

1997

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David R. Schmahmann, James Finch, and Tia Chapman, Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30 *Vanderbilt Law Review* 1021 (2021)
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Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This Article considers the wisdom and constitutionality of a proposed Massachusetts law penalizing companies that do business with Indonesia. In the March 1997 issue of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, two of the authors expressed concerns about the constitutionality of state and local restrictions on business ties with Burma (Myanmar). This Article applies a similar analysis to conclude that the proposed legislation is an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause. The authors also argue that the federal government has clearly preempted action by Massachusetts: first, by providing aid to Indonesia under the generalized system of preferences; second, through involving the Export-Import Bank in fostering trade with Indonesia; third, by enacting the International Rubber Agreement, which may require Indonesian cooperation for its success; and fourth, through Congress's own consideration and rejection of trade sanctions against Indonesia.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Massachusetts legislature made Massachusetts the first state in the United States to impose trade sanctions on the government of Burma.¹ These sanctions penalize companies that do business with Burma by making it nearly impossible for them to do business with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.²

The wisdom of a Massachusetts foreign policy with respect to Burma has been questioned.³ Moreover, even a cursory reading of U.S. Supreme Court cases and the U.S. Constitution makes it absolutely clear that the Massachusetts foreign policy initiative

1. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 1997).

2. The Massachusetts statute applies to (1) companies which have their principal place of business, place of incorporation, or corporate headquarters in Burma; (2) companies which have operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or similar agreements in Burma; (3) companies which provide financial services to the Burmese government; (4) companies which promote the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas, or related products, where commerce is controlled by the government; and (5) companies which provide goods or services to the government. Massachusetts passed the law in June 1996. See *id.* § 22G.

3. See, e.g., *The Very Long Arm of the Law: Is the world ready for 7,284 secretaries of state?*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 57.

with respect to Burma is unconstitutional. Two of the authors have analyzed these constitutional issues and recently published their analysis in the *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*.⁴

The impact of Massachusetts's anti-Burma legislation is circumscribed by the limited foreign multinational corporate presence in Burma.⁵ Even so, the Massachusetts initiative provoked a furor in the European Union and Japan because of its likely contravention of the World Trade Organization Convention on government procurement.⁶

In taking on Indonesia as its next foreign policy initiative, the Massachusetts legislature risks taking the people of the state into even riskier territory with repercussions that may go well beyond the contemplation of state lawmakers.

II. THE VASTNESS OF U.S. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and is the world's largest Muslim country.⁷ The United States has a broad range of interests in this huge country and its economy. The Indonesian economy has a growth rate of seven to eight percent per year, and is projected to be the fifth largest economy in the world by 2020.⁸ While the Investor Responsibility Research Center reports that there are only eighteen publicly traded U.S. parent companies with direct investment or employees in Burma,⁹ there are 240 such companies with ties to

4. See David Schmahmann & James Finch, *The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar)*, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997).

5. Hearings on H. 3730 Before the Joint Committee on State Administration, 180th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 27, 1997) (statement of Brenda Bateman, Burma Project Manager of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)) [hereinafter Hearings].

6. Japan and the European Union say the Massachusetts law violates a 1993 World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) agreement to keep government purchasing open to all bidders on both sides of the ocean. Lorraine Woellert, *Burma Boycotts Collide with Trade Agreements*, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at A1. The European Commission has officially informed U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky that it is beginning the process that leads to filing a formal complaint with the WTO about the Massachusetts law. Frank Phillips, *Group to Fight Mass. Burma Law*, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1997, at B3. Japan has also filed a formal complaint about the Massachusetts law. *Japan May Test State's Burma Law*, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1997, at B7.

7. 142 CONG. REC. S11,238 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pell).

8. See 142 CONG. REC. S13,027 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cochran).

9. MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS IN BURMA (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., D.C.) Feb. 1997, at iv.

Indonesia.¹⁰ Annual bilateral trade between the United States and Indonesia is about \$12.3 billion.¹¹ The United States is one of Indonesia's largest foreign investors, with direct investments totalling more than \$12 billion between 1967 and 1996.¹²

U.S. exports to Indonesia have quadrupled since 1987. In 1995, U.S. exports to Indonesia grew by nearly twenty percent to \$3.4 billion, and are estimated to have reached \$4.0 billion, or 9.7% of Indonesia's total imports, in 1996,¹³ and support more than ninety-five thousand jobs in the United States.¹⁴ In 1996, U.S. imports from Indonesia reached \$8.2 billion.¹⁵ Indonesia received \$96 million in U.S. economic aid in 1995, and \$71 million in U.S. economic aid in 1996.¹⁶ Indonesia is also a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter ASEAN), which is America's third-largest source of imports and its fourth-largest export market.¹⁷

Finally, Indonesia is significant to U.S. interests for its rubber production. The United States is by far and away the world's largest importer of natural rubber and seventy-five percent of the world's natural rubber supply is produced in just three countries: Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.¹⁸

III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-INDONESIA MEASURES

A. Supremacy Clause

The anti-Indonesia law proposed by Massachusetts is nearly identical to its anti-Burma law, and the analysis that leads to the conclusion that the anti-Burma law violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution applies with equal force.¹⁹

10. See Hearings, *supra* note 5.

11. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., *The Trade Information Center's Asia & Pacific Web Site*, (visited Oct. 3, 1997) <<http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/apweb.nsf>> [hereinafter *Asia & Pacific Website*].

12. *Id.*

13. *Id.*

14. See 141 CONG. REC. S15,582 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bond).

15. *Asia & Pacific Website*, *supra* note 11.

16. *Id.*

17. *Id.*

18. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,249 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms).

19. See Schmahmann & Finch, *supra* note 4, at 198-99.

Briefly stated, the argument is this: the Supremacy Clause²⁰ gives the federal government an exclusive power to conduct U.S. foreign policy. Local enactments designed to chart a distinctive local course in foreign affairs risk running afoul of this constitutional mandate. The Supreme Court has been unambiguous in defining the boundary of permissible local actions:

The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. "For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power." Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.²¹

In another landmark decision, *Zschernig v. Miller*,²² the Supreme Court defined the scope of "affecting foreign relations" broadly.²³ In that case, the Court held that an Oregon statute, even in the undeniably local matter of inheritance, was unconstitutional when it prohibited residents of East Germany from inheriting under Oregon wills.²⁴ The Court struck down the statute because it "affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way," and because local statutes "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."²⁵ The Court made its decision in spite of an amicus brief filed by the Justice Department indicating that the Department had no objection to Oregon's statutory stand against Communism.²⁶ Justice Stewart responded to the brief by saying that the allocation of power between the states and the federal government was so fundamental to the Constitution that it could not "vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department."²⁷ Thus, even local statutes that support U.S. foreign policy objectives are out of their depth if they affect international relations in a persistent and subtle way.

20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

21. *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (quoting *Chinese Exclusion Cases*, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).

22. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).

23. *Id.* at 441.

24. *Id.*

25. *Id.* at 440.

26. *Id.* at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).

27. *Id.*

The logic of this is clear: "If a state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties with a foreign power."²⁸ Clearly a Massachusetts law designed to punish a foreign country for its actions—especially when the law is devoid of any context within the nation's foreign policy—violates this constitutional principle.

B. *Foreign Commerce Clause*

The Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution²⁹ prohibits states or localities from regulating or taxing commerce if such actions burden interstate or foreign commerce.³⁰ With regard to foreign commerce, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government's regulatory power is "exclusive,"³¹ and found "evidence that the [F]ounders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be . . . greater" than the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce.³² The Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance, when it comes to foreign matters and commercial relations, of the nation "speaking with one voice."³³

This is not a situation where the state is simply imposing a requirement necessary to protect the health, welfare, and legitimate interests of its population. In attempting to blacklist from its contract roster all businesses present in any degree in Indonesia, the Massachusetts anti-Indonesia initiative seeks to affect foreign trade with Indonesia, the Indonesian economy (although it is hard to foresee who will emerge more bruised, the state or the Indonesians), and the nation's relations with Indonesia. Any argument that the foreign trade or policy consequences of the Massachusetts initiative are merely incidental consequences of the state permissibly minding its own affairs is specious, and under governing Supreme Court cases destined to fail.³⁴

28. *United States v. Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942).

29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

30. *Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages*, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976).

31. *Id.* at 286.

32. *Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles*, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).

33. *Id.* at 449 (citing *Michelin*, 423 U.S. at 285).

34. For a discussion of the so-called Market Participant Doctrine and its inapplicability to state foreign policy expeditions, see Schmahmann & Finch, *supra* note 4, at 191-97.

C. *Federal Law Preemption of the Massachusetts
Anti-Indonesia Bill*

Clearly, states and the federal government cannot have laws that cover the same subject matter when those laws are in pursuit of inconsistent objectives or create the possibility of confusion or futility. Article VI of the Constitution addresses this problem, which arises out of the federal artifact of coextensive sovereigns, by providing that it is the laws and treaties of the United States that are "the Supreme Law of the Land" and prevail over, or preempt, state and local enactments.³⁵ Thus, any local law that purports to regulate or govern a matter explicitly or implicitly covered by federal legislation is preempted, even if it is in an area otherwise amenable to state regulation. In *Hines v. Davidowitz*,³⁶ for example, the Supreme Court struck down an attempt by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impose registration requirements on aliens that were to some extent consistent with federal requirements but which in several respects were more onerous. The Court noted that since the "basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical . . . [t]he only question is whether . . . the state and Federal Government have concurrent jurisdiction"³⁷ In foreign affairs they do not, and the Massachusetts initiative runs directly counter, in intent and effect, to a variety of existing federal programs.

Even legislation that is facially consistent with a stated federal policy may be preempted if the Court finds that it intrudes on foreign commerce. In *South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke*,³⁸ the Court struck down an Alaskan statute that required any timber sold within the state to be processed in Alaska. Even though this requirement did not conflict with any federal law, the Court held that the state had to show more than consistency with federal policy when its statutes intruded on foreign commerce. Moreover, in *Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould*,³⁹ the Supreme Court struck down a state contract debarment law facially consistent with a federal statutory scheme because it impinged on federal jurisdiction. In that case the State of Wisconsin had sought to punish companies that had repeatedly violated the National Labor Relations Act by adding a state coercive measure to ensure compliance with federal law. The Supreme Court disapproved, holding that Wisconsin could not enact such

35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

36. 312 U.S. 52, 54 (1941).

37. *Id.* at 61 (quoting Argument for Appellants, *id.* at 55).

38. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).

39. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).

measures. In doing so, the Court expressed a concern appropriate to the proposed Indonesia sanctions: that the proliferation of local sanctions, while not inconsistent with federal law, "further detracts from the 'integrated scheme of regulation' created by Congress."⁴⁰ "[I]f Wisconsin's debarment law is valid, nothing prevents other States from taking similar action against labor law violators Each additional statute incrementally diminishes the Board's control over enforcement of the NLRA"⁴¹ The state's "goal may be laudable, but it assumes for the State of Wisconsin a role Congress reserved exclusively for the [National Labor Relations] Board."⁴²

Juxtaposing federal law regulating trade with Indonesia and the Massachusetts initiative leaves little room for a plausible argument that the state initiative is not preempted. Indeed, the Massachusetts measure runs the risk of tripping all over federal foreign policy toward Indonesia.

Federal actions signifying the approach the government has charted for the nation with regard to Indonesia are discussed below.

1. U.S. Aid to Indonesia under the Generalized System of Preferences

In 1996, Indonesia ranked fourth among top suppliers of U.S. imports for consumption under the Generalized System of Preferences.⁴³ As stated above, Indonesia received \$96 million in U.S. economic aid in 1995, and \$71 million in U.S. economic aid in 1996.⁴⁴ In 1994, the Clinton administration decided to renew the special trade status, which Indonesia presently enjoys.⁴⁵ That decision resulted in a continued break on tariffs for industrial goods such as electronics, machinery, and spare parts, which Indonesia exports to the United States. The decision also helped insure continued foreign capital investment in the booming Indonesian market.⁴⁶ Congress has clearly implied that free and open trade with Indonesia is within the interests of the United States.

40. *Id.* at 288.

41. *Id.*

42. *Id.* at 291.

43. *Asia & Pacific Website*, *supra* note 11.

44. *Id.*

45. David E. Sanger, *Administration Moves to Defend Indonesia Policy After Criticism*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A1.

46. *Id.*

2. The Export-Import Bank of the United States

While Massachusetts threatens to sanction all companies doing business with Indonesia, the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (hereinafter Ex-Im Bank) is allocating funds toward fostering trade with Indonesia. The Ex-Im Bank is an independent U.S. government agency created by Congress in 1934 to create U.S. jobs through exports,⁴⁷ and to help finance the overseas sales of U.S. goods and services.⁴⁸ In 1995, the Ex-Im Bank helped broker a \$500 million package for Indonesia's first private-sector power project. The project will provide seven thousand new American jobs⁴⁹—obviously a national priority. The Massachusetts initiative, if successful, will do the opposite.⁵⁰ Thus, when Massachusetts attempts to restrict trade with Indonesia, it not only acts inconsistently with the federal government in its pursuit of domestic job creation, but it interferes with congressional objectives and the potential success of the Ex-Im Bank.

3. The International Natural Rubber Agreement's Contemplation of Extensive Trade with Indonesia

Another example of how the Massachusetts measure operates at cross purposes with federal objectives can be seen in connection with the International Natural Rubber Agreement of 1995 (hereinafter the Agreement).⁵¹ On September 25, 1996, the U.S. Senate ratified this Agreement for an additional four years. The Agreement attempts to stabilize the supply and price levels of natural rubber using U.S. Treasury funds. Through a buffer-stock mechanism, the treaty assures that natural rubber will be available to the United States in sufficient supply and at reasonable prices.⁵² Indonesia, the world's second-largest natural rubber producer,⁵³ is obviously important to the Agreement's success. For the Agreement to enter into force, countries representing eighty percent of exports and eighty percent of

47. *A brief history of the Export-Import Bank of the United States* (last modified May 30, 1996) <<http://www.exim.gov/history.html>>.

48. *Id.*

49. See 141 CONG. REC. E986 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).

50. See Hearings, *supra* note 5 (statement of Don Baldini of Associated Industries of Massachusetts and statement of Jim Teague, United Parcel Service, Public Relations).

51. 142 CONG. REC. S11,248 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996).

52. *Id.* (statement of Sen. Helms).

53. *Malay Minds Only Meet, Not Meld*, ASIaweek, Oct. 4, 1996, at 8.

imports need to ratify it.⁵⁴ Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand represent seventy-five percent of world's natural rubber exports.⁵⁵ Because the Massachusetts initiative would punish all companies importing products controlled by the government of Indonesia—such as rubber—the proposed Massachusetts statute may create confusion about which “voice” speaks for the nation. It may interfere with the U.S. rubber trade, and may even alienate the Indonesian government to the point that it may withhold further cooperation with the treaty.

4. Congress's Rejection of the Massachusetts Approach

Finally, Congress has considered Indonesia's human rights record and acted thereon in a way it considers appropriate. During the past two years, for example, Congress has engaged in several heated debates over whether or not to eliminate U.S. aid to Indonesia for expanded international military education and training (hereinafter IMET).⁵⁶ In 1992, Congress voted to end all IMET assistance for Indonesia because of the country's human rights record.⁵⁷ In 1995, however, Congress resumed a modified IMET program for Indonesia in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1996.⁵⁸ Congress describes this modified IMET program as “expanded” IMET aid. Expanded IMET funds differ from standard IMET funds in that they may only be used for human rights-related training. Thus, the funds, as opposed to being “expanded,” are actually “restricted.” These actions indicate that Congress has taken action in connection with Indonesia's human rights record without imposing trade sanctions. By implication, it is clear that Congress has decided against trade sanctions for Indonesia.

Other developments in connection with the IMET program suggest that Congress does not wish to impose trade sanctions against Indonesia. During the 104th Congress, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts offered an amendment

54. *International Natural Rubber Agreement Due to Come Into Force*, Agri. Serv. Int'l, Feb. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, EURASI File.

55. See *supra* note 18 and accompanying text.

56. The IMET program sponsors up and coming Indonesian military officers to study in the United States. Officers receive technical training, such as accounting, or professional education which includes military justice and human rights awareness.

57. The suspension of IMET aid came in response to a November 12, 1991 shooting incident in East Timor by Indonesian security forces against Timorese demonstrators. See 142 CONG. REC. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed).

58. 142 CONG. REC. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Wilson).

(hereinafter Frank Amendment) to eliminate all IMET funding for Indonesia, as had been the case from 1992-1995.⁵⁹ The House rejected the Frank Amendment by a recorded vote of 272 to 149.⁶⁰ In debate, the amendment's opponents emphasized Indonesia's importance to U.S. trade and national security. Representative Charles Wilson, for example, described Indonesia as "one of Asia's most promising expanding markets for American goods," and added that the IMET aid program helps "open opportunities for U.S. business."⁶¹

Several members of Congress have opposed the imposition of any restrictions on IMET aid to Indonesia. Instead, they favor allowing Indonesia full IMET funding. Currently, Indonesia is the only country to receive "expanded" IMET funding. For example, Senator Thad Cochran, arguing in favor of full IMET funding for Indonesia, asked, "Why it is that of all the countries participating in IMET, only Indonesia is singled out for restrictions?"⁶² He further suggested: "Think about the other 108 fiscal year 1995 unrestricted IMET participants, Burundi, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Russia, and Algeria. Are we saying they don't have any human rights problems?"⁶³

During the 105th Congress, Representative Frank again offered an amendment to eliminate all IMET funding for Indonesia.⁶⁴ This bill was referred to the Committee on International Relations. Before the committee could act on the bill, however, the government of Indonesia announced that it would not accept IMET aid.⁶⁵ In a White House press briefing on June 6, 1997, Michael McCurry said that the Clinton Administration regretted Indonesia's rejection of the aid.⁶⁶ He said that the United States has a bilateral relationship with Indonesia, "in which we cooperate in a number of areas."⁶⁷

59. See 142 CONG. REC. H6150 (daily ed. June 20, 1995).

60. See 142 CONG. REC. H6156 (daily ed. June 11, 1996).

61. 142 CONG. REC. H6152 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Wilson).

62. 142 CONG. REC. S8945 (daily ed. July 26, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cochran).

63. *Id.*

64. H.R. 720, 105th Cong. (1997).

65. Indonesia also expressed that it had no interest in buying nine American-made F-16's. The Clinton administration was trying to find some way to dispose of the fighter planes that it had originally sold to Pakistan but which could not be delivered because of the Pressler amendment. The administration had focused on Indonesia as a possible sales prospect. See 143 CONG. REC. H3609 (daily ed. June 10, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).

66. *Transcript of White House Briefing by Mike McCurry*, U.S. Newswire, June 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.

67. *Id.*

Representative Douglas Bereuter called Indonesia's refusal a blow to U.S. relations with Indonesia. He said:

Indonesia is not Burma or Iraq. It is an important country, a key member of ASEAN, APEC, the ARF, the OIC, and the United Nations . . . [.] Indonesia has . . . contributed to the Korean Energy Development Organization. Indonesia supported the gulf war efforts against Iraq. Indonesia's sealanes and air routes are important to United States forces. We, of course, have major economic interest [sic] in Indonesia. Our annual bilateral trade is about \$12.3 billion.⁶⁸

Clearly, whether or not the United States plans to extend IMET to Indonesia has been a matter of some debate. Congress has argued over whether or not Indonesia has made substantial human rights improvements, and what the definition of such improvements ought to be. Regardless of what Congress decides, it appears that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is poised to enact legislation on the matter which, if given effect, would conflict with and probably undermine the federal decision.

Obviously, the Constitution does not countenance such an intrusion.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is not clear that trade sanctions themselves are an effective means of conducting foreign policy, and certainly where parochial concerns are projected into an international arena, the prospect of a coherent trade sanction policy is severely compromised.⁶⁹ The current Massachusetts initiative is apparently motivated by state legislators' desires to satisfy some Portuguese-American constituents who have voiced concerns about East Timor.⁷⁰ Yet, the consequences of such Massachusetts action may be felt by citizens and in states where East Timor is not a major concern. The federal government, far from attempting to isolate Indonesia, has implemented a variety of programs designed to do just the opposite.

68. 143 CONG. REC. H3609 (daily ed. June 10, 1997) (statement of Rep. Bereuter).

69. See Schmahmann & Finch, *supra* note 4, at 204-07.

70. During the debate over the Frank Amendment, Rep. Bereuter said, "I understand that the gentleman from Massachusetts, and both gentlemen from Rhode Island have very big Portuguese American populations in their districts." 142 CONG. REC. H6153 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bereuter). Prior to its annexation by Indonesia, East Timor was a Portuguese colony and its inhabitants are primarily Catholic whereas the majority of Indonesians are Muslim. 142 CONG. REC. S11,239 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (report of Sen. Pell).

At present, the Massachusetts Legislature is buoyed by the apparent success of its anti-Burma initiative.⁷¹ If it proceeds with its plans to punish Indonesia, however, it may lead the state into a maze of confusion, retribution, and litigation.

71. Byron Rushing, one of the prime sponsors of the bill which imposed sanctions on Burma for human rights abuses, was quoted in the Boston Globe as saying that the federal sanctions proved Massachusetts was right all along and that he was something of a trail blazer: "We look good. It shows we are on the cutting edge of the issue." Frank Phillips, *State was in Lead on Burma: Backers of Mass. Law Welcome U.S. Sanctions*, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 1997, at B1.
