Forced to Flee and Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and Practice

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NOTES

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of refugee law is to provide international protection for vulnerable people who are denied state protection. In fulfilling this purpose, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and asylum states have different legal foundations and implementing materials. When terminating refugee status and protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the obligations and legal authorities of UNHCR and asylum states differ. The UNHCR implementing statute allows the facilitation of voluntary repatriation when refugees can return in safety and with dignity. In contrast, host states are able to mandate repatriation when a change in circumstances occurs in the country of origin. The different evidentiary thresholds for voluntary and mandated repatriation have created deep confusion regarding states' ability to end refugee status and the UNHCR's role in facilitating returns. This Note proposes placing voluntary and mandated repatriation on a timeline contingent on developments in the country of origin. Using the current displacement of Rwandan refugees from Uganda as a case study, this Note reconciles the conflicting standards in international law through this timeline.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that ten million refugees exist worldwide.1 Eighty percent reside in developing countries.2 Over half of all refugees are considered to be “protracted”—the conflict that caused them to flee their home country has remained unresolved for five or more years.3 International protection substitutes for national protection as long as refugee status is maintained.4

The legal authority for international protection is located in three foundational documents. States' legal obligations are found in the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). These instruments require state parties to grant refugees rights and provide additional safeguards regarding assets, travel, and employment, among others.5 The third foundational instrument is the UNHCR statute. In conjunction with states' legal obligations, UNHCR is tasked with providing international protection to refugees and supervising host-state responsibilities.6

These different legal authorities place affirmative obligations on host states and UNHCR that overlap harmoniously, with the notable exception of the cessation of international protection. The UNHCR statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention divide into two distinct structures when governing cessation of refugee status. Under its statute, UNHCR may effect voluntary repatriation, on both an individual and group basis.7 First, individual refugees can voluntarily cease protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention by

3. Id.
7. UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, ¶ 1, 8(e); see generally VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, ch. 1.6 (1996) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK] (summarizing UNHCR's methods for voluntary repatriation).
taking affirmative steps to reacquire their nationality or a new nationality, re-availing themselves of the protection of their home country, or reestablishing themselves in the country that they left.\(^8\) Second, if UNHCR determines that refugees can return “in safety and with dignity,” UNHCR may actively promote voluntary repatriation programs to large groups of refugees, eventually ending UNHCR protection.\(^9\)

In contrast, asylum states can revoke international protection by activating a cessation clause. Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention allows states to cease refugee status when a change in circumstances takes place in the country of origin that ends the fear of persecution causing flight.\(^10\) State cessation of refugee status is termed “mandated repatriation.” This option is not well developed in international practice.\(^11\) UNHCR has set forth recommended criteria states can use for evaluating whether fundamental change has occurred.\(^12\) However, UNHCR’s interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention obligations, while authoritative, are not binding on states.\(^13\) As this Note demonstrates, the legal requirements states must satisfy to mandate repatriation under the 1951 Refugee Convention are not clear, and confusion exists at the intersection of voluntary and mandated repatriation.

Even when UNHCR begins coordinating voluntary repatriation with a specified group of refugees, host-state obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention may continue because the evidentiary requirements to mandate repatriation may be higher than the

\(^8\) 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(1)–(4).

\(^9\) See Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 7, ch. 1.6 (stating the current UNHCR mandate to promote “the voluntary repatriation of refugees once conditions are conducive to return”).

\(^10\) 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)–(6).


\(^12\) See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 10–12, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Guidelines on International Protection].

\(^13\) See James Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 175, 204–06 (2005).

While all states have the sovereign authority to allow any person they wish to remain on their territory and while it will often be humane and right to extend such generosity, this is not a matter fairly understood to be required by either the text or purposes of the refugee law.

Id. (footnote omitted).
requirements necessary to support voluntary repatriation. When host states mandate repatriation under the authority of the 1951 Refugee Convention, this action can clash with UNHCR’s statutory obligation to implement voluntary repatriation and place UNHCR or host states in danger of violating international law.

This Note harmonizes voluntary repatriation and mandatory repatriation by placing these options on a continuum, dependent upon positive developments in the country of origin and an end of the fear of persecution that caused flight. Reading UNHCR interpretations and recommendations in the aggregate, UNHCR creates a linear progression of steps toward cessation of refugee status. By placing UNHCR interpretive guidelines on a timeline, voluntary repatriation becomes a necessary, but not sufficient condition in the progression toward mandatory repatriation, instead of operating as a competing and distinct option. Part I presents the background the 1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR’s role in refugee protection. Part II outlines the 1951 Refugee Convention cessation clause. Part III sets forth UNHCR’s statutory obligation to support voluntary repatriation. Part IV details the cessation of international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, examining the authority of states to mandate repatriation and the guidelines UNHCR sets forth for this determination. Syncing voluntary and mandated repatriation measured against progress in the country of origin, Part V recommends that UNHCR articulate this timeline as its interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and actively promote state adherence. Part VI applies this analysis to the current situation of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda and Uganda’s invocation of mandated repatriation.

II. 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF UNHCR

The 1951 Refugee Convention categorized two types of refugees: Article 1A(1) refers to people classified as refugees pre-1939; Article 1A(2) refers to those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted “due to race, religion, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and because of this fear cannot avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin. The 1951 Refugee

14. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2. UNHCR states two reasons why voluntary repatriation can occur at a lower threshold of change. First, the change of circumstances requirement "implies the consolidation, over time, of a process of stabilization." Id. Second, the voluntary nature of this choice is "the core element in promoting and facilitating repatriation." Id.

15. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1A(1)–(2) (showing that, as originally signed, Article 1A(2) limited the definition to events occurring before January 1951).
Convention retroactively applied to refugees granted status under the League of Nations and replaced the authority of the instruments that originally granted that status.16 The 1967 Protocol removed the temporal limitations in the 1951 Refugee Convention, thereby preserving the continual authority of the 1951 Refugee Convention.17 The 1951 Refugee Convention granted UNHCR the statutory authority to declare refugee status and facilitate asylum.18 A grant of refugee status triggers UNHCR's responsibilities, first, to allocate resources to alleviate the immediate crisis, and second, to seek a permanent solution for refugees.19 Articulated in Article 35, UNHCR's role in this process is supervisory, and necessarily dependent on host-state cooperation.20

The contracting States undertake to co-operate with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this convention.21

“Supervision,” as envisioned and enacted by UNHCR, encompasses a range of activities, including protection efforts, daily field activities, overseeing state action, organizing aid, and monitoring nongovernmental organization (NGO) work.22 Article 35 is thus UNHCR's legal authority in requesting states to accept UNHCR's role in protection, provide UNHCR with information, and adhere to UNHCR policy statements.23

UNHCR's work in host countries is multifaceted. When a refugee crisis first arises, UNHCR supervises the application of international conventions,24 and coordinates the admission of refugees and the transfer of refugee assets to host countries.25 For the duration of convention protection, UNHCR works to improve the

21. 1951 Refugee Convention, *supra* note 5, art. 35.
23. *Id.* at 619
24. UNHCR Statute, *supra* note 6, ¶ 8(a).
25. *Id.* ¶ 8(d).
general situation of refugees and meet their material needs. Article 35 expands state cooperation to all these functions of the High Commissioner, not just treaty cooperation. As Walter Kalin states:

By establishing a duty on States Parties to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, Article 35(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention does not refer to a specific and limited set of functions but to all tasks that UNHCR has under its mandate or might be entrusted with at a given time. Thus, the cooperation duties follow the changing role of UNHCR.

These cooperation duties become muddled when UNHCR or host states seek to facilitate refugee returns because UNHCR statutory requirements are different than the 1951 Refugee Convention requirements.

III. THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION CESSATION CLAUSE

Once refugee status is conferred, that status remains unless individual refugees re-avail themselves of the protection of their home country or a third party (UNHCR or the host state) invokes a cessation clause. Withdrawal of refugee status declares that international protection is no longer necessary and ends refugee rights and benefits conferred by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Contracting states have a duty not to return refugees if their “life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership [in] a particular social group, or political opinion” (mirroring the persecution requirement in Article 1A(2)). Encoded in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, this duty of nonrefoulement is legally binding on state parties. UNHCR states that involuntary repatriation “would in practice amount to refoulement.”

26. See id. ¶¶ 8(b), (d), (i), 10 (outlining the mandates through which the High Commissioner must “provide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his office,” and requiring the High Commissioner to administer any funds “he receives for assistance to refugees” to the private and public agencies “he deems best qualified to administer such assistance”).
28. Id. at 617.
29. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(1)–(4); Refugee Handbook, supra note 4, ¶¶ 114–15.
30. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)–(6); UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, ¶ 6(A)(ii)(e).
32. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1A(2), 33(1).
33. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3. UNHCR materials seem to be in tension regarding mandatory repatriation. While this quote
In facilitating the end of convention protection, UNHCR may implement voluntary repatriation. Paragraph 6(A)(ii)(e) of the UNHCR statute provides that “the competence of the High Commissioner” ceases to apply to a refugee when the circumstances causing him to be recognized as a refugee have changed, and no other grounds exist that prohibit him from availing himself of the protection of his country of origin. When UNHCR determines that such a change has occurred, UNHCR implements large-scale voluntary repatriation programs.

In contrast, the 1951 Refugee Convention allows host states to determine an end to refugee status and mandate repatriation. Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides for cessation of refugee status in the following circumstances:

(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality...

(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

While the duty of nonrefoulement prohibits states from returning persons recognized as refugees under international law, Article 1C(5) and (6) allows states to mandate return, on an individual and group basis, when the fear of persecution is eliminated and circumstances in the country of origin have improved such that national protection is available. As will be described in detail in Part IV, the evidentiary burden states must meet to move from
refoulement to properly mandated repatriation—from illegal to legal action—is unclear in international law and state practice.

Combining these cessation provisions, Joan Fitzpatrick summarizes the five contexts in which cessation occurs:

(i) cessation of UNHCR protection under the Statute; (ii) cessation of State protection of refugees previously recognized on a group basis; (iii) individualized cessation for recognized refugees; (iv) withdrawal of temporary protection; and (v) denial of initial claims to asylum based upon changed conditions between flight and status determination.\textsuperscript{40}

While cessation of status is provided for in these international instruments, the temporal boundaries of refugee protection are not clearly delineated in international law.\textsuperscript{41}

The 1951 Refugee Convention cessation clause and the UNHCR statutory cessation provision each require a change in circumstances that negates the need for international protection. It remains unclear whether the degree of change required to facilitate voluntary repatriation and to mandate repatriation are the same.\textsuperscript{42} UNHCR maintains that the evidentiary threshold for mandating repatriation is much higher than the threshold for implementing voluntary repatriation.\textsuperscript{43} State jurisprudence is not uniform on the interpretation of international requirements for repatriation. However, UNHCR requirements and state practice can be harmonized by understanding voluntary repatriation to serve as a benchmark toward mandated repatriation.

\section*{IV. UNHCR'S STATUTORY REQUIREMENT TO FACILITATE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION}

\subsection*{A. Ending UNHCR Protection: Voluntary Repatriation as a Durable Solution}

Under the UNHCR statute, UNHCR must “provide a legal framework for discontinuation of UNHCR protection”\textsuperscript{44} and support voluntary repatriation.\textsuperscript{45} Voluntary repatriation of former refugees is UNHCR's preferred method of ending refugee protection, as opposed

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{40} Joan Fitzpatrick & Rafael Bonoan, \textit{Cessation of Refugee Protection}, in \textit{Refugee Protection}, \textit{supra} note 22, at 492.

\bibitem{41} See Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 13, at 175, 182–84 (addressing the “conceptual void” states face when seeking to implement repatriation).

\bibitem{42} See generally \textit{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook}, \textit{supra} note 7, ch. 2.2 (stating that voluntary repatriation can occur at a lower threshold of change); Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 13, at 175, 200, 211–12 (discussing this confusion in standards and ultimately disagreeing with UNHCR that a higher threshold is legally necessary).

\bibitem{43} \textit{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook}, \textit{supra} note 7, ch. 2.2.

\bibitem{44} \textit{Note on Cessation}, \textit{supra} note 31, ¶ 31.

\bibitem{45} UNHCR Statute, \textit{supra} note 6, ¶ 1.

\end{thebibliography}
to local integration and resettlement. The scope of UNHCR repatriation efforts occurs in stages. UNHCR will facilitate repatriation at the individual refugee's request even if it does not think the situation is objectively safe for returns. Two considerations justify this lower threshold. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person has a right to return to his or her own country. This principle is the foundation for facilitating voluntary return. Second, change in the country of origin occurs over time, and at certain points returning becomes an option for particular groups even when returning remains unsafe for other refugees. UNHCR-facilitated individual, voluntary returns are therefore not sufficient indicators that conditions in the country of origin have improved to such a degree that all fear of persecution is negated.

When changes in the country of origin satisfy UNHCR requirements, UNHCR considers implementing voluntary repatriation programs. This consideration arises in three contexts. Substantial changes in a country of origin may convince UNHCR to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees and discontinue assistance programs. UNHCR also reviews refugee caseloads and, in the course of this review, may reevaluate the need for protection. Finally, UNHCR responds to inquiries from state parties seeking reevaluation and advises governments based on its own initiative. If promotion of voluntary repatriation is successful, UNHCR may consider declaring the cessation of statutory protection under criteria provided in paragraph 6(A)(ii)(e) of its statute. In these circumstances, host states cannot automatically declare cessation under the 1951 Refugee Convention. "The burden rests on

46. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 180.
47. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1.
48. Id. ch. 2.1.
49. Id. The 1951 Refugee Convention also lists several additional international instruments that reflect this right to return. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. Related rights, such as a right to a nationality, also support this principle. For a definition of "voluntary" in the context of repatriation, see VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3.
50. See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, chs. 2.2, 3.1 (supporting the notion that change in the country of origin occurs over time, and each refugee's individual circumstances impact a cessation determination as well as UNHCR's promotion of voluntary repatriation).
51. Id. ch. 3.1.
52. Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 499–511. Fitzpatrick and Bonoan list several examples of each evaluation. See id.
53. Id. at 499.
54. Id. at 500.
55. Id.
56. UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, ¶ 6(A)(ii)(e).
57. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶¶ 33–34; UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII), Cessation of Status, ¶¶ (a)–(b) [hereinafter Cessation of
the country of asylum [to show] that . . . an invocation of Article 1C(5) or (6) is appropriate."58

UNHCR applied the ceased circumstances provision of its statute in only twenty-five instances from 1973 to 2008.59 Each time, the provision was invoked because significant political changes had occurred and democratic rule was instituted.60 Fitzpatrick categorizes the circumstances in which UNHCR has invoked cessation into three groups: (i) accession to independent statehood; (ii) achievement of a successful transition to democracy; and (iii) resolution of a civil conflict.61 UNHCR has provided two reasons for this limited application.62 First, alternative solutions, such as encouraging voluntary repatriation on an individual basis, limit the need to invoke the cessation clause.63 Second, the requisite determination—whether a fundamental, durable change has occurred, ending the fear of persecution—is difficult and resource intensive.64

B. UNHCR Guidelines for Promoting Voluntary Repatriation

In the context of repatriation, “voluntariness” is the absence of physical, psychological, or material pressure.65 In the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR sets forth two overarching principles governing voluntary returns that enshrine this definition:66 Repatriation must be carried out “in safety and with dignity.”67 A safe and dignified return is one “without harassment, arbitrary detention, or physical threats.”68 A return “in safety” requires physical safety, legal safety, and material security.69 Physical safety includes protection from armed attacks, and the absence of land

58. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(ii).
59. UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, Intro. For a detailed list, see generally Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 32; and Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 501.
60. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 32.
62. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.
63. Id.
64. Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 501. This is the authors’ viewpoint and not the expressed view of UNHCR.
65. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3.
66. Id. ch. 2.4.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
mines along the refugees' route of return. Countries of origin can demonstrate advances in legal safety by "amnesties, public assurances of personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination and freedom from fear of persecution or punishment upon return."\(^{71}\)

Given that the goal of refugee law is to fill in the void created by the absence of state protection with international protection, legal safety ensures that international protection can cease because returning refugees are accorded rights as citizens.\(^{72}\) Material security includes "access to land or means of livelihood."\(^{73}\) This prong involves investigation into whether refugees can thrive upon return. To this end, refugees should be allowed to return with possessions acquired while living in the asylum country.\(^{74}\)

A return with dignity ensures that the country of origin restores and protects former refugees' rights.\(^{75}\) This element is less tangible than safety, and encompasses benchmarks that reflect respect and honor.\(^{76}\) Examples include allowing family members to return together, protecting vulnerable returnees, and ensuring freedom of movement.\(^{77}\) Refugees should have access to resources and be treated equally with other nationals as they integrate into the national community.\(^{78}\)

To ensure that these principles are satisfied, UNHCR requires fulfillment of several preconditions before it will promote voluntary repatriation as a durable solution. First, the country must have undergone an "overall general improvement" to the degree that UNHCR believes that the return will be in safety and with dignity.\(^{79}\) Second, the host state, country of origin, and refugee must agree that the return is voluntary.\(^{80}\) The legal status of refugees in host countries is an important factor in considering true voluntariness.\(^{81}\) If refugees' rights are not recognized and they are confined in camps,
it is less likely that the decision to repatriate is voluntary.\textsuperscript{82} In addition, UNHCR must have unimpeded access to refugees.\textsuperscript{83} Finally, the terms of the repatriation must be formalized in an agreement between UNHCR and the countries involved.\textsuperscript{84} If these conditions are satisfied, UNHCR will undertake a campaign to promote repatriation.\textsuperscript{85}

One striking difference between mandatory and voluntary repatriation is the role of the country of origin. Before implementing voluntary repatriation programs, UNHCR requires a high level of cooperation with the government of the country of origin. It must formally guarantee the ability of refugees to return safely.\textsuperscript{86} In addition to this formal guarantee, the government must provide travel documents and proof of citizenship for returnees and their children.\textsuperscript{87} The government must agree to allow UNHCR to monitor returnees, ensuring that national protection is adequate.\textsuperscript{88} In contrast, no similar requirements are present when host states choose to mandate repatriation.

V. MANDATED REPATRIATION

As set forth above, UNHCR implements voluntary repatriation programs, dependent on positive changes in the country of origin. In contrast, states can mandate repatriation without the consent of refugees.\textsuperscript{89} UNHCR has put forth requirements states should follow when determining if mandating repatriation, and therefore ceasing international protection, is appropriate.\textsuperscript{90} Though not extensively used in state practice, state jurisprudence interpreting UNHCR guidelines is not clear. This section details the conflict between UNHCR recommendations and state practice.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} *Id.* ch. 2.3.
\item \textsuperscript{83} *Id.*, ch. 3.1.
\item \textsuperscript{84} *Id.*
\item \textsuperscript{85} *Id.*
\item \textsuperscript{86} *Id.* ch. 1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{87} *Id.* ch. 2.6.
\item \textsuperscript{88} *Id.* chs. 1.6, 2.6.
\item \textsuperscript{89} UNHCR Statement, *supra* note 33, § 2.1.
\item \textsuperscript{90} See generally REFUGEE HANDBOOK, *supra* note 4 (outlining the basic principle that cessation of refugee status requires more than a determination that the fear of persecution has ceased); GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, *supra* note 12 (same); UNHCR Statement, *supra* note 33 (same).
\end{itemize}
As the agency tasked with supervising the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR guidelines are instructive in interpreting convention requirements. The overarching principle is that cessation of protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention arises when a change takes place in the country of origin, “which can be assumed to remove the basis of the fear of persecution.” According to UNHCR, for a state to mandate repatriation and invoke Article 1C(5) and (6) of the convention, thereby ceasing international protection, the host state must determine that changes are fundamental and durable, and effective protection must be available in the country of origin. Changes that qualify as “fundamental” most often involve an end to hostilities and a political change resulting in a return to peace and stability. This type of change is supported by significant reforms that alter the basic legal or social structure of the state, including “democratic elections, declarations of amnesties, repeal of oppressive law and dismantling of former security services.” If a society undergoes a change that eliminates the original cause of the fear of persecution, but the change creates a new fear of persecution that could potentially give rise to refugee status, the cessation clause cannot be invoked.

Additionally, UNHCR maintains that the change must be durable and stable. UNHCR cautions that a change is not durable if the country's political and economic climate is currently in flux or is still potentially volatile. UNHCR recommends that host states wait a minimum of twelve to eighteen months after a fundamental change is implemented before determining whether the change is durable. If the change was undertaken violently, a longer timeframe is appropriate. "The process of national reconstruction must be given

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91. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 135; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.2; GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 10–12.
92. UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.2; see also GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 10–16 (elaborating on the operation of the aforementioned triggering criteria).
93. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 11; Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 20.
95. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 12.
97. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 21; GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 13–14; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1.
98. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 21. UNHCR notes that the average time for fundamental enduring changes to take root is between four and five years. Id.
sufficient time to take hold and any peace arrangements with opposing militant groups must be carefully monitored."\textsuperscript{100}

Finally, UNHCR requires that the home country be able to provide effective protection, thus negating the need for international protection.\textsuperscript{101} Under the UNHCR definition, effective protection requires a functioning government and administrative structures, a working law enforcement and justice system, and the ability of returning refugees to access livelihoods.\textsuperscript{102} Large-scale voluntary repatriation of refugees is one indicator that changes have occurred.\textsuperscript{103} However, UNHCR notes that in instances when the return of former refugees is likely to reignite tensions, repatriation can actually indicate the absence of fundamental, durable changes.\textsuperscript{104}

Analyzing whether these three factors—a fundamental, durable change that establishes effective protection—eliminates the fear of persecution that caused flight necessitates inquiry into whether other international human rights norms are fulfilled.\textsuperscript{105} In the UNHCR \textit{Note on Cessation Clauses}, specific factors include:

\begin{quote}
The right to life and liberty and to non-discrimination, independence of the judiciary and fair and open trials which presume innocence, the upholding of various basic rights and fundamental freedoms such as the right to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, movement and access to courts, and the rule of law generally.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Creating institutions to monitor human rights protection is a strong indicator of a fundamental change.\textsuperscript{107}

In determining the applicability of cessation, UNHCR interprets Article 1C(5) and (6) to place an affirmative obligation on asylum states to evaluate the conditions of the country of origin. Asylum states must allocate resources for investigation and information gathering to identify a fundamental, durable, and stable change that eliminates the fear of persecution.\textsuperscript{108} Any state declaring cessation should use numerous sources of evidence and include information from both governmental and nongovernmental sources.\textsuperscript{109} UNHCR recommends that refugee status review be infrequent, in conjunction with refugees' need for stability.\textsuperscript{110} The burden of assessing

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. ¶ 14.
\item \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 6.
\item GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 15; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.3.
\item GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 12.
\item Id.
\item Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 23.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(i)–(iii).
\item Id.; Cessation of Status, supra note 57, ¶¶ (a)–(b).
\item REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 135; \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
circumstances in the country of origin—combined with the increase in administrative costs of mandating repatriation—limits the application of this clause.\textsuperscript{111}

If, after such an investigation has occurred, a host state chooses to declare cessation, UNHCR insists that several procedural guidelines be followed. Declarations of cessation must be public.\textsuperscript{112} The host state must provide counseling and assistance to refugees,\textsuperscript{113} allow adequate time to prepare for return, and respect the acquired rights of long-term residents.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, cessation of refugee status does not automatically result in mandatory repatriation.\textsuperscript{115} Invoking cessation for a nationality group creates a rebuttable presumption that cessation applies to individual members.\textsuperscript{116}

\section*{B. State Practice Under the Ceased Circumstances Provision}

UNHCR and state parties seem to agree that the cessation clause should be invoked cautiously.\textsuperscript{117} In practice, the procedures outlined above for applying the cessation clause are not well developed.\textsuperscript{118} This gap in international law places refugees at high risk of prematurely losing protection and increases the burden on asylum countries.\textsuperscript{119} Additionally, state jurisprudence on Article 1C(5) to (6) is limited and inconsistent.

A few courts have articulated a much more narrow conception of protection than the interpretation advanced by UNHCR. The High Court of Australia, in \textit{The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. QAAH}, found that when determining whether a fear of persecution still exists, the refugee has the burden of proving a continued fear of persecution.\textsuperscript{120} The court interpreted the 1951 Refugee Convention and domestic law to require Australia to extend protection only to persons who continued to meet the definition set forth in Article 1A(2), which governs the initial determination of

\begin{thebibliography}{120}
\bibitem{112} GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, \textit{supra} note 12, ¶ 25(iv).
\bibitem{113} \textit{Id.} ¶ 25(v).
\bibitem{114} \textit{Id.} ¶ 25(vi).
\bibitem{115} \textit{Id.} ¶ 25(ix); \textit{REFUGEE HANDBOOK, \textit{supra} note 4, ¶ 136.}
\bibitem{116} GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, \textit{supra} note 12, ¶ 19; \textit{REFUGEE HANDBOOK, \textit{supra} note 4, ¶ 136.}
\bibitem{117} Fitzpatrick \& Bonoan, \textit{supra} note 40, at 498–99 (citing the Commission on European communities and the policies of the Australian and Dutch governments as examples of state policy that tracks UNHCR reasoning).
\bibitem{118} \textit{Id.} at 499.
\bibitem{119} Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 13, at 182–83.
\bibitem{110} Kneebone \& O’Sullivan, \textit{supra} note 11, at 514 (citing \textit{Minister of Immigration \& Multicultural \& Indigenous Affairs v. QAAH} (2006) 231 CLR 1 (Austl.)).
\end{thebibliography}
refugee status. This understanding of the convention makes refugee status evaluation and cessation determination the same inquiry, rather than discrete procedures with separate evidentiary requirements. The court construed the cessation clause to operate automatically, in direct contradiction to UNHCR interpretation. Most troubling, the court rejected the affirmative burden UNHCR places on states to investigate a change in circumstances.

Likewise, Germany has interpreted this burden of protection narrowly in recent case law. In 2008, the German Federal Administrative Court withdrew refugee status from an individual because the court determined that the fear of persecution had ceased. Echoing the reasoning of the High Court of Australia, the German court articulated symmetry between the definition of “refugee” set forth in Article 1A(2) and cessation in Article 1C(5). The court rejected the broad articulation of protection advanced by UNHCR that includes an investigation into fundamental, durable changes in the country of origin.

In an advisory opinion on the German cessation cases, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) set forth a more inclusive understanding of protection than that outlined by the German court, but did not fully endorse UNHCR recommended guidelines. When deciding whether a refugee should continue receiving protection, the host country must determine whether the country of origin has a functioning legal system and whether the individual in question will have access to that system. The ECJ also recommended that the host country take into account the basic human rights situation in the country of origin. These standards are higher than the narrow determination focusing solely on a fear of persecution, but still do not reflect the breadth of UNHCR recommendations.

121. Id.
122. See id. (noting the mirrored standard between Article 1C(5) and 1A(2)).
123. Id. at 515. UNHCR states in several publications that cessation procedures must take into account the individual circumstances that caused flight, and therefore refugees should not lose status without the opportunity for a hearing. See GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 19 (explaining the “general principle” that all refugees should have the possibility for a continuation of status based on their individual case); Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 7 (“[N]o refugee claim, whether for granting of refugee status or for its continuation, should be rejected without an individual assessment on its merits.”).
124. Kneebone & O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 515 (citing QAAH, 231 CLR 1).
125. Id. at 516.
126. Id.
127. Id. For other academic criticisms of this understanding of the 1951 Refugee Convention, see id. at 516 n.283.
128. Id. at 517 (citing Joined Cases 175–179/08, Abdullah et al. v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. 113/4).
129. Id.
130. Id.
UNHCR responded by reiterating its much broader conception of states’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention in its statement on the ECJ ruling. In interpreting Article 1C(5), UNHCR stated:

Application of the “ceased circumstances” clause should be informed by the overall objective of refugee protection, which aims at finding durable solutions for refugees. Durable solutions are integration in the host State, resettlement to a third State and voluntary return to the home State if this is possible in safety and dignity.131 Notably absent from this list of durable solutions is mandatory repatriation. Yet, UNHCR stated that application of Article 1C(5) and (6) does not require the consent or any voluntary act of the refugee.132

The cases from Australia and Germany reflect an understanding of protection that begins and ends with a fear of persecution.133 In contrast, UNHCR clarified that “protection,” as envisioned in the mandate, means more than an absence of persecution.134 It requires the availability of “effective protection,” understood in the broad sense of a stable, functioning state.135 The purpose of refugee law “entails protection against return to persecution (as enshrined in the principle of nonrefoulement) and protection allowing for a life in dignity in the host state.”136 Therefore, when a host state applies Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the state declares that the need for international protection no longer exists.137 Accordingly, UNHCR maintains that cessation is not appropriate when protection against persecution can be provided only with the help of multinational forces.138 The authority of non-state actors cannot be substituted for the power of a state to effect the rule of law because under international law, non-state actors are not accorded the same

131. UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1.
132. Id.
133. See Kneebone & O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 514 (discussing the common threads, but sometimes conflicting conclusions, between cases).
134. See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1.2 (arguing that an “effective protection” determination is broader than the grant of status in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention). When determining cessation, UNHCR states that the question is not whether the fear of persecution has ceased, but rather whether national protection is sufficient. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 25.
135. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 15; see also Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 25. Along with legal and physical safety, UNHCR includes returnees’ access to livelihoods when determining whether a state is “functioning.” Hathaway notes that this requirement is above what is guaranteed by international human rights law, which includes only a right to basic necessities. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 212–13.
136. UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1.2.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 4.2.1.
rights and authority as state actors. As a result, their ability to implement national, fundamental, durable change is necessarily limited.

Other state parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention have hewed closer to UNHCR's interpretation of the requirements for mandatory repatriation, placing the evidentiary burden on the host country during refugee status determinations. United States immigration regulations require the government to prove that a change in circumstances has occurred, thereby eliminating the fear of persecution. The refugee does not have to prove a continuing fear of persecution. Similarly, United Kingdom policy documents and case law place the evidentiary burden on the immigration authority to establish that the individual's refugee status has ceased. While these state practices differ from Australian and German case law, it is unclear whether the evidentiary burden in more favorable jurisdictions reaches the threshold advocated by UNHCR, which includes both the end of a fear of persecution and proof of effective national protection.

C. The "Compelling Reasons" Exception to Mandatory Repatriation

The tension between a determination of refugee status based on current fear of persecution and a continuation of status based on past persecution is demonstrated in the exceptions to cessation. If an asylum state applies the ceased circumstances provision to a group and thereby mandates repatriation, UNHCR recommends the state provide a method for reviewing the individual circumstances of a refugee. At this stage, the focus is on the specific causes of an individual's flight. The inquiry is twofold: first, whether the documented change eliminated the risk of persecution and second, whether national protection can replace international protection. The first step of the inquiry recognizes that a formal regime change

139. Id.
140. Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 526.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 527. Kneebone and O'Sullivan note that UNHCR's interpretation of the evidentiary burden required to invoke Article 1C(5) is supported by many academic commentators. Id.
143. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(vii)-(viii); Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 513. In group mandated repatriation, allowing a forum to contest cessation helps ensure that states are not violating the Article 33 prohibition on nonrefoulement. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33(1).
144. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(ix); see generally REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, ¶¶ 37-45 (explaining the objective and subjective elements of a "well-founded fear of persecution").
145. See GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 19-21 (describing compelling reasons that negate a refugee's ability to return to the country of origin).
does not necessarily negate prejudices and the possibility that persecution will continue at the hands of non-state actors.\textsuperscript{146} If the regime change does not end a valid fear of persecution, cessation is improper, regardless of the change in circumstances.\textsuperscript{147} When a change in circumstances has alleviated the well-founded fear of persecution, thereby satisfying the first prong of the inquiry, UNHCR asks states to allow refugees to invoke the humanitarian principle.\textsuperscript{148} Found in Article 1C(5), this exception is limited to pre-1939 refugees.\textsuperscript{149} UNHCR strongly recommends that states allow all refugees the opportunity to apply for a continuation of status.\textsuperscript{150} Terming this exception “the humanitarian principle,” a refugee maintains his status, despite the host state’s invocation of cessation, if he can establish “compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality.”\textsuperscript{151} Such reasons might include severe forms of persecution that result in continuing trauma.\textsuperscript{152} The provision protects refugees who have suffered so greatly that they cannot be expected to return to their country of origin.\textsuperscript{153} UNHCR encourages states to apply this principle to current convention refugees on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{154} Several countries, including the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, adopted the humanitarian principle into domestic legislation; other countries, notably France and Germany, expressly declined to extend this principle to convention refugees.\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[146.] See \textsc{Refugee Handbook}, supra note 4, ¶ 136 (noting that a formal regime change does not ensure that all citizens have undergone the same change of mindset toward the previously persecuted group).
\item[147.] \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 19; Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 517.
\item[148.] 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5); see also Hathaway, supra note 13, at 204–06 (arguing that UNHCR’s interpretation of the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention is based on its own statutory interpretation, and therefore this obligation is not required under the convention).
\item[149.] 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5).
\item[150.] See \textsc{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook}, supra note 7, ch. 2.2 (noting that individual refugees may continue to have a fear of persecution despite significant changes in the country of origin); \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 24 (listing examples of what might qualify as “compelling”).
\item[151.] 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1A(a), C(5).
\item[152.] \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 24.
\item[153.] UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.3; Milner, supra note 16, at 94.
\item[154.] \textsc{Guidelines on International Protection}, supra note 12, ¶ 21; see also Milner, supra note 16, at 96 (noting the “Conclusions of the Lisbon Expert Roundtable” found that extension of this humanitarian principle is “well grounded in state practice” and applies to all Article 1A(2) refugees). However, UNHCR’s recommendation of socioeconomic factors is not explicitly included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. \textit{Id.} at 103.
\item[155.] Milner, supra note 16, at 97.
\end{enumerate}
David Milner highlights the tension between Article 1A(2), which grants protection based on current risk, and this humanitarian principle, which continues protection based on past persecution. Milner seeks to reconcile this tension by focusing on the substitution of the word “person” for “refugee.” By using the term “person,” UNHCR is acknowledging that protection for these individuals should continue, but not formally as refugees. While Milner’s reconciliation satisfies the formality of the instruments, the language of the convention does not obligate states to consider this humanitarian principle.

VI. HARMONIZING MANDATORY REPATRIATION WITH UNHCR’S PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

UNHCR guidelines and state practice can be understood to set forth a timeline for repatriation that ensures the continued safety and protection of the refugee. Beginning when refugee status is conferred, UNHCR aids voluntary repatriation at the request of the individual refugee. As the situation that initially caused flight improves, UNHCR implements voluntary repatriation programs directed at large groups of refugees. These voluntary repatriation programs are indicators that states may consider activating the cessation clause for individual refugees. Mandated repatriation on a group scale is the last stage, implemented after the fear of persecution causing flight is extinguished and the evidentiary burden established by UNHCR is satisfied. Group cessation carries the highest evidentiary burden because it ceases international protection. This timeline syncs these two legal foundations and

156. See id. at 95, 99–104 (identifying three rationales for this exception: breaking of the social contract, psychological damage, and a socioeconomic obstacle to return).
157. Id. at 95.
158. Id.
159. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 204–06.
160. See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1. UNHCR outlines the reasoning behind UNHCR’s stages for voluntary repatriation. UNHCR notes that from the onset of a refugee crisis, the organization begins addressing the crisis through political avenues and relief on the ground.
161. Id. Terming these measures “promotion of repatriation,” UNHCR distinguishes these group programs from its role in facilitating repatriation at the individual refugee’s request.
162. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 12.
163. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)–(6).
164. Cf. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 6–7 (discussing cessation in conjunction with the need to provide durable solutions for refugees); Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶ 6; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.2.1 (asserting that the concept of protection is broader than merely an absence of
their explanatory documents in a linear development that reflects the progress of change in the country of origin and guarantees that the refugee is never without protection.

Understanding voluntary repatriation and mandated repatriation to form a continuum that is dependent on changes in the country of origin unites UNHCR's institutional mandate, convention-based repatriation, and the overarching goals of refugee law. When UNHCR manages repatriations, it operates in line with its statutory requirement to implement only voluntary repatriation. As established earlier, UNHCR will facilitate repatriation at the individual refugee's request even if it does not think the situation is objectively safe for returns. UNHCR-facilitated individual, voluntary returns alone cannot be taken as authoritative indicators that a fundamental change has occurred in the country of origin.

UNHCR promotes voluntary repatriation on a larger scale when it determines that returns can take place in safety and with dignity. This standard—"in safety and with dignity"—requires that the legal status of returning refugees is secure under national law. When UNHCR determines that conditions have improved such that national protection is sufficient and refugees will thrive upon return, transition from a management to return model is appropriate. At this stage of investigation, the inquiry moves beyond merely assessing whether a fear of persecution has ceased to considering other human rights concerns. UNHCR properly roots this obligation in other human rights norms to ensure that it is not violating international law and returning vulnerable people to unsafe situations.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{165.} UNHCR Statute, \textit{supra} note 6, ¶ 1.8(c) (stating that UNHCR must "facilitate" voluntary repatriation and assist government efforts to "promote" voluntary repatriation). Hathaway notes that UNHCR operates as if it is authorized to effect only voluntary repatriation. Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 13, at 192.
  \item \textbf{166.} \textit{VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra} note 7, ch. 3.1. UNHCR will facilitate returns at the request of individual refugees to return to unsafe situations based on the right to return guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. \textit{Id.} ch. 2.1.
  \item \textbf{167.} \textit{Id.} chs. 2.4, 3.1.
  \item \textbf{168.} \textit{See id.} ch. 4.1 (noting that misrepresentation of legal status negates the voluntary nature of the return); \textit{see also} \textit{Note on Cessation, supra} note 31, ¶ 6 (stating that cessation should not result in refugees losing all legal status).
  \item \textbf{169.} \textit{See generally} \textit{VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra} note 7, ch. 3 (describing the stages of voluntary repatriation).
  \item \textbf{170.} \textit{See id.} ch. 2.1 (discussing the right to return and its relation to other fundamental human rights).
  \item \textbf{171.} \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} \textit{Note on Cessation, supra} note 31, ¶ 6 (discussing the object and purpose of cessation clauses in conjunction with the principles of refugee protection). \textit{But see} Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 13, at 208–09 (arguing that UNHCR should articulate the connection with other human rights instruments more clearly).
\end{itemize}
As UNHCR and state parties have recognized, revoking international protection without the consent of the refugee places the burden on the state seeking to terminate status to prove that fear of persecution has ceased and that international protection is no longer necessary. This evidentiary burden is very high, as demonstrated by the fundamental, durable, and effective protection standards required. Though the case law from Australia and Germany seems contrary to UNHCR’s timeline, those cases involved individual status determinations. When mandating repatriation to an entire group of refugees, multiple legal obligations are acting upon states. First, the duty of nonrefoulement in Article 33, interpreted with the “change in circumstances” necessary in Article 1C(5), requires that the “well-founded” fear of persecution based on convention criteria has ceased. Second, host states must satisfy other international human rights obligations to which they are parties in addition to the 1951 Refugee Convention. State practice supports incorporating these human rights principles into an inquiry of status determination. UNHCR materials can be understood to encode these international human rights obligations. Therefore, while UNHCR materials are not legal per se, the guidelines reflect duties host states may have under international human rights law.

Reading UNHCR guidelines to create a timeline of repatriation, and placing voluntary and mandatory repatriation on this continuum, clarifies UNHCR’s interpretation of states’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNHCR’s continual advocacy of solely voluntary repatriation complicates the standards for states implementing mandated repatriation. UNHCR may facilitate voluntary repatriation efforts long before conditions have changed to

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172. Kneebone & O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 526; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, ¶ 2.1.
173. See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2. The voluntary nature of the refugee’s decision to return is a key justification for this lower evidentiary requirement. Accordingly, UNHCR places a great emphasis on ensuring that a refugee’s decision is truly voluntary and not caused by a hostile environment in the host country. Id. ch. 2.3.
175. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33; see generally REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, ¶¶ 37–45 (noting that a “well-founded fear of persecution” includes a refugee’s own perception as well as the context of the country of origin).
176. See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.1 (giving examples of human rights norms activated during cessation).
177. Kneebone & O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 526; see also text accompanying notes 140, 172.
178. For a discussion of applicable human rights norms, see Hathaway, supra note 13, at 208–11. Hathaway disagrees that international human rights law places as high a burden on host states. Id. at 212.
179. Id. at 199.
a degree that supports mandated repatriation.\textsuperscript{180} However, when UNHCR has begun to promote voluntary repatriation, states have taken this action as a signal that their duties as asylum states are fulfilled.\textsuperscript{181} This timeline places UNHCR-facilitated voluntary repatriation as a necessary, but not sufficient, benchmark toward group, mandated repatriation. Host states have an affirmative obligation to investigate and evaluate a change in circumstances.\textsuperscript{182}

At the beginning of the analysis, this Note recognized that UNHCR materials, while authoritative, are not the sole means of interpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention. State practice sets standards in understanding what is required under international law. James Hathaway notes that UNHCR, in an effort to raise humanitarian standards, may actually contribute to their erosion by not acknowledging states' ability to end refugee status.\textsuperscript{183} UNHCR can proactively contribute to the development of international law by encouraging states to adhere to the high evidentiary standard when mandating repatriation.

\textbf{VII. RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA}

As set forth above, tension exists between the UNHCR requirement to implement voluntary repatriation and a state's ability to mandate repatriation under the 1951 Refugee Convention. These conflicting standards are demonstrated by the actions of UNHCR, Uganda, and Rwanda in facilitating repatriation and determining the end of refugee status.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{180} See generally \textsc{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook}, supra note 7, ch. 3.1 (explaining "essential preconditions" for promotion of repatriation). UNHCR states that it will facilitate repatriation at the request of the refugee before the standard to implement the cessation clause has been reached. \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 29.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Hathaway, supra note 13, at 193. UNHCR states that large-scale repatriation can be a factor states consider when determining whether a fundamental change has occurred. \textit{Note on Cessation}, supra note 31, ¶ 29. For a discussion of the current confusion of these two evidentiary burdens, see Hathaway, supra note 13, at 199–200.
\item \textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., \textsc{Guidelines on International Protection}, supra note 12, ¶ 25 (noting that the burden should be on the country of asylum to prove change in the country of origin).
\item \textsuperscript{183} Hathaway, supra note 13, at 199. Additionally, UNHCR's \textit{Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation} instructs host states to follow UNHCR's lead in promoting voluntary repatriation. \textsc{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook}, supra note 7, ch. 2.5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A. Background of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda

In April 1994, Rwanda disintegrated into violence. An estimated 800,000 Tutsis were murdered over the course of four months. Following the genocide, millions of Rwandans fled to neighboring countries. UNHCR has been assisting the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees since 1995.

Currently, 60,000–65,000 Rwandan refugees live in asylum countries, and 16,300 reside in Uganda. Host countries in this region have not always been hospitable. In 1996, Tanzania forced the return of tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees. The government of Burundi pursued a similar strategy in 2005, forcibly returning over 6,000 Rwandan refugees. These states demonstrated no proof that they had undertaken efforts to establish a change in circumstances, as UNHCR maintains is mandated by the 1951 Refugee Convention.

In 2003, Uganda began advocating the cessation of refugee status for all Rwandan refugees, and in July of that year, Uganda, Rwanda, and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary repatriation of the over 23,000 Rwandan refugees living in Uganda. The terms of the agreement provided that Rwandans may return to Rwanda without satisfying any preconditions, and no refugee will be forced to return. Subsequently, UNHCR began

185. Id. at 1223.
186. Id. at 1222.
188. Id.
189. Id.
193. See, e.g., Nessel, supra note 191, at 126 (discussing state behavior inconsistent with obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention).
195. Id.
196. Id.
promoting voluntary repatriation. In April 2009, UNHCR met with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to discuss the continued repatriation of Rwandan refugees. UNHCR and both governments agreed that continuing refugee status for Rwandans living in Uganda was no longer necessary. UNHCR set a goal for ending Rwanda’s protracted refugee problem by 2011.

NGOs expressed concern that the repatriation advocated by UNHCR would be involuntary. The Refugee Law Project, reporting on ReliefWeb, urged UNHCR to clarify the voluntary nature of repatriation and to educate refugees on protection options if they did not wish to return. The lack of consideration for individual circumstances and alternative durable solutions was particularly concerning. Reports of the April 2009 meeting do not include any reference to investigation by Uganda into the changed circumstances in Rwanda.

UNHCR originally set a July 31, 2009, benchmark for repatriation before camps closed. In May 2009, news reports documented that Rwandan refugees living in camps in Uganda had begun to flee, fearing forced repatriation. Among the reasons cited for wanting to remain in Uganda included fear of persecution and imprisonment upon return. Refugees caught fleeing were arrested. Confronting these reports, UNHCR repeated that repatriation was voluntary and that UNHCR would still provide aid to those remaining in the camps.

In June 2009, Human Rights Watch urged the government of Uganda to educate Rwandan refugees, before the camps closed in July, on their protection under international law. Although the tripartite agreement pledges that Uganda will provide alternative

197. UNHCR Mounts Campaign for Return of 80,000 Rwandan Refugees, UNHCR—UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3faa72027&query=rwanda%20repatriation.


199. Id.


201. Rwandese Repatriation Memo, supra note 198.

202. Id.

203. Id.

204. Id.


206. Id.

207. Id.

208. Id.

209. Id.

solutions for refugees who were unwilling to repatriate.\footnote{211} Uganda
had taken no affirmative steps to provide alternative solutions.\footnote{212} Refugees continued to flee, fearing forced repatriation.\footnote{213}

The July 2009 deadline was subsequently extended to August 31, 2009.\footnote{214} Reports from August document the Rwandan government threatening to revoke citizenship of refugees who had not returned by that deadline.\footnote{215} A Rwandan government official was quoted: “[Rwanda] shall apply the secession [sic] clause if they have returned by the end of December, there is no more reason for any Rwandan to become a refugee.”\footnote{216} However, as of 2010, camps remained open.\footnote{217} Uganda continued to force returns in spite the public condemnation from UNHCR.\footnote{218} In one incident, two men died jumping from trucks as Ugandan police attempted to drive refugees across the Rwandan border.\footnote{219}

In its 2011 country report on Rwanda, UNHCR described the domestic political situation as “relatively stable,” with pockets of unrest during the presidential election.\footnote{220} Rwanda frequently requests that UNHCR invoke the cessation clause, ending international protection of refugees.\footnote{221} UNHCR reiterates the goal of invoking its statutory clause by the end of 2011.\footnote{222} Until then, UNHCR will continue to promote the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees.\footnote{223}

\footnote{211} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{212} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{213} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{215} Rwanda/Uganda: Go Home, Uganda Tells Rwandan Refugees, \textsc{Integrated Regional Info. Networks}, Aug. 4, 2009 [hereinafter Go Home], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,RWA,456d621e2,4a7f0c92c,0.html.
\footnote{216} \textit{Id.} This quote reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of international law. As the country of origin, Rwanda has no authority to invoke the cessation clause. \textit{See} Ben Simon, Rwanda Refugees Pushed to Return to a Home They Consider Unsafe, \textsc{Christian Sci. Monitor}, July 30, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/0730/p06s04-woaf.html (noting that the desire to invoke the clause stems from national pride).
\footnote{217} Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
\footnote{218} UNHCR Condemns Forced Return of 1,700 Rwandans from Uganda, UNHCR—UN Refugee Agency (July 16, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4c406edb6.html [hereinafter UNHCR Condemns].
\footnote{219} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{220} Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
\footnote{221} \textit{Id.}; \textit{see}, e.g., Go Home, supra note 212 (quoting Rwandan official expressing desire to invoke cessation clause).
\footnote{222} Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
\footnote{223} \textit{Id.}
B. Comparing UNHCR Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees with UNHCR Guidelines

UNHCR has stated that in order to promote voluntary repatriation, the situation in the country of origin must have improved to an extent that refugees can return in safety and with dignity.\footnote{224} Regarding legal and physical safety, Rwanda worked with UNHCR in providing assistance, including mediating land disputes,\footnote{225} and it has pledged to receive any Rwandan who wishes to return.\footnote{226} UNHCR notes that border skirmishes may challenge repatriation, but not prevent efforts.\footnote{227} The tripartite agreement signed by UNHCR, Rwanda, and Uganda agrees to voluntary returns and UNHCR's continual role in resettlement.\footnote{228} These facts, in addition to the advances in governance noted below, support the initiation of voluntary repatriation programs.\footnote{229}

However, the scarcity of land and lack of resources caution against initiating large-scale voluntary repatriation programs. Returnees' ability to thrive seems uncertain, given the lack of land and livelihood programs.\footnote{230} UNHCR notes that refugee households are dependent on UNHCR assistance for their survival.\footnote{231} Just as the presence of multinational forces calls into question a state's ability to provide sufficient protection,\footnote{232} dependence on multinational aid and assistance for basic survival challenges the ability of the state to ensure the material security of returnees.

Additionally, Uganda's actions raise significant questions about whether returns would actually be voluntary. The process by which Uganda has gone about closing camps—including the lack of notice, inability for individual review, abrupt closing of camps, and destruction of homes—indicates that these returns are coerced.\footnote{233}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK}, \textit{supra} note 7, ch. 3.1.
\item \textit{Nthengwe, supra note 187}.
\item \textit{See Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200} (noting that military operations and political uncertainty in the eastern parts of the DRC may hamper the voluntary repatriation of refugees from Rwanda).
\item \textit{Uganda Tripartite Agreement, supra note 194}.
\item \textit{See supra Part III; see generally VOlUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3} (outlining changes that support implementing the promotion of voluntary repatriation programs).
\item \textit{Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200}.
\item \textit{Id}.
\item \textit{UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.2.1}.
\item \textit{See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3} (noting that physical, psychological, or material pressure from the host country negates the voluntariness of returns); \textit{GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(vi)} (requiring that a gap of time occur between declaration of cessation and subsequent facilitation of returns).
\end{itemize}
Invoking its statutory cessation clause in this circumstance seems contrary to UNHCR's own standards given the demonstrated lack of national protection, continued regional instability, and involuntary returns.

C. Evaluating Uganda's Actions Under UNHCR Guidelines and the Precedent of State Practice

In determining whether Uganda's forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees violates the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR materials and state jurisprudence provide insight. Following the timeline model, mandated repatriation should only be implemented after UNHCR has begun large-scale voluntary repatriation programs and an intensive investigation occurs. Using the UNHCR guidelines in evaluating whether a fundamental, durable change that provides effective protection has occurred over the last fifteen years requires inquiry into the political, economic, and social structures of current Rwandan society. Since Uganda has taken steps to forcibly return refugees, compliance with UNHCR standards ensures that they are not in breach of the Article 33 nonrefoulement prohibition of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

1. Fundamental Change

Fundamental changes eliminate the fear of persecution that caused flight. These changes usually involve an end to hostilities and a political change resulting in peace and stability. UNHCR reports regarding advances in governance are particularly promising for Rwanda. Recent elections were peaceful and the political situation remains relatively stable. In 2010, the government established the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs to provide assistance for refugees within Rwanda and to

234. See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1 (providing references for requirements for change used by UNHCR).
235. UNHCR guidelines include establishing that a fear of persecution has ceased and national protection is sufficient, therefore mandating repatriation after satisfying these requirements necessarily means that states are not in violation of their Article 33 requirements. See Hathaway, supra note 13, at 179 ("[B]ecause repatriation of the former refugee cannot by definition involve a risk of refoulement . . . repatriation does not require a former refugee's consent."). While Australia and Germany seem to establish contrary evidentiary burdens, that case law reflects individual status hearings and not group mandated repatriation. Kneebone & O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 514–16.
236. See GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶¶ 10–16 (discussing character and duration of change required).
237. Id. ¶ 11.
238. Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
239. Id.
facilitate returns. Additionally, the Rwandan Parliament recently passed a gender law addressing equality at all sectors of society and the economic independence of women.

It remains unclear whether this progress truly eliminates the fear of persecution that Rwandan refugees face. In the aftermath of the genocide, many Hutus fled to Uganda fearing persecution for acts of genocide. They remain hesitant to return, afraid of harassment by the current government. Reports on Rwanda’s progress remain mixed. The U.S. Department of State documents government efforts to eliminate ethnic references in government materials, and it has abolished the quota system. The Rwandan Constitution calls for the promotion of national unity over ethnic distinctions. However, success remains uncertain, and discrimination continues.

2. Durable Change

Evaluations of durability assess whether the changes documented above are sustainable. UNHCR reports positive strides in the development of governance in Rwanda. However, respect for human rights and the continuance of peace and security are in question, and protection of general human rights remains tenuous. The legal system in Rwanda continues to garner much criticism for selective prosecution, especially of genocide crimes. Defense witnesses testifying in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda do not travel to Rwanda, because their safety cannot be guaranteed by the United Nations. While the gacaca courts (local courts) have made positive strides in reconciling communities, the situation is far from one of nondiscrimination and freedom from fear of persecution.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Simon, supra note 216; see generally Go Home, supra note 215 (discussing efforts by Uganda and Rwanda to get refugees to return to Rwanda); Ntengwe, supra note 187 (discussing flight of Rwandans).
243. Simon, supra note 216; see, e.g., Go Home, supra note 215 (discussing refugee fears).
244. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 225.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See discussion supra Part IV (explaining the cessation clause and relevant UNHCR guidelines).
251. Id. at 214.
Additionally, the government has twice invaded neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to fight Hutu forces. The government has twice invaded neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to fight Hutu forces.253 Rwandan armed forces just withdrew from the DRC border in March 2009.254 The lack of protection for human rights and prevalence of border skirmishes draw the durability of progress into question. As noted above, many refugees are afraid to return because they believe the Rwandan government will persecute them based on their ethnicity.255 This fear, combined with recent military activity against Hutu militia, arguably establishes the lack of a fundamental change.

3. Effective Protection

Lastly, Uganda must evaluate whether the Rwandan government can adequately protect its citizens, ending the need for international protection.256 In addition to advances in governance and legal safety, UNHCR requires that refugees have access to livelihoods.257 In its 2011 country assessment of Rwanda, UNHCR notes that the majority of refugee households in Rwanda remain dependent on UNHCR support.258 Rwanda is not providing for its own citizens residing in domestic camps.259 "The returnees face extreme poverty, as well as land and shelter issues, lack of medical coverage, a dearth of job opportunities, and the need to walk long distances in search of water."260 Land is scarce, and other citizens have claimed homes abandoned by refugees.261

The principles of refugee protection include alleviating the immediate crisis and seeking durable solutions.262 In the context of cessation, durable solutions involve ensuring refugees have stable legal status and are not returned to a volatile situation.263 Forcing involuntary returns increases the chance that such refugees will flee

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255. Simon, supra note 216; see generally Ntengwe, supra note 187 (discussing flight of Rwandans); Go Home, supra note 215 (discussing ethnic tensions).
257. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 15; see also UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.3 (noting minimum standard of living requirements).
258. Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Simon, supra note 216.
262. Note on Cessation, supra note 31, ¶¶ 19, 28 (discussing the central role of the "durable solution" in repatriation programs).
263. Id. ¶ 28.
again, causing additional instability in regions that have recently begun recovering from conflict.\textsuperscript{264}

\subsection*{D. Recommended Action}

UNHCR creates a timeline for repatriation that ensures the continued safety and protection of the refugee, beginning with individual voluntary repatriation and ending in the cessation of status.\textsuperscript{265} Uganda's actions have disrupted this timeline, drawing the safety of Rwandan refugees into question. Given UNHCR's task to "provide permanent solutions," supporting voluntary repatriation in this case may be preferred over local integration or third country resettlement.\textsuperscript{266} Resettlement in Uganda does not seem to be a viable option, as demonstrated by attacks and forcible returns.\textsuperscript{267} Moreover, Uganda has demonstrated a willingness to violate its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.\textsuperscript{268} Instituting voluntary repatriation programs in this environment may be the best solution from a pool of less than ideal options. If Uganda continues to close camps and effectively mandate repatriation, Rwandans remaining in Uganda may have no legal status.\textsuperscript{269} Decreased access to refugees limits UNHCR's ability to educate refugees about their rights, ensuring that the decision to return is voluntary.\textsuperscript{270} This limitation also truncates UNHCR's ability to organize orderly returns. In addition, food supply to the camps is inconsistent and necessary items are often lacking.\textsuperscript{271} Facilitating voluntary repatriation may provide more protection and security than advocating continued asylum.

According to the timeline set forth in UNHCR materials, Uganda may be in breach of its duty of nonrefoulement under the 1951

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 264. \textit{Id.}
\item 265. \textit{See Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 7, ch. 3.1} (discussing the UNHCR goals of facilitating and promoting repatriation). The overarching goal of cessation is providing a durable solution. Given that mandatory cessation does not require consent and terminates refugee status, the risks are greater and therefore, should be undertaken cautiously. \textit{Guidelines on International Protection, supra} note 12, ¶ 6–7.
\item 266. \textit{See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1} ("The 'ceased circumstances' clause should... not result in uncertain status in the host State nor compel individuals to return to a volatile situation.").
\item 267. \textit{See generally Simon, supra note 216} (discussing recent violence); \textit{UNHCR Condemns, supra note 218}.
\item 268. \textit{See} 1951 Refugee Convention, \textit{supra} note 5, art. 33(1). The principle of nonrefoulement prohibits Uganda from forcibly returning refugees when their life or freedom is threatened on account of race (among other designations).
\item 269. UNHCR cautions states against creating this situation. \textit{See Note on Cessation, supra} note 31, ¶ 6 (noting that countries should avoid leaving refugees in the country of asylum without a definite legal status or with an illegal status).
\item 270. \textit{Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra} note 7, ch. 3.1.
\item 271. \textit{Uganda Needs Assessment, supra} note 190.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Refugee Convention. Although changes have occurred in Rwanda’s system of governance, it is not certain that these changes are durable and eliminated the fear that caused flight. By July 2010, 3,320 Rwandans in Uganda had filed for asylum, and 98 percent of the applications were denied. This indicates that Uganda is not adequately considering individual cases. If Uganda continues to pressure for mandated repatriation in the absence of an independent investigation into the current stability of Rwanda, the government of Uganda may be in violation of international law. To satisfy its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, Uganda can either undertake an investigation determining whether the original cause of flight has ceased or allow Rwandan refugees to remain in Uganda.

VIII. CONCLUSION

According to UNHCR, Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees gives asylum states such as Uganda the authority to mandate repatriation when the country of origin has made fundamental, durable, and stable changes that end refugees’ fear of persecution. In comparison, UNHCR can facilitate voluntary returns at a much lower threshold of change. As this Note demonstrates, these two legal standards are not concentric. Rather, these standards form a timeline of repatriation, starting at voluntary individual repatriation and ending in cessation of status. This timeline ensures international protection remains constant until national protection can resume and reconciles the ability to mandate repatriation with states’ duty of nonrefoulement.

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272. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33(1).
273. UNHCR Condemns, supra note 218.
274. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, ¶ 25(vii)–(viii).
275. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3.
276. Uganda is also a party to several other international human rights conventions that may be activated here, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 207–10.
277. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)–(6).
278. Id. art. 33.
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