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The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice

Terry A. Maroney

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THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

Terry A. Maroney*

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims—for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself—for example, individual variation—also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science

* Associate Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Abigail Baird, Tamar Birckhead, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Emily Buss, B.J. Casey, Nita Farahany, Barbara Fedders, Anna Gabrielidis, Chris Guthrie, Beatriz Luna, Lia Monahon, Stephen J. Morse, Emily Murphy, Alistair Newbern, Erin O'Hara, Christopher Slobogin, Elizabeth Sowell, Kevin Stack, Laurence Steinberg, Christine Sun, Franklin Zimring, and participants in workshops at University College London Faculty of Laws and the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research. Britt Doolittle provided extraordinary research assistance. For additional research assistance I thank Faisal Delawalla, Cassie Malin, Georgia Sims, Christopher Weber, and the excellent librarians at Vanderbilt University Law School.
as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors—good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services—that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.

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Introduction

This is the decade of the adolescent brain. Popular media sources claim that contemporary developmental neuroscience\(^1\) shows “What Makes Teens Tick” and explains their “exasperating” behavior,

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including criminal acts. Allstate Insurance released a major national ad claiming that teens are “missing a part of their brain[s]” and therefore should gain driving privileges only gradually. Parents can now choose among a number of self-help books offering brain-based explanations for why their adolescents are “primal” and “crazy.”

Far from being confined to popular culture, the fascination with adolescent brain science has begun actively to percolate through legal theory, advocacy, and lawmakers. Prominent academics argue that an understanding of the teen brain both supports retention of a separate juvenile justice system and illuminates the proper perspective on the adjudication and treatment of young offenders. Crimes committed by still-developing young people, these scholars urge, are less blameworthy than equivalent acts by adults; further, youths’ developmental plasticity makes them more likely to stop offending—if, that is, we provide them with conditions conducive to rehabilitation. Juveniles’ defense attorneys and policy advocates increasingly cite to such research, which they say puts “the juvenile back in juvenile justice.”


3 Allstate Insurance Co. Advertisement (2007), available at http://www.allstate.com/content/refresh-attachments/Brain-Ad.pdf (“[When] bright, mature teenagers sometimes do things that are ‘stupid’ . . . it’s not really their fault. It’s because their brain hasn’t finished developing.”).


6 See id. at 13–16.

Prosecutors, too, recognize the potential relevance of neuroscience, though they are less sanguine about whether its necessary policy implications tend in the direction of greater solicitude. More, courts and legislatures have begun to take note. United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens in 2002 signaled his interest in “[n]euroscientific evidence” which “has revealed that adolescent brains are not fully developed.” Senator Edward Kennedy in 2007 convened a hearing on the juvenile-justice implications of brain development. Many scholars, attorneys, commentators, and courts believe that such science played a critical role in *Roper v. Simmons*, in which the Supreme Court abol-

This Article uses the terms “juvenile advocates” and “advocates” to signify both defense attorneys and employees and affiliates of institutes that advocate for juveniles’ interests.

8 See, e.g., Am. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., A PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS AND COMPETENCY CHALLENGES IN JUVENILE COURT 1, 18, 42-45 (2006) (presenting data with goal of disputing “sham mental defenses” and countering “disturbing” trend of using “expert testimony to excuse the dangerous and harmful behavior of youth”); Two Training Opportunities, In Re EXPRESS (Nat’l Juvenile Justice Prosecution Ctr., Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 2004 (listing “Adolescent Brain” training program in Columbus, Ohio in May 2004); Course Schedule, National District Attorneys Association Education Division (Oct. 2007—Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/nac_course_schedule_oct_07_mar_08.pdf (stating, in listing for course on “The Adolescent Brain,” that “participants will have a better understanding of adolescent brain development” enabling cross-examination of defense experts); see also Laurence Steinberg, *Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?*, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5-9), available at http://www.temple.edu/psychology/lds/documents/adolescentbrainscienceandpublicpolicy.pdf (describing how in the case of Omar Khadr, a fifteen-year-old held at Guantánamo Bay, military prosecutor questioned defense expert about brain development in effort to show Khadr was fully responsible for alleged actions).


ished the juvenile death penalty. Many now assert that brain science might, and should, play an even larger role going forward.

This Article argues that, contrary to the high expectations many have placed on developmental neuroscience, it will—and should—have fairly modest effects on juvenile justice. Not only is this correct as a matter of theory, it is being borne out in practice. To show how this is so, this Article offers the first attempt systematically to identify and analyze cases in which advocates have attempted to put developmental neuroscience into practice. The case analysis demonstrates that most such efforts fail, for two primary reasons: a disconnect between scientific findings and the questions asked by legal doctrine, and limitations posed by the science itself. Though the analysis reveals instances in which courts cite approvingly to brain-science arguments, in no such case does that science appear to have been outcome-determinative.

The relative inefficacy of brain science in influencing court outcomes illuminates significant theoretical and practical barriers to such influence. Those barriers counsel that the trend toward urging reliance on such science be significantly moderated.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the ascendance of the teen brain within juvenile justice as a product of three streams’ confluence: juvenile justice’s close historical relationship with developmental psychology, a science that began a significant expansion in the 1980s; the radical growth of neuroscience, including developmental neuroscience, in the 1990s; and an emerging post-2000 dialogue between legal scholars and neuroscientists. Importantly, this confluence coincided with a widespread, sharp move away from traditional juvenile justice values, as virtually every state in the 1990s began to treat far more juveniles as adults and to shrink the benefits—such as confidentiality—youth previously had enjoyed. Scholars and advocates began to see brain research as a tool to close an apparent disjunction between science, which increasingly showed that juveniles

12 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.

13 This Article uses the term “traditional juvenile justice values” to capture the primary features of the juvenile justice system in the period between In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and the mid-1990s. That period was characterized by the introduction of largely adult-like procedural safeguards (such as the right to counsel) and retention of core historical features such as confidentiality, record sealing, attention to individual characteristics and family circumstances, time-limited sanctions, and a focus on treatment and rehabilitation. See Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 499–506 (2009) (reviewing Scott & Steinberg, supra note 5) (offering similar definition of an “evolved” traditional model).
and adults are different, and law, which increasingly treated juveniles and adults as if they were the same. Efforts to abolish the juvenile death penalty reflected this new tactic. That the Supreme Court appeared to take cognizance of the science—and did, in fact, eliminate the death penalty—provided significant encouragement to that project.

Part II demonstrates that, despite projections, adolescent brain science has had, is likely to have, and should have only moderate impact in the courts. First, courts tend to regard even scientifically sound claims as legally irrelevant. For example, contemporary analysis of intentional mens rea asks only whether a defendant desired or knew that a result would obtain, while neuroscientific arguments invite a focus on substantive irrationality notwithstanding specific intent. Second, scientific limitations often hinder such claims. For example, because developmental neuroscience supports only probabilistic generalizations about youth as a class, it is unhelpful in making highly individualized determinations such as formation of intent. Direct reliance on neuroscience also has implications for equality and autonomy commitments, of which scholars and advocates have taken insufficient notice. Further, the pressures of advocacy incentivize defenders and advocates to downplay the legal-scientific mismatch or to overplay scientific findings (and incentivizes prosecutors and skeptics to do the opposite). Such distortions, not unique to the juvenile justice context but present in it, create a danger of poorly justified decisions.

Part III, however, argues that neuroscience nonetheless has a role—albeit a small one—to play in shaping juvenile justice policy. Neuroscience has more natural traction within juvenile justice than in adult criminal law. Rather than raising deep and likely unsolvable questions about human agency, it simply reinforces the (once) non-controversial idea that, as a group, young people differ from adults in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, deterrability, and potential for rehabilitation. This message is well worth articulating; the cautionary point is that the theoretical and advocacy uses of adolescent brain science should mirror only the level of generality that the science can support. At this moment, that level of generality is fairly high. Similar lessons from the broader contemporary debate over the use of neuroscience in criminal law have not yet penetrated the dialogue within juvenile justice; this Article shows that they should. More, while neuroscientific evidence may be thought uniquely persuasive, this Article instead suggests that developmental neuroscience is legally persuasive only insofar as it aligns with decisionmakers’ values, beliefs, and commitments.
The Article concludes that legal decisionmakers acting in a policymaking role—usually legislatures but sometimes the courts—therefore ought to consider developmental neuroscience one source among many upon which to draw when making legally relevant assumptions about adolescents as a group. To go further is unwarranted and unwise.

I. ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW

Adolescent brain science came to occupy its current prominence within juvenile justice because of the confluence of three distinct phenomena. Developmental psychology, always important within juvenile justice, became far more sophisticated; neuroscientific technology improved dramatically, facilitating ever more finely grained insights, including about youth; and scholars began a dialogue over the legal implications of neuroscience. By the early part of this century the confluence created the conditions for a close examination of the legal relevance of juvenile brain development. This Part traces this trajectory, describes the relevant findings of developmental neuroscience, shows how that science was invoked in *Roper*, and details the range of legal issues to which scholars now argue it to be relevant.

A. Developmental Psychology and Neuroscience

Theories of adolescence as a developmental stage importantly distinct from both childhood and adulthood always have been central to juvenile justice, underlying not only the core idea—that of having a separate system at all—but also the attributes of that system. However, for most of the twentieth century developmental psychology was in a fairly primitive state and focused primarily on young children.

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In the empirical void about teen development, courts, policymakers, and the public relied primarily on "common sense," or what they believed to be true based on experience and observation. Common sense failed to provide a stable basis for delinquency policy: it is sufficiently elastic as to be consistent with competing theories, and the view it provides is myopic. Beliefs about the causes of and cures for delinquent behavior therefore have vacillated wildly, carrying policy with them.

It wasn't until the 1980s that a sustained program of relevant empiricism took hold. Scientists began to study teens' risk-taking behaviors; "sensation-seeking," ability to adopt a future-time perspective; perceptions of personal vulnerability; attitudes toward

Vill. L. Rev. 1607, 1627 & n.72, 1632–33 (1992) (explaining that Piaget's theory of cognitive development is now largely discredited).


Experiences with youthful offending (and one's resulting common sense about it) vary across a population and over time. Further, a commonsense theory might be accurate as to some juveniles, in some circumstances, some of the time, but fail as a generalizable account. Cf. Maroney, supra note 16, at 877–902 (illustrating that decisions based on common sense are not always subject to categorization as empirically correct or incorrect, but often are best understood as indicators of a person's underlying worldview); Scott, supra note 15, at 1669 (explaining that the goal of research is to "replace intuition with insight"); Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 22 (maintaining that "[c]ommon sense and casual observation" tell us that children and adults are different but cannot reliably indicate whether particular differences are "substantial and consistent enough to potentially shape either public policy or legal practice").

Like the delinquent in "Gee, Officer Krupke," juveniles have been shoved between competing theories. See Arthur Laurents et al., West Side Story 114–18 (1958) (music by Leonard Bernstein and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim); see also Taylor-Thompson, supra note 16, at 172 (asserting that adolescents have sometimes been regarded as "wholly vulnerable and incompetent children in need of paternalistic strategies designed to guide their conduct," and sometimes as "fully calculating and sometimes sociopathic mini-adults deserving society's harshest punishment").


See Jeffrey Arnett, Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New Scale, 16 Personality & Individual Differences 289 (1994).

authority;\textsuperscript{24} self-concept;\textsuperscript{25} peer orientation;\textsuperscript{26} and decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{27} Research generally showed that teenagers are indeed distinct from both children and adults. For example, normal teens show a marked increase in risk-taking behavior, though they often display adult-level cognitive understanding of risk; they also display far higher levels of peer orientation and sensation-seeking.\textsuperscript{28} Of particular importance for juvenile justice, research demonstrated that some level of delinquent behavior is normal, particularly for boys, and that the vast majority of teens "age out" of such offending.\textsuperscript{29} Psychologists and legal scholars began in the 1980s a collaborative effort to define and measure teens' law-relevant psychological attributes, such as competence to waive \textit{Miranda} rights or choose abortion.\textsuperscript{30} Nevertheless, in the early 1990s juvenile justice policy was still largely being "devised in a context of empirical uncertainty,"\textsuperscript{31} and scholars undertook a con-
certained effort to close that gap.\(^{32}\) By the late 1990s a respectable body of research was in place, more research was underway, and advocates increasingly cited to such research.\(^{33}\)

At precisely this same time, a veritable revolution was taking place in neuroscience. Technological breakthroughs allowed for increasingly sophisticated observation of human brains \textit{in vivo}, including those of young people,\(^{34}\) a development that quickly drew widespread attention.\(^{35}\)

Widely publicized structural imaging studies demonstrated in 1999 that the brains of normal adolescents are still developing.\(^{36}\) Such findings, later replicated, challenged an ingrained scientific belief that such maturation was largely complete in early childhood.\(^{37}\) Adolescent structural maturation, these studies showed, appeared to revolve around two processes: myelination, or insulation of neural axons with a fatty substance referred to as “white matter,” and changes

\(^{32}\) See Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz, \textit{Introduction to Youth on Trial}, supra note 1, at 1, 3–5 (explaining how the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice was founded in 1995 to respond to “society’s need for a scientific initiative that would address the implications of adolescent development for the construction of rational juvenile justice policy and law”).


\(^{37}\) See Aronson, \textit{supra} note 2, at 119 (“For most of the 20th century, experts believed that the most important period for human brain development was the first 3 years of a person’s life.”).
in the volume and density of "gray matter," or neuron cell bodies and synapses. Scientists also identified "a preadolescent increase followed by a postadolescent decrease" in gray matter, showing that the early adolescent brain experiences an overproduction of neurons similar to one previously observed in very early childhood. Following this second wave of "exuberance," neural connections are over the course of adolescence sharply "pruned back"—likely because of relative use, dependent on life experiences, and reflecting a "fine tuning" of ability. Further, both pruning and myelination were shown to affect different regions of the brain at different times; the brain's evolutionarily new frontal cortices are the last fully to achieve structural maturity. This finding was particularly meaningful, as the frontal cortices are responsible for higher-order reasoning and "executive control"—fluid coordination of cognition and emotion, goal-directed planning and forethought, and impulse control. A small number of functional imaging studies additionally suggested that adolescents might tend to


39 See Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861; Paus et al., supra note 36, at 1908–09; see also Abigail A. Baird, The Developmental Neuroscience of Criminal Behavior, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 81, 99 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) ("It [is] well established that myelination has a direct impact on the speed and efficiency of neural processing."). The developmental tradeoff is that the brain "is probably losing some of its raw potential for learning and its ability to recover from trauma." Wallis, supra note 2, at 59.

40 See Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861; see also Sowell et al., supra note 36, at 860 (summarizing experimental observations of reductions in grey matter between adolescence and adulthood).

41 See B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOL. PSYCHOL. 241, 243 (2000); see also Strauch, supra note 4, at 9, 15 (defining "exuberance"); Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 863 ("[S]econd wave of overproduction of synapses . . . may herald a critical stage of development when the environment or activities of the teenager may guide selective synapse elimination during adolescence."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 417, 439 (2000) (explaining how the brain is "sculpted on the basis of experience to effectively accommodate environmental needs").


43 Michael S. Gazzaniga et al., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 75 (2d ed. 2002).
employ different brain processes than adults when carrying out identical tasks.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, by the early 2000s neuroscience supported the notion that teen brains are structurally and functionally different from those of both children and adults. A developmentally normal combination of pruning and myelination results eventually in a brain that is better equipped quickly and efficiently to respond appropriately to life’s challenges and perform the types of tasks for which the person has trained. While the average normal adolescent’s physical capacity for such maturity far exceeds that of a child, it falls short of that of the average normal adult. As developmental psychology by that time strongly indicated that “many of the[ ] aptitudes” known to be associated with the implicated brain areas “continue to develop between adolescence and young adulthood,”\textsuperscript{45} a behavioral link appeared logical. It therefore was possible to link the two streams of research and to hypothesize that to “the extent that transformations occurring in adolescent brain contribute to the characteristic behavioral predispositions of adolescence, adolescent behavior is in part biologically determined.”\textsuperscript{46}

This narrative, joining together the complimentary implications of behavioral studies and direct brain observation, emerged against the backdrop of a larger dialogue then taking shape over the implications of neuroscience for law.\textsuperscript{47} Scholars predicted that emerging brain science would be particularly relevant to criminal law, given the


\textsuperscript{45} Sowell et al., supra note 36, at 860 (stating that teens lack structural maturity in brain areas “essential for such functions as response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization”).

\textsuperscript{46} Spear, supra note 41, at 447.

centrality of mental states to criminal responsibility. The most aggressive claim was that neuroscience would upend entrenched concepts of free will and responsibility underlying all criminal law. A more modest prediction was that neuroscience might improve identification and understanding of the types of irrationality already relevant to criminal law. For instance, better understanding of the effects of brain damage might help demonstrate that a defendant is adjudicatively incompetent. Particularly because juvenile justice—far more than the adult criminal system—explicitly invites insights from the mind sciences, this particular brain-law connection appeared especially promising to both scholars and advocates.

It also appeared to be much needed. Completely separately from the development taking place in psychology and neuroscience, the law of juvenile justice began in the 1990s to undergo a convulsive change of its own. Prompted by what appeared to be a spike in gun-related youth homicides, commentators and policymakers warned of a new breed of juvenile “superpredators” who would be responsible for a “coming bloodbath” of youth crime. States responded with an impressive amount of juvenile justice legislation in an extremely short


49 See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, in Law and the Brain, supra note 47, at 207, 224 (detailing and debunking most such claims but arguing nonetheless that neuroscience will dispel “illusion” of free will and cause retributive theories to “give way to consequentialist ones, thus radically transforming our approach to criminal justice”). Scholarship seeking to moderate the strongest claims, see, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 183 (2009), far outnumbers scholarship actually making those claims.

50 Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in Neuroscience and the Law, supra note 47, at 157, 181, 186–87 (“[N]euroscience will surely discover much more about the types of conditions that can compromise rationality [under current legal standards and] may help adjudicate excusing and mitigating claims more accurately.”).


period of time—indeed, during the 1990s nearly every state amended its juvenile code.53 States made it far easier to transfer ever-younger children to adult court for an ever-growing list of offenses, eroded confidentiality protections, and de-emphasized rehabilitation.54 Hindsight shows that the “coming bloodbath” never materialized; the youth homicide spike fell off quickly, and juvenile crime has been at historic lows for some time.55 The deep systemic changes enacted in response to those fears, though, remain largely in place. In important respects, the juvenile system became indistinguishable from the adult one, and the benefits it retained became available to fewer young persons.56


54 See Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development and Juvenile Justice, supra note 10, at 4–5 (testimony of Michael A. Corriero) (characterizing states’ legislative changes as “a collective regression that resulted in discarding or ignoring ancient assumptions, conventional wisdom, and conscientious research”).

55 See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS, at iii (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006 ("[T]he rate of juvenile violent crime arrests has consistently decreased since 1994, falling to a level not seen since at least the 1970s."); ZIMRING, supra note 29, at 120–22 (noting that youth crime rates already were dropping at the time the predictions were being made).

56 See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (extending jury right to juvenile court because it has become so similar to adult court). Children as young as eleven now have been tried as adults, see People v. Abraham, 662 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003), and thousands who committed serious crimes as minors are serving sentences of life without parole, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES 25–31 (2005) (reporting that, as of 2004, 2225 youth offenders were serving life without parole and noting a sharp rise in such cases since the 1980s). Some scholars attribute this trend in part to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), on the theory that importation of adult procedures into juvenile court paved the way for treating juveniles like adults more generally. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Scholars and advocates in the late 1990s therefore correctly perceived that science and law were moving in precisely opposite directions: the former was solidifying around the view that adolescents are different from adults in ways directly relevant to their culpability and capacity for change, while the latter was solidifying around the view that adolescents, particularly older ones or those accused of very serious crimes, ought to be treated like adults.  

B. The Brain-Based Challenge to the Juvenile Death Penalty

Scholars and juvenile advocates soon saw an opportunity to use brain science to break the tension and move law in their preferred direction: a challenge to the juvenile death penalty. This challenge provided a critical testing ground.  

Though the Supreme Court had in Stanford v. Kentucky upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, states remained free to eliminate it. In 2000 a coalition of advocates began a state-by-state effort to convince them to do so, and made a strategic decision to rely heavily on recent findings in developmental psychology and neuroscience. Researchers increasingly incorporated testimony about the teen brain into legislative testi-
mony, even bringing along plastic brain models to illustrate their points.\(^6\)

A series of unexpected events quickly upped the ante. In June 2002 the Supreme Court in *Atkins v. Virginia*\(^6)\) reversed course on the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded persons.\(^6\) In so doing it overturned a case\(^6\) decided the same day as *Stanford*; further, the *Atkins* Court discussed relevant characteristics of the mentally retarded—for example, their relative deficiencies in controlling impulses—in a manner strongly paralleling arguments then being crafted as to adolescents. More, while *Atkins* was pending, Kevin Stanford—of *Stanford*—filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying in part on developmental neuroscience.\(^6\) The Court denied the petition but four Justices dissented.\(^6\) Importantly, Justice Stevens explicitly endorsed Stanford’s scientific arguments:

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63 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that legislators were sometimes convinced to see the issue as “not just a matter of law and morality, but [one] of adolescent development” (quoting Mark Moran, Adolescent Brain Development Argues Against Teen Executions, Psychiatric News, May 16, 2003, at 8 (2003)); Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 Science 596, 596 (2004) (“The latest states [to ban the juvenile death penalty], Wyoming and South Dakota, considered brain development research in their decisions.”); Boyle, supra note 62 (stating that such presentations, being given as early as the 1980s, gained momentum after 2000).


65 *Id.* at 314–16.


Napoleon Beazley and Toronto Patterson, also on death row for crimes committed as juveniles, filed similar petitions in this same time period. Unlike Stanford, they faced imminent execution. Neither appears to have brought brain science to the Court’s attention, though Patterson had done so before the state courts. See Declaration of Dr. Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (No. 02-6010) [hereinafter Gur, Patterson Declaration], available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvius/Gur%20affidavit.pdf. Three Justices dissented from denial of his petition, saying the time had come to reconsider Stanford. Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); see also Beazley v. Texas, 535 U.S. 1091 (2002) (denying Beazley’s petition for writ of certiorari); In re Beazley, 535 U.S. 1094 (2002) (denying Beazley’s request for a stay of execution). Beazley and
Neuroscientific evidence of the last few years has revealed that adolescent brains are not fully developed, which often leads to erratic behaviors and thought processes in that age group. Scientific advances such as the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging—MRI scans—have provided valuable data that serve to make the case even stronger that adolescents "are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults."69

The post-Atkins moment fed a groundswell of attention to the teen brain from advocates, commentators, and the media.70 Indeed, in late 2003 defense counsel for Lee Malvo—the teenager convicted of participating in the Washington, D.C. area "sniper slayings" while under the influence of an adult he regarded as his father—invoked Patterson were executed. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. 1608–2002, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ESPYyear.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (listing execution dates of May 28, 2002 for Beazley, and Aug. 28, 2002, for Patterson). Scott Allen Hain relied in part on developmental neuroscience in a similar petition; it was denied and he too was executed. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18–22, Hain v. Mullin, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003) (No. 02-6438); see also Hain, 537 U.S. at 1173 (2003) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Execution Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (search in field "Search by Name" for "Scott Allen Hain") (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (listing execution date of Apr. 3, 2003 for Hain). Finally, Ron Chris Foster made a similar application. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–25, Foster v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1054 (2003) (No. 02-6655); see also Foster, 537 U.S. at 1054 (denying petition for writ of certiorari). As he was still alive when Roper was decided (because of a pending Atkins claim) he was resentenced to life without parole. See Foster v. State, 961 So. 2d 670, 672 (Miss. 2007).


incomplete brain development as a reason jurors should spare Malvo's life.71

In August of 2003 the Missouri Supreme Court defied Stanford and ruled the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.72 Certiorari was granted in Roper v. Simmons in January 2004.73

Christopher Simmons's lawyers chose prominently to highlight adolescent brain science in their briefs, arguing that "the parts of the brain that enable impulse control and reasoned judgment," as well as "competent decision-making, control of emotions, and moral judgment," are "not yet fully developed in 16- and 17-year-olds," deficits rendering them less culpable, less deterrable, and less than the "fully

71 See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Malvo Closing Argument, Crim. Just. Mag., Spring 2004, at 73, 74 (providing a partial transcript of defense counsel's closing argument). The defense called as a mitigation expert Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist involved in Atkins, see CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. McCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL 219–22 (2006), to testify about teen brain research. The defense's closing argument, which some jurors later credited with their decision to spare Malvo the death penalty, included the following:

Intelligence does not equate to judgment. Intelligence does not equate to maturity. . . . You may have seen it on the front cover of Newsweek a year or so ago. It had a picture of the juvenile brain. It's called brain imaging. It's hard science. That shows that the juvenile brain is different. . . . [T]he frontal lobe of the juvenile brain is not developed. It's the CEO of the brain . . . . It is the portion of the brain that gives us our judgment, and it doesn't fully develop until we're into our early 20s . . . . [A]nd that's why we, as a society, have chosen not to grant full responsibilities . . . . to teenagers. Shepherd, supra, at 74.

72 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003). Simmons had presented developmental neuroscience evidence before the Missouri Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Statement, Brief, and Argument at 50–54, Simmons, 112 S.W.3d 397 (No. 84454), 2003 WL 24219767. The court did not consider this evidence. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 412 ("While the parties have cited this Court to numerous current studies and scientific articles about the structure of the human mind, the continuing growth of those portions of the mind that control maturity and decision-making during adolescence and young adulthood, and the lesser ability of teenagers to reason, this Court need not look so far afield.").


Once certiorari was granted in Roper, a Delaware juvenile moved to preclude the state from seeking the death penalty. See State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2004 WL 2190097 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2004), reh'g denied, No. 9911016309, 2005 WL 950122 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2005). The court offered to stay proceedings; the defense asked to proceed. Jones was sentenced to death, a sentence set aside after Roper. See infra note 230.
rational, choosing agent[s]' presupposed by the death penalty."  

Simmons's counsel similarly emphasized neuroscience in oral argument, devoting to it more time than any other issue. This focus was complemented by a number of amicus parties, notably the American Medical Association, whose brief urged that "[a]dolescents' behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains."  

The Roper Court, in a decision closely tracking many of Simmons's arguments about maturity, agreed that the behavioral attributes of older adolescents were importantly parallel to evidence found dispositive in Atkins. In the most frequently cited portion of the opinion, it noted "[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults": greater propensity to "immaturity and irresponsibility," resulting in overrepresentation in "virtually every category of reckless behavior"; increased vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences, including "peer pressure"; and "more transitory, less fixed" personalities, reflective of less "well formed" character. These attributes of youth, the Court held, "render suspect" both the notion that the death penalty effectively deters teens and "any conclusion

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74 See Brief for Respondent at 10, 23, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1947812 [hereinafter Simmons Merits Brief] (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotes and citations omitted); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-5, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 2046818 (responding to these arguments); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 115 ("A key element of Simmons's defense was new brain imaging evidence suggesting that the adolescent brain is not as well developed as an adult's brain.").

75 See Oral Argument at 28-29, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 2387647 [hereinafter Roper Oral Argument] (statement of Seth Waxman) ("[Y]ou have a scientific community that in Stanford was absent . . . the major medical and scientific associations, were not able in 1989, based on the evidence, to come to this Court and say there is scientific, empirical validation for requiring that the line be set at 18."); see also id. at 38 ("[W]e know . . . from common sense and it's been validated by science . . . that it is impossible to know whether the crime that was committed by a 16- or 17-year-old is a reflection of his true, enduring character . . ."); see also Haider, supra note 58, at 375 (discussing role of neuroscience in oral argument, including a request by Justice Kennedy to comment on it).

76 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1635459 [hereinafter AMA Roper Brief]; see also id. at 2 ("The adolescent's mind works differently from ours. Parents know it. This Court has said it. Legislatures have presumed it for decades or more. And now, new scientific evidence sheds light on the differences."); Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, and the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9-12, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447 (making neuroscience arguments).

77 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.

78 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders." For these and other reasons it struck down the juvenile death penalty. However, the influence of neuroscience was unclear. The Court drew most of its language from prior decisions, none of which had relied on brain science, and remarked that "any parent knows" that teenagers are immature. It buttressed this experiential observation by noting that "the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm" it, but nowhere specified which amicus briefs it found relevant and persuasive. These ambiguous signals, though, were seen in light of the 2002 Stanford dissent, the prominence of neuroscience in briefing and argument, and the broader societal context—one fascinated with the teen brain—within which the case was decided.

Developmental neuroscience thus came to be regarded—accurately or not—as a major influence on the highest-profile juvenile case in decades.

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79 Id. at 570.
80 Id. at 575.
81 See id. at 569-70; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1993) (agreeing that youth is relevant to appropriateness of death penalty); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (reasoning that juveniles are more vulnerable and impulsive and less self-disciplined and future-oriented than adults).
82 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Roper Oral Argument, supra note 75, at 39-40 (statement of Breyer, J.) ("[W]hat I thought the scientific evidence was getting at, that it simply confirms what common sense suggests . . . [and] simply corroborated something that every parent already knows . . . .").
83 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. The reference to "scientific" sources may, but does not necessarily, indicate brain science, as it encompasses all references to psychology and all social-science findings not categorized as "sociology." Five amicus briefs, including the AMA and APA briefs, referenced scientific sources. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass'n in Support of the Respondent at 9-10, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399.
84 Morse, supra note 59, at 410 ("Perhaps the neuroscience evidence actually played a role in the decision . . . but there is no evidence in the opinion to support this speculation.").
85 See Putting the Juvenile Back in Juvenile Justice, supra note 7, at 6 ("In light of this new evidence about adolescent development, the U.S. Supreme Court . . . outlawed the death penalty for youth."); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 395-400, 413 (2008) (noting that the Roper Court emphasized scientific evidence); Jeffrey Fagan, Adolescents, Maturity, and the Law: Why Science and Development Matter in Juvenile Justice, Am. Prospect, Sept. 2005, at A7 (evidence about teen brains "was an important part" of Court's decision); Krueger, supra note 2, (Roper "took into consideration the incomplete brain development in juveniles").
C. Adolescent Brain Science Beyond Roper

Since Roper many scholars and advocates have urged that such science holds enormous potential to transform juvenile justice well beyond the death penalty. Since Roper many scholars and advocates have urged that such science holds enormous potential to transform juvenile justice well beyond the death penalty.86 Such post-Roper claims run the gamut from the broad to the specific. The vast majority are based on a combination of developmental psychology and neuroscience, with the findings of the latter being invoked generally to buttress the reliability of the former.87 Scholars regard that buttressing as critically important, on the theory that it lends a “hard science” edge to behavioral findings that might otherwise be dismissed as inordinately “soft.”88 To

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86 See, e.g., Rethinking the Juvenile, supra note 7, at 7, 10 (arguing that “the brain development-juvenile justice link is a work in progress, but it is the key to” an improved juvenile justice system, including “determining which children to treat in the juvenile system and what sort of treatments will be most effective”); Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 125, 172-73 (2007); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 117 (“[J]uvenile justice advocates are currently seeking to expand the scope of the Roper decision and to use neuroscientific evidence for a variety of non-death penalty related issues.”); Naomi Cahn, Poor Children: Child “Witches” and Child Soldiers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 413, 430 (2006) (characterizing legal implications of developmental neuroscience as “staggering”); Ill. Office of the State Appellate Defender, Registration Form for 4th Annual Midwest Juvenile Defender Summit, July 17, 2008, available at http://www.state.il.us/DEFENDER/acrobatdocs/juvedreg2008.pdf (proposing that brain-science insights could be used to challenge statements of victims, witnesses, and clients, and could inform interviews of adolescent clients); MacArthur Found. Research Network on Adolescent Dev. & Juvenile Justice, Presentation on Adolescent Development and Criminal Blameworthiness, at slide 29 (2006). http://www.adjj.org/downloads (describing “The Immaturity Gap” between adolescents and adults).


88 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 133 (proposing that psychological testimony is “perceived as soft” while brain images are perceived as “hard”); Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1443, 1463-64 (2008) (“In a society evermore dependent upon science and technology, advocates’ increasing emphasis on hard science has earned them some support.”); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 321, 331-32 (2006) (contrasting attitudes between behaviors caused by “differences in brain structure or function” with those attributable to “environmental or social factors”); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Defense, Crim. Just. Mag., Winter 2005, at 51, 51
the extent that the psychological and neurological strands are separable, this Section briefly articulates those aspects of the claims that rely on assertions about the teen brain. The next Part demonstrates how such claims have fared (and are likely to fare) when put to the test in the courts.

The most generalized claim is that evidence of population-typical brain immaturity during the teenage years both reinforces the original impulse to create a separate system of adjudication and treatment for juveniles and counsels recommitment to that system. Perhaps the most prominent contemporary scholars of developmental science and juvenile justice, Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, articulate this notion in *Rethinking Juvenile Justice,* a 2008 book described by one scholar as representing the “gold standard in legal-developmental collaboration.” Their central brain-based claims may be synopsized as follows. First, structural immaturity in a normal teenager’s frontal lobes may explain her relative deficiency in imagining the future, including the long-term consequences of her actions. Second, puberty-linked changes in the brain’s reward circuitry and in its hormone production predispose that teen to seek novelty and to value the rewards of risky behavior more than its risks. Third, the relative weakness of neural connections between frontal cortices and those brain areas associated with primary social and emotional processing contributes to her poor impulse control and emotional regulation. Fourth, because brain regions associated with executive function fully mature only in late adolescence and early adulthood, while those associated with primary emotional arousal and social information mature shortly after puberty, that teenager will for some years experience a “maturity gap” during which she is attracted to risky or irresponsible behaviors that she lacks full capacity to appreciate or control. Thus, (“hard science” supports what policymakers know from behavioral studies and “what they have intuitively known from their personal experiences”); *see also* Brown & Murphy, *supra* note 36 (manuscript at 69) (asking whether advocates are using brain images “specifically for their prejudicial effect,” as they might thus persuade factfinders to “accept psychological constructs that would otherwise be suspect as ‘soft’ science”).

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89 *See, e.g.*, *Rethinking the Juvenile,* *supra* note 7, at 4.

90 Scott & Steinberg, *supra* note 5, at 28, 44–50 (arguing that “scientific knowledge,” including “neurobiological” knowledge, about adolescent development “should be the foundation of the legal regulation of juvenile crime”).


92 Scott & Steinberg, *supra* note 5, at 40.

93 *Id.* at 42–43, 48.

94 *Id.* at 44–45.

95 *Id.* at 48–49. *See also* Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development and Juvenile Justice, *supra* note 10, at 2 (testimony of Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D.) (“[M]iddle adolescence
the normal attributes of the teen brain add up to "a prescription for bad choices," generally reflective more of normative developmental process than of bad character. These aspects of adolescent brain development, as manifested in behavior, should mitigate the law's response to juvenile offending. A teenager is not (like a child) so compromised as to be fully excused, but neither is she fully responsible, a status she will attain only once she has finished this critical stage of maturation. A sound juvenile justice system ought to reflect, in all its particulars, such a theory of mitigation.

Scott and Steinberg's basic theory, which may be called the "diminished culpability" model, has been endorsed to some degree—and often completely—by virtually every scholar, advocate, and defender now seeking to expand the influence of neuroscience within juvenile justice. Specific claims fall at every possible point along the life course of a juvenile proceeding. What follows is a brief sketch of the range of such claims.

**Waiver of rights.** Adolescents' impulsivity and relatively deficient decisionmaking processes, particularly when under stress, render them less able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent to searches, participate in identification procedures, waive Miranda rights, confess, waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea. Juveniles may

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96 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 49.
97 Id. at 121-26.
98 See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 86, at 447 (positing that neuroscience shows why children in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations are easily turned into soldiers, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished); Nina W. Chernoff & Martha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, 39 CLEAINGHOUSE REV. 209, 210-11 (2005); CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 10-15 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/juvenilesentencing.pdf; Shepherd, supra note 71, at 75 ("Children—adolescents—are responsible for their acts, but they are not as responsible as mature adults."); Shepherd, supra note 88, at 52 (stating that juvenile's behavioral traits are "built in—literally hard-wired into the adolescent brain—and are not aberrant symptoms of moral weakness").

One partial exception is Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author). While offering a similar account of the brain science, Slogobin and Fondacaro argue in favor of a model focused not on juveniles' relative culpability but their lesser deterrability. Id. (manuscript at 43-57).

99 See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 215; Bishop & Farber, supra note 86, at 172 ("Some of the most defining characteristics of adolescence—impetuosity, susceptibility, and immaturity, which Roper explains make children less culpable than
assert or waive such rights, but because of their brain immaturity they should not be allowed to do so absent meaningful adult guidance and as non-coercive a context as possible.\textsuperscript{100}

\textit{Competence.} Neuroscience buttresses research showing that younger juveniles are less likely than adults to demonstrate adjudicative competence\textsuperscript{101}—that is, the ability to understand proceedings, consult with and assist counsel, and make critical decisions in a minimally rational and self-protective manner.\textsuperscript{102} Normal developmental immaturity therefore ought to provide a basis for finding a juvenile incompetent, particularly in adult court, even if she cannot demonstrate a psychiatric disorder, developmental disability, or neurological abnormality relative to other teens.\textsuperscript{103}

\textit{Transfer to adult court.} To transfer a minor to adult court for prosecution is to engage in a legal fiction out of step with developmental reality.\textsuperscript{104} Juveniles may commit crimes that cause as much harm as an adult’s crime, but those equivalencies do not obviate brain-devel-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} See Chernoff & Levick, \textit{supra} note 98, at 215–16; Birckhead, \textit{supra} note 85, at 429–32 (“[Y]outh may be incapable of adult reasoning during questioning because of the long maturation process of the adolescent brain.”); \textit{id.} at 446–47 (encouraging use of expert testimony on teen brain development to determine youth’s perceptions of whether they are in custody and their responses to interrogation).
\item \textsuperscript{101} See, e.g., Fagan, \textit{supra} note 85, at A7 (“[T]he developmental deficits of immaturity that make [teens] less culpable may also make them less competent defendants . . .”); Shepherd, \textit{supra} note 88, at 52.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Maroney, \textit{supra} note 51, at 1376, 1391.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Steinberg and Scott, in a pragmatic move not entirely consistent with their theoretical model, contend that while such developmental immaturity should provide a basis for an incompetence finding in adult court, it ought to provide no such basis in a juvenile court. Scott & Steinberg, \textit{supra} note 5, at 168–74.
\item \textsuperscript{104} See Aronson, \textit{supra} note 2, at 117 (describing advocate’s claim that scientific evidence “could be used to slow or stop the automatic transfer of juveniles to adult criminal courts”); Lisa McNaughton, \textit{Extending Roper’s Reasoning to Minnesota’s Juvenile Justice System}, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1063, 1071–72 (2006) (citing brain research in support of argument that automatic transfer scheme is unconstitutional); Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, \textit{Children As Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons}, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 176 (2007) (asserting that teens’ “social, physiological, and psychological underdevelopment . . . demand [ ] a reexamination of current transfer policies”); Fagan, \textit{supra} note 85, at A5 (arguing that the “push to treat more kids as adults” is “contradicted by new behavioral and biological research about maturity and criminal culpability”).
\end{itemize}
opment differences relevant to both culpability and amenability to reform. Transfer should be abolished or, if allowed, triggered only by specific findings by a juvenile court judge focused on the attributes of the individual juvenile.

Mens rea and mental-state defenses. Because of brain immaturity, juveniles are less able or likely to form “specific intent” to carry out a particular action or to cause a particular result. Instead, their choices tend to be impulsive, and they are unlikely fully to contemplate consequences. Even when a juvenile can and does form the requisite mental state, that mens rea is a relatively poor proxy for culpability and future dangerousness. Further, assessment of both

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105 See, e.g., Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development and Juvenile Justice, supra note 10, at 1-4 (testimony of Jennifer L. Woolard, Ph. D) (offering synopsis of relationship between brain and behavioral aspects of developmental science and asserting that together they “support a fundamental tenet of the juvenile justice system,” that juveniles are not “‘miniature adults’ simply because they are capable of committing certain offenses”); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing “incongruous” scenario in which “a 10-year-old who biologically cannot understand the long-term consequences of a murder is treated as an adult for commission of that crime”).

106 MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE 4 (2006) [hereinafter LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE], available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf (arguing that because of difficulty in making individual assessments of maturity, including by reference to “brain images,” all individuals under 18 presumptively should be treated as juveniles, with limited exceptions for the few youth who “have exhausted the resources and patience of the juvenile justice system” and are very dangerous); Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 (stating that “neuropsychological research" counsels against “laws that funnel adolescents wholesale into the adult courts” and the “remedy is to rely on case-by-case assessments by judges”).

107 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 117-18 (describing advocate’s claim that scientific evidence will alter mens rea concepts because teens are in a “natural state of diminished capacity”); Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 214 (“[F]act finders should be required to consider the intent element of an offense in light of the research on adolescent incapacities.”).

108 See Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 17 (Testimony of Daniel Jackson, M.D.) (drawing distinction between “impulsive” and “predatory” aggression and asserting that most juvenile crimes reflect the former); LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 106, at 2 (proposing that teens’ impulsivity, “lack of foresight,” and tendency to focus on “immediate gratification” may lead to “bad decisions” in committing crime); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 22 (“We now know that the areas of the brain not yet developed by adolescence are those that inhibit commission of crimes.”).

109 See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 214 (arguing that evidence that would indicate an adult formed specific intent may not indicate that “more precise and elevated form of intent” in a juvenile); cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557-58, 578 (2005) (prohibiting death penalty for juveniles despite proof that individual defendant possessed most culpable mens rea).
criminal intent and defenses based on a “reasonable person” standard should adopt the perspective of someone with an age-typical brain. Structural and functional brain immaturity also undermines the application to juveniles of the felony murder doctrine and accomplice liability. Doctrine in each of these areas reflects baseline assumptions about rationality and forethought that are inapposite for the typical juvenile.

**Imposition of adult punishment.** “Adult” punishments—sentences that appear on the juvenile’s public, permanent record, include state control for longer periods of time than permitted in the juvenile system, and/or are at least partially served in adult institutions—never should be imposed, whether as a result of transfer or a “blended sentencing” scheme. Such sentences are disproportionate to juvenile

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110 See Aronson, *supra* note 2, at 118 (describing one advocate’s claim that scientific evidence produces new idea of the “reasonable adolescent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This idea was proposed pre-*Roper* and relied on developmental psychology. See Taylor-Thompson, *supra* note 16, at 145 (arguing that defense of “developmental negligence” should be available to youth charged in adult court with specific intent crimes or accomplice liability); *see also* J.R. v. Alaska, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (adopting reasonable adolescent standard).


112 Accomplice liability is particularly important because much youth crime is committed in groups. See *Human Rights Watch & Amnesty Int’l, supra* note 56, at 1–2 (finding that more than one-fourth of JLWOP sentences for felony murder are imposed on accomplices); Office of Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Co-Offending and Patterns of Juvenile Crime 6 ex. 3 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210360.pdf (reporting that the majority of youth crime is committed in groups). The claim is that minors’ vulnerability to peer pressure may indicate that actions taken to further the criminal activity of another frequently are motivated by unreflective loyalty, not underlain by the required dual intents to assist and that the crime be committed. See *Model Penal Code* § 2.06 (1985) (defining mens rea for accomplice liability); Chernoff & Levick, *supra* note 98, at 214; *see also* Taylor-Thompson, *supra* note 16, at 167–68 (examining a possible extension of developmental defenses).

113 Chernoff & Levick, *supra* note 98, at 211; *see also* Juvenile Justice Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Section, Mitigating Circumstances in Sentencing Youthful Offenders 1, 11 (2008), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/juvenilesentencing.pdf (noting that *Roper’s* conclusions apply “with equal force to all sentences for juvenile offenders” and to parole determinations). A “blended sentencing” scheme is one in which a court imposes a juvenile disposition and an adult sanction, the latter often being stayed pending successful completion of the former. See,
offenders' diminished culpability and ignore the developmental reality that most will desist criminal behavior naturally as their brains mature. Such sentences also are unlikely to deter other minors, who inadequately consider consequences. Finally, incarceration (particularly with adults) can distort juveniles' growth at a critical juncture in brain development.

* * * *

These claims are not radically different in kind from those regularly made by scholars and advocates on the basis of developmental psychology and "common sense." They are different only insofar as they purport to rest on a different empirical basis—that of neuroscience—and to result in more unshakeable conclusions, as a biological basis for immaturity ostensibly shows immaturity to be more deeply rooted and involuntary than does a psychological basis. They are also different to the extent they suggest that adolescent maturation takes longer than once was thought. Those differences, though,


115 See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 17) (noting that the ability to anticipate future consequences develops with age).

116 See, e.g., Rethinking the Juvenile, supra note 7, at 14 (suggesting adverse brain impact on teens subjected to "sensory deprivation" while incarcerated); Putting the Juvenile Back in Juvenile Justice, supra note 7, at 6 (proposing that the "malleability of the adolescent brain" contributes to "vulnerability to sexual exploitation and physical assault" in adult prisons).

117 See Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 10, at 1 (testimony of Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D.) (arguing that "[s]cientific discoveries about brain development have helped us understand why juveniles are different, "but they haven't changed the basic story line" that those differences are real and justify differential treatment).

118 Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 15) (describing "overarching consensus . . . that teenagers are not as neurobiologically mature as we once thought they were").
have not proved as consequential in legal practice as some have predicted.

II. THE LIMITED IMPACT OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN THE COURTS

As the previous Part showed, before *Roper* scholars and advocates had begun to envision a powerful role for developmental neuroscience within juvenile justice. Buoyed by apparent success in that case, since *Roper* such theories have proliferated. Defenders and advocates have begun actively to test those theories in cases. To measure the extent to which reality is conforming to predictions, I conducted a study of such cases. As this Part demonstrates, the range of neuros-

119 The methodology was, briefly, as follows. I used Westlaw to identify post-*Roper* cases raising legal issues to which defenders were likely to regard brain science as relevant, and reviewed those cases to detect mention of such science, for example with a search for "JUVENILE /P (LIFE /3 PAROLE) & DA(AFTER 2004) & ROPER" in Westlaw's ALLCASES database. I also searched directly for mention of such science, for example with the search, "(BRAIN /S DEVELOPMENT) & (ADOL! JUVE!)" in the ALLCASES database. In many cases I examined briefing and oral argument. As many criminal and juvenile cases are not reported, I also used broader internet searches, reviewed the secondary literature for clues to relevant cases, and located amicus briefs by advocacy organizations. When I became aware through contacts in the defender community that neuroscience evidence had been argued in unreported cases, I sought public records of the proceedings. At the low-relevance end of the responsiveness continuum were cases in which parties or courts made a quick mention of brain science or the "scientific studies" language of *Roper*. At the high-relevance end were cases in which parties presented testimony of brain-science experts. The last search was conducted on August 13, 2009.

The searches yielded a total of fifty-seven cases, falling at all points along that continuum, five of which are pending. In eleven cases (including one case that is counted here as two because it referenced an unpublished, pending case not otherwise accounted for), developmental neuroscience appears to have been regarded at least somewhat favorably by a court in granting some form of relief to a defendant, almost always in the context of sentencing. In four of those eleven, the defendant given a sentencing concession was a young adult rather than a juvenile. In an additional three cases, developmental neuroscience was referenced by a judge in dissent or concurrence. As discussed below, inclusion in the "possible influence" category was generous; in none of these fourteen cases does developmental neuroscience fairly appear to have been outcome determinative, and in most it was not demonstrably influential.

The project does not claim to be quantitatively authoritative. First, I did not gather primary data on confidential proceedings in juvenile courts. This necessary constraint confines the data set to (a) cases in which the state proceeded against a minor in adult court or (b) juvenile-court cases that are reported, whether because they are not confidential under state law or because the court protected the youth's identity (for example, by use of pseudonym). These criteria capture a great many juvenile cases, but analysis of nonpublic juvenile-court cases might have enriched the
scientific arguments before the courts—state and federal, juvenile and criminal—is both wide and deep. Their impact, however, has been shallow.

This shallow impact, likely surprising to many, cannot be explained fully on the grounds that the science is new or the effort early. Rather, the courts' response to adolescent brain science reflects a frequent disconnect between the questions asked by law and those answered by science. Though courts sometimes cite the science approvingly, they do so only to buttress conclusions otherwise fully explained. The shallow impact also reflects scientific limitations that are genuine and likely to persist. These factors explain how courts generally have responded to developmental neuroscience arguments.

analysis. Second, I am not likely to have captured the entire universe of relevant, public, but nonreported cases, particularly those resulting in acquittal, or to have detected all cases in which neuroscientific arguments somehow influenced diversion or plea bargaining, the largely invisible methods by which most juvenile cases are determined. Third, in some cases brain science may have influenced prosecutorial discretion, exercise of which is largely invisible. For example, Ruben Gur—a frequent expert—in 2005 asserted that his pre-Roper affidavit on brain development on behalf of Hector Huertas had been influential. Ruben C. Gur, Brain Maturation and the Execution of Juveniles: Some Reflections on Science and the Law, PA. GAZETTE, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 14 (2005) (“[I]t apparently worked. The Commonwealth decided not to pursue the death penalty in light of scientific findings that the brain does not mature until early adulthood.”). Huertas's attorneys did argue that brain science provided one reason why Pennsylvania should be precluded from seeking the death penalty. Motion to Preclude the Commonwealth from Seeking the Death Penalty against a Juvenile and Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 35, 38, 57, Commonwealth v. Huertas, CP 0009-0941 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 2002), available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/huertasfinaljuvenilechallengemotion.pdf. It is not, however, possible to discern whether the state relied on that evidence in declining ultimately to seek the death penalty. See Aronson, *supra* note 2, at 129.

Finally, this Article analyzes only claims based on developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain, not cases in which juveniles claimed abnormality relative to other teens—for example, because of organic brain injury or psychiatric disorder. See, e.g., *In re* Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193, 1205-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing a neuropsychological evaluation claiming to show deficits consistent with head injury). Such claims should be considered as they would if raised by adults, a topic that is the subject of a separate and growing literature. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., *Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility*, in *The Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law*, *supra* note 39, at 183; Brown & Murphy, *supra* note 36 (manuscript at 32–74); Maroney, *supra* note 51, at 1417–25; O. Carter Sneed, *Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment*, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1292–99 (2007).

but also show why that response has some basis. Two additional factors demonstrate why courts should not unduly privilege such claims. First, juvenile justice cannot directly track neuroscience without implicating equality and autonomy concerns, and no adequate limiting principle has yet been articulated. Second, the pressures of legal advocacy incentivize overstatement and often result in inaccuracy; while this tendency can be controlled, it cannot be eliminated.

As this Part will show, then, adolescent brain science has not been (and is unlikely to be) a transformative force in juvenile justice, at least in the courts. Part III argues that the science nonetheless may play some role going forward, and makes clear that the criticisms herein raised do not detract from the normative desirability of many of the policy changes in support of which the science has been invoked.

A. Doctrinal Obstacles

The most frequent shoal upon which post-*Roper* adolescent brain science claims founder is that of existing legal doctrine, which tends to render them either irrelevant or unpersuasive. In some instances, courts perceive that the issue has been foreclosed by legislatures; in others, doctrine directs a relatively narrow inquiry and scientific insights fall largely outside its boundaries. Such disconnects are most clearly seen in cases involving imposition of adult punishment. The language of *Roper* has been widely interpreted so as to undermine its applicability to non-death sentences, review of which is limited. A similarly narrow focus applies to determinations of a juvenile’s mens rea or other mental capacity.

Doctrine is not a full independent measure of a claim’s intrinsic merit. For example, if a procedural default is held to bar pursuit of an actual innocence claim, that holding says far more about the doctrinal valuation of procedural bars than it does about innocence as an exculpatory factor. Further, doctrine potentially is mutable. The point of this Section therefore is not to endorse the status quo but, rather, to

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120 The same doctrinal constraints apply to developmental science generally, though full discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Both sorts of claims tend to be invoked simultaneously, and courts that reject the doctrinal relevance of behavioral work also reject that of neuroscience. However, courts that accept as doctrinally relevant some insights from behavioral work do not always credit neuroscientific evidence. Indeed, this is a plausible description of the *Roper* decision. This disparity may be partially explained by the newcomer status of neuroscience relative to behavioral science. It is largely justified, even setting newcomer status aside, as not all of the relevant limitations of neuroscience pertain to behavioral studies. See infra note 129.
demonstrate how it currently is operating to diffuse neuroscientific claims. Questions of merit are taken up in the following Section and in Part III.

1. Adult Punishment

Contemporary Eighth Amendment doctrine, under which non-death sentences will be invalidated only if so "extreme" as to be "grossly disproportionate" to the crime, frequently is fatal to juveniles' neuroscientific claims that particular punishments are unconstitutional. Similarly, courts have tended to uphold adult-sentencing schemes against brain-science challenges, hewing to doctrine directing deference to facially reasonable legislative and judicial choices as to which youths, or categories of youths, may or must be tried and punished as adults. The only punishment context in which neuroscience has had discernable, if marginal, impact is in a small number of individual sentencing proceedings, a context in which—unless mandatory sentences apply—judges have considerable latitude. This Section addresses each issue in turn.

Juvenile life without parole. Because Roper eliminated the most extreme possible sentence for youth, scholars and advocates quickly have sought to extend its reasoning to the most extreme remaining sentence—juvenile life without parole (JLWOP). As they have


122 See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.

123 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(b), at 744, 746 (3d ed. 2007) ("[I]t could be argued that there is no aspect of a defendant's life that may not be weighed in assessing the appropriate sentence under a discretionary sentencing scheme."); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (stating that in sentencing a judge should possess "the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life").

124 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (noting that if execution is the ultimate penalty life without parole is the "penultimate" one). As this Article is going to press, JLWOP is permitted in the majority of jurisdictions. See Adam Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A1 (reporting that forty-two states and the federal government allow JLWOP and many states allow its imposition on young children). JLWOP affects far more youth than the death penalty did. Compare Streib, supra note 68, at 3 (reporting that 226 juveniles were sentenced to death in the three decades before Roper), with Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leigh-
argued, developmental science would appear to bear as directly on the underlying purposes of JLWOP—retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence—as on the death penalty. Indeed, the Court has agreed to hear in its October 2009 term two cases challenging the constitutionality of JLWOP as applied to a thirteen-year-old and a sixteen-year-old convicted of nonhomicidal offenses. Both petitioners have made brain-science arguments strongly paralleling those in Roper, and largely the same lineup of amicus parties has done the same. The Court’s treatment of developmental neuroscience may provide valuable insight, largely absent in Roper, to its attitude toward its relevance. Even if no such insight is forthcoming, its decisions clearly will alter the landscape within which JLWOP claims are decided.

Under the existing framework, though, such claims have been nearly uniformly unsuccessful, and adolescent brain science has


125 Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 114, at 10.

126 See Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No. 08-7621) (mem.) (granting certiorari to consider the constitutionality of imposing JLWOP on thirteen-year-old convicted of rape); Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No. 08-7412) (mem.) (granting certiorari to consider the constitutionality of imposing JLWOP on sixteen-year-old convicted of probation violation for robbery and burglary). Because of petitioners’ ages and crimes, even if the Court invalidates their sentences, it might leave open the possibility of JLWOP for older teens or those convicted of homicide.

127 See Brief for Petitioner at 15–18, Sullivan, No. 08-7621 (U.S. filed July 16, 2009); Brief for Petitioner at 39–43, Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 16, 2009).

128 See, e.g., Brief for the American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 23, 2009), 2009 WL 2256778 [hereinafter APA Sullivan & Graham Brief]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in Support of Petitioners, at 1 Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 23, 2009), 2009 WL 2256775 [hereinafter Aber Brief] (explaining interest of “an interdisciplinary group of psychologists, social scientists, and neuroscientists who have devoted their careers to the study of adolescent development and behavior”).

had no discernable impact. The most commonly articulated justification for rejection of such claims is *Roper* itself, in which the Court appeared in dicta to endorse the Missouri Supreme Court’s resentencing of Simmons to “life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.”

Many courts have relied on this dictum. The second major justification is the oft-repeated “mantra” that “death is different”: many courts have relied on this dictum.


130 *Roper* v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (quoting State *ex rel.* Simmons v. *Roper*, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2005)); cf id. at 572 (stating that “[t]o the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person,” and noting further that the Governor of Kentucky had so commuted Stanford’s sentence). Justice Scalia regards this to be a vulnerable dictum. At oral argument, counsel for Missouri predicted that “if the Court says [juveniles] are immune from . . . capital punishment . . . someone will come and say they also must be immune from . . . life without parole”; Scalia agreed, stating, “I’m sure that would follow. I—I don’t see where there’s a logical line.” *Roper* Oral Argument, supra note 75, at 5; see also *Roper* 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s reliance on international authority would also dismantle JLWOP sentences).


132 Rachel E. Barkow, *The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity*, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1147–49 (2009) (advocating abandonment of death-is-different rationale for limiting noncapital sentencing review, as it is “wrong as a matter of doctrine, and . . . unwise as a matter of policy”); see also id. at 1161 (noting that the *Roper* Court’s solicitude toward youth has not extended to noncapital sentencing review).
have stated that *Roper* applies only in the death penalty context,\(^\text{133}\) and have instead judged JLWOP under the grossly disproportionate standard that, long before *Roper*, underlay the failure of most Eighth Amendment challenges.\(^\text{134}\) These long odds have not changed with invocation of brain science.

Courts that have directly addressed neuroscientific claims in the JLWOP context generally have treated the issue as either doctrinally irrelevant or as surplusage. For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld a JLWOP sentence imposed on a fourteen-year-old convicted of intentional murder.\(^\text{135}\) The court took no issue with the defendant’s developmental psychology claims, drawn directly from *Roper*, but held that those factors were properly considered and rejected by the sentencing judge in determining the youth’s culpability and dangerousness.\(^\text{136}\) Similarly, it took no serious issue with his brain-science claims—including that such research “demonstrates biological reasons for adolescents’ inability to control impulses, avoid...
risky behaviors, and make good decisions”—but held that it did not “constitute a new factor. The trial court was aware of the differences between juveniles and adults. Continued medical and scientific research that provides a physiological explanation for the differences is not highly relevant to the sentence.”137 Similar (if more oblique) claims have met a similar fate in other courts, which appear to agree that the science either sheds little light on the individual defendant’s crime or personal attributes or adds little to developmental arguments already given adequate due.138

Lengthy or harsh adult sentences. Juveniles also have used brain science to challenge other lengthy or harsh sentences.139 Such challenges stand on even less secure doctrinal footing, as the possibility of parole (even if remote) weighs in favor of constitutionality.140

137 Id. at 330–31 (noting defendant’s argument that “[r]ecent research also shows adolescents’ amygdalas are more active than adults.’ The amygdala is closely related to emotionally laden responses. In addition, Ninham argues that mounting research suggests alcohol causes more damage to developing brains of teenagers than previously thought”).

138 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 944 So. 2d 660, 661–64 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (failing to address defendant’s claim that JLWOP was unconstitutional because of “[t]he principles underlying the decision in Roper v. Simmons, bolstered by continuing scientific research,” and upholding sentence because of brutality of the offense (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)); see also id. at 664 (explaining that Craig did not demonstrate that he was “‘exceptional’” and “‘a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case’” (quoting State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672, 676 (La. 1998))). Similarly, in Connell, 7 So. 3d at 1076–77, both the trial court and an appellate court dismissed defendant’s JLWOP claim despite amicus briefing that had drawn on the developmental portion of Roper, including Roper’s nod to scientific studies. See Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 17–19, Connell, 7 So. 3d 1068 (No. CR 06-0668); see also Allen, 958 A.2d at 1233, 1236 (denying defendant’s JLWOP challenge, which had cited to the “sociological and physiological evidence on which Roper relied”).

Accordingly, few have prevailed. As in the JLWOP context, courts have tended to take a narrow view of substantive sentencing oversight.\(^\text{141}\) They also have tended to dismiss arguments based in developmental neuroscience, often under the rationale that it fails to offer anything meaningfully new but also because it fits poorly with record evidence as to mens rea or aggravating factors.

A cluster of Kentucky cases demonstrates the first rationale. Prior to \textit{Roper}, a number of juveniles pleaded guilty to capital offenses in order to avoid potential execution; each agreed to a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years.\(^\text{142}\) After \textit{Roper} many moved for resentencing on the ground that they should not be held to a sentence agreed to under the shadow of an impermissible penalty.\(^\text{143}\) Most argued that the court should take notice of adolescent brain science, which emerged after their pleas were entered. Blake Walker, for example, argued that \textit{Roper} “provides a new framework for our understanding of the appropriate penalties for juveniles in light of adolescent brain development.”\(^\text{144}\) Similarly, Samuel McMillen argued that \textit{Roper} “explained the constitutional importance of adolescent brain development in sentencing juvenile criminal defendants” and that teens’ “lack of full brain development is an even greater mitigating factor now than anyone understood at the time of” his original sentencing.\(^\text{145}\) Both the Walker and McMillen courts, though, refused to order resentencing, unpersuaded either that \textit{Roper} applied or that


145 McMillen v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-001806, 2007 WL 3406851, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (discussing defendant’s argument that the “\textit{Roper} Court established that juvenile criminal defendants possess diminished culpability when compared to adults due to their adolescent brain development” and “when the [trial court] made its sentencing decision, it was unable to give full and sufficient consideration to the constitutional importance
neuroscience materially changed the factual premises. These and similar cases, to be sure, presented unique difficulties because the petitioners were required to overcome a presumption of the finality of plea bargaining. The McMillen court, though, signaled a more general lack of receptivity to neuroscientific arguments, declaring that despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court discussed adolescent brain development in very broad and general terms. . . . Roper does not contain any language mandating that a trial court must give an offender . . . a new sentencing hearing in order to retroactively apply the Roper Court's reasoning regarding adolescent brain development. . . . [T]he Roper Court's discussion regarding adolescent brain development. . . . is not retroactive as a constitutional matter.

Neuroscience arguments raised in several other Kentucky cases were dismissed without discussion.

The second rationale is illustrated by People v. Pratcher, in which a fifteen-year-old challenged his sentence of fifty years to life for intentional murder. A neuropsychologist testified about adolescent brain development generally, and Pratcher's brain specifically, in support of his arguments that such a sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate of adolescence as a mitigator with respect to the specific level of brain development of juveniles).

146 Walker, 2008 WL 1991612, at *2 ("[A] valid plea by a juvenile to any sentence other than the death penalty will NOT be re-opened based upon Roper"); McMillen, 2007 WL 3406851, at *3 (holding that “because McMillen was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, not death . . . Roper does not apply”).


149 See Devers v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002049, 2008 WL 612246, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008) (rejecting claim that “circuit court 'was unaware of the full effect of adolescent brain development as it relates to culpability' at the time he was sentenced" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Denton v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-00587, slip op. at 2–3 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2007) (rejecting claims that court failed “to give full and sufficient consideration to the characteristics of adolescent brain development relating to culpability . . . [and] was not fully aware of the relationship between adolescent brain development and culpability, and was thus unable during sentencing to give full and sufficient consideration to the constitutional import of adolescent brain development”). Similar arguments were made obliquely in one other case. See McStoots, 245 S.W.3d at 791 (noting defendant's arguments based on the Roper Court's statements about developmental maturity).

The sentencing court, however, found those arguments ultimately unpersuasive in light of the deliberate nature of the crime (including, for example, loading and cocking a rifle for four successive shots), and the appellate court agreed. Other state courts similarly have relied on assessment of high individual culpability to refuse brain-based challenges to multi-decade sentences imposed on defendants as young as twelve.

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151 Id. at *10–11 (describing testimony of Dr. Myla Young). In addition to describing normal adolescent brain development, Dr. Young performed a SPECT scan on Pratcher’s brain, concluding that he was particularly “dysfunctional,” but she acknowledged that “[i]t’s unclear whether we’re talking about frontal lobe damage or immaturity.” Id. at *11 n.7.

152 Id. at *44–50 (discussing, inter alia, the Roper dictum, state-court precedent, and the factual findings of the sentencing court, though noting that Pratcher “presented evidence at trial both that adolescents’ brains are immature and that appellant was immature even for a 15-year-old”).


Though most adult-punishment challenges referencing brain science have failed, it is worth noting a small countertrend. In two cases, state courts relied on developmental principles—possibly including neuroscience—to limit extraordinarily long sentences, once by allowing the eventual possibility of discretionary parole\(^{154}\) and once by imposing a term of years well below the maximum.\(^{155}\) These were individual, not categorical, determinations; the same courts refused to limit juvenile sentences generally or to invalidate mandatory minimum sentences for youth.\(^{156}\) Two additional state courts also appear to have relied in small part on brain science to invalidate juvenile sex-offender registration, once by removing a juvenile from the list and once by invalidating the entire registration scheme.\(^{157}\) This group of

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\(^{154}\) Citing, inter alia, the “scientific and sociological studies” language from *Roper* and “the literature regarding juveniles that supported that position,” the sentencing court determined that “in spite of [the juvenile’s] horrific crimes, there was some possibility that [he] would change by the time he was eligible for parole at approximately age fifty” and imposed a sentence of ninety-nine years with parole eligibility after thirty-three. *Cotting v. State*, No. A-9909, 2008 WL 4059580, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008). That sentence was upheld as “not clearly mistaken” by the appellate court. *Id.; see also* Ling v. State, No. A-9228, 2008 WL 2152028, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. May 21, 2008) (approving identical decision by different trial court to allow a juvenile’s eventual eligibility for parole, nowhere mentioning “scientific studies” but referring instead to “the factors that the Supreme Court considered in *Roper* and the fact ‘that it was not uncommon for teenagers to make poor decisions’”).

\(^{155}\) See *State v. Carrasquillo*, 962 A.2d 772, 775–76 (Conn. 2009) (discussing the testimony of Carrasquillo’s expert, a psychiatrist, about “development of the adolescent brain generally and the defendant’s cognitive development in particular,” focusing on “significant differences between the adolescent brain and the adult brain”). The sentencing court accepted that Carrasquillo’s “judgment” and “thinking” were “in development,” but stated that such mitigation “only goes so far”; the court sentenced him to thirty-five years, more than the mandatory twenty-five but less than the authorized life term. *Id.* at 776–78 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the sentence. *Id.*

\(^{156}\) See *Cotting*, 2008 WL 4059580, at *2 (rejecting defense request to limit sentence to sixty years); *Ling*, 2008 WL 2152028, at *2 (same); *Carrasquillo*, 962 A.2d at 777–78 (noting that propriety of a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence was not affected by *Roper* and stating that “[t]he delineation between juveniles and adults for purposes of prosecution and punishment is a public policy determination reserved to the legislative branch”).

cases indicates that developmental neuroscience sometimes may work to solidify a holding—whether individual or categorical—where a court regards developmental principles as both persuasive and relevant to punishment and sees brain science as informing, in some way, those principles.

As most punishment cases indicate, though, courts tend to view the findings of developmental neuroscience as either irrelevant to the specific determination before them or as insufficiently persuasive as to invalidate schemes for imposition of non-death sentences.\(^\text{158}\)

2. Transfer to Adult Court

Brain-based challenges to the transfer of minors to adult court also have been relatively ineffective. This area of law is closely related to adult punishment, as such punishment—for example, incarceration beyond the twenty-first birthday—generally may be imposed only following transfer. Historically, transfer decisions were left to juvenile court judges, who had authority to find that a particular youth warranted adult treatment. Legislatures provided broad parameters within which that discretion was exercised—for example, by setting an age below which transfer was unauthorized—bounded on the outside by due process principles.

Increasingly, though, states allow prosecutors to determine the court in which to proceed, or provide for legislative transfer, in which adult jurisdiction follows automatically from the state’s selection of a particular charge against a person of a prescribed age.

Nonindividualized transfer. Well before the advent of developmental neuroscience, young people had argued that these newer schemes unconstitutionally exposed them to adult punishment without the benefit of an individualized hearing on their maturity, culpability, and potential for rehabilitation. Virtually all such challenges failed.

Courts overwhelmingly deferred to legislatures’ choices as to what

Another case raising a cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge to a term of years is pending. See Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Stay the Federal Habeas Petition to Permit Petitioner to Return to State Court to Attempt to Exhaust All Unexhausted Claims at 11, Williams v. Ryan, No. 3:05-cv-00737-WQH-WMC (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2007) (arguing that “advancing medical technologies that provide insight into the brain development of juveniles...directly relate[ ] to Petitioner’s assertion that his sentence of two consecutive 25 years to life terms” is cruel and unusual); see also infra note 180 (discussing Williams in greater detail).
combinations of age and charged offense categorically warrant adult treatment; they also affirmed prosecutors’ power to make that determination, either by choosing the charge or by choosing the court.\textsuperscript{163} Brain science has not altered these tendencies.

A number of youth have urged post-	extit{Roper} that developmental neuroscience shows the irrationality of nonindividualized transfer and counsels reversal of this doctrinal trend. David Garcia, for example, offered expert testimony on adolescent brain development to support his claim that New Mexico’s transfer law was “a rejection of biology,”\textsuperscript{164} a claim echoed by that of a California teenager.\textsuperscript{165} An Illinois youth similarly argued that the transfer should be disallowed as the “same science . . . that led the Supreme Court to conclude that the incomplete brain development and resulting character attributes . . . renders the death penalty an inappropriate punishment for juveniles necessitates the conclusion that other harsh adult penalties are also inappropriate for juveniles.”\textsuperscript{166} Each of these appeals, like their pre-	extit{Roper} predecessors, appears to have failed because of deference to the

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\item See, \textit{e.g.}, United States \textit{v.} Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1333–38 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rejecting challenges based on equal protection, separation of powers, and due process); State \textit{v.} Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1364–68 (Fla. 1980) (rejecting the same under state and federal law).
\item Petition for Review Following Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5–6, People \textit{v.} Gonzales, Nos. E036344, E037793, 2005 WL 1799520 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2005) (asking “whether in view of the growing consensus of the medical community and mental health professionals that the teenage brain has much less control over impulsive behavior coupled with the impulsive nature of petitioner’s first crime,” automatic transfer and mandatory adult sentencing is cruel and unusual). Gonzales urged that the science post-dates, and calls into question, the California voters’ decision to institute legislative transfer.
\item Motion to Declare Defendant’s Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional at 7–8, 10, People \textit{v.} Jones, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Apr. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Casey Jones Motion], available at http://www.njdcc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow link on left for “Advocacy in Adult Court” and scroll down to link for “Motion to Declare Defendant’s Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional”) (“If we can no longer put juveniles to death because of their diminished culpability, we can no longer treat them as adults when punishing them for crimes in any context.”); \textit{id.} at 16 (noting that in twelve years since Illinois Supreme Court upheld transfer scheme “significant developments have been made in understanding adolescent brain develop-
legislative scheme. Only in the *Gonzales* case did the state even respond substantively to the neuroscientific argument, and though several days were consumed by expert testimony, the *Garcia* trial court declined even to mention science in its ruling; it simply found that the constitutionality of legislative transfer was answered by pre-*Roper* precedent.

**Judicial transfer.** There is no evidence that juveniles have on the basis of neuroscience either persuaded individual judges to retain juvenile-court jurisdiction; nor have they managed to overturn transfer decisions on appeal. The case of Christopher Pittman, a twelve-year-old convicted of killing his grandparents, is exemplary. Pittman argued that a juvenile court judge lacked authority to transfer him because “recent scientific data” shows that twelve-year-olds lack “capacity” to be tried as adults. The South Carolina Supreme Court instead held that the “rules of statutory construction do not allow the Court to determine legislative intent based on scientific data” and noted that the statute contained no minimum age for judicial trans-

Adolescent brain science also was presented by amicus parties in a case successfully challenging Nevada's transfer scheme on the ground that it violated juveniles' right against self-incrimination. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Juvenile Defender Center in Support of Appellants at 13–15 & n.14, *In re William M.*, 196 P.3d 456 (Nev. 2008) (No. 48649); Affidavit of Marty Beyer, Ph.D, *William M.*, 196 P.3d 456 (Nev. 2008) (No. 48649). However, the court did not cite to the developmental research in overturning the scheme. See *William M.*, 196 P.3d at 460–65.

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167 See *Gonzales*, 2005 WL 1799520, at *9 (rejecting challenge). It is not possible to ascertain with certainty the fate of the *Jones* case. “Casey Jones” is a pseudonym assigned by amicus counsel. However, a legal database search reveals no reported Illinois case matching the described facts; a lower court ruling that the transfer scheme is unconstitutional certainly would have been appealed by the state, as it would have overruled state supreme court precedent, and almost certainly would have been reported. The logical inference is that the challenge was denied.

168 *Gonzales*, 2005 WL 1799520, at *7 (“Regardless of whether the nature of the adolescent brain produces behavior that is more impulsive than an adult’s, as defendant asserts, his conduct in this case reveals a high degree of individual culpability.”); see also Reply to State’s Response to Motion to Declare Defendant’s Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional at 1, 11–12, *Jones*, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, June 23, 2006), available at http://www.njdca.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow link on left for “Advocacy in Adult Court” and scroll down to link for “Reply to State’s Response to Motion to Declare Defendant’s Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional”) (reflecting that State did not respond to brain-science arguments).


fer.\textsuperscript{171} In the same vein, a Minnesota appellate court rejected a defendant’s claim that a judge should have considered neuroscience when making the transfer decision, as the legislature had determined the relevant factors and had not included neuroscience among them.\textsuperscript{172}

Thus, developmental neuroscience has to date proved no match for the strong doctrinal pull toward deference to transfer schemes and has failed materially to influence individual transfer determinations.\textsuperscript{173}

3. Mental States

Defenders’ efforts to use developmental neuroscience in the context of mental-state assessment—whether going to mens rea, mental-state defenses, or to the ability competently, knowingly, and intelligently to assert or waive constitutional rights—also have largely fallen short, primarily because of the generally “adult-like” tests of mental state by which juveniles are judged. Substantive criminal law generally is adopted wholesale by the juvenile justice system; the special attrib-

\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 162.

\textsuperscript{172} In re Welfare of A.J.F., No. A06-303, 2007 WL 92843 at *2, 4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (indicating that fifteen-year-old charged with first-degree murder asked that the judge be required to consider \textit{Roper}’s “discussion of how adolescent brain development impacts culpability,” but the court held that science could not alter the legislature’s choices “regarding how culpability is to be viewed” for transfer purposes); see also Petitioner’s Petition for Review from Denial of Petition for Writ of Mandate at 5–7, Gregory H. v. Superior Court, No. S158098 (Cal. Nov. 13, 2007) (describing expert testimony at transfer hearing that argued because “the last stage of brain maturity engages higher reasoning, abstract abilities, judgment, foresight and the ability to delay gratification, a 14-year-old boy is far from achieving neurological development” but noting that the juvenile was nonetheless transferred); Docket Entry of Jan. 16, 2008, Gregory H., No. S158098 (Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (denying petition for review).

In a Vermont case, defense counsel raised developmental neuroscience in an appeal from denial of “reverse waiver,” a process by which juveniles initially charged as adults sometimes can be transferred to juvenile court. The appellate court remanded for a new hearing on other grounds and did not discuss the brain-based argument. See State v. Dixon, 967 A.2d 1114, 118–19 (Vt. 2008) (summarizing results of a psychological evaluation of the defendant); Brief of the Appellant at 33, Dixon, 967 A.2d 1114 (No. 07-457).

\textsuperscript{173} As in the punishment cases, there is evidence of a small countertext. A Ninth Circuit judge dissented from a decision upholding deportation of a juvenile following his mandatory transfer to, and conviction in, adult court. The judge relied in small part on developmental science, possibly including brain science, to assert that all youth should be afforded individual judicial transfer hearings. Mendez-Alcaraz v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 849–51 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“Both the law and the scientific literature agree that when it comes to crime, juveniles are different.”).
utes of that system cluster around adjudication procedures and dispositional consequences, not standards for determining guilt.\footnote{See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2005 & Supp. 2009) (defining delinquent child as person under eighteen who commits an act designated as a crime by the penal code); Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 672 (1970).} Thus, the same mental-state concepts are used in juvenile and adult court.\footnote{This is so unless the legislature has chosen to extend to minors tried in juvenile court either an infancy defense or a presumption of inability to form intent. See, e.g., In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 133–34 (Cal. 1970); In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 668 (Conn. 1989).} More, while age clearly matters to assertion of Fourth Amendment rights and to competence determinations, courts have yet to reach any consensus over how this is so, and tend to use adult-like tests despite brief nods to the impact of youth.\footnote{See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–67 (2004); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725–26 (1979); see also Lourdes M. Rosado, Note, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status Should Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (1996) (explaining how courts have applied the Fourth Amendment to minors and arguing for a juvenile consent standard to account for adolescent’s cognitive differences).} Reliance on adult-like standards has made courts reticent to consider brain-based arguments that minors are unable (or less able) to form “specific intent,” do not consider future consequences in the manner contemplated by the felony-murder doctrine, and should be measured by a different concept of “reasonableness.” Such challenges often are perceived as going to the legitimacy of the rules themselves rather than their application.

\textit{Intent.} In a number of homicide cases defenders have claimed that the young person, because of brain immaturity, did not consciously desire, or realize to a substantial certainty, that someone would die as a result of his actions.\footnote{A first-degree murder charge typically requires such proof. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.2 (4th ed. 2003); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a), (b) (1985) (defining “purpose” and “knowledge,” which together comprise what is called specific intent).} They sometimes also argue that the young person did not consciously deliberate over whether to act, defeating any element of premeditation.\footnote{Premeditation usually is defined as advance contemplation or a turning over in the mind. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 501 A.2d 133, 134 (D.C. 1985).} Such assertions were first raised pre-\textit{Roper}, not in the courts but in the media. In a 2001 editorial following a school shooting in which fifteen-year-old Andy Williams killed two and injured thirteen, a researcher with the National Institutes of Health wrote:

\begin{quote}
I doubt that most school shooters intend to kill, in the adult sense of permanently ending a life and paying the price for the rest of
\end{quote}
their own lives. Such intention would require a fully developed prefrontal cortex, which could anticipate the future and rationally appreciate cause and effect. The young school shooter probably does not think about the specifics of shooting at all. The often reported lack of apparent remorse illustrates how unreal the reality is to these teenagers.

This brief lesson in brain development is not meant to absolve criminal behavior or make the horrors any less unconscionable. But the shooter at Santana High, like other adolescents, needed people or institutions to prevent him from being in a potentially deadly situation where his immature brain was left to its own devices. No matter what the town or the school, if a gun is put in the control of the prefrontal cortex of a hurt and vengeful 15-year-old, and it is pointed at a human target, it will very likely go off.\textsuperscript{179}

The editorial may have influenced Williams’s defense, as shortly after the shootings he had an MRI taken of his brain.\textsuperscript{180} Before it was examined, though, Williams pleaded guilty. He now claims that “trial counsel erred because that MRI could have been analyzed to determine whether his brain development showed a lack of maturity and impulse control,” factors that purportedly would have been relevant to the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” mens rea required on all counts.\textsuperscript{181} As he asked in a 2007 \textit{pro se} motion,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Daniel R. Weinberger, \textit{A Brain Too Young for Good Judgment}, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A13; \textit{see also} STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 114–15 (discussing Williams case).
\item Williams v. Ryan, No. 05-cv-0737, 2007 WL 925834, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) (holding that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on unexamined MRI was exhausted for habeas purposes). Though Williams’s many post-conviction filings all refer to the MRI, they nowhere explain why it was taken and why it was not examined. \textit{See}, e.g., Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Stay the Federal Habeas Petition to Permit Petitioner to Return to State Court to Attempt to Exhaust All Unexhausted Claims at 9, Williams, No. 05-cv-0737 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Williams Memorandum]. Nor is such information found on a website maintained by his supporters. \textit{See} Andy Speaks, http://www.andyspeaks.com/main.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
\item Several years prior, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel, who pleaded guilty to killing his parents and two schoolmates and injuring many more at his school, introduced brain-scan evidence as mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. That testimony was intended to support psychiatric testimony that Kinkel was mentally ill and in need of treatment, not to show that he had a developmentally normal brain. The prosecution did not cross-examine the brain expert and the judge did not discuss that evidence at sentencing. \textit{See} Frontline, \textit{The Killer at Thurston High: 111 Years Without Parole}, PBS, May 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial. It is possible that Williams’s counsel initially sought the MRI because of the Kinkel case.
\item Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Williams, No. 05-cv-0737 (S.D. Cal. filed July 10, 2008) (internal quotation marks omit-\
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The Superior Court of the United States has recently ruled teenage criminal defendants cannot be sentenced to death because their brains are not fully developed, and yet there is an unread MRI of this teenage criminal defendant's brain, taken just after shooting 15 fellow students and school personal, but no lawyer appointed had it examined, considered, or used in defense. When? Where? What Court takes this claim seriously?\textsuperscript{182}

This claim is pending and, given the complicated habeas posture, likely will not be resolved for some time.\textsuperscript{183} However, similar efforts to defeat evidence of specific intent to kill, or of premeditation, by recourse to brain science all have failed.

Pittman, for example, argued that "the portion of the brain that gives one the cognitive capacity to satisfactorily perform acts such as forming malice . . . is underdeveloped in a twelve-year-old."\textsuperscript{184} The court found the argument "unconvincing given the nature of the criminal acts," pointing to evidence that the child acquired a gun, waited until his grandparents were asleep, "executed an escape plan, and concocted a false story" to mislead police.\textsuperscript{185} As such actions by an adult would be sufficient to infer either a conscious plan to cause death or an awareness that death would (and did) result, it was considered a fortiori to allow the same inference for a child. Similarly, a Tennessee court rejected expert testimony about adolescent brain development in determining that a fifteen-year-old premeditated the killing of her grandparents.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182} Williams, 2007 WL 925834, at *8 (quoting motion for coram vobis). These arguments have now been echoed by Williams's habeas counsel. See Williams Apr. 2007 Filing, supra note 180, at 11–13 (asserting that MRI and other evidence as to adolescent brains show unconstitutionality of Williams's waiver of rights, guilty plea, and sentence).

\textsuperscript{183} Williams's claim is unlikely ever to provide significant guidance on the relevance of brain science to mental-state defenses, as it will be filtered through the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), test for ineffectiveness of counsel—meaning that a court easily could find that the relevance of such evidence was sufficiently unclear in 2001 as to preclude a claim that counsel was neglectful in failing to pursue it.

\textsuperscript{184} State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 163 (S.C. 2007).

\textsuperscript{185} Id. ("Appellant's story was so detailed that it led law enforcement on an extensive ruse for most of the morning following his discovery.").

In like fashion, Garcia invoked brain science to assert that fifteen-, sixteen-, and seventeen-year-olds are so generally incapable of forming a "willful, deliberate and premeditated" mens rea as to invalidate their wholesale transfer to adult court when charged with first-degree murder, and was granted a hearing at which to present expert testimony.\(^{187}\) That hearing, though, revealed that Garcia was not so much arguing that teens cannot (or do not) satisfy the legal test for specific intent as he was arguing for a different conception of the mental state morally justifying conviction of a teen for intentional murder. His own experts agreed that adolescents are capable of forming specific intent.\(^{188}\) Their main point about brain immaturity was a not testify regarding the development of the Appellant's brain or that she, specifically, was incapable of exercising judgment" but nonetheless finding that "[r]egardless of her young age, the circumstances surrounding the shootings, both before and after, demonstrate premeditation").

187 See Motion to Dismiss First Degree Murder and Felony Murder Charges as Unconstitutional at 9, 13, State v. Garcia, No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Garcia Motion to Dismiss]; see also id. at 17 (asking to present expert testimony that brain immaturity "precludes juveniles from considering the consequences of their actions"). Three mental-state questions were at issue: juveniles' capacity to form specific intent, Garcia's capacity to do so, and whether he actually did so. See, e.g., Reporter's Transcript of Apr. 26-27, 2007 at 13, Garcia, No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Garcia Transcript I] (stating the court's understanding that the issue "was the science behind the question of the maturation of the human brain, not David's brain, per se," that "[a]ll brains mature, basically, the same way," and that "as a class . . . the brains of juveniles are not as fully developed as an adult"). Garcia's brain-science arguments were issues of first impression. Garcia Reply, supra note 164, at 12 ("[T]he Defense has not found a New Mexico state case in which a reviewing court has directly considered the impact of Roper and brain development research . . .").


much deeper one: that though a typical teenager literally is capable of intending his actions and their consequences, his technically sufficient mental state is substantively irrational.\footnote{189} For example, an adolescent might intend the victim to die, but he lacks a meaningful conception of what it means for a person to be dead.\footnote{190} Even if true, that point is also irrelevant unless a court were willing to adopt a substantively deep concept of the applicable mens rea. The experts' secondary point was about odds: that the planning and forethought contemplated by New Mexico law is far less common in adolescents is to develop beyond age 18.”). At the hearing Gur gave a PowerPoint presentation about adolescent brain development, concluding that a typical juvenile will, because of incomplete myelination and pruning, be less able to “make the appropriate executive decision at the time of upheaval or excitement,” control aggressive impulses, and anticipate and plan for the future. Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 46–48 (testimony of Gur).

Both experts conceded the ability to form specific intent. \textit{id. at 64} (testimony of Gur) (“I’m not saying that juveniles are unable to form an intent.”); \textit{id. at 3} (testimony of Beyer) (testifying that Garcia was capable of forming specific intent). A third expert testified that Garcia did not actually form such intent. \textit{See id. at 59} (testimony of Thomas Calvin Thompson) (“[T]he indications in the neuropsychological testing, the prolonged history of stress and depression, and the extreme high level of vulnerability of his system to emotional overload would have prevented him from the criteria for specific intent.”).

\footnote{189} \textit{See Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 74} (testimony of Gur) (explaining that while children can and do plan, the real “question is the quality of their consideration,” that is, “the extent to which they’re able to premeditate in a rational fashion”); \textit{id. at 89, 131–32} (expressing the view that children can plan, but their quick decisions are bad ones); \textit{id. at 185} (testimony of Beyer) (“[T]eenagers can form intent, but . . . the way they think it through is often not rational . . . .”); \textit{id. at 227} (noting that Garcia’s actions in obtaining gun showed ability to form intent while “not being able to think rationally”); \textit{id. at 258} (stating that individual assessment should focus not just on teen’s intent “but also their ability to think rationally”).

The State’s experts agreed that adolescents are capable of forming specific intent, but applied straightforward definitions of planning and forethought. \textit{See, e.g.,} Reporter’s Transcript of May 10, 2007, at 212, \textit{Garcia,} No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter \textit{Garcia Transcript II]} (testimony of Adrian Raine) (concluding that in order to convince him that teens can’t “form intent and make an informed decision,” intent would have to be defined other than by its ordinary meaning); \textit{cf. Morse, supra note 59, at 407} (asserting that advocates’ mens rea claims necessarily must concede a “\textit{prima facie} case for guilt” but urge that youth “are nonetheless less criminally responsible because they have insufficiently developed rationality”).

\footnote{190} \textit{See Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 140–42} (testimony of Gur) (asserting that, in part due to “lack of development of the brain,” “teenagers don’t really have a concept of what it means to kill or die”); \textit{cf. id. at 223} (testimony of Beyer) (testifying that Garcia understood that “guns kill people” but did not anticipate death of victim).
acting impulsively, particularly in emotionally intense situations.\textsuperscript{191} That point, even if true, also is irrelevant unless a court were willing to find that specific intent is so rare in teenagers who kill as to upset the legislative transfer scheme on its face, rather than leaving that determination in the individual instance to prosecutors (in selecting the charges) and factfinders (in determining whether adequate planning has been proven). The \textit{Garcia} court apparently was uninterested in taking either step, as it summarily rejected both arguments.\textsuperscript{192} As in \textit{Pittman}, the court hewed closely to traditional mens rea definitions and deferred to legislative choices.\textsuperscript{193}

\textit{Reasonableness.} If brain-based challenges to specific intent have been unsuccessful because of the relatively undemanding prevailing conception of that mens rea, challenges going to reasonableness might fare better. Failure to foresee consequences is culpable only where such failure constitutes a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have foreseen, and the developmental attributes of one’s age are part of one’s “situation.”\textsuperscript{194} Thus,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{191} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at 73–74, 89 (testimony of Gur) (arguing that conscious planning and consideration of consequences are unlikely when teen experiencing “emotional upheaval”).
\item \textsuperscript{192} See \textit{Garcia Denial Order}, \textit{supra} note 169, at 2–4.
\item \textsuperscript{193} A similar result obtained in a case in which a ten-year-old unsuccessfully argued that he was unable to form specific intent to commit “mayhem” and aggravated assault. His appellate counsel relied in part “on recent scientific studies that purport to show that brain development plays a crucial role in a child’s ability to understand the consequences of his actions.” Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 864 N.E.2d 13, 20 n.8 (Mass. 2007); \textit{see also id.} at 19 n.6, 20 n.8 (rejecting “evidence that children between the ages of seven and fourteen years are incapable of committing criminal acts because of insufficient brain development,” out of “respect for the legislative process” and because the data, which was not part of the record, did not refer specifically to the defendant (quoting Mass. Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. Of Educ., 767 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Mass. 2002))).
\item In an additional case, a fifteen-year-old convicted of shooting two students at his high school appealed the trial court’s rejection of his insanity plea. On a post-\textit{Roper} appeal he argued that due process requires that teens be judged by not by the M’Naghten test for insanity but by the “irresistible impulse” test, “because adolescents’ brains are less developed than adults’ brains in regions related to impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning” and therefore they “may understand their actions or know that they are wrong, but still be unable to control [their] behavior.” State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). As the claim was raised for the first time on appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to reach it. \textit{See id.} at 713.
\item \textsuperscript{194} \textit{MODEL PENAL CODE} § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (“A person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . [and that] disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”); \textit{id.} § 2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently
doctrinal barriers to consideration of developmental factors are lower in this context. Notwithstanding this relatively open space, however, adolescent brain science generally has failed to persuade.

Courts' first rationale is that the legislature has allowed them less interpretive room than advocates urge. State v. Heinemann makes this point. Gabriel Heinemann asked that the adult-court jury considering his duress defense be instructed on attributes of the "reasonable adolescent"; while the argued instruction would not have mentioned brain science, its content would have reflected insights drawn in part from that science. Dismissing as irrelevant "literature about the developing adolescent mind," the trial court determined that whether a person of "reasonable firmness" in Heinemann's position would have been unable to resist a threat was "a community objective standard." On appeal Heinemann and his amici again presented developmental literature, both psychological and neuroscientific. The

... when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk ... [and that] failure to perceive it ... involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

State and federal law generally allows courts to consider the impact of youth and immaturity, at least to some degree, in such determinations. Cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (noting need for flexibility to consider "special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved").

Id. at 284–89. Heinemann, sixteen years old, claimed he had been frightened into submission by two older, larger, and stronger teenagers, one of whom had a gang connection and both of whom were armed. Id. at 285–87. Under Connecticut law duress has both a subjective component—the defendant must have been sincerely afraid that he would be physically harmed—and an objective component—the threat must be such that "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-14 (West 2007). The trial court refused to instruct the jury to consider age-typical psychological attributes when determining the reasonableness of his response to the purported duress. Heinemann, 920 A.2d at 288–89, 294 (refusing instruction that age is relevant to "reasonable, moral firmness" and "moral temperament" aspects of legal test for duress, and instructing jury that Heinemann's age was a "stark tangible factor," like size and weight, that it should consider only in differentiating him from the other defendants).

Id. at 295 (repeating the defense's argument that the court should "recognize the differences between a juvenile and an adult in maturity, sense of responsibility, vulnerability, and personality traits, which make it more difficult for adolescents to resist pressures because of their limited decision-making capacity[,] . . . their susceptibility to outside influences," and their different evaluation of risks); see also id. at 296 n.19 (detailing developmental arguments, including those pertaining to recent "research on brain development," made by amici).
Connecticut Supreme Court “acknowledge[d] that juveniles often have more immature decision-making capability and recognize[d] the literature supporting the notion that juveniles are more vulnerable to all sorts of pressure, including, but not limited to, duress.”

However, it believed itself bound by the legislature’s decision to treat sixteen-year-olds as adults, including for purposes of assessing mental states. Taken to “its logical conclusion,” the court held, Heinemann’s argument would “require this Court to rewrite the entire Penal Code, crimes, and defenses, to necessitate consideration of the age of young offenders for the ultimate purpose of defining their culpability.” Developmental science was not sufficient to persuade the court to characterize as “‘clearly irrational and unreasonable’” the legislature’s decision to confine its “appreciation of the different mental abilities and susceptibilities of younger persons” to those under sixteen, and to express that appreciation not through differential definition of reasonableness but through maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system with distinct procedural attributes and sentencing outcomes.

A further rationale, previously noted in the JLWOP cases, is that a tutorial in brain science adds little or nothing to factfinders’ existing knowledge. A Minnesota appellate court reached this conclusion in the context of a defense-of-others claim in adult court. Relying (like the Heinemann court) on the legislative scheme for transfer, it refused to order instruction on the “reasonable adolescent” standard. It also approved exclusion of defendant’s proffered expert testimony about “the physiological differences between adolescent and adult brains,” which he claimed would explain why his perceptions and actions were reasonable. Such testimony, the court held, would not

200  Id. at 296.

201  Id. at 297 & n.20 (arguing that the same result would obtain even if court ignored ramifications of scientific evidence, for unless defendant could show a “‘gross and verifiable’” mental disability he is “confined to the normative function of duress” (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.09, cmt. 2 (1985))); cf. In re A.C.L., No. A06-1489, 2007 WL 447080, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2007) (refusing to disturb juvenile-court assessment that “impulsive” and “unplanned” actions, part of defendant’s imperfect self-defense claim, were “typical” of an adolescent, though not mentioning or relying on brain science).

202  Heinemann, 920 A.2d at 297 (quoting State v. Dupree, 495 A.2d 691, 697 (Conn. 1985)). The court noted a then-pending bill to extend that “appreciation” to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds; it later became law. 2007 Conn. Acts 96 (Spec. Sess.).


204  Id. at *5.
assist the jury, as “every parent and person who has gone through adolescence is familiar with and can understand the immaturity and impulsive responses of adolescents.” Thus, courts that have considered brain-based arguments going to reasonableness have found them irrelevant, both as a matter of law and a matter of fact.

Felony murder. Courts also have turned aside efforts to invalidate application to juveniles of the felony murder doctrine. Under that doctrine, the state generally need not prove intent to kill if it is able to prove intent to commit the predicate felony and a causal link to the death. Like reasonableness, the doctrine necessarily relies on group-level assumptions about what people do and should foresee; the doctrinal space is similarly somewhat open. Therefore, J.B., an Ohio thirteen-year-old convicted of the felony murder of his infant brother, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that it is unreasonable to assume that minors, particularly very young ones, would or should foresee a risk of death when committing predicate felonies. Garcia similarly claimed that brain science showed that teens generally lack the level of forethought justifying that doctrine. One of his experts testified that anatomical brain immaturity contributes to

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205 Id. at *6 (noting further that trial court had allowed psychiatrist to testify about defendant’s background, state of mind, and effects of drugs and alcohol; even if “fully informed about the physiology of adolescents’ brains” jurors would have found actions unreasonable).

206 See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 31.06[B], at 523–26 (5th ed. 2009). Even as applied to adults the doctrine is unpopular among commentators. See State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1201 (N.M. 1991) (“‘Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great a resiliency as the felony-murder rule.’” (quoting Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rub: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 446 (1985))).


209 Garcia Reply, supra note 164, at 15–19, 25 (arguing that “brain science relied upon in the Roper decision[] clearly demonstrates that proof of mens rea for felony murder would be highly problematic . . . as a matter of law,” as “a child cannot understand and appreciate the magnitude, nature, and consequences of risks” and teens cannot “intend the consequences of their acts”). New Mexico’s felony murder provision is unusually stringent; it requires both intent to commit an inherently dangerous felony and independent “proof that the defendant intended to kill, [or] . . . knew that
teens’ “difficulty in anticipating the consequences of their actions” and in seeing either “the wors[t] thing that could come from their actions” or “that there’s more than one choice.”

Though these assertions, if true, would undermine the felony murder doctrine, courts have stuck by it, relying (in a now-familiar pattern) on the legislatures’ choices to apply the same responsibility standards to adults and juveniles. The Garcia court summarily rejected the facial challenge. Though the facts in J.B. were quite sympathetic—the boy had been left home alone in charge of four younger siblings and apparently did not intend his brother’s injuries or death—and the predicate showing required of the state quite low—as it had only to prove that J.B. “recklessly abused” his brother—the state courts rejected the challenge without mention of the science, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Ability to assert or waive rights. Few courts have been directly presented with neuroscientific claims going to minors’ competence to waive rights or to face prosecution. In one such case, a sixteen-year-old challenged Colorado’s rule dispensing with a parental-presence requirement for interrogations of out-of-state runaways, arguing unsuccessfully that the rule ought to be judged by the strict scrutiny standard because juveniles’ undeveloped brains render them a sus-

his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.” Ortega, 817 P.2d at 1205 (“An unintentional or accidental killing will not suffice.”).

210 Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 170–72 (testimony of Beyer) (claiming that teens frequently “don’t think about the consequences of their actions,” showing “terrible shortsightedness” though they may see their errors in “hindsight”).


212 J.B. Certiorari Petition, supra note 208, at 15–16, 25. J.B. testified that he had accidentally hurt the baby, J.R.; lost his temper when J.R. would not stop crying; and then injured him further. J.B., 2005 WL 3610482, at *1. He and another sibling attempted CPR and tried to call for help, but their mother had removed the phone. Id. They lay J.R. in a blanket and prayed next to him until their mother came home. Id. J.R. died at the hospital. Id.

213 J.B. 2005 WL 3610482, at *13. Ohio—like most U.S. jurisdictions—requires only proof of the mens rea for the predicate felony, and many predicate felonies require only a reckless or negligent mens rea as to consequences. See J.B. Certiorari Petition, supra note 208, at 25–29.

pect class. In a small handful of other cases, defendants and amici have raised brain science as one reason why evidence—statements to police or the fruits of a consent search—should have been suppressed, and courts have simply ignored or rejected the assertion as insufficiently developed.

As in the sentencing context, though, there is a small counter-trend. In one case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court (nowhere relying on neuroscience) used the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test to conclude that a fourteen-year-old’s written confession was involuntary. Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote a lone concurrence in which she

215 People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552, 555 (Colo. App. 2005) (rejecting defendant’s argument that "juveniles lack the cognitive ability to make a knowing election under Miranda" and "occupy a special class of persons to whom additional constitutional protection ought to be afforded because ‘[t]he scientific studies on the cognitive abilities of adolescents do not differentiate between adolescents who are runaways and those who are not’"); see also Blankenship v. Estep, No. 05-cv-02066, 2008 WL 4964712, at *1, *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 18, 2008) (accepting recommendation of denial of habeas petition and citing that portion of the state court decision); Gilbert v. Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 793–95 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting habeas challenge to failure to suppress statement without parental presence, despite citation to academic article referencing brain development) (citing Kenneth J. King, Waving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 431, 432–44).

216 See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (S.C. 2007) ("Appellant has presented no evidence, other than his age, supporting his claim that his confession was involuntary. Appellant instead relies exclusively on abstract scientific data and rhetorical questions for his argument. This evidence is not probative of coercion."); see also Williams Memorandum, supra note 180, at 11–14 (challenging waiver of Miranda and guilty plea).

In another case, a coalition of advocates and scholars submitted an amicus brief relying, in part, on developmental neuroscience to urge the Massachusetts Supreme Court to suppress evidence and statements obtained from a fourteen-year-old. See Brief of the Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae at 39–41, Commonwealth v. Guthrie G., 869 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. 2007) (No. SJC-090805). The court did not mention that research when it ruled the search and interrogation lawful. See Guthrie C., 869 N.E.2d at 586. The Juvenile Law Center also has made a modest brain-science argument in the pending military-tribunal case of Omar Khadr; that case involves a number of other issues (like the military commissions' jurisdiction over minors) but also involves the voluntariness of Khadr’s statements to military interrogators. See Amicus Brief Filed by Marsha Levick on Behalf of the Juvenile Law Center at 16 n.8, United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.jlc.org/files/briefs/OK%20BRIEF.Jan.18.FINAL.pdf.

217 In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 139–40 (Wis. 2005) (applying test derived from Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), and citing Jerrell’s age, education, and low intelligence, the questioning tactics used by the police, and the fact that his parents were excluded). The court used its supervisory power to require that custodial interrogation of juveniles be electronically recorded. Id. at 122–23.
asserted eight reasons why she would go further and "adopt a per se rule, excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult"; reason number three was that "[e]merging studies demonstrate that the area of the brain governing decision making and the weighing of risks and rewards continues to develop into the late teens and the early twenties."\(^\text{218}\)

In addition, at least one competence challenge succeeded in part because of neuroscience. A California appellate court ordered competency hearings for two young boys, eleven and twelve, holding that simple "developmental immaturity" (rather than a mental or cognitive abnormality) might provide a basis for an incompetence finding.\(^\text{219}\) While the court relied primarily on psychological findings, it—unlike the trial court—also credited expert testimony about the brain immaturity of very young adolescents.\(^\text{220}\) In each of these cases the role of brain science appears to have been small, but that it was mentioned as one of many reasons to grant a juvenile defendant relief is noteworthy.

* * * *

As this Section has shown, the impact of adolescent brain science on juvenile justice has been strongly cabined by the extrinsic reality of

\(^{218}\) Id. at 135 & n.46 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Amicus parties had brought the brain science research to the court's attention. See Nonparty Brief of the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law's Bluhm Legal Clinic et al. at 1, 4 & n.2, Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110 (No. 02-3423); see also In re J.T., 851 N.E.2d 1, 25 (Ill. 2006) (Freeman, J., dissenting) (asserting that juvenile's waiver of appeal was invalid, citing, inter alia, "[s]cientific and sociological studies" language of Roper); cf State ex rel. P.M.P., 975 A.2d 441, 447-48 (N.J. 2009) (determining that filing of juvenile petition is "critical stage" of proceedings sufficient to trigger right to counsel that is nonwaivable unless counsel is present, but explicitly declining to engage with amicus parties' brain-science arguments because question was answered by statute).

\(^{219}\) Id. at 754, 755 n.12 (Dr. Edwards testified that minors are different from adults because their brains are still developing and as myelination occurs during puberty, the minor develops the ability to think logically and abstractly . . . . [B]ecause of his age, Dante's brain has not fully developed and he was unable to think in those ways. Their conclusions are supported by the literature, which indicates that there is a relationship between age and competency to stand trial and that an adolescent's cognitive, psychological, social, and moral development has a significant biological basis."; id. at 754 n.12 ("[T]he frontal lobes oversee high-level cognitive tasks such as hypothetical thinking, logical reasoning, long-range planning, and complex decision making. During puberty, that area of the brain matures as the myelination process takes place.").
Though that science has been positively received by a small number of courts and judges, usually in the context of sentencing, in no instance has it been outcome-determinative. Courts generally perceive it either as proving nothing new or as raising a challenge to the rules themselves, rather than informing an inquiry properly falling within the confines of the rules. While they sometimes are “troubled by” the rules and follow them “reluctantly,” courts generally do believe themselves to be bound to them.

Doctrine can, of course, change and therefore represents a soft target. But in this area of law it is not very soft. Because the above-described doctrinal forces are so entrenched and of such broad applicability within criminal law, adolescent brain science is inadequate to provoke deep change, at least within the courts.

B. Scientific Limitations

The previous Section delineated the many doctrinal hurdles that have largely hamstrung adolescent brain science in the courts. Some of those hurdles say far less about the merits of adolescent brain science than they do about contemporary trends generally disfavoring both juvenile claims and judicial oversight of legislatures’ criminal justice policies. However, the challenge for brain science goes deeper than doctrine. This Section demonstrates limitations that inhere in the science itself, limitations that show some the courts’ general reticence sometimes to be well placed.

221 See Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 98 (manuscript at 32) (noting that teens’ “lack of maturity does nothing to mitigate their culpability under criminal law doctrine as it exists today”).

222 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (No. 06-7949) (question of Souter, J.) (arguing that defendant’s assertions about immaturity, if true, “should be accepted in every case,” because “the brain is less developed in the case of everyone under a certain age” and arguing that “that amounts, in effect, to a rejection of the policy for a certain swath of individuals, relatively young individuals, for whom the judge is saying age is relevant, the policy says age is not”).

223 People v. Pratcher, No. A117122, 2009 WL 2332183, at *44 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2009); see also State v. Allen, 958 A.2d 1214, 1236 (Conn. 2008) (commenting that JLWOP raises “deeply troubling questions” but stating that “the wisdom of this sentencing scheme remains with the legislature”).

224 These difficulties are not unique to young defendants; mentally retarded persons have to date been similarly unable to leverage Atkins into greater judicial relief. See Barkow, supra note 132, at 1161–62.
1. Individual Differences

The most significant current limitation of developmental neuroscience is its inability to inform individual assessment. Imaging studies that show group trends in structural maturity—such as relative levels of myelination in prefrontal cortex—do not show that all individuals in the group perfectly reflect the trend. Normal brains follow a unique developmental path bounded roughly by the general trajectory; that is, while all humans will pass through the same basic stages of structural maturation at more or less the same stages of life, the precise timing and manner in which they do so will vary. Moreover, such variation cannot be detected or interpreted in any legally meaningful way. Neither structural nor functional imaging can determine whether any given individual has a “mature brain” in any respect, though imaging might reveal gross pathology. Researchers therefore consistently agree that developmental neuroscience cannot at present generate reliable predictions or findings about an individual’s behavioral maturity. Courts thus have a strong basis for deeming brain science irrelevant to many highly individualized claims, such as whether a defendant was able to form specific intent.

Indeed, the cases reflect the difficulties posed by individual variation. Legal decisionmakers display incredulity, even annoyance, when general lessons about the adolescent brain appear to conflict with evidence about the individual juvenile. One particularly vivid account

225 Casey et al., supra note 28, at 119–21; Morse, supra note 59, at 403–04, 404 n.4.
226 See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 24 (“Within any given individual, the developmental timetable of different aspects of maturation may vary markedly . . . . [D]evelopment rarely follows a straight line during adolescence—periods of progress often alternate with periods of regression. . . . Variability between individuals is still more important . . . .”). The problem of individual variation is present in all biological research. See, e.g., Steven Pinker, My Genome, My Self, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2009, at 24, 28–29 (asserting that though “a substantial fraction of the variation among individuals . . . can be linked to variation in their genes . . . no one knows what the nongenetic causes of individuality are”).
227 See Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial, SCI. NEWS, May 28, 2004, at 299, 299 (“There’s no way to say whether . . . an individual 17-year-old possesses a fully mature brain.”); Gur, supra note 119, at 15 (agreeing with that idea).
228 See Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development and juvenile justice, supra note 10, at 4 (testimony of Woolard); Baird, supra note 39, at 121; Henderson, supra note 7, at 5 (“[S]cience has not progressed to the point where an individual adolescent’s brain scan can be used to back up any one of these propositions in an individual case.”); see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 27) (noting that individual differences are a troubling issue for neuroscience and criminal law generally).
of that phenomenon was offered by a Delaware judge who presided over a juvenile capital case while *Roper* was pending. In a pretrial hearing, Michael Jones presented the testimony of Ruben Gur "that juveniles are less criminally culpable than adults because the area of their brains controlling foresight, goal setting, and ability to plan are not yet fully developed." Gur later offered such testimony at trial, alongside the testimony of one Dr. Ragland, a psychologist who had examined Jones. Recounts the court:

Dr. Ragland discovered that Jones is an exceptionally gifted planner. Dr. Ragland testified that Jones' scores regarding planning and ability to foresee consequences were "off the charts," and were, indeed, higher than any he had ever seen. This admission, which Dr. Ragland repeated *ad nauseum*, annihilated Jones' only viable defense: that, as a juvenile, he was too young to reasonably calculate the possible outcomes of his murderous rampage, and to plan accordingly. It also eliminated another proposed mitigating factor: that a sentence of life imprisonment would ensure that Jones would never again threaten society. The State used Dr. Ragland's testimony to suggest that Jones would use his exceptional gift for planning to formulate an escape, endangering corrections officers and the public at large. . . .

When Dr. Gur took the stand as the next defense witness, explaining the complicated science of brain development and its nexus to planning ability, the jury appeared disinterested. Their courtroom demeanor, as well as their sentencing recommendation, made it clear that the jury viewed the medical evidence as mere "psychobabble" meant to mislead them into excusing an inexcusable crime. This was despite the fact that Dr. Gur is a superb witness: engaging, charismatic, highly expert, and convincing. There simply was no way for him to salvage the train wreck . . . of the defense case.

Similarly, in *Garcia* the state was able to rebut the notion that anatomical immaturity necessarily manifests itself in a lack of meaningful appreciation of death by showing that Garcia himself had such

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1116 (Ill. 2007) (overruling, in part, the sentencing court, which had found that testimony as to Clark's "mature and respectful" nature "[r]eally destroy[ed] any far fetched argument that he had a frontal lobe that wasn't developed").

230 *See* State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2005 WL 950122 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2005) (denying motion for new trial). The many opinions in *Jones* reveal a high level of acrimony between the trial judge and defense counsel. The context of extreme antipathy likely colors the judge's description. However, given the jury's vote for death there is no reason to question its basic accuracy.


232 *Id.* at *4–6.
appreciation; he was deeply affected by the recent death of his grandmother and frequently worried that his gravely ill mother would die. The Gonzales court, too, remarked that “[r]egardless of whether the nature of the adolescent brain produces behavior that is more impulsive than an adult’s . . . [Gonzales’s] conduct in this case reveals a high degree of individual culpability.” Neuroscience may provide marginal support for categorically limiting the sanctions that may be imposed on juveniles, but it has little to offer in assessing the mental state, capacity for rehabilitation, or other law-relevant attributes of any given juvenile.

2. Structure v. Behavior

A related difficulty stems from the reality that structural and functional differences between individual brains may not correspond with predictable or discernable differences in behavior. Just as scientists cannot look at an individual teen’s brain and conclude that she has a particular level of behavioral maturity, observers cannot look at a teen’s behavior and deduce the structural or functional maturity of her brain. This is not an issue only for individual determinations, for even at the group level there are few data demonstrating a clear

233 Garcia I Transcript, supra note 187, at 225 (testimony of Beyer) (answering “yes” when asked if Garcia “comprehended death really well”).


235 Cf. Emens, supra note 58, at 61, 88-89 (arguing that a categorical prophylactic rule against juvenile execution is justifiable if case-by-case assessment of maturity and culpability creates undue risk of irrational, discriminatory decisions).

236 Experts sometimes fall into this trap. For example, in Garcia, Dr. Gur, asked to explain the Columbine school shooters’ extensive planning, replied that the planning and the crime itself were “a good illustration of failure of myelination.” Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 92-93 (testimony of Gur). Such an argument is circular, in that any bad act by a juvenile can be characterized as evidence of defective brain processes. Cf. Baird, supra note 39, at 118 (asserting that “there are some criminals who have very functional brains” but offend because of other factors, such as “deprived backgrounds”). Conversely, a military prosecutor sought (unsuccessfully) to elicit expert testimony that Omar Khadr’s allegedly deliberate actions likely reflected brain maturity. See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 8-9).
The link between structural immaturity and immature behavior. The structure-behavior hypothesis is a strong one, as brain attributes often correlate with specific behaviors, and a significant developmental stage is highly likely to manifest in behavior. Developmental psychology provides a picture of the attitudes and behaviors that typify adolescents; neuroscience provides a picture of the brain maturation processes that typify adolescence; and the latter can be interpreted in such a way as to provide a plausible, partial explanation for the former. But though it is highly plausible that “[a]dolescents’ behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains,” science has not determined the nature or extent of that mirroring.

Advocates, commentators, and defenders unnecessarily overstate the case when they claim that imaging studies explain adolescent behavior, let alone any given adolescent’s behavior. Courts also have a basis for believing neural explanations to be less probative than behavioral ones. The Supreme Court displayed that defensible per-

237 See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77, 83 (2004); Spear, supra note 34, at 26 (“What is clear at this early point . . . is that the brain undergoes considerable sculpting and remodeling during adolescence. What remains a challenge is to detail the extent of this restructuring, its functional ramifications, and the opportunities and vulnerabilities provided by this unique transition for the adolescent.”).

238 See Casey et al., supra note 28, at 104 (detailing efforts to determine extent to which brain development “parallel[s] behavioral and cognitive development,” but warning against “common trap” of claiming “causality between coincidental changes in brain and behavioral development”); Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race, Behavior, and the Brain: The Role of Neuroimaging in Understanding Complex Social Behaviors, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 747, 755 (2003) (explaining that though complex behavior is “mapped” onto the brain, there is no “one-to-one correspondence between a behavior and a brain structure”). But see Strauch, supra note 4, at 21 (asserting that it “can’t be just a coincidence” that most dramatic stages of behavioral change coincide with most dramatic stages of brain remodeling).

239 See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 36, at 111 (positing “biologically plausible model of the neural mechanisms underlying . . . changes in behavior”); Morse, supra note 59, at 409 (“At most, the neuroscientific evidence provides a partial causal explanation of why the observed behavioral differences exist and thus some further evidence of the validity of the behavioral differences.”).

240 AMA Brief, supra note 76, at 10; see also Garcia Transcript II, supra note 189, at 208–10 (testimony of Raine) (taking issue not with the defense’s description of adolescent brain maturation but with the argued behavioral and legal implications); id. at 77–79 (testimony of Edward Siegal) (conceding accuracy of testimony about structural brain development but questioning such development’s “functional impact”); Aronson, supra note 2, at 132 (noting AMA’s “interpretative leap” in their brief).

241 See Phelps & Thomas, supra note 238, at 748 (“Although brain science can inform our understanding of complex human behaviors, it cannot help us predict human behavior with any more certainty than can be derived from examining behav-
spective in *Roper* by relying overtly on historical beliefs and legal precedent rooted in direct experience with teenagers' behavior—about which "any parent knows"—and in the behavior-based findings of developmental psychology.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^2\)

3. Relative Deficiency

Even if one credits the strongest hypotheses about the behavioral impact of brain immaturity, that impact cannot automatically claim legal significance. Psychological studies show that adolescents are consistently less able than adults to implement fast, appropriate, and mature responses to environmental challenges; neuroscience suggests that these relative deficiencies are partly attributable not to bad character but to biological constraints attending developmental processes.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^3\) But relative deficiency—for example, in impulse control—does not establish that the deficiency is legally meaningful or that any individual failure of control is excusable. It instead implies that, compared to a similar failure in an adult, it is less blameworthy to the extent that its avoidance would have required more effort, through no fault of the child's own.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^4\) Relative deficiencies do not necessarily take juveniles below a legal threshold but may instead show that they exceed it by a lower margin.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^5\) Where to set that threshold relative to juvenile deficits is, at its core, a moral and legal determination, not a scientific one.

Unfortunately, defenders and experts often treat the legal significance of the science as a given; indeed, they sometimes bypass the relative-deficiency point altogether and devolve into hard biological determinism.\(^2\)\(^4\)\(^6\) They sometimes argue, for example, that because of...
their immature brains, adolescents can’t make good decisions under stress, control their emotions, suppress violent impulses, foresee consequences, or defy antisocial peers. The cases reveal that legal decisionmakers are, by and large, unprepared to accept flat assertions of inability. Such assertions conflict with everyday observations (and, often, record evidence) that most teenagers make good choices most of the time and that offenders, too, make socially beneficial, self-protective, or strategic choices, sometimes within the context of the offense behavior itself. The prosecutor in Garcia, for example, noted that Garcia had previously threatened his girlfriend with a gun but had not shot her, something for which his experts had little explanation except that at one moment he was able to exert self-control and at another he was not. Such evidence might be contextualized by explaining that juveniles’ capacity for self-control is less stable than adults’, but that is a relative-deficiency point that may not be legally meaningful. Courts should not be expected to assume the legal relevance of relative deficiency; that relevance must be directly and adequately defended.

not get in the way “of learning more about the biological contributors to behaviors and propensities”).

247 See, e.g., Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 16–17 (testimony of David Fassler, M.D.) (“[A]dolescents act on impulse. When they see a stimulus or they are in a frightening situation, they don’t have the physical cognitive capacity, the developed pre-frontal lobes that say I shouldn’t do this because there are X, Y, or Z consequences.”); Casey Jones Motion, supra note 166, at 9 (stating that “science tell us that Casey did not have the logical reasoning and decision-making skills” to comprehend the import of carrying a gun near school, and “science tells us that the underdeveloped nature of Casey’s brain means that when acting he does not process differently based on the location of where he is or where he plans to be”); id. at 19–20 (asserting the same claim for juveniles in general); Garcia Motion to Dismiss, supra note 187, at 9 (“[J]uveniles under 18 are incapable of possessing the mens rea required for capital offenses.”); id. at 12 (asserting that the “inability of juveniles to modulate their emotional responses and make rational decisions is a biological fact”); Rethinking the Juvenile, supra note 7, at 10 (“[D]eterrence does not work with juveniles.”).

248 See Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 218–19, 246 (testimony of Beyer) (conceding that adolescents sometimes make good decisions under stress); Bower, supra note 227, at 301 (quoting Harvard’s Jerome Kagan as saying that teens must usually be able to “restrain their darker urges,” or we would “be having Columbine incidents every week”).

249 Garcia Transcript II, supra note 189, at 40–41 (testimony of Thompson) (responding to the question of how he knew Garcia was, by reason of frontal lobe disinhibition, unable to inhibit an impulse to shoot the victim when he had inhibited similar impulses at other emotionally intense moments, by offering as evidence the fact that he did shoot her).
4. Age Limits

Neuroscience also tends to run headlong into a perennial difficulty in juvenile justice: the search for a stable justification for pegging law’s relative solicitude to the eighteenth birthday. Because it is implausible to posit that any given date constitutes a maturational tipping point, courts and theorists historically have relied on practical concerns justifying line-drawing.\(^{250}\) States’ choices are not consistent: while most terminate juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen, others choose seventeen or sixteen; all allow adult treatment of younger children in some circumstances; and all recognize different age milestones for benefits and responsibilities such as driving, voting, and drinking.\(^{251}\) Adolescent brain science has not offered a theory by which this erratic line-drawing might be harmonized and may have further muddied the waters.

Developmental neuroscience consistently indicates that structural brain maturation is incomplete at age eighteen. Though estimates vary, many scientists have opined that structural maturation is not complete until the mid-twenties.\(^{252}\) Some also have opined—including in court testimony—that just as brain maturation is completed by the mid-twenties, it starts to decline in middle age, perhaps as early as age forty-five.\(^{253}\) Taking neuroscience as the proper benchmark therefore would suggest that the criminal justice system systematically should recognize the brain deficiencies of both young adults and the


\(^{251}\) See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 579–88 & apps. A–D.

\(^{252}\) See Gur Patterson Declaration, supra note 68, at 3 (citing a “congruence of evidence” that maturation is complete “about age 21”); Bower, supra note 227, at 300 (relating Baird’s belief that maturity is achieved at “25 or 26”); Sabbagh, supra note 2, at 24 (stating that Giedd was “surprised” at “how long [the brain] changes into young adulthood”). But see State v. Daniel, No. M2005-01211-CCA-R3, 2006 WL 3071929, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 30, 2006) (invoking an expert opining that “age 20 is when the full maturation process in 99 percent of individuals growing is—is peaked out”).

\(^{253}\) Gur Patterson Declaration, supra note 68, at 12–13 (stating that men experience “age-associated decline” earlier than women); Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 109 (testimony of Gur) (noting that the “brain begins to deteriorate at roughly after age 45”); see also Luna & Sweeney, supra note 243, at 299 (observing that “response inhibition” improves as children develop, but “diminish[es] in the aged”); Bower, supra note 227, at 301 (reporting the results of a study, Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span, 6 Nature Neuroscience 309, 312 (2003), showing that myelination peaks around age 45).
elderly. Not only would such a position be politically untenable, particularly because young men between eighteen and twenty-four have a high criminal offense rate, it would dilute any argument that there is something so developmentally special about age eighteen as to justify juvenile treatment for all below that age. Scholars and advocates understandably have conceded the date's artificiality but point to a societal consensus as to its significance. Some articulate a deeper rationale: that eighteen is a reasonable guess as to when most people will have crossed an important developmental threshold even though they will continue to mature significantly. However, as with relative deficiency, science cannot define that threshold, nor can it tell us precisely when it is likely to have been crossed. Further, other evidence suggests that most adolescents achieve intellectual and cognitive maturity, though not psychosocial maturity, by the mid-teenage years. There is, therefore, some law-relevant decisional maturation before eighteen, and it is not yet clear how to harmonize those

254 Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 108 (testimony of Gur) (answering "unfortunately, . . . yes" when asked if "older people become less culpable because they're losing gray matter or parts of their mind"). One obvious distinction is that the elderly, unlike youth, have significant life experience on which to draw, and which may well compensate for much neural decline when making important decisions. This is a behavioral and environmental argument, not a neuroscientific one.


256 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 5, at 70–81.

257 Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 12–14 (testimony of Fassler) (stating that "certainly the vast majority of eighteen-year-olds will, at least from a biological, cognitive development standpoint," have capacity to be legally responsible for their actions).

258 See Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 ("Few people doubt that the brains of 13-year-old teens differ from the brains of 25-year-old adults. But the research doesn't make the types of age-graded distinctions that the new waiver laws make, especially in the critical age span of 14 through 19. . . . The legislatures and the courts are much more concerned with the fine distinctions of 15 versus 16 versus 17 years of age."). But see Casey Jones Motion, supra note 166, at 21 ("The brain of the 15, 16, and 17 year old is underdeveloped, just as is the brain of the 12, 13, and 14 year old.").

259 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 119; Baird, supra note 39, at 97–99; Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 1021 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 51, 54 (2004). Competence studies reliably show, for example, that sixteen-year-olds have greater capacity than younger teens for understanding Miranda warnings. Thomas Grisso, What We Know about Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in Youth on Trial, supra note 1, at 139, 149–50. See generally Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights (1981) (finding that younger adolescents are far less likely to assert their rights when in custody than older adolescents).
findings with brain maturation. Just as neuroscience is not responsible for the difficulties of line-drawing, it does not resolve them.

Courts therefore rightly tend not to see in brain science significant support for a sharp dividing line at age eighteen. Generally this inures to youths’ disadvantage, as when courts refuse to second-guess the legislatures’ choice of the age at which children face transfer.260 Sometimes, though, this inures to a defendant’s advantage. An unexpected finding of the case analysis is that a good number of the cases reflecting successful brain-based defense arguments involve young adults.261 An Illinois appellate court, for example, reduced an eighteen-year-old’s forty-four-year sentence to thirty-six years, pointing to his great “rehabilitative potential,” and in so doing appeared to endorse expert testimony on brain development.262 Similarly, in United States v. Gall263 a federal district court noted that “human brain development may not become complete until the age of twenty-five” before granting a downward departure to a man whose offense behavior occurred before he turned twenty-one and who had demonstrated rehabilitative potential.264 That language was approvingly cited by the

260 The state’s experts in Garcia, for example, questioned whether brain science proves so few developmental differences between older teens and those fourteen and under as to delegitimize the legislature’s choice to expose only the former to mandatory transfer, a position with which the court appeared to agree. See Garcia Transcript II, supra note 189, at 208–10, 238–43 (testimony of Raine).

261 See supra note 119 (addressing four of eleven arguably “successful” arguments made by young adults). Qualitatively, it is striking that these cases are among those reflecting the most full-throated embrace of developmental neuroscience. But see Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 246 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (denying habeas petition for defendant convicted of capital murder committed when nineteen, and concluding that proffered 2004 brain-development study was not “newly discovered evidence”); Hodges v. State, 912 So. 2d 730, 764 (Miss. 2005) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in a capital sentencing proceeding for failing to call an expert on adolescent brain science, particularly given that the nineteen-year-old defendant was “legally an adult”).

262 People v. Clark, 869 N.E.2d 1019, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), app. denied, 875 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 2007). Clark, granted a new sentencing hearing on other grounds, called Gur to testify about adolescent brain development. Id. at 1026. The sentencing court found Gur’s testimony “very fascinating” but declined to give it any weight, as Gur had not examined Clark’s brain. Id. at 1040. The appellate court appeared to criticize the lower court on this ground. Id. at 1042 (appearing to disagree with the lower court’s assessment that testimony “about generally accepted studies involving the brain development in adolescents . . . did not offer anything helpful”).


264 Id. at 762 n.2; see also id. (“Recent studies on the development of the human brain [are] of critical importance in the area of criminal law . . . . The Supreme Court based its most recent death penalty decision, Roper v. Simmons, on studies indicating
Supreme Court in upholding the departure. Other courts have cited developmental neuroscience when granting sentencing concessions to young adults, including one case in which the judge noted—in dicta, as the defendant was twenty-two—that he had "conducted a review of the scientific literature in this area and believes there is compelling evidence that the judicial system's longstanding principle of treating youth offenders differently than adult offenders is justified in part based on the unformed nature of the adolescent brain."266

The fact that such evidence is having at least as much, if not more, influence in young-adult than juvenile cases is striking. Several explanations suggest themselves. First, many of the juvenile challenges were broader, taking on (for example) entire sentencing schemes, while the adult cases were narrow appeals to an allowable exercise of mercy at sentencing.267 This cannot be the entire story, as some unsuccessful juvenile claims shared that characteristic;268 how-

[265] The departure initially was overturned by the Eighth Circuit, but the Supreme Court reversed. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 601 (2007) ("Given the dramatic contrast between Gall's behavior before he joined the conspiracy and his conduct after withdrawing, it was not unreasonable for the District Judge to view Gall's immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, and his later behavior as a sign that he had matured and would not engage in such impetuous and ill-considered conduct in the future.").

[266] United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Gall, Roper, and NIMH, TEENAGE BRAIN, supra note 153, and imposing relatively lenient sentence on twenty-two-year-old convicted of possession of child pornography, observing that defendant had begun viewing such materials when just fourteen). Like Gall, Stern had demonstrated rehabilitative potential. Id. at 955.

Additionally, an Idaho appellate court overturned a lower-court decision denying a twenty-year-old defendant's request for a neuropsychological evaluation to aid in sentencing. See State v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 678–80 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008). The defendant had raised a sufficient issue as to his "neurocognitive abnormalities," and the appellate court believed defendant's proffered evidence about normal brain development to be relevant to that showing. Id. at 679–80 (presenting neuropsychiatrist's summarized research on brain maturation processes that continue "well into [the] late 20s" and chiding lower court for not considering such research). Numerous other factors also supported the appellate court's order of resentencing. See id. at 680–81 (citing, inter alia, sentencing judge's apparent disapproval of legislative scheme for murder sentencing).


[268] See Clark, 869 N.E.2d at 1042.
ever, it is buttressed by the fact that most of the marginal juvenile successes also fit that model. Second, perhaps these judges would have taken the same position had the defendants been juveniles, but also believed that evidence of continuing neural development counsels that the relative solicitude historically limited to those under eighteen ought also extend to young adults. Third, and on a deeper level, perhaps juveniles asserting such claims appear to courts to be unusual juveniles, that is, more calculating, callous, and dangerous, while these young adults appear to be unusual adult offenders, that is, less calculating, callous, and dangerous. The developmental attributes thought to stem from brain maturation may seem to conflict with perceptions of the former and to cohere with perceptions of the latter; that is, the perceived relevance of brain science may stem not from its inherent persuasive power but from the degree to which it challenges or confirms perceptions based on other factors.

Whatever the explanation, the lack of clear age-limit implications for developmental neuroscience poses a challenge to those who seek thus to justify sharp dividing lines.

5. Equality and Autonomy Commitments

Finally, direct reliance on developmental neuroscience implicates commitments to equality and teen autonomy. While the latter danger

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270 See Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 755–58 (arguing that the jurisdictional age for juvenile court should be raised to benefit “emerging adults”).
271 See, e.g., State v. Ninham, 767 N.W.2d 326, 329–30 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Ninham’s crime was unusual for its senseless and extreme brutality. When combined with his lack of remorse, his prior record and other crimes he committed while awaiting trial, his case is distinguished from other juveniles arrested for murder or manslaughter.”); cf. Emens, supra note 58, at 77 (noting that jurors might perceive juveniles facing death penalty as so unlike normal children as to seem “monstrous, evil, or genetically defective”).
272 This, too, is unlikely to be a full explanation, as some juveniles appeared to present sympathetically. See, e.g., In re J.B., No. CA2004-09-226, 2005 WL 5610482, at *18–20 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005) (noting that the court took “no pleasure” in sentencing the juvenile defendant); cf. Michele Deitch et al., From Time Out To Hard Time 2–5 (2009), available at http://utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/From%20Time%20Out%20to%20Hard%20Time-revised%20final.pdf (offering far more sympathetic narrative of Christopher Pittman than appears in courts’ opinions). The role of belief confirmation is discussed further infra Part III.
has been partially addressed by commentators, both remain worrisome.

Just as developmental neuroscience might, if taken literally, counsel special treatment of the elderly, it might counsel differential treatment of girls and boys. Brain maturation is importantly linked to puberty, and girls tend to reach puberty significantly earlier than boys. Though physical and sexual maturity are poor proxies for either brain maturity or cognitive development, there is a clear gender differential, likely linked to pubertal onset. Girls, on average, experience early-adolescence neural exuberance—particularly in the frontal lobes—at least a year before boys, and possibly more. If structural brain maturity were the correct legal metric, it would counsel that boys and girls become subject to juvenile-court jurisdiction, and age out of it, at different times; indeed, one testifying expert has conceded as much.

The behavioral implications of brain-level gender differences are largely unknown. Whatever they may be, law should not track


274 Dahl, supra note 273, at 15–18 (stating that capacity for “planning, logic, reasoning ability, inhibitory control, problem solving, and understanding consequences,” seem to depend on age and experience rather than timing of puberty; however, studies have shown “a significant positive correlation between pubertal maturation and sensation seeking” in both boys and girls, which is associated with greater risk-taking behaviors).

275 Brizendine, supra note 4, at 44 (claiming that the female brain “matures two or three years earlier the male brain”); Strauch, supra note 4, at 54 (citing study showing girls’ faster myelination, which “may be one reason why young girls often seem to attain emotional maturity before boys”); Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 862–63 (noting that the earlier gray-matter peak in girls corresponds with “earlier age of onset of puberty” and “suggests a possible influence of gonadal hormones”); Giedd, supra note 237, at 79, 82 (noting other gender differentials, such as overall cerebral volume). But see Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 13 (testimony of Fassler) (“We have not found differences in boys and girls in the research that has been done to date . . . . The research we have so far does not show differences in that level of brain development.”).

276 Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 65 (testimony of Gur) (stating that, because girls’ brains mature faster, “biology would say” that they should be held to a different standard for accountability than boys); see also Buss, supra note 13, at 513 (raising similar concern about gender implications).

277 Giedd, supra note 237, at 83 (“The connection between these structural changes and behavioral changes is only beginning to be elucidated.”); Charles A. Nel-
them. Indeed, behavioral research already shows that boys and girls have markedly different propensities for violence and lawbreaking, and law rightly does not officially impose more severe punishment for girls' violent acts because they are less normative. While the equality concern is most evident for gender, it is not confined to it. It would apply to any group for whom a statistically significant developmental trend could be identified, including racial or socioeconomic groups. As race is strongly linked to age of pubertal onset—it is well documented, for example, that African American girls tend to begin puberty much earlier than white American girls—boys and girls of different races might be subject to different rules.

Any argument that law's treatment of children should track developmental neuroscience must demonstrate why such inequality is not its logical outcome, and the only way to do so is to concede that neuroscience (and, for that

son, Brain Development During Puberty and Adolescence, 1021 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 105, 108 (2004) ("[W]hat are the functional correlates of changes in gray and white matter before and after puberty, and how do these morphological changes account for sex differences?"); Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd & William D.S. Killgore, Fear-Related Activity in the Prefrontal Cortex Increases with Age During Adolescence: A Preliminary fMRI Study, 406 Neuroscience Letters 194, 198 (2006) (stating that sex differences in frontal activation contribute to "rapidly growing evidence supporting sex-related differences in neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and neurocognitive functioning"). Caution is particularly warranted here, as claims about the relatively small size of female brains long were invoked to support female subordination. Brizendine, supra note 4, at 1.


Evidence that the juvenile justice system sometimes does, as a de facto matter, punish girls more harshly is rightly seen as disparate treatment. See Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept of Justice, Guiding Principles for Promising Female Programming, at ch.1 (1998), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/principles ("[G]irls who break the law are sometimes treated more harshly than boys who offend.").

See Dahl, supra note 273, at 12–13 & fig.3. Moreover, girls who experience greater family stress might reach puberty significantly earlier, and family stress tends to correlate with socioeconomic disadvantage. See Cameron, supra note 273, at 134, 137.
matter, developmental science generally) must sometimes give way to other values.

Undue emphasis on the immature brain also might alter our societal commitment to allow teens incrementally greater control over important aspects of their lives—whether to access health services, leave school, marry, exercise their right to free speech, and the like. This issue has been transparent since *Roper*, in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, excoriated the American Psychological Association for taking what he saw as inconsistent stances on teen maturity in death penalty and abortion cases.\(^{281}\) As other commentators—in analyses whose full repetition is unnecessary here—correctly have argued, the state can, does, and should distinguish between the competence necessary to make certain critical choices about one’s fate—such as whether to have an abortion—and the relative moral blameworthiness and capacity for change that justifies differential treatment when accused of a crime.\(^{282}\) But a strong and simple message about brain immaturity poses a challenge to making complicated and contingent claims about autonomy, and the former easily is interpreted to be in irreconcilable tension with the latter.\(^{283}\) Indeed, even some defense experts have endorsed incursions into teen autonomy for this reason.\(^{284}\)

There are no simple answers to when teens deserve and can handle the right to

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\(^{283}\) See, e.g., *In re D.L.*, No. B205263, 2009 WL 43513, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2009). In *D.L.*, a child-dependency judge partially justified his decision to remove an infant from the custody of the twenty-two-year-old father, by referencing judicial education programs in which the judge learned that brain development is not complete in early adulthood. The judge opined that the father (who had begun a sexual relationship with the fifteen-year-old mother when she was thirteen) would not have adequate “judgment” to know what is “age appropriate” for his child until he was twenty-six years old, at which time he would have a fully mature brain. Id. at *5.

\(^{284}\) See *Garcia Transcript I*, *supra* note 187, at 86 (testimony of Gur) (testifying that he would be hesitant to let a sixteen-year-old decide to forego cancer treatment because of brain immaturity). It could instead be argued that teens need experience making hard choices in order for their brains to mature, a theory that is consistent with the idea that teens nonetheless should be shielded from the harshest consequences of
direct the many aspects of their lives, and the answers will vary according to the multiplicity of interests at stake (for example, teens’ right to free speech deserves far greater protection than their ability to drive cars). Adolescent brain science appears (wrongly) to offer far too simple an answer, one that points in most instances away from autonomy.

C. Advocacy Pressures

The previous Section delineated the intrinsic limitations of developmental neuroscience for juvenile justice. It also raised reasons to be concerned were neuroscience to be given the influence some have urged. One additional concern is intrinsic to all efforts to link law to science. The realities of advocacy, in which nuance and complexity are difficult to convey without compromising effectiveness, incentivize advocates to oversimplify. All scientific data must be simplified for legal or policy arguments, if for no other reason than to render them comprehensible. But simplification easily can creep into oversimplification, creating a risk that legal decisions will be based on incorrect premises. This danger is not unique to juvenile justice, but it has manifested in this context, and its presence counsels great caution.

Consider, for example, how advocates, experts, and commentators tend to characterize teenagers’ recruitment of the amygdala, an evolutionarily old brain structure often described as the seat of primitive, aggressive impulses. They consistently assert that teenagers act more “emotionally” than adults, who are more “rational,” and that such emotionalism explains teens’ criminal behaviors. They

bad choices. Cf. Zimring, supra note 29, at 17–22 (conceptualizing adolescence as a “learner’s permit period of life”).

285 See Buss, supra note 13, at 507 (“Common to the law’s use of all social science is the risk of bad data or misused data, and the danger that lawmakers will not have the sophistication or the inclination to assess the data closely and limit its use accordingly.”).

286 See Gazzaniga et al., supra note 43, at 537, 553–72 (explaining the complex roles of the amygdala); Phelps & Thomas, supra note 238, at 750, 753, 755 (explaining that the amygdala is important to emotional learning, implicit evaluation, and memory, but asserting that “it is a mistake to assume any given brain region ‘does’ a given behavior, just as it is a mistake to assume that activity in a given brain region predicts a single behavior”).

287 See, e.g., Casey Jones Motion, supra note 166, at 6; Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 156 (testimony of Beyer) (“The immature behavior we see in teenagers comes in large part because they are so driven by a primitive emotional process rather than the deliberative thought process that we see in adults.”); Rethinking the Juvenile, supra note 7, at 11–13; cf. Brief of the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, 48, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-5666, 87-6026), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 56 (adoles-
explain this tendency toward unchecked emotionalism as the consequence of an overactive amygdala that has not yet been tamed by mature, rational frontal lobes. In addition to oversimplifying the complex role of the amygdala, this narrative overstates the behavioral implications of relevant studies.

In support of this narrative advocates, experts, and commentators most frequently cite to a small number of functional-imaging studies that show teens to display more amygdala, and less frontal-lobe, activation than adults when engaged in an emotion-recognition task.

The narrative also overstates the irrationality of emotion and understates the extent to which emotion influences adult decisionmaking. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 119, 121–23 (2006) (discrediting the opposition of emotion and reason); Maroney, supra note 51, at 1387–88, 1404–08 (advocating that emotional and cognitive capacity both form necessary part of “reason”).

There are several such studies with a variety of findings, though advocates and commentators tend primarily to discuss the unpublished data described in a study by Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd and William D.S. Killgore. See Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore, supra note 277, at 195–98; see also Baird et al., supra note 44, at 196 (providing similar data); Frontline, Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, PBS, Jan. 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html [hereinafter Yurgelun-Todd Frontline Interview]. For reliance on such studies, see, for example, Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 7 (testimony of Fassler) (noting that “[f]unctional
These studies provide little support for the assertion. In a typical study, subjects’ brains are scanned while they view photographs of unfamiliar persons displaying stylized “fearful” facial expressions; they then are asked to identify the emotion being displayed. This task bears little relation to juvenile offending. The only reported behavioral outcome is teens’ higher rate of misidentification of the emotion, and that differential may be erased by using color photographs and including images of people the teens know. It is tempting to conclude (as at least one researcher has) that a teenager, if confronted with a person displaying a fearful expression, is likely to misinterpret that expression and harm the person out of a misguided instinct toward self-defense. That conclusion may be true, but it cannot be reached on the basis of the studies. Indeed, other studies show that teens “tend to rely more on these instinctual areas, like the amygdala, and less on the more advanced areas, like the frontal lobes, which are associated with more goal-oriented and rational thinking”;

See Steinberg, supra note 259, at 52–53, 55–56 (describing efforts to design studies that better mimic teens’ real-world decisionmaking); Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 (“[W]e know next to nothing about how brains react under real-world conditions of threat, arousal, or peer provocation.”). However, it is particularly pronounced in brain imaging research given the technological restraints (for example, needing to immobilize the subject). See Yurgelun-Todd Frontline Interview, supra note 290 (describing small unpublished study showing adults correctly identified emotion one hundred percent of time while teen rate was fifty percent); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 122 (same); cf. Baird et al., supra note 44, at 198 (describing how, though without an adult comparison group, teens correctly identified fearful emotional expression seventy-four percent of time).

See Aronson, supra note 2, at 123 (stating that researcher questioned extent to which studies revealed “anything relevant about impulse control”); Beckman, supra note 68, at 599; Bower, supra note 227, at 300.

See Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 13 (testimony of Fassler) (“When you show a stimulant, a picture of someone who is frightened to a sixteen or seventeen year old, they respond in fear. They don’t recognize it as someone who is frightened. They are much more likely, if they are standing in a gas station with a gun, they are much more likely to impulsively pull that trigger.”).

One study claims to have generated the first preliminary data suggesting a general developmental shift toward frontal rather than amygdala activation. See K. Rubia et al., Functional Frontalisation with Age: Mapping Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with fMRI, 24 Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Revs. 13, 18 (2000). But see Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore, supra note 277, at 198 (finding "no evidence of systematic age-related
ies show that when presented with different tasks teenagers tend to display greater frontal-lobe activity than adults.\textsuperscript{296} This does not suggest that they are somehow more "rational," but instead may indicate that processes that have by adulthood become automatic require more effortful thought for adolescents.\textsuperscript{297} Some studies indicate that aggression and violence sometimes correlate with low levels of amygdala activation;\textsuperscript{298} yet others suggest that teens have great variation in amygdala response.\textsuperscript{299}

In short, the brain's emotional circuitry is highly complex. Teens unquestionably have distinctive emotional experiences.\textsuperscript{300} They may well have distinctive neural patterns of emotional activation and of emotion-cognition interaction, and those patterns may well be linked to maturation processes, but to date we know little about these phenomena or their behavioral implications.\textsuperscript{301} Teens' emotional lives, change in functional activity of the amygdala" in adolescence, though data suggest possible greater involvement of frontal areas). For a review of the state of this aspect of the science, see Casey et al., supra note 28, at 111–12.

\textsuperscript{296} See Luna & Sweeney, supra note 243, at 302; see also Beckman, supra note 63, at 597–99 (describing, inter alia, a study that showed that "adolescents' prefrontal cortices were considerably more active than adults" in an impulse-suppression task).

\textsuperscript{297} David J. Kupfer & Hermi R. Woodward, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Behavior and Emotion, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 320, 320 (2004). It is worth considering that groups' differential recruitment of brain pathways ultimately may bear no relation to measurable differences in behavior. See, e.g., BRIZENDINE, supra note 4, at 5 (claiming that studies show "no performance differences between . . . men and women" in certain tasks despite "significant, sex-specific differences in the brain circuits they activated").

\textsuperscript{298} See Baird, supra note 39, at 115–16 (citing, inter alia, Adrian Raine, Biosocial Studies of Antisocial and Violent Behavior in Children and Adults: A Review, 30 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 311 (2002)).


\textsuperscript{300} See Dahl, supra note 273, at 2, 7–9 (noting there is a "natural biologic proclivity toward high-intensity feelings that emerges at puberty" and that "emotional changes in adolescence have been generally recognized for many centuries"); Carolyn Saarni et al., Principles of Emotion and Emotional Competence, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 361, 374–75.

\textsuperscript{301} A very plausible hypothesis is that neural exuberance, myelination, and pruning converge to "support[ ] the development of a coordinated relationship between emotional and cognitive processes, a relationship whose integrity is critical to the production of behavior in accordance with personally or socially mandated standards." Baird, supra note 39, at 83; see also Dahl, supra note 273, at 18 ("The ability to integrate these multiple components of behavior—cognitive and affective—in the service of long-term goals involves neurobehavioral systems that are among the last regions of the brain to fully mature.").
and their patterns of criminal behavior, cannot be reduced to the relative strength of amygdala response; they are shaped by a rich set of factors including social goals and expectations, as well as relative lack of life experience.\footnote{Kupfer \& Woodward, supra note 297, at 321. A second sort of oversimplification visible in both the cases and commentary is relative inattention to other biological processes shaping adolescents' brains and behaviors. Genetics, neurochemistry, and hormones—to name just a few—all play significant roles, but have received far less attention in juvenile justice. See, e.g., Brizendine, supra note 4, at 32–56 (presenting theory of female brain development centered on hormonal influences in adolescence); Cameron, supra note 273, at 110; Rudolf N. Cardinal et al., Limbic Corticoatrial Systems and Delayed Reinforcement, 1021 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 33, 43–44 (2004); Casey et al., supra note 28, at 113, 118–119 (identifying the role of dopamine and hormones). A dominant focus on structural brain maturity creates an inaccurate impression as to its relative importance.}

It may be tempting to regard the frequently flattened or even distorted portrayal of neuroscience as harmless if it appears to come "close enough" to the truth for legal, not laboratory, purposes. The temptation is strong for all biological explanations, as if a trait or behavior is partially determined, then society is less inclined to regard it as morally blameworthy.\footnote{See generally Nita A. Farahany, Law and Behavioral Morality, in NOMOS LII: EVOLUTION AND MORALITY (Sandy Levinson ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2) (defining "behavioral morality" as "a form of moral philosophy that claims that deviant behavior attributable to a physical cause is either less or is not at all morally blameworthy"), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336268. For instance, some credit recent advances in gay and lesbian civil rights to increased public belief in a biological basis for sexual orientation. Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 Nev. L.J. 774, 782 (2006); Posting of Jeff Walsh to Oasis Magazine, http://www.oasisjournals.com/issues/9705/cover.html (May 1, 1997, 6:00 AM EST) (quoting Simon LeVay, a researcher for the Salk Institute: "There is no question that people who think sexuality is imborned [sic] are, in general, much better disposed towards gay people and gay rights than people who think it's some kind of lifestyle choice. . . . I've run into many people whose minds have been changed due to the science.").} It is even stronger at present, as people seem now to find neuroscientific explanations particularly persuasive.\footnote{See Aronson, supra note 2, at 119 ("[This] culture finds . . . biological explanations of behavior and personality captivating.").} This temptation must be resisted. Inaccuracy has costs. Some are immediate: it may, for example, prompt one's opponent either to offer an equally inaccurate counterclaim (which a court might accept), or successfully to impeach evidence that might have been persuasive were it not being oversold. Some costs, though, cannot presently be anticipated and have wider reach. If, for example, courts were routinely to endorse the "unchecked-amygdala" explanation for teen behavior, that endorsement would lend undeserved support to
an underlying theory about the low value of “emotion” relative to “reason.” That pernicious distinction already infects legal analysis, and it should receive no further encouragement.\footnote{See Maroney, supra note 289, at 121–23, 135; Maroney, supra note 51, at 1434.}

Some of these dangers can be mitigated by high-quality advocacy that seeks to portray science in as nuanced and grounded manner as possible. A number of contemporary efforts satisfy that criterion.\footnote{The APA’s brief in the Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida cases provides one example. That brief accurately relates the basics of structural brain maturation and uses appropriately cautious language in describing the ways in which such maturation is “thought” to be “consistent with the demonstrated behavioral and psychosocial immaturity of juveniles.” APA Sullivan & Graham Brief, supra note 128, at 27; see also id. (acknowledging that “the precise underlying mechanisms of brain development continue to be studied”).} However, the need to be consistent with the advocacy goal provides a built-in incentive to oversimplify, one that cannot be eliminated.

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This Part has shown that, contrary to many predictions, adolescent brain science has had no deep impact on juvenile justice in the courts. It has proved generally insufficient to uproot doctrine that tends to disfavor juveniles’ claims, particularly when they are accused of serious crimes. While most courts have ignored neuroscientific arguments, some have soundly rejected them, particularly where the individual juvenile appears to be an exception to the argued rule. One of the main beneficiaries of brain-based advocacy is a group not specifically targeted by most scholars and advocates: young adults. Those courts that have reacted favorably to arguments about the adolescent brain, whether for young adults or juveniles, have done so to buttress conclusions reached on other grounds.

More, this Part has shown that these trends are far from irrational. Developmental neuroscience does not shed direct light on the highly individualized determinations that are so commonly at issue in specific criminal cases. Its implications cannot be fully grasped until its link to behavior is better understood. To tether law to that science creates dangers—inequality, diminished autonomy, and inaccuracy—with no intrinsic hedge. Therefore, adolescent brain science should not on its own meaningfully shift doctrine, even if that shift is normatively desirable. Its inherent limitations do, and should, limit its influence. These conclusions closely parallel those other scholars have reached in theorizing the role of neuroscience in adult criminal
law. Insights from that literature have not before now significantly penetrated debates within juvenile justice. As this Article demonstrates, they should.

This is a sobering picture. The following Part, though, presents a vision of the real—albeit limited—role that adolescent brain science nonetheless can play in moving juvenile justice away from the destructive trends of the last two decades.

III. A LIMITED ROLE FOR ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE WITHIN JUVENILE JUSTICE

The findings of the previous Part confirm the skepticism that many developmental neuroscientists have themselves expressed about the legal relevance of their research. That research is not, however, utterly irrelevant. It contributes marginally to our understanding of general principles about the distinctiveness of adolescence as a developmental stage. General principles matter. The general principles that, as a group, normal young people differ from normal adults in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, ability to be deterred, and potential for rehabilitation, were for most of the last century invoked to justify differential treatment of juvenile offenders in virtually all instances, with only narrow exceptions. Always supported (if erratically) by everyday observation, these beliefs are now well supported by behavioral and criminological research. In the last two decades the juvenile justice landscape has shifted dramatically as our collective commitment to those principles has eroded, though (as Roper showed) that commitment is far from extinguished. The ero-

307 See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 77-79); Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW AND THE BRAIN, supra note 47, at 227-228, 238-40 (outlining differences between the questions asked by neuroscience and those asked by law, and theorizing how the former might nonetheless inform the latter); Snead, supra note 119, at 1280-99, 1338-39.

308 One exception is Morse, supra note 59 (applying certain insights from the law-and-neuroscience field to the juvenile justice context).

309 Several prominent developmental neuroscientists have taken "a dim view of the movement to apply neuroscience to the law," and even those who believe that "[b]rain data are eventually going to support reduced legal culpability for adolescents" believed as recently as 2004 that "we're not quite there yet." Bower, supra note 227, at 301 (quoting Ronald Dahl); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 134 (detailing debate).

310 See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4) (discussing that "[w]hile it is undoubtedly true that the neuroscience evidence has sometimes been embraced too uncritically, explained too glibly, or extended too broadly," it should not be "dismissed too readily, described as less conclusive than it actually is, and banished from the discussion prematurely").
sion can and should be reversed, and to the limited degree to which brain science helps remind us of these first principles, it is useful.311

Adolescent brain science therefore is appropriately considered by legal decisionmakers performing a policymaking function. “[A]ggregate data” about youth should be considered when formulating “policy that will optimize the costs and benefits of treating a large similar group in a particular way.”312 Because neuroscience generally corroborates the beliefs traditionally undergirding a strong and separate juvenile justice system, it somewhat strengthens the confidence policymakers can have in those beliefs. If this minor buttressing role is less spectacular than some would hope, it is a real one. More, this role could expand if the science eventually were to show stronger connections between neural structure, neural functioning, and externalized behaviors. Neuroscience is simply one new input into the well-established interface between juvenile justice policy and developmental science.313

311 A full defense of the wisdom of maintaining a strong, separate, and substantively distinct juvenile justice system for virtually all persons under eighteen is beyond the scope of this Article, and has been made more than adequately by numerous other scholars. Suffice it to say that this author concurs.
312 Pinker, supra note 226, at 50 (making this point with regard to policy uses of genetic data, but stating that using such data to reach conclusions about the attributes of any given person “is just plain weird”).
313 At this juncture it is worth addressing directly the reality that behavioral studies suffer from at least some of the same scientific limitations described in the previous Part. For example, individual variation is just as true of behavioral maturity as it is of neural maturity. Behavioral studies also carry some of the same potentially undesirable implications. For example, they show even more relevant differences between girls and boys. Further, as Part I made clear, rigorous behavioral study of adolescence is only a few decades older than neuroscientific research.

There are, however, several features of behavioral work that commend it as a more relevant and stable source on which to draw in making juvenile justice policy. First, as the law cares primarily about behavior, direct measures of behavioral traits and tendencies always will be one giant step closer to law’s core than will studies of underlying correlates (or even causes) of behavior. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 49, at 1779 (critiquing Scott and Steinberg’s view of the importance of adolescent brain science, in part because such evidence is indirectly relevant while evidence of behavior is directly relevant); Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 22) (“[I]n the formulation of policy, the scientific evidence in which we should place the most faith is the evidence that is most similar to the actual behavior the policy is intended to regulate.”). Second, psychology provides tools for directly measuring law-relevant traits, so the match between group behavioral tendencies and individual behavioral characteristics can be tested to a non-negligible degree. See, e.g., Richard Dembo & Amanda Anderson, Problem-Oriented Screening Instrument for Teenagers, in MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 112, 112 (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2005) (describing POSIT, a psychological screening test for adolescents);
It is for this reason, too, that neuroscience has more natural traction within juvenile justice than it does in adult criminal justice. Any system of criminal law that incorporates determination of responsibility necessarily rests on the fundamental assumption that persons possess—and can exercise—free will, unless some gross pathology exists. At a minimum, the philosophical orientation of such a criminal law must be compatibilist in order to function. Neuroscientific arguments that purport to challenge free-will or compatibilist theories may be of theoretical interest but are unlikely to influence practice; neuroscience rightly will have greater influence if it can prove or fine-tune determinations already within the purview of criminal law, such as showing that some identifiable pathology contributed to insanity or incompetence. A modest invocation of adolescent brain science has far more in common with the latter than the former. At least where advocates avoid biological determinism, developmental neuroscience steers clear of fundamental questions about free will and instead describes one aspect of a type of relative disability—youth—the law historically has recognized. Its insights—correctly contextualized—therefore may be made available to policymakers to take for what they are worth.


Despite these distinctions, the shared limitations and implications of these two types of developmental science counsel that juvenile justice policy ought not directly and literally rely on such science, even if it should be significantly enriched by its findings. See Buss, supra note 13, at 507–08. One distinct benefit of criminological studies—for example, deterrence and desistance studies of actual juvenile populations—is that they measure offense behavior in the real world and can directly measure the impact of different legal schemes, social environments, and interventions. See generally infra text accompanying notes 331–38 (discussing advocates' task of educating policymakers and the public about the real-word effects of juvenile policy).

But see Greene & Cohen, supra note 49, at 208 (arguing instead that current legal doctrine is only "officially compatibilist" and is actually "grounded in intuitions that are incompatibilist" and "libertarian"). Without taking a stance on whether our criminal law always should incorporate consideration of responsibility, it suffices to say that our criminal and juvenile law does consider both responsibility and consequentialist concerns, long has done so, and is unlikely to stop doing so. For an argument that law's treatment of children should instead be concerned only with prevention, a consequentialist concern, see Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 98 (manuscript at 36–43).

See Maroney, supra note 51, at 1392–99; Morse, supra note 59, at 400–03; Sapolsky, supra note 307, at 1793–94.

Legislatures also may be more open to adolescent brain science because they need not observe evidentiary standards for admissibility. See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 34–76) (discussing the wide variety of evidence law
Because legislatures unquestionably are in the best position to reverse the sweeping policy changes of the last two decades, they should be acknowledged as the primary audience. If developmental neuroscience is perceived as challenging the rules rather than their application, then it is best addressed directly to the primary rulemakers.\footnote{317 Even before \textit{Roper} some commentators had thought the science more relevant to legislatures than to courts. \textit{See} Boyle, \textit{supra} note 62, at 38 (quoting Victor Streib as saying, "I don’t think the brain research has any impact at all on the constitutional issue."). Some advocates have explicitly directed their efforts toward the legislatures. \textit{See} Eileen Hirsch et al., \textit{Raise the Age: Return 17-Year-Olds to Juvenile Court}, Wis. Law., June 2007, at 15 (arguing in favor of a legislative proposal to raise the age of adult court jurisdiction in Wisconsin to eighteen); \textit{Putting the Juvenile Back in Juvenile Justice}, \textit{supra} note 7, at 7–9 (seeking to persuade North Carolina’s legislature to reform its juvenile justice system); \textit{see also} Fagan, \textit{supra} note 70, at A7 ("As legislatures move toward placing increasingly younger teens in adult criminal court, social and biological evidence suggests moving in the other direction. It’s time for the law to change course and follow the science.").}

To be sure, legislatures are a tough audience for this message. It is an unfortunate political reality that modern crime policy tends to be a one-way ratchet consistently trending in the direction of more punishment, less judicial discretion, and fewer chances for serious offenders, including young ones. But though such political forces remain strong, very recent developments at the state level show that directing juveniles to the legislatures is far from a fool’s errand. Even before \textit{Roper} some states apparently had relied in part on developmental neuroscience to eliminate the juvenile death penalty.\footnote{318 \textit{See} Bower, \textit{supra} note 227, at 299; Boyle, \textit{supra} note 62, at 37 (citing victories in Indiana, South Dakota, and Wyoming); Moran, \textit{supra} note 63, at 8. Not all such efforts were effective. \textit{See} Pro-DeathPenalty.com, Legislation, http://prodeathpenalty.com/legislation.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) (reporting comments of Linda Aguirre, a state senator in Arizona and sponsor of a 2004 bill to ban juvenile death penalty, who “hope[d] testimony about teenagers’ brain development [would] change[ ] minds of colleagues,” but acknowledged “that her bill . . . is dead”).} Since \textit{Roper}, states have taken additional steps to roll back certain other punitive policies; and in so doing, some have looked to brain science. Washington State, for instance, in 2005 abolished mandatory sentencing of juveniles convicted as adults, relying in part on a legislative finding "that emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabili-
ties, differ significantly from those of mature adults.\textsuperscript{319} The Wisconsin Governor's Juvenile Justice Commission in early 2009 accorded "great weight" to brain science in recommending that the legislature raise the criminal-court jurisdictional age to eighteen.\textsuperscript{320} Most recently, Texas abolished juvenile life without parole after legislative hearings that included testimony about juvenile brain development.\textsuperscript{321}

Legislatures, though, are not the only relevant audience. Though it is unfashionable to say so, the courts also are entrusted with a policymaking role.\textsuperscript{322} Not all of the extreme deference to legislatures reflected in the findings of the previous Part, therefore, is warranted. Courts must make judgments about youth as a class when they determine, for example, what mental states are "reasonable" for adolescents; whether the factual assumptions about foresight undergirding the felony-murder doctrine and accomplice liability are irrational when applied to youth; and whether youth are so different from adults as to warrant categorical protection under the Eighth Amendment from extreme, lifelong, irrevocable punishments. As such legal determinations inevitably include policy judgments, courts should feel free to take from developmental neuroscience the same modest messages as would a legislature.

Whether directed at courts or legislatures, though, adolescent brain science never should be the primary argument for juvenile justice reform. The real struggle lies elsewhere, and always will.

First, the persuasive power of developmental neuroscience always will be limited by confirmation biases. This may not seem obviously


\textsuperscript{320} Statement Related to Wisconsin's Age of Adult Criminal Responsibility. Governor's Juvenile Justice Commission (Feb. 2009), available at http://njjn.org/media/resources/public/resource_961.pdf (listing eight relevant factors, of which "recent and evolving brain development research" was one).


\textsuperscript{322} See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 81–88 (2008) (stating that all judges, but particularly appellate judges are "occasional legislators" whose policymaking powers are greatest in "legalistically indeterminate" cases presenting a "zone of reasonableness" of interpretation).
so, as a number of recent studies show that people unduly credit neuroscientific explanations, even bad ones. Those studies suggest that adolescent brain science is uniquely persuasive. This Article, though, suggests instead that such persuasiveness is in fact quite limited. As this author and other scholars elsewhere have demonstrated, legal decisionmakers (like all people) filter factual assertions, including scientific ones, through their prior beliefs, values, and commitments. They tend to accept evidence as relevant and plausible where it aligns with implicit views and judgments and to reject it when it does not. This Article strongly suggests that such bias is operational here. In many cases, this factual filtering is shaped by views based on record evidence. For instance, in the Delaware capital case, evidence of the defendant's high level of planning capacity reduced subsequent testimony about adolescent brains to "psychobabble" in the jurors' eyes. In contrast, where sentencing courts were presented with credible evidence that particular defendants had matured, they saw in brain science a plausible explanation. More abstract background beliefs, too, play a filtering role. Legal actors evaluate brain science through implicit political, cultural, or role-based perspectives that predispose them to favor or disfavor juveniles' claims. That phenomenon may explain why juvenile advocates and defenders have tended wholeheartedly to embrace neuroscience and to take a broad view of its implications, while prosecutors have tended

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323 See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 344 (2008); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008) ("Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information," and "irrelevant neuroscience information . . . may interfere with people's abilities to critically consider the underlying logic.").


327 See supra note 157 (discussing case in which a Delaware family court credited demonstrated rehabilitation of youthful sex offender).

to take just the opposite tack, acknowledging the basic empirical points about structural maturation but displaying extreme skepticism as to its relevant behavioral implications.\textsuperscript{329} Judges and juries, too, necessarily come to juvenile cases with implicit views. It is noteworthy that in every instance in which a court positively cited developmental neuroscience, it did so as part of a roster of reasons why it would reach a particular result. Not only were the other items on the roster sufficient to justify the result, the fact that the court credited them is one reason why it also found the science relevant. Steinberg recently has argued that the same phenomenon is true for legislatures, who “often look to science for evidence that supports a position they have take for other reasons.”\textsuperscript{330} Developmental neuroscience is not materially shifting beliefs and values; it is instead being read through the lens of those beliefs and values.

To make this point is not to cast aspersions on legal advocates and decisionmakers for coming to their tasks with views about juvenile offenders and their proper treatment, whether in the abstract or as to a specific person. Human beings necessarily have such views, and these views necessarily influence how facts are regarded. The point, rather, is that a clear-eyed recognition of the phenomenon should temper expectations. The value-confirmation bias confines the persuasive potential of adolescent brain science to cases of ambivalence or equipoise. In all other instances, it is likely to be understood in a manner conforming to conclusions to which the decisionmaker already is inclined.

The real task, then, for those seeking juvenile justice reform is to influence such beliefs, values, and inclinations directly rather than expect such influence to flow naturally from explanation of neuroscience. While there is no simple formula for that task, it has long been the bread and butter of juvenile justice scholarship and advocacy. It includes demonstrating the ways in which teens are developmentally distinct, but also educating the public and legal decisionmakers about the real-world effects of juvenile policy and

\textsuperscript{329} See, e.g., supra note 8 (citing prosecutors’ guides to rebutting juvenile brain science); see also Greene & Cohen, supra note 49, at 215 (arguing that Scott and Steinberg’s enthusiasm for adolescent brain science is based on a “moral intuition,” grounded in an unstated dualist mind-brain dichotomy, and is appealing to them because it “allows us to blame adolescents’ brains instead of the adolescents themselves”).

\textsuperscript{330} Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 20) (“[I]t is highly unlikely that lawmakers are going to rewrite statutes because of a new study of synaptic pruning, myelination, brain activity, or neurotransmission. If only scientists held such sway in our legislatures.”).
what "works" from a utilitarian perspective. Such messages suffer from few of the vulnerabilities attending brain science. The strongest challenge to transfer schemes, for example, has nothing to do with the juvenile brain and everything to do with robust data consistently showing that transfer to adult court increases recidivism and that many youth transferred to adult court are accused not of serious interpersonal violence but of property crimes. The public might be even more moved if they fully understood how frequently incarceration with adults leads to physical and sexual abuse. Strict "zero tolerance" policies in schools are becoming increasingly unpopular because they lead to patently absurd results. Attitudes about JLWOP might be swayed by stories of youth who have grown into different people, and yet necessarily will die in prison; juvenile sex offender registration may seem less palatable if the public were to learn about the range of youth on such lists (including, for example, preadolescents who engaged in inappropriate "play" and have responded well to treatment) and what registration does to their futures.

Developmental principles, in short, tend to draw our attention inward. We need, too, to maintain a clear view of the world within which youth develop. Societal factors such as stable families, safe


333 See id. at 55 (reporting studies showing much higher levels of physical and sexual abuse of youth held in adult, not juvenile, facilities); CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES 13 (2007), available at http://www.campaign4youthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf.


housing, medical and mental health care, good schools, and economic opportunities—all subject to relatively direct societal control—will continue to be the most important contributors to juvenile offending, and they should continue to receive the lion's share of attention. This is particularly so because a disproportionate focus on the teen brain tends to support a false notion that teens' propensity to offend is "hard-wired," a view that not only makes societal reform seem pointless but, by implying the impossibility of deterrence, could support needless incapacitation of many youth until their brains "grow up."337

Educating the public and policymakers about teen brain development need not devolve into such counterproductive reductionism; instead, understanding the brain's "biological processes can actually enhance the importance of behavioral or social policy interventions" by highlighting the extraordinary impact of environment during a critical period of development.338 Conceptualizing neuroscience as background rather than foreground keeps us collectively focused on creating the conditions necessary for youth to become healthy, productive adults—including those youth who have committed serious offenses.

337 Shepherd, supra note 88, at 52 (stating that a juvenile's behavioral traits are "literally hard-wired into the adolescent brain"); B. Smaller, Cartoon, The New Yorker, Apr. 24, 2006, at 129 (showing parent disciplining teenage son by saying, "Young man, go to your room and stay there until your cerebral cortex matures"); see also Buss, supra note 13, at 509-10 (noting the danger that by deferring too heavily to developmental principles, including brain science, law "will lock in a developmental status quo," and asserting that "law can shape development instead of the other way around").

338 Dahl, supra note 273, at 4 ("Evidence of brain plasticity in the early years of life has not led to the conclusion that parenting and social experience are unimportant . . . . [W]e are more likely to emphasize the value of social policies that protect and support infants and toddlers during this important period of brain development. There are . . . parallel opportunities [with] adolescent brain development."); see Aber Brief, supra note 128, at 25-29 (discussing young brain's extreme plasticity in response to environmental pressures, both positive and negative); see also Elizabeth Cauffman, The Adolescent Brain: Excuse Versus Explanation, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 160, 161 (2004) ("[W]e should view our findings as providing an explanation that may enable more effective means of encouraging healthy development."). Advocates, commentators, researchers, and experts frequently acknowledge the role of environment. See, e.g., Ann S. Masten, Regulatory Processes, Risk, and Resilience in Adolescent Development, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 310, 312 (2004); Rethinking the Juvenile, supra note 7, at 13-14. Nevertheless, that point is at risk of being overshadowed.
CONCLUSION

This Article tells a cautionary tale. Relying aggressively on developmental neuroscience in legal theory and practice might wear out its welcome early, even though it now offers some law-relevant insights and in the future might offer more. The courts' early cold shoulder shows this to be a real danger. Nor is such reliance necessary, as we already have all the information we need to construct a rational juvenile justice policy. Adolescent brain science does not provide an independent basis to recommit to traditional juvenile justice values; it merely reinforces the wisdom of doing so. The bulk of that wisdom comes not from understanding what is going on inside the teen brain but from understanding the impact of the legal and social environments we create for young people.

We need that wisdom now, as we are at a potentially momentous crossroad for juvenile justice. By removing the most extreme possible punishment for youth, Roper unquestionably has shifted the terms of debate. Recent legislative developments suggest that the states are, wisely, starting to roll back some of the policy changes of the 1990s. Most Americans report being committed to second chances for youth. Even recent fiscal challenges have wrought change, as states seek to avoid costly incapacitation if cheaper alternatives, like supervised release and family therapy, can be shown equally effective.

339 See Munakata et al., supra note 1, at 125 box 3 (stating that “the excitement surrounding” developmental cognitive neuroscience, “and the potential applications of this research, increase the need for caution in interpreting study results and their implications”).

340 Strauch, supra note 4, at 215 (quoting scholars worried that brain science will be reduced to a “fad” or allowed to narrow rather than broaden understanding of teen behavior).


343 See Editorial, Money Saved, Safer Streets, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2009, at 14 (noting that the “Redeploy Illinois” program “saves money and steers kids in the right direction” by keeping them out of more costly detention while simultaneously reducing recidivism); Jackie Nash, Legislation Would Transform Ohio’s Criminal Prosecution of Delinquent Children, DAILY REP. (Atlanta, Ga.), July 7, 2009, at 1 (discussing H.B. 235, which would prioritize cheaper community-based treatment over incarceration). Fiscal challenges also have created opposing pressures, highlighting the need to focus policy-
These shifts may well portend a welcome new era in juvenile justice, one in which recommitment to the protection and rehabilitation of youth is the driving first principle. But if we move into that new era, it will not be because of adolescent brain science. To the extent that the science appears to promise transformation, it is a false promise.