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Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review of State Regulatory Inaction

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Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review of State Regulatory Inaction

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ABSTRACT: Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the other—especially as traditional governmental functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role to address market monitoring. This Article defends a process-based account of the antitrust state-action exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive efficiency-preemption approach that Richard Squire recently advanced, and it elaborates on what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases. It recasts the debate as focused around delegation issues and judicial deference to regulation—traditionally issues of administrative law. Courts frequently invoke antitrust state-action-exception issues where state officials fail to act or only act partially to regulate, as is increasingly common where states privatize governmental functions or attempt to deregulate, or implement competition policies of their own. As this Article argues, in such contexts a delegation model, which focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have made delegations, whether agency regulators have standards, and the reasons provided by state and local officials for regulatory inaction, provides a more powerful and principled approach for evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust litigation than alternative approaches.

* Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University College of Law; L.L.M., Yale Law School, 1994; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1991; B.S., Arizona State University, 1988. I am particularly grateful to William Araiza, Lisa Bressman, Rebeccca Brown, Rick Hasen, Jon Klick, Richard Nagareda, Erin O’Hara, Bill Page, Katherine Pratt, Mark Seidenfeld, Peter Spiro, Richard Squire, Paul Stancil, and Christopher Yoo for their comments, insight, and guidance on this project. Thanks to my colleagues at Florida State University College of Law and also to faculty workshop participants at the University of Georgia School of Law, University of Iowa College of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, and Vanderbilt University Law School for their helpful comments on drafts.
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INTRODUCTION

In adopting federal antitrust statutes, Congress has consistently failed to address how national competition rules will coexist with state or local regulation. Recognizing that Congress could not have intended blanket preemption of state or local regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court created an antitrust "state-action exception," which exempts anticompetitive state regulations from antitrust enforcement. The exception originated in Parker v. Brown, a 1943 case rejecting a Sherman Act challenge to a California raisin-producer marketing program that a grower brought because the program derived "its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state." Over recent decades, courts have routinely invoked the state-action exception to reject federal antitrust claims—so much so that in early 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission included, among its initial recommendations, a finding that lower courts have interpreted the defense far too broadly, echoing an earlier conclusion by the Federal Trade Commission.

While Parker was born of an "era of exceptional confidence in government," commentators’ skepticism about regulation and the process from which it evolves has grown. For example, public-choice theory highlights how the incentives surrounding the lawmaking process diverge from the public interest when state and local regulations are at issue. Recognizing these concerns, the modern doctrinal test for the antitrust state-action exception, derived from California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., places its primary focus on the delegation issue faced by a state legislature in adopting a regulatory program. First, a court asks whether a state's sovereign lawmaking body (i.e., a legislature) has clearly articulated a policy to allow the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Second, a court asks whether the government entity to which authority has been delegated actively supervises the private conduct at issue.

While delegation concerns seem central to the basic state-action doctrine the Court expressed in Midcal, attention to delegation issues is largely foreign to the predominant judicial applications of the doctrine as well as to academic accounts. Instead, the predominant accounts of the antitrust state-action exception ground its purposes in federalism (or preemption based on substantive economic efficiency)—a view that Frank Easterbrook and, more recently, Richard Squire have advanced—or on a more policy-oriented balance between markets and regulation—a view advocated by scholars such as Daniel Gifford. In contrast, Einer Elhauge has proposed to understand the antitrust state-action exception through a political "process-based" lens—an account that has much abstract appeal but has not resulted in useful, practical wisdom for courts in the fifteen years since its articulation.

This Article urges a fundamental reorientation of the state-action doctrine in antitrust law. I defend a process-based account of the state-action exception against alternative interpretations such as the federalism approach that commentators like Squire have recently advanced. I then elaborate on what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases. In doing so, I refocus the debate around delegation issues and judicial deference to regulation—traditionally issues of administrative law.

9. Id.
12. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1995) (placing the antitrust emphasis on striking the balance between markets and regulation). Increasingly, antitrust law and regulation are converging to present new doctrinal challenges for courts. See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 748 (2004) ("[A]s economic regulation has evolved it no longer makes sense to treat antitrust and regulation as separate bodies of doctrine—unified, they should form the building blocks of a new competition law.").
13. Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 696 (1991) ("[T]he Court should recognize the process view that actually underlies its doctrine and, if it is going to decide cases based on that view, explicitly incorporate it into a rule of decision that better explains and fits its case law.").
officials invoke antitrust state-action-exception issues when they fail to act or only act partially to regulate (as is increasingly common where states privatize governmental functions), implement industry-wide settlements (as in the context of the tobacco industry), or attempt to implement competition policies of their own (what commentators refer to as "deregulation"). As I shall argue, in such contexts a delegation model—which focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have made delegations, whether regulators have standards, and the reasons that state and local officials provide for regulatory inaction—provides a more powerful and principled approach for evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust litigation than alternative approaches. A federal court, in making a decision to extend the state-action exception, is allowing a state legislature to delegate to state regulators the discretion to opt out of federal antitrust laws. Of course, courts are willing to allow federal agencies to exercise discretion pursuant to broad legislative delegations, but typically only when subject to judicial review for reasonableness. By analogy, it is entirely appropriate, and normatively desirable, for a federal court to impose a similar condition on state legislative delegations to a state agency, subjecting these to arbitrary and capricious review prior to suspending national competition laws.

The process-based approach to this question leaves room for federal courts to defer to traditional state regulatory schemes such as cost-of-service regulation. It also challenges courts confronted with new regulatory approaches to develop a more nuanced approach to deciding the extent to which federal law—in particular, the Sherman Act—preempts state regulation. A process-based account of the state-action exception recognizes federalism and efficiency as important values, but it changes the primary emphasis of the judicial inquiry. Applications of the state-action exception may advance federalism and economic efficiency, but that does not require courts to ground their decisions in individual cases entirely on federal preemption or efficiency. In a process-based account, state and local political processes could advance federalism goals as much as federal courts

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14. See infra notes 264–69 (discussing tobacco settlement); infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (discussing deregulation policies).

15. For the general argument that the issue of the state-action exception under the antitrust laws is a type of federal-preemption inquiry, see generally Squire, supra note 11. Squire’s argument understands the assessment of articulated and unarticulated substantive regulatory goals at the state level and their conflict with federal antitrust-law goals as the basis for the judicial decision to extend an antitrust state-action exemption. However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s application of Chevron to federal agencies, this Article’s approach focuses primarily on state regulators’ processes and pre-articulated reasons for their decisions, not their substantive regulatory goals as determined by federal courts. Further, this Article’s approach does not propose to replace the state-action exception with a federal-preemption inquiry, but to refine its application. Thus, to the extent this Article’s approach is preemption-oriented, it is a process-based preemption approach.
by attempting to identify and apply the substantive values in broad federal statutes such as the Sherman Act. By discouraging courts from directly addressing economic-efficiency concerns before addressing the merits of an antitrust violation, a process-based approach promotes judicial economy and, if properly cabined, can also have a positive effect on the behavior of private groups in the lawmaking process.

At its core, the antitrust state-action exception focuses on the conditions under which it is appropriate for federal courts to defer to state regulators—a kind of vertical deference in antitrust law. However, antitrust law and scholarship ignore that administrative law has its own well-settled approach to determine when it is appropriate for a federal court to defer to federal regulators—a type of horizontal deference. The *Chevron* test provides the predominant paradigm for federal courts reviewing matters of agency statutory interpretation. When applying the *Chevron* test, a court will typically engage in a two-part inquiry: first; it asks whether the statute clearly and unambiguously resolves the issue in question; second, to the extent the court deems the statute unclear or ambiguous, it typically defers to an agency’s reasonable interpretation. In contrast to *Midcal’s* approach to the antitrust state-action doctrine, a court addressing deference issues under *Chevron* does not always get to the second inquiry. However, where a statute is ambiguous, the *Chevron* step two inquiry—deference to an agency’s reasoned interpretation—is generally appropriate.

While an appeal to *Chevron* deference alone provides an unsatisfactory (and, in my view, impoverished) way of thinking about vertical deference issues in antitrust law, an emphasis on delegation issues at *Chevron’s* step two, and especially the presence of standards to constrain and guide the

16. There is substantial evidence that the drafters of the Sherman Act, who were willing to allow many inefficient state and local regulations to stand, simply did not have powerful substantive definitions of efficiency in mind as a basis for preemptsing state or local regulation. *See infra* notes 70–78 and accompanying text.


18. *Id.* at 842–43.

19. *Id.*

20. There are, for example, those who argue from both the left and the right that strong deference at step two of *Chevron* recognizes the constitutional values of the unitary executive. *See, e.g.*, Elena Kagan, *Presidential Administration*, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing that delegation to agency officials authorizes the President to manage executive interpretations); Thomas W. Merrill, *Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent*, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 978 n.44 (1992) (“*Chevron’s* democratic theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive, i.e., an interpretation of separation of powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution of the law—including the so-called independent regulatory agencies—under Presidential control.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, *The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is*, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 333–35 (1994) (arguing that the unitary executive approach to *Chevron*, which would entitle the President’s interpretation of laws to the greatest deference, is the better interpretation).
exercise of discretion, provides a particularly powerful set of guideposts for addressing state-action-exception cases.  

First, a process-based approach to state-action doctrine helps courts to focus on the core process questions at issue in evaluating whether a state legislative body has a clearly articulated policy in making the delegation, if any. As this Article argues, Midcal's clear-articulation requirement, like step one of Chevron, can be framed as a type of penalty default rule designed to promote clarity in lawmaking and to deter interest groups from promoting, and lawmakers from adopting, ambiguous laws that purport to make excessively broad delegations to regulators. A process-based approach to state-action doctrine cautions federal courts against aggressively attributing purposes to state and local legislative delegations, particularly to the extent this encourages adverse levels of interest-group lobbying in the state legislative process as a way of opting out of federal antitrust enforcement.

Second, a process-based approach to state-action doctrine replaces a court's evaluation of state-regulator supervision (the second prong of Midcal) with an evaluation of the reasons given by regulators. The core prescriptive recommendation is to focus on the nature and sufficiency of the reasons the regulator gives (akin to arbitrary and capricious review under Chevron step two). Unlike judicial application of Chevron step-two deference in reviewing a federal agency, however, I argue that where there is a state legislative delegation to an agency in the antitrust context, a court should always apply something more than mere deference and should review the regulator's decisions for transparency, consistency, and pre-articulated criteria. Given the specific interest-group pathologies at issue in state and local political processes, and especially those processes that large regulated firms are likely to exploit, the state-action exception presents a more serious type of institutional problem than judicial review of the run-of-the-mill federal agency.

21. For a discussion of the delegation-based approach to Chevron, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 483 (2002) (suggesting that there are strong public-choice rationales for requiring administrative standards in arbitrary and capricious review to address delegation-oriented concerns). For additional discussion, see Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 263 (2006) (arguing that Chevron deference only extends to specifically assigned agency delegations, not to general delegations to the executive branch); and see also Evan Criddle, Fiduciary Foundation of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 152 (2006) (arguing that, like corporate law's emphasis on fiduciary duties, administrative law, including Chevron, "calls upon courts to enforce agency duties in order to promote fidelity to agencies' statutorily defined missions and the best interests of their beneficiaries").

22. Phil Weiser has suggested that federal courts should apply Chevron deference to the decisions of state regulators when applying the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1999). Weiser's analysis focuses on the extent to which federal courts should defer to a state regulator's decision regarding the meaning of federal law. By contrast, this Article focuses on the extent to which federal courts should defer to state regulators when applying state law
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the problems with current formulations and applications of the antitrust state-action exception, which no one finds satisfactory. Traditional approaches, such as a federal preemption-oriented understanding of the state-action doctrine, have serious limitations given a state and local regulatory environment that is increasingly characterized by regulatory transition and inaction. Part II introduces *Chevron*\(^{23}\), the predominant paradigm for judicial review of regulation in administrative law, highlighting its delegation structure and aspects of it that are useful in understanding the problems that state regulation presents for antitrust law. Part III explains the limits to the analogy between *Chevron*’s first step and the clear-articulation requirement for antitrust state action. Part IV draws an analogy to step two of *Chevron* and analyzes the implications of recasting the antitrust state-action exception to focus on agency reasons, not power or history. The Article concludes by elaborating on the kinds of reasons that state or local regulators would need to provide prior to a court’s extension of the antitrust state-action exception to cases where a regulator bans competition outright, where regulatory intervention is intermittent (such as in the context of market-based rates), or where regulation focuses on disclosure and monitoring. I conclude that emphasizing such accountability in the antitrust state-action exception context is not only desirable, but it is consistent with the broader goals of antitrust law and superior to alternative approaches.

I. ANTITRUST FEDERALISM AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE TO STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION

Congress clearly has the power to preempt state regulation by adopting national competition-policy laws, such as the Sherman Act. However, in first recognizing the antitrust state-action exception\(^{24}\) in *Parker v. Brown*,\(^{25}\) the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress had failed to preempt state law:

> We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its


\(^{24}\) Although a number of courts and commentators refer to “state action immunity” or the “state action exemption,” this Article eschews these labels of the defense. “Immunity” implies that the same defense would apply to all firms within a single regulatory program, but the defense loses its generality as the nature of regulation begins to vary between firms, as it increasingly does in industries undergoing change. In addition, the term “exemption” implies permanence to the decision to suspend antitrust laws, but changes in regulation in the same regulatory program or involving the same firm may necessitate changes in an antitrust defense. Hence, this Article uses the term “state-action exception.”

officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.\textsuperscript{26}

The \textit{Parker} approach treats a state legislative body as a “sovereign,”\textsuperscript{27} presumptively allowing it to regulate private conduct as it sees fit.

The presumption of legitimacy that the antitrust laws afford state regulation is, however, hardly absolute. \textit{Parker} also left open the possibility that state regulation could, in some instances, allow firms to engage in conduct that runs afoot of the Sherman Act. For instance, a state cannot “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.”\textsuperscript{28} Significantly, the Court in \textit{Parker} noted that California’s regulation did not implicate the Sherman Act because legislators had established an extensive regulatory apparatus, including a public-approval process and an enforcement mechanism:

\begin{quote}
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program. Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

As \textit{Parker} suggests, the antitrust state-action exception first serves as a doctrinal context for judicial scrutiny of private conduct,\textsuperscript{30} furthering the federalism purpose of facilitating participation in the state regulatory process\textsuperscript{31} and, consequently, lending legitimacy to the development of

\begin{footnotes}
\item 26. \textit{Id.} at 350–51.
\item 27. \textit{Id.}
\item 28. \textit{Id.} at 351.
\item 29. \textit{Id.} at 352.
\item 30. \textit{See} Frank H. Easterbrook, \textit{The Limits of Antitrust}, 63 \textit{Tex. L. Rev.} 1, 39 (1984) (arguing that antitrust law should design filters “to screen out beneficent conduct and pass only practices that are likely to reduce output and increase price” and that it is necessary for courts to “establish rules, recognizing that one cost of decision by rule is occasional over- and under-breadth”).
\end{footnotes}
A. PREEMPTION, DELEGATION, AND MIDCAL

_Parker_ embraced deference to state regulation on the rationale that the Sherman Act did not preempt the state's regulatory approach. An important recent article by Richard Squire argues that state-action issues in antitrust cases can be understood entirely through the lens of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Squire argues that federal-preemption concerns should "replace" the state-action exception. An extension of an antitrust state-action exception is, at its core, a refusal to extend federal preemption to state regulation.

As _Parker_ made clear, however, states were not afforded carte blanche to override the Sherman Act. Yet, the case failed to provide a workable standard for determining when state laws were impermissible under the Act. For the first thirty-five years of its existence, courts interpreted the state-action exception so as to allow a virtual type of state sovereign immunity, in which courts strongly deferred to state legislatures and regulators.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court approved a more skeptical stance toward state and local regulation in antitrust law, questioning _Parker_'s deferential approach. In _Midcal_, the Court refused to extend the state-action exception to California's wine-pricing scheme, which did not involve anything more than passive approval of prices. In reaching this conclusion, _Midcal_ articulated a two-part test to assist modern courts in evaluating antitrust claims involving state regulation: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state

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32. The state-action exception may also serve a judicial-avoidance purpose, providing federal courts a way of disposing of complex and technical issues without having a binding impact on state law. However, other legal doctrines, such as abstention (which advises federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction out of comity), adequately protect against the precedent-creating risk of direct federal-court review of state regulation. See City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 174 (1997) (allowing federal-court review of state regulatory-law claims notwithstanding a state-law provision for deferential review, but leaving open the possibility of a lower court applying abstention principles). Abstention can be invoked where a federal court is making a decision that has a binding effect on state law. By contrast, in antitrust litigation, courts are not normally passing judgments on the merits of state regulation, but are focused on the merits of private conduct under federal law.

33. This strong deference to state and local regulation is observed in the recent FTC analysis of the state-action exception. FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.

34. Squire, supra note 11, at 77.

35. Id. at 79.

36. See supra notes 24–35 and accompanying text.

policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." \[38\] This test seems simple enough. Only if a state legislature expressly envisions monopolistic conduct and delegates authority to a governmental body to supervise such conduct actively will the conduct escape antitrust enforcement. A court must be satisfied that both parts of the test have been met before extending the state-action exception in an antitrust claim.

In application, though, courts have struggled with the antitrust state-action doctrine, often because different institutions within a state take on various regulatory roles and the nature of regulation varies so much from industry to industry. While the state-action exception might be intended to create a safe harbor for state or local political and regulatory processes—displacing courts as overseers of private monopolistic conduct—the judicial decisions addressing the state-action doctrine are hardly consistent or principled. The Supreme Court's current approach to the antitrust state-action doctrine also seems to ignore how judicial deference in this context can increase incentives for rent-seeking in ways that may prove harmful to social welfare in the state and local lawmaking process.

The application of the state-action exception in the context of local governments (such as municipal bodies), as opposed to states, highlights the current judicial misadventure with the doctrine. \[39\] In a short-lived line of cases, the Supreme Court read the state-action doctrine narrowly in the context of municipal, as opposed to state, regulation. The Court in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder \[40\] subjected municipal governments to antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct. Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan distinguished between states regulating as states—entitled to the state-action defense under a federalism rationale—and states regulating as political subdivisions—exempt from antitrust enforcement only when they are implementing state policy, not when they are acting as municipal governments. \[41\] The City of Boulder's moratorium on cable-television expansion was thus subject to antitrust challenge because Colorado, at the state level, had not clearly expressed a policy to regulate cable television; in fact, Justice Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado had no state-wide policy at all—finding there was a suspicious gap in state

38. Id. at 105 (citation omitted).


41. Id. at 52–53.
regulation. City of Boulder correctly recognized that a judicial reluctance to extend the state-action exception from antitrust enforcement is justified in the context of municipal regulation, given the higher propensity for interest-group exploitation of local, as opposed to state-wide, legislative processes.

A more recent line of cases, however, departs from the municipal-state distinction that Justice Brennan laid down in the context of cable-television regulation. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in assessing municipal state-action immunity. Instead, Justice Powell reasoned in his majority opinion that so long as a state confers permissive authority in general terms for a municipality to deal with a matter, this suffices to exclude the conduct from antitrust enforcement. Thus, when the state of Wisconsin granted municipalities the authority to establish sewage-treatment plants, this impliedly granted municipal governments the power to make decisions regarding which populations would be served. Justice Powell recognized that municipalities may exercise "purely parochial public interests" which, at some level, could be subject to antitrust enforcement. However, in his view, a state delegation to a municipal government alone is sufficient to meet the "clearly expressed and fully articulated" criterion of antitrust state-action doctrine, thus exempting from antitrust enforcement a large range of municipal regulation. Under this approach, an "express mention" by a legislature of its intent to displace competition is not necessary (although perhaps it would be sufficient); instead, the Court suggests, what matters is that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is a "foreseeable result" of the state policy.

In addition, at least in the original Midcal formulation, the state-action doctrine requires courts to determine how active and involved a regulatory scheme must be for purposes of deeming it "actively supervised." In Hallie, however, the Court effectively abandoned the requirement of active state

42. *Id.* at 54–55. Justice Brennan was clear that "mere neutrality" by the state regarding municipal regulation does not suffice. *Id.* at 55. Instead, a "clear articulation and affirmative expression" to replace antitrust enforcement with regulation is necessary. *Id.*

43. Reacting to the prospect of liability created by City of Boulder, Congress abolished money-damage liability under the antitrust laws for municipalities, their officials, and private persons acting under the direction of local governments and their officials in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. See H.R. REP. NO. 965, at 2, 18–19 (1984), *reprinted in* 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4619–20. Congress continued, however, to authorize antitrust liability for private conduct that municipal governments have sanctioned or authorized.


45. *Id.* at 42–43.

46. *Id.*

47. *Id.* at 47.

48. *Id.* at 41–42.

supervision, at least insofar as it applies to municipalities. In so holding, the Court explained that the purpose of state supervision is to ensure that municipalities pursue regulatory policies for public purposes and not to enrich private actors. According to the Court, "Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests rather than the government interests of the State." However, the Court reasoned that if a state has clearly authorized a municipality to act, there is no such problem. Instead, "[t]he only real danger is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals." Thus, if some clear state authorization exists, either expressly or by virtue of foreseeable results, the Court held that there is no need to make a finding that the state actively supervises the municipality's regulation of the private activity.

While this approach envisions some judicial inquiry into the "foreseeable results" of policy adopted by a state legislative body, the Court has never defined exactly what such a divination of legislative intent would entail. Appellate courts following this approach frequently invoke the state-action exception based almost exclusively on a clear legislative purpose, or a clear statement to allow the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Beyond this, however, they generally engage in judicial restraint, deferring to state regulation of public-utility monopolies under the antitrust laws. Agency deference has some inevitable appeal in a complex regulatory environment, but the Court's relaxation of a state-supervision requirement for municipalities is counterintuitive if not incoherent. Since Madison's Federalist No. 10, scholars have recognized that state and local political processes are more susceptible to interest-group exploitation than their federal counterpart. The premise that private interests are not likely to exploit municipal regulation at the expense of the public good ignores the high risk of interest-group rent-seeking at the local level, where the incentives for ex ante lobbying of the regulator are perhaps strongest. At the local level, the costs to firms of organizing and lobbying regulators are much

50. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S at 46–47.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 47.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 44.
56. See infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text.
57. For discussion and criticism, see infra Part I.B.
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (describing how economic and class interests of politicians will influence legislation, especially in local as opposed to national lawmaking). See generally JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1996).
lower than at the state level. In addition, at the state and local level, extreme interest groups are more likely to wield influence, while at the national level extremist groups are more likely to cancel each other out.

Although the Court seems to embrace a federalism-based formalism as a rationale for deference to municipal regulation, this account of federalism proves too much. It can result in state delegation to municipal governments with no strings attached, thus insulating private behavior at the local level from almost all antitrust enforcement. Further, it focuses on the mere formalistic articulation of state goals by a state body, without addressing their purposes. States, as well as municipal governments, sometimes regulate in ways that allow private interests to place their own economic well-being ahead of the public good. Allowing the law to insulate such private conduct from antitrust scrutiny may have serious consequences, especially in deregulated markets where municipal utilities providing electric, gas, telephone, and cable services can readily subvert competition policies with little or no scrutiny.

In the context of municipal regulation, the Court’s state-action-exception cases view the clear-articulation and active-supervision requirements as converging into a one-step foreseeability test, in which the judicial role is focused on divining legislative intent. Fortunately, a more recent case on the topic clarifies that the active-supervision requirement is alive and well as an independent criterion where the conduct of state, as opposed to municipal, regulators is at issue—although the Court’s decision also raises many questions about the scope of the application of this market to many private arrangements in deregulated markets. In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., the Court addressed the extension of the state-action exception to the rate-setting activities of title-insurance companies in several states. Most of the states regulating the title-insurance defendants permitted private insurers to jointly file rates, which state officials could review or allow to remain in effect. The record of the case suggested that the states engaged in no significant review of the rates. The FTC had conceded that the state statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed rates met the clear-articulation requirement, but the Court found the agency’s review did not constitute active supervision and thus failed the

61. Id. at 627.
62. In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred. Id. at 630.
63. Id. at 631. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, following a First Circuit decision, held that the existence of a funded and authorized state program met the active-supervision requirement. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1140 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing New Eng. Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990)).
second step of *Midcal*. Hence, the Court concluded that a party could challenge the allegedly anticompetitive acts of the insurers.

Squire’s recent federalism approach attempts to explain these and other cases as interpreting the Sherman Act to preempt the state regulatory program where the state regulations seek to confer monopoly profits on market participants by constricting output. His approach would replace an independent antitrust state-action exception with an inquiry into preemption that hinges on a federal court’s determination of the costs a state chooses to incur under state law. As Squire explains:

[A] state which takes control over market prices incurs costs the state could avoid if its only goal were to confer monopoly profits on producers. These costs are pricing distortions, higher administrative expenses, and constituency protest. A state’s willingness to incur these costs thus suggests that the state’s regulatory objectives do not clash with federal antitrust policy. My proposed preemption doctrine therefore allows states to suspend price competition among producers if the state also steps in to set market prices.

Squire’s approach, which emphasizes the costs a state chooses to incur in its regulatory approach, provides a tidy explanation for why private conduct sanctioned under traditional state price regulation—such as franchise and cost-of-service regulation of electric utilities—is generally not subject to antitrust attack. His analysis would focus antitrust state-action-exception analysis entirely on whether a regulatory regime’s objectives conflicted with the purposes of the Sherman Act; where they did, federal preemption and antitrust enforcement would be appropriate. His approach also implicitly assumes that courts should interpret the Sherman Act broadly, given the public-interest goal of protecting competition. Hence, Squire’s approach endorses a presumption that is generally in favor of preemption.

The federalism approach may have some traction in explaining some of the twentieth-century cases, but it is problematic in two main respects. First, it wrongly assumes that in passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended state and local regulation to be understood as imposing costs. There is no single, fixed meaning to the open-ended terms of the Sherman Act. Congress was

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64. *Ticor*, 504 U.S. at 639.
65. *Id.* at 640.
67. *Id.* at 79–80.
68. *Id.* at 79.
69. As Squire states, “the required limitations must reflect the Act’s general purpose to prevent marketplace wealth transfers from consumers to producers, and yet must honor Congress’s additional mandate that rules of antitrust be more deferential to state lawmakers than they are to market participants.” *Id.* at 107.
focused on a wide range of broad goals in adopting the Sherman Act, including economic efficiency,\(^ {70}\) protecting consumer welfare,\(^ {71}\) preserving competition,\(^ {72}\) and protecting the political process from dominance by large corporate interests.\(^ {73}\) There is, however, no evidence that when Congress adopted the Sherman Act it embraced such a strong efficiency understanding of antitrust enforcement that would have condemned widespread state regulation of activities—especially based on costs. By contrast, there is substantial evidence that Congress intended to leave in place a broad range of state regulation and to leave the evaluation of the appropriateness of future state and local regulation to the courts.\(^ {74}\) At the time Congress adopted the Sherman Act, state and local governments widely accepted regulation of a variety of private activities, including grain rate-setting, bridge tolls, sewage regulation, railroad regulation, and other widely accepted regulatory approaches ranging from bans on prostitution to state and local taxes and rent control.\(^ {75}\) There is also substantial evidence that the drafters and primary sponsors of the Sherman Act were focused primarily on the evil of the pursuit of “greed” by the few at the expense of the many.\(^ {76}\) According to Senator Hoar, a member of the Judiciary Committee that drafted the final version of the Sherman Act:

> When . . . we are dealing with one of . . . the combinations aimed at chiefly by this bill, we are dealing with a transaction the only purpose of which is to extort from the community, monopolize, segregate, and apply to individual use, for the purposes of individual greed, wealth which ought properly and lawfully and for the public interest to be generally diffused over the whole community.\(^ {77}\)

As Elhauge has indicated in his survey of the history surrounding adoption of the Sherman Act, “Not once did a congressman condemn a restraint


\(^{71}\) See generally Robert H. Land, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that Congress passed the Sherman Act to protect consumer welfare).


\(^{74}\) See 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (“I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case.”); see also id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Turpie); id. at 3148 (statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 4089 (statement of Rep. Culberson); id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. Bland).

\(^{75}\) Elhauge, supra note 13, at 700.

\(^{76}\) Id. at 699–700.

\(^{77}\) 21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
imposed by financially disinterested actors," such as state or local regulators.\textsuperscript{78}

Second, in application, a federalist approach that is focused on the costs of state and local regulation answers none of the difficult questions that courts confront today in state-action-immunity cases. Put simply, this approach does not provide a workable set of standards for courts to decide modern state-action-exception issues, especially those of the type that the FTC has recently identified as being of concern.\textsuperscript{79} At its core, as recent state-action-exception cases illustrate, issues of delegation within state governments are as significant to judicial decisions to extend antitrust exceptions as pure assessments of the substantive purposes of antitrust law or economic efficiency. In deciding to extend state-action immunity, modern courts focus not only on federalist principles, but they also pay attention to the procedures under which a state regulator makes its decision.\textsuperscript{80} The delegation inquiry in state-action-exception cases provides an especially useful set of tools for courts in addressing problems of extending antitrust laws to private conduct that is sanctioned through regulatory inaction in industries undergoing change.

Indeed, a pure federalist approach must confront how state regulators still may be entitled to deference notwithstanding ambiguity under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court's longstanding presumption against preemption—an interpretive canon that reflects a desire to protect state regulatory processes and state and local sovereignty—advises strongly against allowing state regulation ever to take priority over the Sherman Act.\textsuperscript{81} As a general matter, the Court requires a "clear statement" or other strong evidence of a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" before finding that federal legislation preempts a state law.\textsuperscript{82} If such a presumption were to apply explicitly in the context of antitrust law, the judicial decision reflected in antitrust state-action doctrine would hinge on federal, not state, regulation.

\textsuperscript{78} Elhauge, supra note 13, at 700.

\textsuperscript{79} See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 34–36 (discussing the problem of broad regulatory regimes).

\textsuperscript{80} For example, this dual focus on federalist principles and procedures is the best interpretation of Midcal. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.).

\textsuperscript{81} Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).

\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 230; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001) (seeking a "clear indication" that Congress authorized the agency to "invoke the outer limits" of congressional authority, and commenting that "[t]his concern [about agency authority] is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment on a traditional state power"); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
Squire's response to this concern in defending a federalism-based understanding of state action is to read the Sherman Act broadly as national public-interest legislation that ought to generally preempt narrowly crafted state and local laws—an approach that is generally consistent with Chicago School statutory interpretation, which would interpret broadly the pro-competition policies of legislative ambiguity in the Sherman Act while reading narrowly other kinds of legislation as interest-group driven. This approach to statutory interpretation has some elegance and is particularly appealing to market-oriented advocates of the Sherman Act. It also takes into account some process-based concerns in addressing the tension between state regulation and national competition laws. But its fault is in giving state and local government short shrift as legitimate political bodies. Even if scholars acknowledge, as I believe they should, that state and local decisions are more susceptible to interest-group influence than federal lawmaking, it does not follow that federal courts should condemn all state and local process and presumptively favor an ambiguous national statute over them. A process-based approach to state-action immunity has much more to lend to the analysis of whether state or local regulations give rise to an antitrust exception. Specifically, a process-based approach recognizes that what happens within a state or local governmental unit—how regulatory decisions are made and by whom—is significant to the decision to suspend application of the Sherman Act.

In addition, as a practical matter, courts applying the state-action exception have failed to interpret state laws and local laws consistent with the Chicago School approach Squire urges. Instead, against the implicit backdrop of the well-acknowledged presumption against preemption, courts have largely deferred to state and local regulators. The siren song of vertical deference has had an overwhelming appeal to federal courts, even where it is clear that there is mischief in the works at the state and local level. As a result, courts have extended the state-action exception to many unwarranted scenarios, even under a substantive-preemption approach based on the cost considerations that Squire emphasizes.

For example, state and local regulators do not always adopt explicit and public regulatory programs with well-defined procedures, such as marketing...
referenda with enforcement mechanisms or cost-of-service hearings. Instead, state and local regulators are increasingly drawing on different kinds of regulatory approaches—sometimes designed to restrict competition and sometimes designed to further it. Some states have banned competition within the state in industries such as electric power, in which federal law authorizes (and perhaps even encourages) interstate competition. Some states have approved restraints between competitors that, unlike the California raisin-producer marketing program, are not voluntary and do not contain clear enforcement mechanisms. Some states have abolished cost-of-service hearings in favor of so called “market-based rates,” designed to further market-oriented goals. In addition, states have increasingly looked to regulatory disclosure and enforcement regimes that require firms to provide information to regulators but leave agencies significant discretion in deciding what to do with such information. Unlike some of the previous instances in which courts have expressed comfort with state regulation, such as state ratemaking proceedings, these new approaches challenge courts to evaluate seriously the effectiveness of state regulatory oversight. To date, courts simply have not risen to the challenge presented by new approaches to regulation at the state and local levels.

B. THE STATE-ACTION EXCEPTION AND REGULATORY INACTION IN INDUSTRIES UNDERGOING CHANGE

Recent cases involving the antitrust state-action exception, particularly in the deregulated electric-power industry, illustrate the problem with the current judicial approach. The state-action exception serves as a conceptual predicate to antitrust enforcement; thus, as a routine defense in antitrust cases, the exception increasingly plays an important role as

86. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
89. In deregulated telecommunications markets, for example, scholars have observed that the regulatory model has shifted from firm-specific cost-of-service hearings toward regulating industry structure through firm-specific tariffs and ex ante rules for defining network access. See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 701, 707 (“[P]olicymakers have increasingly moved away from tariffs towards more flexible agreements negotiated on a customer-by-customer basis... regulators have increasingly begun to abandon classic rate regulation in favor of a new approach known as ‘access regulation.’”); see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1340–57, 1364–83 (1998) (describing broader trends toward detariffing and access regulation across all regulated industries); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 885, 889–90, 960–70, 980–87, 1002–18 (2003) (describing access regulation in local telephony).
90. In this context, courts are highly likely to make a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was either explicitly envisioned by or foreseeable to state legislators. See supra notes 50–55 (referencing the foreseeability approach).
formerly regulated firms become deregulated. Yet, according to most appellate courts, antitrust law's enforcement gates remain closed, allowing the conduct of many private firms to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether in emerging competitive markets. Despite *Ticor*'s signal that active supervision is alive and well as a judicial basis for evaluation, lower courts—especially the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—generally have continued to take a deferential approach to the antitrust state-action doctrine when reviewing state regulation in deregulated markets. Even where the issue is state, not local, regulation, and even where competitive markets for service are emerging, these courts are not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to apply to private conduct in formerly regulated industries where there is some state regulatory scheme, however incomplete it is.

The Tenth Circuit's embrace of particularly broad antitrust immunity for electric utilities, despite the introduction of competition to large segments of the industry, is illustrative of the deferential approach to judicial intervention. For example, the Tenth Circuit extended an antitrust state-action exemption to Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company's ("OG&E") conduct based on evidence that the state regulatory agency had "general supervision" authority over the utility, "including the power to fix all of OG&E's rates for electricity and to promulgate all the rules and regulations that affect OG&E's services, operation, and management." The Tenth Circuit deemed a state agency's power to engage in rate review as itself sufficient for applying an antitrust state-action exemption, effectively rendering the active-supervision requirement meaningless. While the court cited a previous case that "found that the use of similar authority over an electric utility satisfied the active supervision requirement" as a basis for this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence of the regulator's affirmative use of such authority with respect to the utility whose conduct was at issue. Moreover, based on a review of the docket index for both the appellate and trial courts, there is no indication that the Oklahoma

93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1988)).
95. The case presents a notable contrast to a later Tenth Circuit case, in which the court refused to extend a state-action exception to unilateral activity that was not "mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about" by the state regulator. Telecor Commc'n, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002). This case is also too narrow in defining the limits of antitrust state-action doctrine. As is discussed infra, courts should not limit refusal to extend the state-action exception to purely "unilateral" activity but should also extend to bilateral activity in which the regulator plays a passive role. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
state regulatory agency made a single filing in the trial or appellate case; it
did not weigh-in as amicus in the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, although
Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") (a nationwide industry association
representing private utilities such as OG&E) filed an amicus brief.\footnote{96}

The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach to the
antitrust state-action defense.\footnote{97} North Star Steel, a customer located within
the exclusive service territory of MidAmerican, an electric utility in Iowa,
sought to purchase competitively priced electricity and requested that
MidAmerican wheel power to it.\footnote{98} MidAmerican refused, and North Star
sued, alleging that the utility violated the antitrust laws by refusing to allow
access to its transmission lines.\footnote{99} The court found that active supervision
of the utility's conduct existed because an Iowa statute assigned new customers
to exclusive service providers and, in the event there was a conflict over
which provider was in control of a given area, the regulator determined
which provider should occupy the area.\footnote{100} The court found that Iowa's
legislature "affirmatively expressed" a policy of displacing competition in the
market for retail electric service.\footnote{101} The court refused, however, to explore
the substantive basis for the agency's regulatory determinations in defining
exclusive service territories. For instance, even though the state had
experimented with limited "pilot" retail-wheeling programs,\footnote{102} the court did
not evaluate how the state agency's efforts to promote competition in power
supply could coexist with its maintenance of exclusive service territories over
transmission and distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on all
of these issues. In fact, the only regulatory action discussed related to the
definition of service territories,\footnote{103} not the allocation of power supply or
generation. The court also reasoned that "less pervasive regulatory regimes
have been held to satisfy the active supervision prong."\footnote{104} On appeal, the

\footnote{96. This observation is based on a review of the docket indices available through Westlaw
for both the appellate and trial court cases. See \textit{Trigen}, 244 F.3d at 1220 (No. 00-6047) (showing
that the Oklahoma regulatory agency did not file an amicus brief at the appellate level); Trigen-
Okla. Feb. 19, 1999) (showing that the Oklahoma regulatory agency did not file an amicus brief
at the trial court level); Brief for Edison Electric Institute as Amicus Curia Supporting
Defendant-Appellant, \textit{Trigen}, 244 F.3d at 1220 (No. 00-6047) (showing that Edison Electric filed
an amicus brief).}

\footnote{97. See \textit{N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.}, 184 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir.
1999).}

\footnote{98. \textit{Id.} at 734.}

\footnote{99. \textit{Id.}}

\footnote{100. \textit{Id.} at 739.}

\footnote{101. \textit{Id.} at 736. Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit
assumed for collateral-estoppel purposes that "under Iowa law the exclusive service territory
provisions include the generation of electricity for retail sales." \textit{Id.} at 737-38.}

\footnote{102. \textit{N. Star Steel Co.}, 184 F.3d at 736.}

\footnote{103. \textit{Id.} at 738.}

\footnote{104. \textit{Id.} at 739.}
Iowa Utilities Board filed an amicus brief before the Eighth Circuit discussing its regulatory approach, but the court did not address explicitly the issue of how much deference it should afford to the state regulator's position.

One of these "less pervasive" regulatory regimes is blanket state prohibitions—by statute or regulation—of certain types of pro-competitive conduct. For example, according to Florida's regulators and courts, Florida has adopted a statutory prohibition on retail-electric competition, outside of self-wheeling arrangements (e.g., a supplier transmitting power over the utility's lines for the supplier's own use). Although Florida certainly does not have a clear legislative statement regarding the issue, Florida's Public Service Commission ("PSC") adopted a regulation that prohibits retail wheeling to provide access to competitive power supplies outside of self-wheeling. A Florida Supreme Court case had previously interpreted this regulation to preclude cogenerators from selling their power in the retail market. Accepting both the regulation and the Florida Supreme Court's characterization of the regulation, the Eleventh Circuit applied the state-action exemption to preclude an antitrust action by a cogeneration facility against a utility that refused to wheel power at a competitive rate. The Florida PSC filed an amicus brief with the Eleventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the state regulator's interpretation of Florida law without discussing the issue of how much deference it should afford to the agency's interpretation in its brief.

A way of understanding the antitrust claim before the Eleventh Circuit is as a collateral attack on the state-agency rule based on a substantive violation of federal antitrust law. The decision echoes a previous Eleventh Circuit case in which the court found that the state-action defense protects a

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105. This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw for the appellate case. Brief for Iowa Utilities Board as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, N. Star Steel Co., 184 F.3d 732 (No. 92-2987).

106. See PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the legislature's determination "that the protection of the public interest required only limiting competition in the sale of electric service, not a prohibition against self-generation").

107. See TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1566 n. 17 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 25-17.0882 (2007)).

108. See PW Ventures, Inc., 533 So. 2d at 284 (clarifying its previous decision in Fletcher Properties v. Florida Public Service Commission, 356 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1978)).

109. TEC Cogeneration Inc., 76 F.3d at 1567.

110. This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw for the appellate case. Brief for Fla. Power et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, TEC Cogeneration Inc., 76 F.3d 1560 (No. 88-CV-02145).

111. The court reasoned that "the doors to the PSC were open to all with standing to complain[,]" but nowhere did the court identify how a private cogenerator might raise such issues before the Florida PSC. TEC Cogeneration Inc., 76 F.3d at 1570. Arguably, it could not do this other than by directly challenging the state-agency regulation authorizing the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
regulated electric utility's division of service territories from Sherman Act restraint-of-trade claims.\textsuperscript{112} Taken together, these Eleventh Circuit opinions seem to suggest that the mere existence of an agency rule authorizing anticompetitive conduct is enough to trigger active supervision.\textsuperscript{113} If this holds, however, not only can the actions of a state legislature insulate private conduct from antitrust liability, but a unilaterally adopted agency rule can also excuse private conduct from antitrust enforcement, even if this rule prohibits pro-competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.

This deferential approach to antitrust-enforcement filtering by state regulatory agencies has serious implications for the enforcement of the antitrust laws in deregulated markets. In California's deregulated electric-power market, wholesale power suppliers possessing market power allegedly have engaged in tacit collusion to withhold supply and thus artificially inflate their prices.\textsuperscript{114} Of course, both federal and state regulation continued, even in the context of California's failed regulation plan. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") made its own determinations that individual firms lacked market power and had approved several market-based tariffs, allowing deregulation in the wholesale market. As to California's retail market, state agencies also had approved the sale of power by these suppliers through the state-sanctioned market exchange.\textsuperscript{115} To the extent that the behavior of any private firms operating in this market raised a plausible Section one\textsuperscript{116} (or even a Section two)\textsuperscript{117} antitrust claim under the Sherman Act, the mere existence of a state-sanctioned and state-supervised market should not give rise to a state-action exception.

\textsuperscript{112} Praxair, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 611 (11th Cir. 1995).
\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 613 ("An agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation."). In an earlier case, the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the clear-articulation requirement to find a state-action exception. See Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501–04 (11th Cir. 1991). This seems to take the antitrust state-action exception completely outside of the two-part \textit{Midcal} test, turning it into a one-step, clear-articulation requirement. In \textit{Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States}, 471 U.S. 48 (1985), the Court stated, "The federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties. As long as the State clearly articulates its intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied." Id. at 60. In the same opinion, however, the Court made it clear that the presence or absence of compulsion is not the "\textit{sine qua non} to state action immunity." Id.
\textsuperscript{115} For discussion of this regulatory framework, see generally Jim Rossi, \textit{The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods}, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768 (2002).
\textsuperscript{117} Id. § 2 (prohibiting monopolization and attempts to monopolize).
Judicial decisions that adopt this deferential approach send mixed signals and present a barrier to plaintiffs seeking to sue under antitrust laws. Still worse, these decisions invite private manipulation of state and local regulators to create antitrust immunity. Particularly, as state and local governments engage in lawmaking in partially deregulated markets, and move away from the standard regulatory process afforded in a public rate hearing, the risks of private manipulation of the policy-making process heightens. Given this risk, courts could improve the functioning of deregulated markets, as well as the political process, if they devised a more principled way of exercising their filter function in the state-action-exception context.

Since Hallie, the Supreme Court has abandoned the political-process informed municipal-state distinction in assessing the antitrust state-action doctrine. In place of this standard, federal courts embrace a highly deferential stance in reviewing both state and local regulation as they apply the state-action exception. If a state regulates an activity, courts reviewing private conduct under complex regulatory schemes are increasingly likely to imply a regulatory policy—sometimes even absent the state's clear articulation of a regulatory purpose. Given the strong presumption against preemption, the general approach disfavors judicial intervention in applying the state-action exception as an antitrust defense.

Many courts also imply the active-supervision prong of the antitrust state-action doctrine, limiting judicial intervention in many recent cases involving deregulated electric-power markets, especially in the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. These courts consistently have failed to evaluate the degree of scrutiny that state or local regulators provide, as well as whether the purpose of this supervision overlaps with the Sherman Act's pro-competitive goals. Their approach evinces a serious lapse of the judicial filtering function in considering antitrust challenges to private conduct in restructured industries, such as electric power and telecommunications. Without a judicial safeguard, overbroad judicial endorsement of the state-action exception allows anticompetitive private conduct to escape scrutiny altogether and risks undermining the goals of competition law, particularly as national markets in these industries develop.

In recognition of this serious problem, Easterbrook and Squire, along with many other scholars, including John Shepard Wiley, Matthew

118. See generally MASHAW, supra note 58.
119. Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was either explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41–42 (1985) (referencing the foreseeability approach).
120. See supra notes 92–143 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
121. See supra note 10.
122. See supra note 11.
Spitzer, and others, have advanced approaches that focus on the substantive efficiency of state and local regulation, with a particular eye toward limiting capture in the political process. In contrast, Merrick Garland, now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, has been one of the most strident proponents of a strongly deferential approach to the state-action exception in considering the relevance of state regulation. In a leading article, he argues that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between municipalities and states for federal-antitrust purposes. Put simply, his view is that federal courts should not assess state and local legislation for either its efficiency or rent-seeking effects, or for process-based concerns, in antitrust cases. Defenders of judicial deference in antitrust federalism see judicial review of state and local laws for efficiency, rent-seeking, or public-interest goals as tantamount to federal courts returning to substantive-due-process review of state and local regulation, encroaching on decentralized lawmaking in the economic-regulation context. Like advocates of deregulatory takings in public-utility law attempt to reinvigorate Lochner in determining government liability for regulatory transitions, strong-deference advocates are concerned that judicial intervention in the evaluation of the state-action defense will lead

123. Responding to Hallie, John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address the efficiency and, in particular, public-choice implications of state and local legislation in deciding whether to accept an antitrust state-action defense. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748 (1986). According to Wiley, if anticompetitive legislation is inefficient and the result of producer-interest lobbying, the state-action defense should not shield conduct authorized under the legislation from scrutiny under the Sherman Act. Id. at 788-89.


125. See Cirace, supra note 39, at 515 (arguing that courts should employ an efficiency test to evaluate the effects of state and local legislation on claims under the Sherman Act); Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State-Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 212 (2000) (arguing that based on a “status choice” approach courts should inquire “whether a government actor’s conception of the public interest is being furthered by an anticompetitive restraint”).


127. Id. at 502-07.

128. Id. at 519.


courts to a *Lochner*-type review of regulation.\(^\text{131}\) Garland, for example, favors exempting all regulatory actions by state and local governments from judicial review under the Sherman Act except for delegations of the power to restrain the market to private parties.\(^\text{132}\)

Yet, while it has been one-hundred years since the Court decided *Lochner*, and more than sixty years since it reigned supreme in utility law,\(^\text{133}\) no one—including those who wish to evaluate the efficiency of state regulations in the antitrust state-action exception context—seriously wishes to invoke its ghost.\(^\text{134}\) Indeed, if courts approached judicial review of decentralized lawmaking in a principled and cautious manner, a strongly deferential stance to state regulators would not be necessary to limit the scope of judicial review. As Daniel Gifford has argued, federal courts have the capacity to review state and local legislation without directly addressing their substantive-efficiency effects.\(^\text{135}\) Gifford suggests that courts apply the same "free market" approach to the antitrust state-action exception that they apply under the dormant Commerce Clause by recognizing two markets.\(^\text{136}\) Antitrust state-action evaluation would protect the internal (intrastate) market from trade restraints, while the dormant Commerce Clause extends to the external (interstate) market.\(^\text{137}\)

Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld have made perhaps the most strident political-process-based argument in the antitrust-federalism context. They argue that the antitrust state-action defense should apply only where regulation imposes substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests.\(^\text{138}\) In their view, the state-action exception would not remove from antitrust enforcement all private monopolies sanctioned by regulation but only those that are actively supervised by the state for purposes of limiting the harms that flow from unregulated monopoly.\(^\text{139}\) As such, the active-supervision prong of the antitrust state-action doctrine is not inherently anti-commerce, but it recognizes the need for regulation to correct for certain market failures when the public interest demands it. On this understanding, enforcement of pro-commerce norms is necessary where the federalism-based value of participation conflicts with efficiency, as can occur if state

\(^{131}\) Garland, *supra* note 126, at 488 (making an explicit comparison to *Lochner*).

\(^{132}\) *Id.* at 506.


\(^{134}\) Chen, *supra* note 130, at 1568.

\(^{135}\) Gifford, *supra* note 12, at 1252-53.

\(^{136}\) *Id.* at 1230-31.

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at 1272.

\(^{138}\) Inman & Rubinfeld, *supra* note 31, at 1207.

\(^{139}\) See *id.* at 1257 (analyzing *California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.*, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980), in which the Court required active state supervision).
regulation creates spillover costs for those who do not participate in the relevant state or local regulatory process.\textsuperscript{140}

In contrast to even this modest process-based view of judicial intervention, recent cases involving utility restructuring illustrate the problem presented by the low state-action-exemption threshold that many lower courts currently utilize. While Squire’s federalism approach embraces skepticism in approaching state and local laws, in practice, this type of approach may further encourage an even more deferential approach given the well-recognized judicial presumption against preemption. Further, the substantive-cost criteria for evaluating federal preemption fails to adequately address state laws that do not take an affirmative regulatory approach. Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulation, which gives birth to the norms of competition, private firms face strong incentives to use the regulatory process to enact partial regulatory schemes for purposes of establishing immunity from the antitrust laws. As states have begun to deregulate industries such as telecommunications and electric power, the nature of state regulation has changed. Rather than regulating utilities through rate and traditional certificate-of-need proceedings, increasingly regulators are laying down general structural rules or approving structural—rather than pricing—tariffs.\textsuperscript{141} Most agree that with the rise of competitive markets antitrust law plays a more—not less—important role than under

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\textsuperscript{140} Id. at 1207.
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traditional rate regulation.142 As one Department of Justice lawyer recognized in the context of antitrust enforcement in emerging electric-power markets, "if a state opens its retail market to competition, then the state action doctrine would not apply to conduct that relates directly to retail competition."143 The reality of separating regulated from unregulated conduct for antitrust-federalism purposes is hardly simple, however, because states frequently endorse competition in some, but not all, aspects of formerly regulated industries such as electric power and telecommunications.

It is entirely sound for a court to extend an antitrust state-action defense where a state or locality has a history of affirmative state regulation—such as regular hearings to set rates based on cost—and continues to embrace this regulatory approach. However, courts also extend the defense where a state official has the jurisdiction to regulate but fails to exercise it—even where there is little or no history of regulatory action.144 Courts are also asked to review not only traditional agency decisions, such as cost-of-service ratemaking, but also to evaluate the state-action implications of agency inaction, such as an agency's failure to revoke a permit or an agency's failure to enforce regulations. In such contexts, jurisdiction or vague reference to a past history of regulation is of little or no relevance to how state regulators approach the problem today. Private antitrust defendants or regulators can proffer regulatory rationales on appeal—including the relationship between regulation and competition—rather than at the time the agency adopts a specific regulatory approach. To the extent state regulators provide any rationale at all (and in many instances they do not make any filings in antitrust litigation), they only address the failure to regulate ex post in briefs filed in antitrust cases. When a state regulator does file an amicus brief, courts do not address the level of deference they ought to afford the agency's position.145

At one extreme, the presumption against preemption results in too much deference to state regulators. At the other extreme, the federalism approach, when coupled with the Chicago School skepticism of state and local regulation, results in too little deference. What both approaches share is that they treat all state and local regulators homogeneously, without

142. See Dibadj, supra note 12, at 763–64 (describing the Post-Chicago School and its proposals for limited antitrust); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89, at 1350 (explaining the necessity of imposing new regulations in monopolistic industries); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 89, at 888 (arguing for the enforcement of regulations of the telecommunications industry).


144. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's extension of an antitrust state-action exemption based on a state agency's apparent authority to engage in rate review).

145. See supra notes 96, 105, 110 (referencing briefs filed in appeals).
regard to institutional and other variables that influence the accountability of regulation at the state and local level.\textsuperscript{146} As argued infra, antitrust state-action-exemption cases could learn from a delegation approach and \textit{Chevron} step two's focus on reasons, rather than antitrust law's emphasis on clear statements, jurisdictional delegation, and agency actions. Giving reasons would allow federal courts to evaluate whether officials have legitimate goals in mind in refusing to regulate, or whether they are merely opting out of antitrust enforcement to favor powerful interest groups at the state and local level. In addition, such an approach could force state officials to provide reasons before making a decision not to regulate conduct, subjecting such reasons to review within a state's regulatory system.

\textbf{II. \textit{Chevron}, Delegation, and Reasonableness Review}

The \textit{Chevron} case,\textsuperscript{147} often seen as a very pro-agency approach to the judicial review of regulation, has attracted the attention of administrative-law scholars since the Court decided it in 1984. \textit{Chevron} stands at the center of many major recent Supreme Court decisions.\textsuperscript{148} In \textit{Mead}, decided in 2001, the Court signaled a clear retreat away from application of the \textit{Chevron} test as the exclusive model for reviewing agency interpretations of law.\textsuperscript{149} However, \textit{Chevron} remains the predominant controlling framework for most courts and commentators approaching judicial review of agency legal interpretations, as well as agency policy decisions made in the context of broad legislative delegations.\textsuperscript{150} The rationale of \textit{Chevron} deference and

\textsuperscript{146} Squire does emphasize that, ultimately, process matters in some way to the assessment of state regulation, but his test for assessing the sufficiency of process is limited to assessing whether the decisionmaker gives independent weight to interests of both sides to a transaction. Squire, \textit{supra} note 11, at 116. Hence, a one-sided ratemaking proceeding, whether before a legislature or a regulatory agency, would be problematic under his view, but he is willing to allow regulators to "enrich producers by raising prices, as long as consumer interests enjoy independent weight in the price-selection method." \textit{Id}. This helps to sustain the preemption approach's promise of being "[d]eferential . . . but not toothless." \textit{Id}. at 107. But, such an approach relegates process to a mere evidentiary role in assessing whether the Sherman Act preempts state or local regulation.


\textsuperscript{149} In \textit{Mead}, the Court suggested that \textit{Skidmore} rather than \textit{Chevron} will provide the appropriate standard for reviewing courts in approaching many agency legal interpretations. \textit{Mead Corp.}, 533 U.S. at 230.

many aspects of its application involving delegation concerns strongly parallel the kinds of issues courts confront when they address antitrust immunities and defenses, such as the state-action exception.

A. THE RISE OF THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK

Justice Stevens's unanimous Chevron opinion articulates what has become the predominant judicial paradigm for reviewing agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. In Chevron, the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary sources" in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The statute required "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution to comply with certain permit requirements and authorized the EPA to define the relevant terms by regulation. Initially, the EPA determined that the "stationary source" referred to each individual piece of equipment that emitted pollution, but in 1981 the Agency changed the definition to mean an entire plant. As an effect of this new interpretation, firms could avoid some pollution-permit requirements by reducing emissions from old equipment in order to offset emissions from new equipment installed in the same plant.

The Chevron Court's approach to reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation distills judicial review into two distinct questions. At step one of the Chevron approach, the Court inquires into whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." If Congress has—and has done so clearly—the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." If, however, the statute at issue is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, a court is to move on to Chevron's step two. At step two, a court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the agency's legal interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." At step two, Chevron endorses judicial deference to the agency's statutory interpretation by giving the agency's regulations "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Justice Marshall’s exhortation in *Marbury v. Madison* that it is “the province and duty of the judicial department . . . to say what the law is” thus takes a back seat to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s legal interpretation at step two of *Chevron*. In this sense, one might see *Chevron* as having a basis in separation of powers. Surely, however, the power to define the balance of powers in judicial review remains within Congress’s prerogative, as illustrated by the many statutes in which Congress has defined standards of review or even abolished judicial review altogether.

Rather than separation of powers, *Chevron* is best explained by a more pragmatic set of institutional concerns aimed at improving the quality of agency decisions and the accountability of the process that produces them. An appreciation of agency expertise, the limits of the specialized knowledge of judges, and political accountability are at the normative core of Justice Stevens’s rationale for deference to the agency in *Chevron*. As Justice Stevens wrote in *Chevron*, “Judges are not experts in the field,” and thus in interpreting statutory gaps courts should “rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.” Justice Stevens emphasized that judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation furthers political accountability:

[T]he [EPA] Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference . . . . Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.

Implicit in Justice Stevens’s accountability rationale is the recognition that agencies are institutionally superior to courts in their capacity for making accountable political decisions against the backdrop of ambiguous statutory

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160. Cynthia R. Farina, *Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State*, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 476 (1989) (“It is surely a far more remarkable step that *Chevron* acknowledged to number among Congress’s constitutional prerogatives the power to compel courts to accept and enforce another entity’s view of legal meaning whenever the law is ambiguous.”).
162. *Id.*
Agency legal interpretations will be subject to political oversight and thus are accountable to presidential politics, as well as congressional oversight. In addition, as Professor Peter Straus has argued, for reasons of judicial economy, *Chevron* promotes uniformity in regulatory policy. Because the Supreme Court has limited resources to resolve conflicting statutory interpretations by lower courts, judicial acceptance of agency legal interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms will promote uniformity in interpretation, providing regulated entities and other branches of government some degree of certainty in assessing the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.

Thus, while some commentators consider separation of powers or congressional intent to delegate lawmaking authority as the primary rationale for *Chevron* deference, other commentators accept political accountability and institutional concerns as the principle justifications for the doctrine. Although scholars have observed that the direct impact of *Chevron* on the doctrinal approach of the lower courts is sometimes overstated, studies suggest that the decision did affect the reversal and remand rates for judicial appeals of agency decisions in lower courts.

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164. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from *Chevron* and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990) (explaining that *Chevron* is justified by the agency's superior political accountability). At the extreme, this view sees *Chevron* as working pure unitary-executive principles.


166. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 160, at 476; see also Michael Herz, Defe rence Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under *Chevron*, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 189–90, 202–03 (1992) (using constitutional concerns of institutional roles of Congress to distinguish deference analysis for interpretive rules and legislative rules); Randolph J. May, Tug of Democracy: Justices Pull for America's Separation of Powers, LEGAL TIMES, July 9, 2001, at 51 (applauding *Mead* on the ground that its limits on *Chevron* are consistent with constitutional principles).

167. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150 (arguing that courts should define the *Chevron* doctrine with respect to Congress's intent to delegate lawmaking authority to an agency).

168. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, *Chevron's* Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 223 (“The only workable approach is the approach that *Chevron* took in the beginning: to fill in legislative silence about judicial review by making policy choices based on institutional attributes, with Congress then free to overrule these conclusions.”).

169. See Merrill, supra note 20 at 980–85.

170. Professors Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliott observe that “[a]ffirmance increased by almost [fifteen] percent after *Chevron*, and both remands and reversals declined by roughly [forty] percent.” Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the *Chevron* Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKEL.J. 984, 1058. The authors concluded, “On the evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is sometimes able to effectively shape the court-agency relationship through the kind of relatively broad, open-textured rule adopted in *Chevron*.” Id. at 1059. Another study found that the D.C. Circuit's deference to EPA
B. Extending Chevron Review to State Economic Regulation

Apart from a very active current debate regarding the scope of Chevron deference, courts have struggled with two issues in applying Chevron to the review of agency regulation. The purpose of this Article is not to catalog the entire range of problems that courts have confronted, but to highlight the issues that are most relevant in expanding Chevron’s delegation structure to antitrust immunities and defenses. First, at step one of the Chevron inquiry, courts have struggled with the role of non-textual information regarding statutory meaning. Although there is substantial disagreement on what sources courts should draw on when discerning statutory meaning, step one of the Chevron inquiry creates incentives for clear legislative statements, thus enhancing the transparency of the legislative process. Second, while courts have struggled with the appropriate approach to the second step of Chevron, recent judicial and scholarly focus on the procedural issues presented at step two have a particular traction in the context of assessing state and local regulation.

1. Step One’s Limits as a Clear-Statement Rule

At step one of the Chevron inquiry, a court focuses on what the statute means—a task judges have the experience and institutional competence to perform without drawing on other expertise. Discerning meaning remains a controversial judicial task, but if a court can resolve the issue of statutory meaning, it is the judicial prerogative to determine whether an agency’s regulatory approach violates the statute. The Court played this role in cases such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FDA lacked authority to regulate cigarettes as nicotine-delivery “devices” subject to FDA jurisdiction under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. 172

One popular approach to conceptualizing step one of the Chevron inquiry focuses on the background incentives favoring legislative delegation. The basic approach is to understand step one as creating incentives for clear and comprehensive legislation and against broad delegations. Under this view, if Congress wishes for courts to restrain agencies, it should use clear and unambiguous language in the legislation it passes. Justice Scalia, for example, has praised Chevron for creating an incentive for Congress to use interpretations increased after Chevron. Aaron P. Avila, Applications of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398, 403, 431 (2000).

171. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150, at 848–52 (cataloging a range of “unresolved questions” with Chevron’s application).

172. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). Einer Elhauge defends this result by arguing that the Court was following current enactable congressional preferences, as is appropriate where the Court reviews agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions. Einer Elhauge, Preference Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2148–54 (2002).
clear language in statutes: “Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates... will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”

Put another way, judicial deference to an agency—triggered by the step-one inquiry of whether Congress failed to use clear language to limit an agency’s policy choices—serves as a “default rule” which, on a case-by-case basis, Congress can change. Where Congress is sloppy, as frequently occurs in drafting statutes, Congress and interest groups face the potential “penalty” of judicial deference at step two, generally reaffirming the agency’s view. Einer Elhauge, for example, has argued that the Chevron doctrine allocates authority between courts and agencies in a way that is designed to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguity will best match current (majoritarian) government preferences. In this sense, step one of Chevron can operate as a type of clear-statement rule, designed to elicit statutory clarity from Congress where there is a majoritarian preference supporting clarity. A desirable by-product of such an approach is to channel interest-group lobbying efforts to focus on Congress, not agencies or courts, making it more likely that legislative decisions better reflect majoritarian preferences.

While clear statements at Chevron’s step one have an appealing democracy-forcing function, if approached too aggressively they invite judicial mischief and, by hamstringing agencies on programmatic details for which congressional revision is unlikely, may undermine sound regulatory policy. Indeed, according to one understanding of the judicial role at Chevron’s step one, a court’s primary emphasis is on whether clear and unambiguous language prohibits or precludes a regulator from exercising discretion in a certain way: at the extreme, such an approach invites aggressive judicial attribution of clear statutory meaning as a way of limiting agency discretion and avoiding Chevron’s step-two deference. In contrast to

174. See id. (describing Chevron as a “background rule of law against which Congress can legislate”); Merrill, supra note 20, at 978 (referring to Chevron as a “default rule” that Congress can change).
175. Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2162 (arguing for preference-eliciting default rules in statutory interpretation).
176. For a notable Supreme Court case illustrating this activist approach to applying Chevron step one, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). There, the majority’s step-one analysis (applied to reverse the INS) was so searching that it prompted Justice Scalia to argue that it “implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever... they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia protested that the Court’s “approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.” Id.
this oft-criticized approach, the predominant approach of courts in reviewing an agency’s interpretation at Chevron’s step one focuses on whether a statutory gap or ambiguity exists, leaving questions about how an agency exercises discretion for resolution at step two.\(^\text{177}\)

2. Step Two as a Reason-Giving Requirement

Step two of Chevron assumes that the statute itself does not answer the question of whether an agency’s action is valid. While many courts are extremely deferential in reviewing agency action at step two, most commentators today see step two as co-existing with a type of reasonableness review of agency action designed to manage the discretion exercised by the agency. In endorsing “hard look” review, the Supreme Court has stated that a rule

would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the decision before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.\(^\text{178}\)

The notice-and-comment process legally binds the agency to produce explanatory material in the form of a statement of general basis and purpose.\(^\text{179}\) Thus, the rigors of hard-look review promote deliberation and accountability\(^\text{180}\) and protect against arbitrariness.\(^\text{181}\) Several recent commentators emphasize that such an approach to arbitrary-and-capricious review addresses delegation-type concerns.\(^\text{182}\) Others have observed that

\(^{177}\) Chevron itself embraced such an approach:

If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation . . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, the court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of the agency.


\(^{180}\) See Seidenfeld, supra note 163, at 128–30 (advocating a more exacting scrutiny of agencies’ statutory interpretation).


\(^{182}\) See id. at 518 (arguing that meaningful standards make administrative law “ordinary” as opposed to “constitutional”); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing Bressman, Stack, and Criddle).
hard-look review serves a “signaling” function by allowing courts to overcome their comparative informational disadvantage in assessing complex technical and policy issues vis-à-vis other branches to the extent that a “court can reason that the expert government decisionmaker's willingness to provide an explanation signals that the government believes the benefits of the proposed policy are high.”

Indeed, evidence suggests that courts find attractive the kind of heightened review reflected in a process-based approach to step two. While observers have noted that, in practice, step-two *Chevron* review is so lenient that it is almost meaningless, lower courts take hard-look review more seriously. The Court's failure to reverse an agency decision at step two of *Chevron* characterized the first fifteen years following the decision; but in at least two recent cases, the Court has adopted a more rigorous approach, reversing and remanding agency action where regulators failed to provide adequate reasons for their decisions. If public-choice concerns justify such review in the context of federal agencies, such concerns are even more salient in the context of state and local economic regulation. Moreover, two of the main rationales for strong *Chevron* deference at the federal level are inapposite to the state- and local-government contexts: the national-uniformity interest in strong *Chevron* deference is simply not applicable, and the unitary executive is foreign to most state and local governments, where the more predominant executive governance model is governance by plural executive or by commission rather than a single executive-branch official.

187. See Bressman, *supra* note 21, at 483 (citing public-choice concerns).
188. Peter Strauss has advanced *Chevron* deference as a way of promoting uniformity in agency interpretations and policy approaches. See Strauss, *supra* note 165, at 1121. Deference to a state or local regulator may further uniformity but only within the state or local jurisdiction at issue and not at the national level.
189. See *supra* note 20 (citing Merrill and Paulsen).
Chevron's step two has four additional implications for the delegation issues that courts routinely address in applying the antitrust state-action exception. First, under Chevron, courts are frequently asked to address how deference relates to the presumption against preemption. In the antitrust context, the deference issue demands a different analysis given that vertical rather than horizontal deference is at issue. Second, private delegations have historically called for heightened judicial review in administrative law, in large part as a constitutional-avoidance mechanism. Third, as has long been recognized, courts frown on agencies providing reasons for their decisions after the fact, as occurs when an agency provides a post hoc rationale for its position in a brief filed in a judicial proceeding. Fourth, the hard-look doctrine can not only extend to affirmative-agency decisions to regulate, but can and should also be used to attack agency failures to act.

Courts are frequently called on to address how Chevron relates to federalism-oriented concerns, such as the federal government's respect for decentralized decisionmaking and state sovereignty. The approach of those who embrace a federalism-based understanding of the state-action exception, such as Squire, would see preemption of state regulation of antitrust cases—i.e., a judicial finding of no state-action exception—as applying only where a court makes an affirmative finding that the regulatory purposes of a state approach conflict with the purposes of the Sherman Act.191 However, casting the antitrust state-action defense entirely as a federalism issue, such as a background presumption against preemption requiring an affirmative finding of preemption by courts to overcome the mere fact of state and local regulation, also invites courts to define the range of regulatory actions leading to antitrust exemptions too broadly. At one extreme, given the ambiguous approach of Congress in the Sherman Act, no state or local law would ever be preempted. At the other extreme, Congress could not have intended to allow passage of the Sherman Act to invalidate a broad range of state and local regulation at the time, including grain regulation, sewage regulation, and trolley franchises. For this reason, a federalism-based approach provides a troubling basis for courts to use in applying the state-action doctrine.

As Nina Mendelson has emphasized, "the source of the tension between Chevron and the presumption against preemption is that Congress has failed to define explicitly whether it believes a statute preempts state law or whether it wishes an administrative agency to decide that question."192 In the context of horizontal-deference issues, deference and the presumption against preemption pull judicial scrutiny in opposite directions. Where

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551, 559 (2001) ("[I]n most states the ability of a governor to oversee executive branch policymaking is weak in comparison to the U.S. President.").

191. Squire, supra note 11, at 99.

Congress makes ambiguous delegations, Mendelson suggests that courts need to exercise independent judgment to resolve state-law preemption questions rather than defer to federal agencies at step two of *Chevron*. In particular, she focuses on how this can further institutional-competence and political-accountability goals, as well as how this promotes agency expertise, protects against self-interest, and minimizes the prospect of arbitrary decisionmaking, raising some of the concerns that inform the delegation-oriented account of *Chevron*.

Of course, the state-action exception addresses judicial deference to state—not federal—regulation. Here, although the presumption against preemption and deference pull courts in opposite directions, they point in precisely the same direction—supporting deference to state regulators. State and local governments, as independent sovereigns whose power is not derived from Congress, have always retained significant regulatory powers if they choose to exercise them—as the judicially created category of state-action doctrine recognizes. For vertical-deference issues, then, blind judicial adherence to a presumption against preemption would perversely result in not less, but more, deference to state regulators in the state-action exception context. Thus, the deference problem that courts face is fundamentally different from that presented in other federalism contexts involving *Chevron*.

That is not to say that the lessons of *Chevron* are irrelevant, but there is good reason to think that the same approach to issues like federalism simply is not justified where judicial deference to state, rather than federal, regulators is at issue. As with other *Chevron* questions, any institutional analysis of the deference problem presented by the state-action exception must focus on the competence of various actors and incentives produced in the state lawmaking process. Given the well-accepted Madisonian account of interest-group behavior in state and local politics, a court’s increased caution in deferring is in order. If, as Mendelson argues, independent judicial inquiry is necessary to protect accountability in the context of a federal agency making a decision to preempt state regulation, an even greater level of judicial scrutiny will be necessary to protect accountability where the preemption decision hinges on the policy choice of a state or local regulator.

Furthermore, courts are not any more inclined to defer to federal delegations over state agencies. The D.C. Circuit has recognized this basic principle and the limits of *Chevron* deference in the context of telecommunications regulation. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") adopted a provisional nationwide rule, subject to the possibility of

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193. *Id.*
194. *Id.* at 798–800.
195. *See supra* note 58.
local exceptions in response to a series of reversals on its rules, which intended to foster a competitive market in local telecommunications.\textsuperscript{197} The rule relegated to state public-utility commissions the power to determine when local exceptions to access were warranted, even though Congress had specifically directed the FCC to consider whether the lack of access would impair the ability of an entrant to provide service.\textsuperscript{198} On review, the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC's "subdelegation" of determination of an "impairment" to a state agency.\textsuperscript{199} While the court recognized that is was entirely appropriate for the FCC to delegate to a subordinate within the agency, it limited subdelegation to outside parties, including state or local regulators, for fear that "lines of accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic check on government decision-making."\textsuperscript{200} The court emphasized that such subdelegation "aggravates the risk of policy drift inherent in any principal-agent relationship."\textsuperscript{201}

A second implication of \textit{Chevron} step-two review of state economic regulation is that courts review delegations to private entities with an especially jaundiced eye. The general movement away from traditional means of regulation and toward deregulation and privatization has generated much praise for challenging many negative aspects of the traditional regulatory state.\textsuperscript{202} Administrative law has long recognized, however, that delegations of authority to private entities also present a unique set of problems—bordering, at some level, on the unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{203} As Paul Verkuil has recently chronicled, privatization can be pursued without thwarting public values if democratically accountable public officials preserve certain inherent democratic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{In re} Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 16983–85 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{198} \textit{Id.} at 17263, 17272, 17275.
\item \textsuperscript{199} U.S. Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594–95 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{200} \textit{Id.} at 565.
\item \textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.} at 566. The D.C. Circuit distinguished, and left open the permissibility of, subdelegations for "(1) establishing a reasonable condition for granting federal approval; (2) fact gathering; and (3) advice giving." \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{202} \textit{See} Orly Lobel, \textit{The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought}, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343–44 (2005) (describing a "paradigm shift" away from the top-down, command-and-control approach to regulation and toward a more reflexive approach to governance, placing private stakeholders at the driver's wheel).
\item \textsuperscript{203} The outer limit is best summarized in \textit{Carter v. Carter Coal}, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), which invalidated a delegation to a district board that coal operators elected and unions that would set wages binding upon all coal producers and noted "[t]his [was] legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it [was] not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested." \textit{See also} Louis L. Jaffe, \textit{Lawmaking by Private Groups}, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 247–53 (1937) (expressing concerns with private delegations but suggesting that \textit{Carter Coal}'s emphasis on the nondelegation doctrine might be replaced by a focus on due-process issues).
\end{itemize}
More than two decades ago, Cass Sunstein highlighted these concerns in the context of step two of the *Chevron* framework by calling for more heightened reasonableness review of deregulatory policies. As the issue of private delegations highlights, where private entities solely execute deregulatory policies and regulators make little or no judgment, the basis for an elevated standard of review is strong—if nothing else as a type of constitutional-avoidance device. As Kenneth Bamberger has recently observed, extending basic administrative-law principles to private delegations yields significant accountability benefits.

Third, it is a well-recognized tenet of administrative law that if an agency has failed to provide reasons or has provided inadequate reasons, a court may not repair the deficiency by providing post hoc rationalizations. As the Supreme Court stated in *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*:

> [A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.

Courts may accept post hoc explanations from agencies that "merely illuminate reasons obscured but implicit in the administrative record," however, if the subsequent explanation provides an "entirely new theory" to support the agency’s decision and does not simply provide "additional background information about the agency's basic rationale," courts will reject it. Courts have applied this principle to reject agency rationalizations provided in briefs but not provided by the agency itself in making the initial decision subject to appeal.

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206. For instance, regulators make no judgment where a legislature has delegated the setting of rates to an industry, as the Court addressed in *Ticor*. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.


210. *Id.*

211. In *Christensen v. Harris County*, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), for example, the Supreme Court refused to extend *Chevron* deference to an amicus brief filed by the United States
positions that the agency advances may be afforded less weight if they only are provided post hoc on the grounds that Congress did not delegate to executive agencies the authority to justify agency decisions ex post.\(^{212}\) This principle is a foundation of administrative law, frequently serving as a basis for agency reversal and giving agency officials "strong incentives to attend to the justifications they provide for their actions."\(^{213}\) To the extent that this principle extends to the state-action exception, as I argue it should below, courts should evaluate reasons ex post by state regulators or reasons proffered by private litigants with skepticism and afford them no deference; agency positions presented ex post should be afforded less deference than agency positions taken concurrent with or prior to a decision.

Finally, the hard-look doctrine, which generally would apply at *Chevron*’s step two, not only addresses affirmative decisions by regulators, but also provides an important rationale for extending judicial review to agency inaction—such as the failure to adopt a rule, to enforce a regulation, to issue a permit, or to regulate a firm’s conduct—as well as affirmative agency regulatory decisions. As Lisa Bressman has argued, since an agency is susceptible to corrosive influences when it fails to act, courts can play a useful role in policing agency inaction.\(^{214}\) Specifically, courts may review the failure to enforce pre-articulated regulatory goals under the arbitrary and capricious doctrine. As Bressman states:

> [A]dministrative nonenforcement decisions should be subject to the familiar requirement that agencies articulate reasons supporting their affirmative regulatory decisions. In addition, administrative nonenforcement decisions should be subject to the important requirement that agencies promulgate and follow standards guiding their affirmative regulatory authority. Only by subjecting agency inaction to these principles will courts help agencies resist the influences that produce arbitrary administrative decisionmaking, regardless of how those influences are manifested.\(^{215}\)

supporting the interpretation at issue. For further discussion, see Merrill & Hickman, *supra* note 150, at 901, noting that the Court’s rationale for *Chevron* “clearly precludes giving *Chevron* deference” to interpretations that are "post-hoc rationalizations of agency counsel such as agency briefs".

212. *See* Kevin M. Stack, *The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery*, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 957–58 (2007) (arguing that the *Chenery* principle—focusing on what the agency has articulated as a grounds for its actions, not only on what is permissible or rational—is based on constitutional nondelegation doctrine).

213. *Id.* at 957.


215. *Id.* at 1661.
Just as an agency must provide reasons for taking affirmative regulatory action, where an agency fails to regulate its inaction should be subject to a reasons-giving requirement and scrutinized by courts at step two of *Chevron*.

Regulatory inaction also can be understood on delegation terms—an otherwise valid legislative delegation of authority is more likely to raise private delegation concerns where an agency has authority to regulate but does nothing, so the justification for heightened judicial scrutiny in this context is strong. Such a principle can play an important role in the antitrust state-action-exception context, where private firms frequently assert a state-action defense against the backdrop of inaction by regulators at the state or local level.

III. THE LIMITS OF CLEAR STATEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR APPROVING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT OR SUPPORTING DELEGATIONS

As Frank Easterbrook has suggested, legal presumptions can play an important role in antitrust law, particularly where they serve as a type of filter for judicial consideration of antitrust claims. If courts approached the state-action-exception doctrine as providing default rules to guide judicial intervention, such presumptions could set positive background incentives in the bargaining process of state lawmakers. The first step of the *Midcal* test—the clear-articulation requirement—holds some promise in this regard. In approaching the clear-articulation requirement of *Midcal*, courts might take a lesson from *Chevron*’s analysis, especially its call for modesty in attributing statutory meaning and its emphasis on clarity as a mechanism for promoting more democratic decisionmaking. The antitrust state-action exemption promotes federalism values—values we endorse because they enhance democratic legitimacy; when properly approached, clear-statement rules skew decisionmaking toward the political process and away from judicial resolution.

If courts required such statements as a predicate to extending an antitrust state-action defense, it could increase the likelihood that a legislature would be explicit about a decision to approve allegedly anticompetitive conduct or that it would delegate (and articulate on what terms) approval to a regulatory agency.

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216. Bressman discusses two nonjusticiability doctrines in administrative law that can pose a barrier to such review: nonreviewability doctrine and standing doctrine. As she suggests, neither is an insurmountable barrier to judicial review of agency inaction. *Id.* at 1664–75.

217. For a discussion on heightened judicial review as an avoidance mechanism for addressing the constitutionality of private delegations, see supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.


If a state or local legislative body endorsed a clear ban on competition, leaving no role for agency regulators (or private firms) in implementing the ban, there would be little for a federal court to resolve by evaluating the legitimacy of the ban; this is precisely the sort of state determination that the Sherman Act intended to leave in place so long as the state made that determination in a legitimate and transparent manner. In such an instance, the legislature would have explicitly approved the allegedly anticompetitive conduct ex ante by stating its policy of displacing competition. Assuming such a policy were explicit, clear, and self-executing, a court should use a clear-statement approach to make a finding that the state policy gives rise to a state-action exception.

In most instances, however, a legislature will not have expressed a clear and comprehensive view, but will have delegated some discretion to a regulatory agency. Assuming that such a delegation were clear in its purpose to displace competition, the legislature would have met the minimum requirements for clarity, although there still may be important issues to assess regarding regulatory oversight. However, it is far more worrisome if a legislature were ambiguous about its specific purpose in delegating to an agency and a court purported to find clarity for purposes of satisfying Midcal's first step. As scholars have observed, Chevron's step one invites judges to engage in the same interpretive mischief. In such cases, rather than overemphasizing clarity, courts need to carefully address the scope of the delegation and the extent to which, if at all, the legislature has provided guidance for the regulatory agency—an exercise that can aid the judicial inquiry into active supervision.

Just as most courts applying Chevron do not halt their analysis at step one (determining whether a statute merely delegates the issue to an agency, aggressively reversing the agency where it does not and blindly deferring to the agency in any instance in which it does), the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal should not merely emphasize whether the legislature itself has articulated a general policy of displacing competition with clarity. Given that many state regulatory programs delegate discretion, sometimes with only a general clear purpose, it is important for courts to define what questions remain for agency regulators to address under the statute—issues

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220. By contrast, if a state or local legislative body adopts a clear statement by expressly articulating policy to regulate in restraint of trade, as they do in endorsing a monopoly franchise that is rate-regulated by an agency, the courts may have a very different role to play. Here, the clear statement is a delegation, and a court still has to evaluate how the agency exercises that delegation under step two of the Midcal test. See infra Part IV.

221. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the Cardona-Fonseca approach to Chevron step one).

that will need to be assessed at step two of the Midcal test when the agency-supervision role is examined.

Where the state or local legislative intent regarding the relationship between a state law and the goals of the Sherman Act is at all ambiguous, or is only general in nature, courts should refuse to attribute clear articulation of a specific legislative purpose unless there is evidence that this is what a current majority in the state would endorse. How the legislature articulates a regulatory program should play an important role in courts' decisions whether to review the action. "The clear articulation requirement serves an important purpose," C. Douglas Floyd wrote, "by ensuring that departures from the presumptive federal competitive norm are authorized only as the result of a carefully considered, deliberately adopted, and visible state policy."\(^\text{223}\) As William Page has argued in some of the leading articles on state-action immunity, a clear statement heightens the visibility of legislation, encouraging participants in the political process to acquire information about policies and to debate them.\(^\text{224}\) Absent such a statement, private conduct that was consistent with or authorized by broad delegations to municipal governments or regulatory agencies would be subject to review under the Sherman Act. The key variable in such an analysis should not be the creation of a majoritarian fiction based on a selective reconstruction of what a past legislature would have thought. Instead, where there is ambiguity, courts should focus on clear evidence of what a current majority would think, since the focus is on encouraging more legitimate democratic processes today at the state and local level.\(^\text{225}\)

Such an approach is hardly foreign to local-government law and its operation. Although largely superseded by modern "home rule" approaches to local government, Dillon's rule served the same overall goal of providing a higher level of supervision for municipal lawmaking.\(^\text{226}\) Dillon's rule invalidated delegations to municipalities absent the state legislature's

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\(^{223}\) C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for State-Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 1059, 1136 (2000). Writing before Ticor, Floyd argued that clear articulation alone should suffice for purposes of extending state-action immunity to state-wide sovereign bodies, including both legislatures and agencies. Based on a Chevron-type analysis of the problem, informed by the political science of interest-group decisionmaking, I reject this position below, except for in the extreme cases in which nothing at all is left to others in implementing a state regulatory approach. See infra Parts III, IV.


\(^{225}\) See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2148–54 (defending step-one reversal of an agency where the agency's position does not represent "any enactable political preference"); Note, "How Clear is Clear" in Chevron's Step One, 118 HARV. L. Rev. 1687, 1706 (2005) (describing the step-one process of predicting the current congressional majority).

express consideration. This canon of statutory interpretation applied in many states to invalidate broad state delegations to municipalities, although most states have moved away from this due to the growth of home rule. The effect of the clear-articulation requirement, however, is not merely to create a federally enforced version of Dillon's rule. In contrast to Dillon's rule, which automatically validated a clear delegation, the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal would subject private conduct within the scope of the delegation to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.

Yet, traditional clear-statement rules have their limits as they assume that a legislature speaks with a single purpose and voice. As Kenneth Shepsle and many others before and after him have stated, a legislature is a "they," not an "it." A clear-statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get at legislative intent—to pay fidelity to past preferences, which are judicially constructed as a fiction—but a legislature having made a delegation will rarely have a clear specific intent on an issue of complex economic regulation. Courts can readily abuse clear-statement rules to the extent that they use judicially implied clear statements as a backdoor to impose a constitutional design, allowing "judicial modesty [to] cloak judicial activism." Moreover, a clear-statement rule assumes that the major problem is the legislature, not the interest groups that interact with lawmaking bodies.

By contrast, a different type of interpretive canon—a preference-eliciting "penalty default rule"—provides a better way of conceptualizing the clear-articulation requirement in state-action immunity. Where a court interpreting a statute is unsure of legislative intent, the court adopts the interpretation of the statute most unfavorable to the interest group that is most likely to persuade the legislative body to reverse the judicial interpretation. Much as penalty default rules in contract law are designed to elicit better information in future contracting, such a preference-eliciting approach encourages a different type of private behavior in future lawmaking processes. In his work on statutory interpretation, Elhauge envisions a preference-eliciting approach as influencing private behavior to procure more explicit legislative action in the future, which will increase the accountability of the political process. He observes that such an

228. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).
229. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 219, at 646.
230. Id.
231. Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2257.
233. See Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2207.
approach is especially suitable to statutes that involve exceptions favored by powerful interest groups, such as tax and antitrust legislation.\textsuperscript{234}

In contexts in which the legislature is clear and specific regarding allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the clear-articulation requirement in the antitrust state-action exception can serve precisely these purposes. Understood as a preference-eliciting default rule, however, a clear-articulation requirement should not give rise to automatic state-action immunity where a legislature is ambiguous and arguably could foresee some regulatory activity, as has occurred in a variety of past cases.\textsuperscript{235} The FTC has observed that courts repeatedly place an emphasis on foreseeability as the basis for inferring clarity in a legislature's purpose to displace the Sherman Act: Courts seem to equate a grant of authority or a delegation to an agency with a clear purpose to displace competition under the Sherman Act.\textsuperscript{236} A penalty default clear-statement rule would afford ambiguity a purpose that those interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation (i.e., those with monopoly power in an industry) would disfavor—here, antitrust enforcement. Interest groups may be successful in persuading state and local lawmakers to adopt an antitrust exemption for industries, but legislatures should be expected to use clear and unmistakable language in supplanting antitrust laws with regulation and especially in making delegations to implement such regulation to local governments or regulatory agencies. Beyond clear and unmistakable statutory terms, however, courts must recognize where discretion—even constrained discretion—remains for state regulators.\textsuperscript{237} Indeed, the risks of judicial overreaching at \textit{Midcal}'s step one are far more significant than overreaching at \textit{Chevron}'s step one, since the risks involve federal judicial interpretation of state and local legislation.

This increased risk of overreaching has two implications. First, courts should be reluctant to read detail in state and local statutes as a way of constraining discretion, although such detail can play an important role in

\textsuperscript{234} Id. at 2207.

\textsuperscript{235} See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41-43 (1985)).

\textsuperscript{236} See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (condemning the expansive interpretation of "clear articulation" by many federal courts).

\textsuperscript{237} Hence, by arguing for a modest penalty-default-rule approach, this Article does not endorse a hypertextualist approach to discerning meaning, in which federal courts rely almost exclusively on dictionaries, rules of grammar, and canons of construction to determine when a state legislature has clearly articulated a policy of displacing competition. For a discussion of this analogy in the \textit{Chevron} context, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., \textit{The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State}, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995). Instead, this Article urges federal courts to draw on the full range of tools available to them to discern meaning but to exercise caution against implying clarity where none exists by construing ambiguous statutes against those who stand to immediately benefit from such clarity and who are in a position to lobby for clarity. In the state-action exception context, those who stand to benefit will typically be the firms that claim that federal antitrust laws do not apply to them.
identifying whether a program of regulatory supervision has standards.\footnote{238} Second, any clear statement at \textit{Midcal}'s step one should limit its focus on the extent to which a legislative delegation is explicit in its purposes. To the extent that courts reduce the antitrust state-action defense to foreseeability under \textit{Hallie}, based on implied legislative intent,\footnote{239} application of the state-action defense would benefit the interest groups most likely to lobby for ambiguous delegations. By encouraging firms to lobby for antitrust exclusion in state legislation and leaving courts to clean up ambiguity through their aggressive attribution of clarity, state-action immunity can have harmful forum-shopping effects. For example, a state restructuring plan that envisioned a scheme of competitive restructuring as displacing antitrust enforcement could evict the competitive norms of the antitrust laws, regardless of how such a scheme actually organized the industry and monitored firm behavior.

Antitrust federalism allows positive regulation by decentralized governmental bodies, but it does not authorize raw state repeal of federal antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even through plain-language overrides of the Sherman Act that depend on decisions of regulators.\footnote{240} Thus, to the extent the preference-eliciting default rule interpretation of state-action immunity eviscerates the active-scrutiny requirement, it concedes too much. This result is not required by judicial deference or antitrust federalism, and it may prove harmful to social welfare.

While the parallel to \textit{Chevron}'s step one provides a useful interpretation of \textit{Midcal}'s step one, there is clearly a difference between a statutory gap, as \textit{Chevron} addresses, and identifying a legislative purpose, as \textit{Midcal} emphasizes. \textit{Chevron} excuses all delegations, both implicit and explicit.\footnote{241} \textit{Midcal} only excuses explicit delegations.\footnote{242} It would be a mistake to end the judicial inquiry here, as if a clear-statement approach could provide a full analysis. Of course, clarity at step one can end the inquiry under \textit{Chevron}, to the extent an agency renders an interpretation that contravenes clear statutory language, but identification of a clear legislative purpose, especially a clear purpose to delegate implementation of clear general goals to regulators, should not end the inquiry into whether an antitrust state-action exception exists. Where there is some kind of a delegation, a preference-eliciting penalty default rule is only the beginning. As I argue below, some

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item 238. As suggested below, such emphasis on detail would more appropriately occur in evaluating active supervision. \textit{See infra} Part IV.
\item 239. \textit{See supra} notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing \textit{Hallie}).
\end{itemize}
evaluation of how the state engaged in regulatory oversight under a legislative delegation is necessary.

IV. MIDCAL'S STEP TWO: REASONS FOR FOREGOING ACTIVE SUPERVISION

Step two of Chevron's analysis can also help courts understand the antitrust state-action defense, especially in the context of state regulatory inaction. As the Supreme Court stated in Ticor, and the Ninth Circuit embraced in Columbia Steel Casting, active supervision of state regulators' conduct, as well as a clear statement of purpose, is required to trigger a state-action defense from antitrust enforcement. However, many appellate courts remain astonishingly deferential to regulators in applying the active-supervision prong of the Midcal test. Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the context of municipal regulation, these appellate courts effectively read out of antitrust state-action doctrine any serious scrutiny of regulatory supervision, focusing instead on whether a decentralized legislative body has delegated authority to supervise private conduct to an agency. In most cases, potential supervision of conduct alone has been sufficient to trigger a state-action exemption from enforcement of the antitrust laws.

This Article argues that the mere potential for agency regulation, as may be present where a legislature has delegated authority to an agency, is never sufficient to extend an antitrust state-action exemption. Further, focusing on past regulatory actions alone in evaluating the state-action exception can be misleading. A focus on reasons provided by regulators, as Chevron's step two recommends, would allow courts to develop a more principled approach to antitrust state-action defense cases—especially where they are reviewing private conduct that is not subject to regular government intervention.

A. THE NECESSITY OF AN ACTIVE-SUPERVISION INQUIRY

Some commentators argue that clear articulation of a policy to displace competition by a state-wide regulator should suffice for purposes of extending state-action immunity. As C. Douglas Floyd noted, "[S]tate
agencies frequently do possess authority, as a matter of state law, to prescribe competition policy for the state as a whole under general delegations of authority from the state legislature."\textsuperscript{248} Thus, he suggests, "the agency's clear articulation of state policy within the scope of its delegated authority should suffice in itself to satisfy the clear articulation component."\textsuperscript{249}

Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes, private interest groups frequently face incentives to lobby lawmakers to secure benefits and may prefer open-ended regulatory schemes that leave details to be worked out by an agency on a firm-by-firm basis. As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, "Regulation by state and local government is not only pervasive, but it is also probably more susceptible to political influences than federal regulation is."\textsuperscript{250} The more local the lawmaking process, the less costly it is for powerful interest groups to organize and influence the process, but the process can have serious spillover effects for non-participants. At the local level, rent-seeking may be more visible, but it also may be more stable given the ability of private firms to exploit the political as well as the regulatory process. Thus, if courts focused on the quality of the political process leading to enactment of a market restraint, the now defunct municipal-state distinction would be sensible. It would require courts to apply more scrutiny to local, as opposed to state, regulations in restraint of trade.

While Floyd is correct that state and municipal process may demand different degrees of judicial scrutiny, his recommendation that state agencies be allowed to opt out of the antitrust law with a clear articulation alone\textsuperscript{251} throws the baby out with the bathwater. Allowing clear-articulation of a policy to suffice for purposes of bringing private conduct outside of the scope of the antitrust laws would greatly broaden the scope of the antitrust state-action doctrine. It would present particularly inviting immunity for industries in which state legislatures have made broad delegations to implement regulation to administrative agencies. Moreover, it would encourage powerful industry-based interest groups to seek broad delegations with little or no oversight under the antitrust laws.

Rather than allow clear articulation to exempt states from antitrust enforcement, much as \textit{Chevron} step one ends the judicial review inquiry for federal agencies with clear statutory statements, a \textit{Chevron} analysis informed by the economics of interest-group decisionmaking illustrates why, under \textit{Midcal}, it is always necessary for a court to reach the second step of the test. At the federal level, where interest-group exploitation of the legislative process is less likely, it makes sense for courts to end their inquiry with an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[248.] Floyd, \textit{supra} note 223, at 1136.
\item[249.] \textit{Id}.
\item[250.] Herbert Hovenkamp, \textit{Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise}, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 346.
\item[251.] Floyd, \textit{supra} note 223, at 1136 (discussing the varied degrees of deference required at the federal, state, and municipal levels).
\end{footnotes}
assessment of the consistency of a federal agency's conduct with clear statutory language. However, as politics move from the federal context to the state and municipal levels, the economics of interest-group decisionmaking make the prospect of strategic use of the lawmaking process more likely. Firms might use the lawmaking process to extract clear statements as a strategy to opt out of antitrust enforcement, making it more likely that the process of such lawmaking will exclude interstate interests that suffer harm from anticompetitive conduct. For this reason, under Midcal, unlike Chevron, it will always be necessary for a court to deal with step two of the inquiry.252

As Ticor would suggest,253 it is incumbent on federal courts to take step two of the Midcal analysis seriously. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the importance of active supervision in restructured network industries by applying Midcal in a way that contrasts markedly with the approaches of the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.254 In Columbia Steel Casting,255 the state of Oregon had clearly expressed a legislative policy to remove market competition by authorizing regulators to approve allocations of service territories in the electric-power market.256 However, Midcal and Ticor suggest that what matters is not only the legislature's clarity in delegating to the regulator, but also what the regulator does in exercising its discretion. Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit properly refused to extend an antitrust state-action defense to a utility's purported anticompetitive conduct in dividing Portland into exclusive service territories, given that regulators had not made firm-specific decisions to displace competition with regulation.257 "Mere 'state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity,'" the Ninth Circuit explained.258 If a clear articulation of purpose alone were sufficient to provide a shield from the Sherman Act, this would create perverse incentives for interest groups in the state and local lawmaking process. Thus, courts must examine any delegation to state and local regulators under step two of Midcal.

252. In this sense, a Chevron-type analysis of the antitrust state-action exception leads me to a fundamentally different conclusion than Phil Weiser, who advocates higher levels of judicial Chevron deference to state regulators interpreting federal law. See supra note 22.
253. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 92–143 and accompanying text.
256. Id. at 1433 n.2.
257. Id. at 1441–42.
258. Id. at 1440–41 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 736 (9th Cir. 1981) (other citations omitted)).
B. REQUIRING REASONS FOR INACTION

A *Chevron* analysis also sheds light on what the judicial assessment of active supervision ideally should entail. Commentators writing on *Chevron* recognize that step one typically focuses on an agency's authority, whereas step two assumes authority but focuses on the reasonableness of the agency decision. In other words, under *Chevron* a court only gets to step two if Congress has not delegated authority to an agency.

The step-two focus on reasonableness is necessary because a court would seem unduly deferential if it simply deferred to any agency action that fell within the agency's authority to regulate. In fact, for the same reason that courts must always arrive at step two of the state-action inquiry, judicial deference to regulatory authority, without more, invites interest-group manipulation of the regulatory forum for enforcement of competition law. The Supreme Court took a particularly egregious misstep in this direction in *Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States*, in which the Department of Justice accused truckers of horizontal price fixing. The Court rejected that antitrust claim under *Midcal* on the grounds that state ratemaking commissions had approved rates that the truckers had proposed. It reasoned that mere authority to regulate, absent any legislative requirement or prearticulated criteria, is sufficient to extend a state-action exception.

However, even where the legislative delegation at issue may be clear, it does not follow that the regulator exercised authority in ways that are consistent with its pre-articulated standards or, if there are none, with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act. Allowing antitrust state-action doctrine to preclude antitrust enforcement in such circumstances creates strong incentives for delegation to state regulators with little or no guarantee that these regulators will exercise such authority in ways that promote federalism or social welfare, let alone competition. If monopolistic conduct warrants any scrutiny under antitrust federalism, appellate courts must depart from their current and past practice of ignoring the active-supervision requirement. Put simply, an opportunity for regulation is not the same as active supervision—although courts seem to consistently reach this conclusion.

259. See Levin, supra note 184, at 84; Seidenfeld, supra note 163, at 83.
261. Id. at 61 ("[A] state policy that expressly permits, but does not compel, anticompetitive conduct may be 'clearly articulated' within the meaning of *Midcal*.").
262. Id. at 64 ("The details of the inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process . . . are left to the agency's discretion. The State Commission has exercised its discretion by actively encouraging collective ratemaking among common carriers.").
263. Raising a similar concern, the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force states, "One recurring problem involves the failure to distinguish between authorizing classes of activity and forming state policy to displace competition." FTC *STATE ACTION REPORT*, supra note 5, at 26.
Ticor clarifies that courts must assess how frequently and under what circumstances regulators exercise their supervisory authority. For example, the Second Circuit correctly refused to extend an antitrust state-action exemption to a challenge to an output cartel permitted by New York's legislation implementing a tobacco settlement.\footnote{264} The legislation was clear and express in its purpose to implement market-share allocations in cigarette sales, but the Second Circuit criticized the state for failing to articulate either a competitive or anticompetitive rationale for the policy.\footnote{265} Regardless of whether the clear-articulation requirement had been met, and whether the cartel was foreseeable under \textit{Hallie}, the Second Circuit refused to extend a state-action exemption due to a lack of active supervision, as the second prong of \textit{Midcal} requires. As the court observed, neither the New York statutes, the settlement, nor any other regulation envisioned active supervision of pricing under the cartel.\footnote{266} Given no mechanism for reviewing the reasonableness of pricing decisions or monitoring market conditions,\footnote{267} the court concluded, "New York has failed to provide for any state supervision, much less active supervision, of the pricing conduct of cigarette manufacturers under the anticompetitive market structure."\footnote{268} It further observed, "'Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests.'"\footnote{269}

Recognizing the important role an active-supervision inquiry plays in antitrust federalism, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to apply an antitrust state-action defense on this ground in the context of deregulated electric-

\footnote{264. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 222 (2d Cir. 2004).}
\footnote{265. \textit{Id.} at 229. The court was not convinced by the state's health-benefit claims in the course of litigation and observed that the only public discussion of the effect of the market-share provisions was to increase prices and to discourage young people from smoking—the precise type of cartel that the Sherman Act condemns. \textit{Id.} at 230. In an order on rehearing, the court clarified: "[T]he court must find under this [clear-articulation] prong that the state did not inadvertently include anticompetitive activities in some larger scheme. For this reason, it is important that a state enunciate its intent to displace competition when it means to do so." Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).}
\footnote{266. Freedom Holdings, 357 F.3d at 230 ("[T]he resolution of the price/sales/public health conflict is left by the [tobacco settlement agreement] to the [participating manufacturers].").}
\footnote{267. \textit{Id.} at 231.}
\footnote{268. \textit{Id.} at 232.}
\footnote{269. \textit{Id.} (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)). An earlier Third Circuit case reached a similar conclusion, noting that the states "lack oversight or authority over the tobacco manufacturers' prices and production levels. These decisions are left entirely to private actors." A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 264 (3d Cir. 2001). However, that same case extended \textit{Noerr-Pennington} immunity to the settlement, noting that government settlements are no different in form from other types of legislative lobbying. \textit{Id.} at 253–54. For criticism of this approach, see RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 205–07 (2007). For a popular press account of the significant financial stakes in this antitrust dispute, see Roger Parloff, \textit{Is the $200 Billion Tobacco Deal Going Up in Smoke?}, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 2005, at 126.}
power markets. The court allowed an electrical cooperative to sue an investor-owned utility for refusing access to essential transmission facilities, rejecting the utility’s claim to an antitrust state-action exemption.\textsuperscript{270} The utility argued that the state regulatory scheme clearly envisioned that the utility would have the ability to refuse to wheel power to the extent the state had adopted a clear policy to displace competition among electric suppliers, but the Ninth Circuit did not allow this to trigger an antitrust defense.\textsuperscript{271} Under Idaho law, the utility could decline the customer’s wheeling request without the substantive review of a state agency or state courts, but the court reasoned that “[t]his is the type of private regulatory power that the active-supervision prong of \textit{Midcal} is supposed to prevent.”\textsuperscript{272} Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a self-policing regulatory scheme may not require active supervision to qualify for an antitrust state-action exemption,\textsuperscript{273} but where the regulator has discretion to exercise active supervision, there is an appropriate inquiry for a court. Similarly, perhaps signaling a departure from the deferential approach it previously had embraced in the electric-power context,\textsuperscript{274} the Tenth Circuit refused to extend an antitrust state-action defense to Southwestern Bell’s lock-up telephone contracts, which were “neither mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about” by state regulators.\textsuperscript{275}

Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active-supervision threshold can create, some lower courts have recognized that active supervision “would be satisfied if the state or state agencies held ratemaking hearings on a consistent basis.”\textsuperscript{276} Such an inference would be a good starting point for a judicial analysis of the application of antitrust laws in a restructured network environment. Courts have a long history of allowing the existence of consistent ratemaking hearings at the state or local level to give rise to an antitrust state-action exemption.\textsuperscript{277} In \textit{Ticor}, for instance, the Supreme Court found it relevant that the Wisconsin state regulatory body had not held rate hearings prior to approving a jointly filed insurance rate.\textsuperscript{278} Thus, extending a presumption of an antitrust state-action exemption and against judicial intervention in the context of rate hearings is appropriate.
Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this standard. For example, the antitrust state-action defense does not protect a contract provision prohibiting a customer from entering into the electricity market as a competitor in the future that a utility offers in exchange for a discounted rate.\textsuperscript{279} For similar reasons, mere private filings of contracts or tariffs with a regulatory agency, without active regulatory scrutiny or oversight, would not meet the active-supervision requirement under a process-based account. Without meaningful agency review of the specific private conduct at issue, private firms can abuse the antitrust state-action defense in a deregulatory environment.\textsuperscript{280} The factors that should guide courts include how frequently agencies monitor private activities, whether agencies have authority to enforce standards through the imposition of penalties, and whether agencies have adequate resources to engage in meaningful monitoring and enforcement. When in doubt, if a regulatory system risks the imposition of spillover effects on non-participants, the presumption should be against invoking an antitrust state-action defense.

Courts must be true to the overall federalism purposes of the antitrust state-action exemption in interpreting the active-supervision requirement. Fidelity to federalism would not only limit assessment of supervision to state regulation, but also would include other regulatory bodies, such as municipalities. In addition, fidelity to federalism would require some attention to the process that gives rise to regulatory supervision. If the purposes of regulatory action overlap with the overall consumer-welfare goals of the Sherman Act, perhaps some degree of deference to supervision by the state or local regulator is appropriate. However, intervention of the antitrust laws is entirely appropriate if the purpose is blatantly protectionist in ways that do not even arguably improve consumer welfare and that impose spillover costs on those in other jurisdictions who have not participated in the process leading to the adoption of regulation. A preference-eliciting default rule would align private incentives to ensure more explicit procurement of state-action immunity via legislation and regulatory activity.

In contrast to the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit correctly requires an affirmative finding of active supervision by the regulator as a predicate to any finding of an antitrust state-action exemption,

\textsuperscript{280} As the FTC \textit{Report of the State Action Task Force} observes:

Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that \textit{[clearly articulated]} regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly be placed with the state.

\textit{FTC State Action Report}, \textit{supra} note 5, at 54.
even in deregulated markets. However, a more recent Ninth Circuit case addressing the antitrust state-action defense in the very same antitrust claim illustrates how readily courts will undermine the active-supervision prong if they allow it to hinge entirely on the nature of the regulatory program approved by a state legislature rather than on what regulators do in implementing that program. On the heels of the court’s recognition that there was no state-action defense in the first *Snake River Valley Electric Ass’n v. PacifiCorp*, the Ninth Circuit extended state-action immunity to the same allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Following the first judicial finding of no state action, which allowed antitrust litigation to go forward, the Idaho legislature intervened by amending its Electric Supplier Stabilization Act. The amendments allowed an electric supplier to refuse to wheel power if the requested wheeling “results in retail wheeling and/or a sham wholesale transaction,” subject to review of the state regulatory agency. In addition, the Idaho legislature prohibited competing suppliers from serving customers or former customers of other electric suppliers unless the competing supplier petitioned the Idaho regulator and the regulator issued an order allowing the service.

In addressing this legislative intervention, the Ninth Circuit held that, unlike the previous statutory arrangement, which left the decision not to wheel entirely to private choice, the amended statute “has not left unregulated a private preserve without competition.” Thus, the statute met the active-supervision requirement for extending an antitrust state-action exemption. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Idaho statute precluded a private utility from wheeling without a contrary decision by the state regulator. As a result, statutes and regulations that prohibit competition can eviscerate any active-supervision requirement. Under this approach, a private firm that is successful in lobbying for a statute that prohibits it from engaging in competitive conduct would be immune from antitrust challenge—even if that legislation occurs in the context of a pending antitrust challenge.

Recently, the FTC State Action Report elaborated on the benefits of a process-based approach to assessing state active supervision in the state-action context, as requiring (1) “the development of an adequate factual

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281. See supra notes 270–73 and accompanying text.
282. *Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp*, 357 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004).
283. Id.
285. *Id.* § 61-334B.
286. *Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n*, 357 F.3d at 1049.
287. *Id.*
288. *Id.* at 1048–49.
289. The Eleventh Circuit allowed this in the *TEC Cogeneration* case. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
record, including notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) "a written decision on the merits"; and (3) "a specific assessment—both qualitative and quantitative—of how private action comports with the substantive standards established by the state legislature." While the FTC did not explicitly reference administrative-law principles, the connection seems obvious and is worthy of attention by antitrust scholars, litigators, and decisionmakers. Paying attention to agency actions and history is a start to an active-supervision inquiry, but a *Chevron* step-two-type inquiry in antitrust state-action analysis might give meaningful content to the process-based approach urged in the recent FTC State Action Report. Instead of focusing on actions, the *Chevron* step two focuses on process and reasons. In the antitrust context, it would seem that antitrust enforcement should proceed if a state or local agency failed to provide basic standards for evaluating inaction. Courts might create an exception where the actions of the regulator illustrated the regulator’s capacity and willingness to supervise markets. These actions might include a history of regulatory intervention in setting rates or regulating industry structure, assuming this approach remains in effect.

However, absent reasons given ex ante by state or local officials, within the scope of the regulators’ discretion, courts generally should proceed to apply antitrust law to the private conduct at issue. Where state or local officials provide reasons for inaction that are in tension with the goals of federal antitrust laws, courts should require those reasons to be given ex ante in the state regulatory forum, where they will be subject to judicial review. Further, for purposes of extending an antitrust state-action defense, a court should require those reasons to be consistent with the regulatory framework and to meet minimal reasonableness standards.

For example, consider state and local bans on competition. While these bans exist in a variety of industries, they are most visible in industries such as electric power, where competition exists in the deregulated wholesale market but retail markets are left to the discretion of state regulators. Many states have banned retail electric-power competition outright, allowing incumbent electric utilities, regulated under traditional cost-of-service principles, to provide service without the competitive threat of new entrants. To date, such bans on retail competition have avoided antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act given the state-action exception.

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290. FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, *supra* note 5, at 55.

291. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has identified several ways in which state regulators have failed to conform to wholesale markets, represented at the extreme by states that have banned retail competition to favor traditional rate regulation. FED. TRADE COMM’N, *COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION* 13–32 (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/elec/electricityreport.pdf.

292. See *supra* notes 109–13 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in TEC Cogeneration).
However, casting the antitrust state-action exception as focusing on delegation issues suggests that, while state and local governments have considerable leeway to ban competition in various industries, competition bans are not prima facie valid. Under a delegation approach, the significance of competition bans will depend on who—a legislature or a regulatory agency—makes the basic decision to ban competition. A state legislature can, as a sovereign body, make that decision without providing reasons, assuming that whatever ban it enacts is self-executing and not contingent on decisions delegated to governmental agencies or private parties. At the same time, if a state-enacted competition ban were intended to undermine national markets, extending a state-action exception to antitrust enforcement would be inappropriate under the Supremacy Clause. For example, state bans on competition may pose a conflict with national regulatory approaches (such as the deregulated wholesale market). To the extent this is so, if state regulators have failed to address this conflict or to pursue legitimate state regulatory objectives, federal courts should be wary of a private firm’s invocation of an antitrust state-action defense even by the state legislature.

At the same time, a delegation approach recognizes that there must be some outer limit on legislative decisions to ban competition. For example, if a legislative decision to ban competition also authorized collusive behavior among private actors, private delegation concerns would arise and judges would exercise scrutiny when analyzing the legislation. Where a

293. As I have argued elsewhere, the dormant Commerce Clause can serve as the outer limit for such exercises of legislative power, such as where a state legislature imposes spillover costs on those who do not have the opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process. See Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 521 (2005) (discussing the importance of the political process in analyzing antitrust legislation). There I also argue that courts examine spillover effects of regulation and legislation in assessing whether to extend the state-action exception by focusing on the lawmaking process. Id. at 567-68. My proposal there is similar to Squire’s focus on the fairness of process as a basis for scrutinizing state regulations that set prices, see supra note 146, but this Article’s emphasis on the delegation issues presented in state and local regulatory processes clearly advises in favor of more aggressive judicial scrutiny in other regulatory contexts than his proposal would endorse.

294. The Federal Trade Commission has identified several ways in which the failure of state regulators to conform to wholesale markets, represented at the extreme by states that have banned retail competition to favor traditional rate regulation, limits the benefits of competition from wholesale electric-power restructuring. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291, at 13–21. For example, state restrictions on power-plant and transmission-line siting have limited the benefits from regional wholesale-power markets. Id. at 22–28. State standard-offer service programs have impaired new entrants and limited the benefits of wholesale competition for retail customers, especially smaller residential customers. Id. at 43–51. Stranded cost recovery allowed by state regulators has also allowed traditional state monopolists to preserve their grip over consumer welfare while they simultaneously benefit from wholesale competition. Id. at 51–55.

295. As Herbert Hovenkamp observes, “the state could not simply pass a statute authorizing building contractors to fix prices and then leave them free to do so entirely on their own.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 72, at 233.
competition ban operated within the context of a governmental delegation, as did Idaho's ban (which allowed state regulators to exercise discretion to grant exceptions),\(^{296}\) the state's decision to ban competition would warrant careful scrutiny. It would seem that the most democratically elected officials within a state government, such as a state legislature or governor, should have the authority to ban state or local competition without providing elaborate reasons ex ante. Yet, where there is less majoritarian accountability (as may exist when state or local agency regulators give reasons), there is also much more to be gained from a judicially imposed reason-giving requirement. At a minimum, a state regulatory agency should be expected to articulate such reasons—either ex ante (before adopting a competitive ban) or post hoc (such as in an amicus brief)—as a condition to a court approving the extension of an antitrust state-action exception.

Disclosure and monitoring programs present perhaps one of the most challenging new issues in applications of the state-action exception. Just as disclosure and monitoring programs are increasingly popular at the federal level, many state and local regulators have experimented with the same approach in traditional and new regulatory scenarios.\(^{297}\) For example, states frequently require energy suppliers in deregulated electric-power markets to file reports with regulators regarding their market activities. If a state

\(^{296}\) See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing how Colorado's failure to have a "state-wide policy" made the City of Boulder's ban "subject to antitrust challenge").

\(^{297}\) In addition to states that continue to require reporting for traditional electric utilities using market-based rates, disclosure requirements for suppliers range from reporting information to regulators about pricing, generation, distribution, and transmission, to labeling laws that require the disclosure of fuel content. Many states also require registration and reporting for intermediate market actors, including aggregators, marketers, and brokers. For example, the Virginia registration summary and a summary of many of these licensing requirements can be found online. See Virginia Energy Choice, Virginia Utility Regulation, available at http://www.vaenergychoice.org/suppliers/suppliers.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); see also RICHARD P. SEDANO, CONSUMER INFORMATION SERIES, ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A STATUS REPORT (2002), available at http://www.distributed-generation.com/licensing.htm. For a more complete description of such requirements, see generally RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON COMPETITION & THE ELEC. INDUS., ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A STATUS REPORT (2002), available at http://www.ncouncil.org/pdfs/disclosure-final.pdf. This is a major shift in the role of state regulators in this industry, from traditional rate hearings to information gathering, monitoring, investigation, and, at the extreme, whistleblowing or enforcement. These examples from state electric-power regulation are a small part of a larger emphasis on disclosure as a regulatory approach in this and other industries. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 610 (2005) (emphasizing the need for state regulators to transform themselves from traditional price regulators to "investigative/disclosure" vehicles and "ultimate monitors/whistleblowers"); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.Org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 239–40 (2004) (describing state attorney-general registration and disclosure programs for nonprofit solicitation); see also Donald F. Santa, Jr., Who Needs What, and Why? Reporting and Disclosure Requirements in Emerging Competitive Electricity Markets, 21 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2000) (describing a new class of disclosure requirements at the federal and state levels).
requires the disclosure of information for purposes of market monitoring, the fundamental question in deciding whether to extend state-action immunity hinges on the standards that state officials apply in monitoring and enforcing regulations against firms that have disclosed information to regulators. For example, a group of private firms might disclose their participation in joint ratemaking activities. If the regulator did not act to prohibit the practice, the firms could claim antitrust immunity.

At its core, this type of problem challenges courts to examine state and local regulatory inaction to decide if it is consistent with broader antitrust goals—paralleling calls that federal courts review agency inaction for arbitrariness at step two of *Chevron.* To the extent that a regulator’s disclosure-and-monitoring standards are consistent with competition (i.e., pro-market, as is frequently the case with state plans designed to enhance competition), a federal court can review them for overlap with federal antitrust enforcement and should only extend a state-action defense to the extent it is co-extensive with the goals of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, if a disclose-and-monitor program is inconsistent in its approach with the competitive goals of the Sherman Act, the fundamental inquiry should focus on whether a state or local agency gives reasons for failing to enforce that are consistent with its pre-articulated criteria to either displace or regulate competition. If a state has no pre-articulated criteria, or if those criteria are only expressed ex post, a federal court should refuse to extend the state-action exception.

**CONCLUSION**

In terms of remedy, under the process-based account advanced in this Article, a failure to apply the antitrust state-action exception has less significant consequences than other judicial review of legislation or regulation. It does not result in condemning public conduct or necessarily striking state or local legislation. It also does not require anything specific of state officials, other than to provide reasons in cases where state regulators wish to allow firms to escape antitrust scrutiny. Nor does it result in

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298. *See Bressman, supra* note 181, at 503 (explaining that "courts ought to refuse to accord *Chevron* deference to any administrative interpretation that does not reflect a federal directive").

299. The Tenth Amendment does not pose a barrier to a process-based account of the antitrust state-action exception, given that no state or local regulatory action is compelled and that it promotes democracy at the state and local level. *Printz v. United States,* 521 U.S. 898, 933–35 (1997), establishes that Congress or federal regulators cannot commandeer state officials by requiring them to act. Under the delegation account of the state-action exception presented in this Article, state officials may still choose not to articulate reasons and may refuse to file briefs in federal antitrust cases. Even if they do so, the state or local regulatory program still would survive under both federal and state law to the extent it is consistent with federal antitrust law. However, if courts adopted the approach that this Article proposes, the silence or inaction of
vacation or reversal and remand, as typically occurs when a court reverses an agency decision under *Chevron*. Instead, a failure to extend the state-action exception merely subjects private conduct to judicial evaluation under the antitrust laws. Such an approach preserves federalism values by protecting the type of democratic participation that forms the core of federalism. It also reduces the incentive for private interest groups to quietly lobby state and local regulators in ways that allow the state-action doctrine to become a forum-shopping strategy for private firms to opt out of antitrust enforcement.

While accountability-driven, this proposal is not intended to interpret the Sherman Act as a free-roaming invitation to federal judges to impose their own political accountability ideals onto state and local governments. First and foremost, antitrust laws are about competition and efficiency in private markets. Often, however, industries face a mix of private and public ordering: the state-action exception defines that mix where state or local regulation is at issue. Nothing in the history of the Sherman Act indicates that political accountability was its primary goal, but if the judicially fashioned state-action exception fails to heed accountability, this could come at the cost of the explicit goals of competition law.

While state or local governments have the choice to embrace monopoly over competition, Congress could not have intended to encourage private firms that wish to avoid federal antitrust scrutiny to hide behind the veil of state or local government approval without some transparency and accountability for public decisions; after all, this would allow state and local governments to facilitate antitrust violations with no scrutiny at all. In addition, paying attention to political accountability advances at least one articulation of the primary goals of the antitrust laws: that Congress sought to protect competition by smaller firms for purposes of ensuring that large firms with monopoly power do not dominate the political process, especially at the state and local level where powerful firms are more likely to thwart lawmaking that maps majoritarian preferences. In this sense, market competition may have been designed to encourage not just any private arrangement but to encourage those that are most consistent with increased political accountability.

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301. *See supra* notes 239-40 and accompanying text (arguing that the state-action doctrine has forum-shopping effects).

302. This implication of broad state-action immunity is discussed *supra* at Part I.

Even if the more ambitious proposal of viewing the defense entirely through a process lens is not endorsed, this Article advances the case for requiring attention to procedure as an evidentiary predicate to making a decision to extend the state-action exception on other grounds. Casting state-action issues as a type of vertical deference requiring reasons for inaction by state regulators provides a way for federal courts to reconcile competition policy with state regulation without sacrificing political accountability at the state and local level or undermining the goals of antitrust law. If courts addressing state-action-exception issues were to draw on the process-based principles that inform *Chevron* and its application, antitrust law would be much better equipped to deal with the issues presented by inaction in state and local regulation, particularly as legislatures and courts restructure industries such as insurance, health care, energy, and telecommunications to enhance competition.

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304. For example, hard-look review serves the signaling function of state or local regulation that could help courts evaluate whether a state sovereign sees the benefits of a regulatory program as justifying the costs. See Stephenson, *supra* note 183, at 755. Such an approach would aid courts in making decisions under Squire's preemption approach. See *supra* note 146 (describing how Squire incorporates process considerations into his substantive-preemption analysis).