded. *Id.* at 150, 165-70.

¹⁶*Id.* at 153. See also INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES (L. Bloomfield ed. 1964).

The difficulties underlying such measures, however, are not primarily military, but political. The use of military force by the United Nations, like its use by an individual nation, is essentially a political decision. For the major powers, who would be required to provide the largest proportion of the manpower and financing of these operations and who would most likely have to take the initiative in proposing and planning them, such a decision to proceed against South Africa would rest on an exhaustive assessment of the range of political costs and gains. On this basis, the likelihood of United Nations collective military intervention is slight. For instance, the Soviet Union refused to support the position of the African states regarding South West Africa in 1967 at least in part because it does not wish the United Nations to establish the precedent of usage of an effective peace-keeping body. At the present time the United Kingdom is far too vulnerable to risk a direct conflict with South Africa. The United States is reluctant to limit its ability to pursue unilateral action by becoming irrevocably involved in an area where its security interests are marginal. French policy toward the area is by no means consistent with support for United Nations collective military actions against South Africa.¹⁷ In the face of such political obstacles, the United Nations is likely to remain a useful device for "peace-keeping" operations in certain limited situations, but an unrealistic basis for major military operations seeking a profound alteration in the political structure of southern Africa.

In response to these conditions, United States policy in the United Nations regarding South Africa has continued since 1963 to be one of cautious gradualism. When the United States voted for the December 16, 1966, Security Council resolution imposing selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, its action was probably prompted more by the desire to assist Great Britain in her Commonwealth relations and to retain a degree of support from the other independent nations of Africa than it was by any genuine indignation at Rhodesia's domestic politics or an assessment of a "threat to the peace" within the meaning of

¹⁷The French contribution to South African arms supplies now includes over 100 Panhard armoured cars and over 400 steel-plated French riot trucks. The main air force equipment comes from France, including a French-trained squadron of Mirage 111-E fighter bombers with air-to-ground missiles. THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1969, at 32.

Article 41 of the Charter. The fact that the United States refuses to endorse such action against South Africa can, of course, either be praised as sensible and realistic or condemned as a cowardly refusal to face up to the consequences of a difficult situation. The readiness of the United States to take drastic action against Cuba, China, and other Communist regimes is inevitably contrasted with its scruples and hesitations regarding South Africa. For instance, one critic notes that "the United States presently boycotts and embargoes countries in which over a third of the world's population lives. Yet it has been unwilling to go beyond a ban of arms and ammunition to implement United Nations resolutions against apartheid."¹⁸

It is unclear, however, what conclusions one is to draw from such analyses. They can be understood as advocating either complete cessation of United States intervention abroad; or intervention in undesirable non-Communist, as well as Communist, situations; or, finally, merely substitution of such reactionary targets as South Africa for the Communist-oriented targets of intervention which have characterized post-World War II United States foreign policy. If either of the latter two alternatives are called for--if the United States is expected to bring its economic and military resources to bear upon South Africa through unilateral or United Nations initiatives--then those actions are likely to prove as counter-productive as have many of its recent anti-Communist ventures. Any government which urges mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa must be willing to acknowledge the possibility of its actions provoking a direct and bloody confrontation. The prevention of such open conflict in southern Africa, polarized along racial lines, must be the foremost end of United States foreign policy in that area. Critics have argued that the present South African policy of the United States is simply a postponement of the conflict that is destined to develop when the level of internal disruption from guerrilla activity reaches a critical level. Yet all indicators point to the conclusion that such a nationalist uprising is not, in fact, inevitable. The South African government's rigid hold on the domestic situation is being increasingly supplemented by flexibility in dealing with its black neighbors to the north. Many South African whites

¹⁸Partners in Apartheid: United States Policy on South Africa, AFRICA TODAY, March 1964, at 11. See also R. STEEL, PAX AMERICANA 318 (1967).

believe a modus vivendi could be reached with a black-ruled Rhodesia, just as it has been achieved with Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Nor is it inconceivable that some working arrangement could be reached in the future if moderate nationalist forces should succeed in driving the Portuguese from Mozambique. Faced with this situation, and with the fact that the United States lacks any legal or moral basis upon which to justify an aggressive intervention in South African affairs, United States policy-makers are left with the sole alternative--however unpleasant--of using the means presently at their disposal to alleviate the condition of non-whites in the Republic.

III. DISENGAGEMENT AND THE IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING ECONOMY

Disengagement is often presented as being an intermediate policy alternative between sanctions and military intervention on the one hand, and a passive, detached policy on the other. Proponents of disengagement argue that United States policy must be made credible in its opposition to racial discrimination and specifically to the apartheid policies of South Africa. If the United States cannot support sanctions against South Africa for strategic or other reasons, then at least it can withdraw its positive support and end the accompanying responsibility. There is a feeling that the United States policy of "consultation and persuasion" has failed to produce the desired results, leading advocates of disengagement to insist that something concrete must be done to impress upon the South African government our abhorrence of apartheid. Such action, it is contended, would improve United States credibility with the Africans who are dismayed by what they regard as a hypocritical policy, and would give encouragement to the small but determined group of liberal whites within South Africa. All of these arguments contain considerable merit. But in the final analysis, a weighing of the pros and cons of disengagement must be based upon conclusions concerning the impact of South Africa's improving economy. The central issue is whether the non-white South African population is being aided by the country's economic growth (for which United States involvement is at least partially responsible), with the policies of apartheid being adversely affected at the same time.

Depending on the specific measures adopted, the various forms of disengagement could reflect a government policy of neutrality, noncooperation, or dissociation. According to William Hance's extensive survey, there are at least four basic

forms that United States disengagement from South Africa might take. They may be summarized as follows: (1) reduction of United States government involvement in South Africa, including removal of the NASA tracking station and severing diplomatic relations with South Africa; (2) reduction of United States economic involvement, including measures to dissuade or prohibit new investments or other capital movements; (3) regulations restricting or prohibiting personnel movement, tourist travel, cultural exchanges, and permanent emigration to South Africa; (4) restrictions on transportation and communications through the denial of ports and airfields to South African ships and planes or to ships and planes of all nationalities destined for or coming from South Africa; and the discontinuation of postal, telephone, and telegraph communications with the Republic.¹⁹

As suggested earlier, it is unlikely that any of these various proposals for disengagement would pose serious problems for the United States. Government and military facilities could be located elsewhere. The damage suffered by American business interests, while of course distasteful to certain firms and investors directly involved, would hardly impose an unmanageable burden upon the United States economy. Yet a number of doubts persist about the long-range utility of disengagement. If one of the principle ends of United States foreign policy vis-à-vis South Africa is to stimulate change in the structure of that country's internal politics, and not simply to inflict deprivation on South African whites for the injustices they have perpetuated against the non-white population, then disengagement as a means toward that end is of limited value. It does not provide satisfactory answers to the questions which a policy of disengagement raises.

First, in spite of the involvement in certain important sectors, United States economic relations are not sufficiently important to South Africa for unilateral economic disengagement to have a severe impact on its economy. There has been a trend since 1962-63 toward a rapid growth of domestic savings and a relative decline in the role of foreign capital in South Africa. It is estimated that the Republic could provide 80 to 90 per cent of present capital needs from domestic resources and that it could meet all essential requirements for several years in the event of a cessation of all--not just United States--foreign funds.²⁰ South Africa is well prepared to offset any effects

¹⁹Hance, supra note 6, at 119-30.

²⁰Leiss, supra note 3, at 121.

of economic sanctions by stockpiling, rationing, preemptive purchasing, the extension of labor controls, and repatriation of foreign labor.

Second, South African dependence upon the United States is most significant in the quantitative and qualitative contribution of American firms to the manufacturing sector. In view of the relatively favorable record of manufacturing industries in South Africa with respect to wages and new job opportunities for non-white South Africans, the effects of the present and growing emphasis of United States investment in manufacturing should not be negated by an arbitrary United States disengagement.

Third, to the extent that United States disengagement would impose a burden on the economy of South Africa, that burden would surely be first and most deeply felt by the non-whites of South Africa and the dependent African states surrounding the Republic. Frequently other Africans or refugees from the Republic proclaim that the Bantu population is eager to sustain what is expected to be a temporary hardship in order eventually to attain a measure of political freedom, but in view of the enormous sacrifices inevitably involved, these assurances are not always convincing.

In considering the impact of economic disengagement, there is also the complicating factor of the economic dependence on South Africa of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and, to a lesser extent, Malawi and Zambia. The first three would undoubtedly be caught in any crossfire between United States efforts at economic pressure and the government of South Africa. Lesotho lies entirely within the Republic. Swaziland is enclosed on three sides by South Africa and its only alternative outlet to the sea is through potentially hostile Mozambique. Botswana is also bordered on three sides by South and South West Africa, but does have outlets via Rhodesia and Zambia. Lesotho suffers the most vulnerable dependence, with 45 per cent of its adult male population absent at any one time in South Africa for work and other purposes. Botswana normally has about 23,000 of its estimated 600,000 people residing and working in South Africa. In Lesotho, receipts from voluntary deferred pay disbursements and remittances received from workers outside the territory were estimated to be 2.6 million dollars by 1965. Workers also bring back additional sums of money and goods purchased in the Republic. Total annual benefits were estimated at 2.8 million dollars to Botswana in 1965 and at 750,000 dollars to Swaziland.

The geographic and economic dependence, as well as the fragile nature of the three economies, gives South Africa a considerable leverage over the activities within these countries. There is no reason to suspect that this leverage would not be used with considerable ruthlessness in the event of economic pressure on the Republic resulting from United States disengagement. Because of this fact, the leaders of Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, and Malawi have all stated that they could not support economic measures against South Africa in view of their dependence on trade and earnings from migrant labor employed in South Africa.

Fourth, there is little historical or psychological evidence for the conviction that sufficient external pressure on South Africa will necessarily lead to flexibility and change in the direction of a more open society. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that such a transition will most certainly not result from permitting South Africa to proceed in the diplomatic and political void which would result from a policy of disengagement. Just as it was a mistake to suspend South Africa's voting privilege in WHO, and to give it cause to withdraw from UNESCO and the ILO, it would be a further mistake to cut off the remaining contact through diplomatic and commercial channels, thereby leading to the illusion that the United States has successfully washed its hands of responsibility. Such abdication has proven notably unsuccessful in the case of Rhodesia. As the United States delegation has stated in debate before the Security Council, "As for suggestions of diplomatic isolation, persuasion cannot be exercised in a vacuum. Conflicting views cannot be reconciled in absentia."²¹ The fact that only minimal positive achievements have thus far resulted from the United States policy of "consultation and persuasion" is not sufficient reason either to abandon the effort altogether by disengagement or to adopt mandatory economic or military sanctions that could clearly prove counterproductive.

Fifth, those who conduct business in South Africa assert the continuing validity of the maxim that for major trading nations, "except in times of war, markets and goods are neutral, and one trades neither with friends nor enemies but with customers." In addition, investors argue that it is the duty of the United States State Department to determine foreign policy and that private enterprise should not be

²¹ Quoted in Hance, supra note 6, at 117.

²² Hance, supra note 6, at 124.

called upon to formulate such policy as a substitute for governmental inaction, or to impose private economic sanctions when official sanctions have not been legislated.²² To call for economic disengagement of private trade and investment in this manner is thus to apply a double standard by advocating a business interposition in foreign domestic politics that would surely be criticized in any other country than South Africa.

Finally, there is the important and widely-discussed issue of the impact--economic and political--that the expanding South African economy is having on all segments of South African society, and the ways in which a United States disengagement would potentially alter that situation. The broad claims for an improving South African economy, and for continuation of United States business participation in it, are that it provides a strong base for the future of all the inhabitants of South Africa by broadening and diversifying the economy. The underlying assumption is that prosperity encourages wants and forces a sharing of power among the rising social and racial groups. It is further noted that the objective of securing the economic and social development of all races can best be achieved if the standards already attained by the whites are being improved, an objective which can be reached only by cooperation between the races in all spheres of a strengthening economy.

In the long run, an improving economy increases the likelihood of change in existing political and racial policies. Newell M. Stultz, for instance, notes that "where in the past ideology and economics have pulled in opposite directions, as in the case of 'job reservation' [exclusively for white employees], economics has usually prevailed."²³ Similarly, Leo Kuper has predicted that the major source of change within South Africa is likely to be in the tension between the economic and political systems. Presumably, there must be some point at which an equilibrium can no longer be maintained between continued economic growth and increasing political rigidity.²⁴

If economic forces are actually having a favorable impact in South Africa despite policies designed to restrict the role

²³Stultz, The Politics of Security: South Africa Under Verwoerd, 1961-66, JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 19 (Apr. 1969).

²⁴Kuper, The Political Situation of Non-Whites in South Africa, in W. Hance ed., supra note 2, at 103.

of non-whites in the economy, one would expect to find, for instance, increasing percentages of non-whites employed in certain sectors of the economy and wages improving more rapidly than the average. These are, in fact, the currently prevailing trends in South Africa. Hance's analysis of demographic, employment, and wage relations in the Republic suggests that all of these forces are "working more or less powerfully against the stated goals of apartheid."²⁵

Due to the rapid economic growth, non-whites in South Africa are being increasingly integrated into positions originally reserved for whites. As a result of the tightness in the South African labor market, the legislation governing "job reservation" and "influx control" into the urban areas is gradually coming to be marked more by its exceptions than by the formally enforced rules. Consequently, at least in the economic sphere, apartheid is becoming an illusion. The non-whites are not being crowded out of the economy but rather are being increasingly absorbed, albeit in lower positions and at lower wages, except in the manufacturing and construction sectors. In the latter two areas, wages have shown a significant relative improvement in recent years. South African government protests notwithstanding, it does not appear that there will be further restriction of this integrative process. The recently completed South African five-year development plan for 1963-1969 was based on a substantial increase in the number of non-white workers in industry. It was estimated for the purposes of this plan that while the white working population would grow from 1,210,000 (1963) to 1,360,000 (1969), the non-white employed population would increase from 4,870,000 (1963) to 5,490,000 (1969)--or a 12.5 per cent increase in the white employed population and a 12.7 per cent increase for non-whites.²⁶

In order to reduce the increasing pressure from the employment-seeking non-whites on the South African labor market, the national government is attempting to develop the Bantustans economically by means of the Bantu Development Corporation, an industrial finance company with a working capital of 500,000 pounds. At first no "white" capital was admitted to the Bantustans, on the ground that it would lead to "undesirable colonialistic relations." In 1965 this ban was removed and white entrepreneurs permitted to establish

²⁵Hance, supra note 6, at 157.

²⁶Snellen, Apartheid: Checks and Balances, INT'L AFF. Q. REV. 299 (Apr. 1967).

enterprises in the Reserves through the Bantu Investment Corporation. The Corporation regulates the investments, pays part of the profit to the investors and reinvests the remainder in the Bantustans. In addition, the government is attempting to establish labor possibilities for the Bantus within daily reach of the Bantustans, thus limiting the inflow of non-whites into the theoretically all-white urban areas. To this end, the government has demarcated strips bordering on the Reserves where special facilities are granted to white "border industries" which do not necessitate job reservation provisions. It is highly likely that the absence of such restrictions in the border industry areas will tend to erode the prejudice that non-whites are incapable of holding jobs requiring advanced technical skills and further point to the underlying absurdity of "job reservation" laws in other areas.

The crucial question is whether or not the tentative economic advances made by non-whites as a result of increasing racial integration in manufacturing and industry will inevitably result in the erosion of apartheid policies in the political arena. The most oppressive aspects of the non-white's existence in South Africa are not economic deprivations, but are rather the lack of voting rights, representation in the National Assembly, and the complex of repressive laws that restrict virtually every aspect of the African's civil and personal life. After examining recent developments in the Republic, Edwin Munger points to signs of limited hope: voting privileges and rapid Africanization within the Bantustans, tempering of original African opposition to the Bantustan concept, and a new South African civility and diplomatic flexibility toward the independent African states to the north.²⁷ Yet the continuing difficulty is that South African policy-makers have done little to show that they are convinced that measures others deem repressive--such as pass laws, prohibitions against interracial marriage, and the absolute suppression of political dissent--are incompatible with economic growth and prosperity.

IV. CONCLUSION

The dilemma that conditions in South Africa pose for United States foreign policy is obvious. If the present situation in that country is not exactly stable, it is at

²⁷Munger, supra note 13, at 385-86.

least rigid. The government of South Africa has successfully established a legal and military structure that can prevent the radical transformation of its political and social system, at least in the foreseeable future. Only massive collective military action could alter the present balance of power. In the event that sufficient economic or military sanctions were taken to implement standing United Nations resolutions, there is absolutely no assurance that even the fragile modicum of stability that presently exists in the area would survive. Indeed, there is every reason to suspect that if open conflict were precipitated and the present government of South Africa overthrown, the result would be a long and bitter period of racial and Cold War ideological confrontation throughout the entire southern half of Africa. The impact that such developments would have on United States interests in South Africa is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty, but it is probable in view of many years of United States equivocation that any government representing the sentiments of the 82 per cent of the South African population that is non-white would be at least to some extent hostile to the United States. This situation has dictated that the United States accept the short-term and vulnerable stability in tacit cooperation with the white minority government as preferable to a longer-range policy of almost certain conflict, followed by a stage of South African political development during which the maintenance of United States interests would be highly unpredictable. The basic rationale underlying this distasteful choice has not changed significantly from 1966, when Assistant Secretary of State Williams informed the House Subcommittee on African Affairs that "we must frankly admit that the problems that we and other like-minded nations face regarding South Africa remain virtually intractable."²⁸

The difficulty of the situation does not mean, however, that there are no modifications of present policy that might be undertaken to promote long-term conditions of internal stability and racial cooperation in South Africa. On the contrary, the ends of United States policy will best be achieved by maximizing all constructive means to eliminate racial antagonism short of direct intervention in South African affairs. As indicated previously, however, military and economic sanctions, as well as economic disengagement, represent, at best, negative and potentially counterproductive

²⁸Quoted in R. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 107.

forms of pressure.

On the other hand, the weight of evidence points to the fact that continued economic expansion in South Africa will begin to break down the artificial barriers between the races and reduce the probability of widespread armed conflict in the area. To insure such integrative effects of economic development insofar as it involves American businesses, Congress should enact legislation providing that every United States business firm operating within South Africa be required to observe strictly the fundamental laws applicable in the United States prohibiting racial discrimination in employment procedures, wage determination, job promotions, and housing. If objections are raised by the South African authorities, then at least the burden would be shifted to them to elect between giving up the gains from American industry or permitting that industry to operate free from the restrictions of apartheid.

There are a number of other measures that might be adopted which do not jeopardize either the present stability in the area or the potential for future gains for the non-white population through economic growth. Of foremost priority would be a comprehensive economic aid program to Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, eventually extended to include Zambia and Malawi. Such an aid program, designed to strengthen the economic interdependence between those countries' economies and decrease the dependence upon South Africa, would permit them to exercise a genuine choice between cooperation or non-cooperation with South Africa. Second, all political refugees from South Africa and South West Africa should be accepted in the United States and afforded the same assistance as refugees from various Communist countries. Third, the United States government should seek stricter enforcement of the arms embargo to South Africa, including a ban on sales of American-made items such as heavy trucks and planes that could be converted to military use. The United States should also use its influence to halt such sales by Japan, France, and other countries. Fourth, the United States government should closely examine the over-all utility of the present nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa. Finally, the United States should restrict the granting of visas to certain South African government officials and athletes with a view toward excluding them when black Americans of similar status are excluded from South Africa.

With the adoption of these and other positive measures, the United States need not be resigned to a passive policy which places total reliance upon a repressive stability. Rather, United States foreign policy could provide the lead in establishing an acceptable and beneficial framework for political change in southern Africa.