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Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law's Contribution to China's Economic Development

Margaret K. Lewis*

ABSTRACT

China's rapid rise to become the second largest economy in the world is nothing short of extraordinary. When economic reforms took off in the late 1970s, China had been without formal criminal law for three decades. China's economic development since the launch of the reform period has occurred directly alongside the development of its criminal law, but the academic literature has failed to ask what role criminal law plays in China's impressive growth.

This Article argues that not only has the People's Republic of China leadership historically used criminal law in service of economic ends but also, going forward, criminal law will likely play a multifaceted role in the leadership's strategy to sustain

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growth. This inquiry is particularly timely on the heels of a once-a-decade leadership transition and as China's ability to maintain a robust growth rate is facing rising skepticism.

Looking beyond China, the law and development literature more generally has also failed to seriously discuss criminal law. At a time when many are rethinking the role of law in economic development, it is worth broadening the discussion to include criminal law. China is an instructive test case to begin that conversation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

“Our country must develop; if we do not develop then we will be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.”¹ – Deng Xiaoping, 1992

“We must have a profound understanding of the development trend and requirements of our country’s social productive forces, focus on economic development and formulate and implement a correct line . . . .”² – Jiang Zemin, 2001

“Development is critically important, and upholding stability is also a critically important task.”³ – Hu Jintao, 2011

“We must follow the strategic thinking that development is of overriding importance.”⁴ – Xi Jinping, 2013

As these statements from the highest ranking members of the past four generations of leaders indicate, development has been a paramount goal of the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). Viewing development from the perspective of macroeconomic growth, China’s development over the past three decades has been extraordinary. In the late 1970s, China was emerging from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the resulting shambles of its national economy.³ By April 2010, China had surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in terms of nominal gross domestic product (GDP).⁷ In 2013, the World Bank reported, “By any standard, China’s economic performance over

the last three decades has been impressive. GDP growth averaged 10 percent a year, and over 500 million people were lifted out of poverty.\(^8\) China’s rosy story of uninterrupted growth masks concerns that its economy is slowing.\(^9\) This uncertain moment in China’s growth trajectory is an opportune time to reflect on the forces behind China’s stunning economic rise. In particular, this Article considers China’s rapid development and asks what role criminal law has played to date and will play in the future. This Article then goes a step further, asking why the law and development literature has failed to seriously ask this question both with respect to China and more generally.

Law and development literature, though extensive, generally overlooks the role of criminal law. At base, law and development scholars question how governments use law to create order in society and bolster the government’s legitimacy. A common thread in the literature is how this foundation can in turn promote economic growth.\(^10\) The debate has focused on the Washington Consensus’s support for a market economy’s need for clear and enforceable contract and property rights, often referred to as the “rights hypothesis”\(^11\) “[T]he thesis is that property rights determine who has control over assets; contract law enables market participants to exchange those assets in complicated transactions; and the courts enable market actors to plan by resolving disputes predictably, efficiently, and in accordance with the legal rules.”\(^12\) China has repeatedly been singled out as posing a particular challenge to the rights hypothesis because of its astounding growth despite what is

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widely regarded as a weak legal system.\textsuperscript{13} Academics have countered this position by exploring the role of informal institutions and questioning the significance of property rights in China’s development.\textsuperscript{14} Yet throughout these debates, the role of criminal law has been almost totally ignored. This is a mistake, and, at a time when many are rethinking the role of law in economic development, it is worth broadening the discussion to include criminal law.

The law and development literature’s focus on empowering private actors by creating a neutral bureaucracy subject to objective judicial review has shifted the debate away from the most basic function of law: creating order. And creating order starts with the coercive power of the state exercised through criminal law. Not only is criminal law a direct way for the government to deprive people of money, liberty, and life, it is likely cheaper and faster to build than the civil and administrative law systems on which the rights hypothesis relies.\textsuperscript{15} If a country’s civil and administrative law systems are not credible enough to deter activities that are detrimental to economic growth, the government can invoke the heavy hand of criminal law. Furthermore, the politically neutral judiciary envisioned by the rights hypothesis may not be desirable to an authoritarian government.\textsuperscript{16}

To the extent that the conversation is purely about the healthy functioning of a market-driven economy and an overriding concern about protecting property rights against the state, it is understandable that criminal law is pushed to the side. In a market economy, the state largely sets ground rules and then steps back and allows individuals to function with little intervention.\textsuperscript{17} But criminal

\begin{itemize}
  \item 13. See, e.g., Cheryl Xiaoning Long, \textit{Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China?}, \textit{J. L. \\& ECON.} 629, 629 (2010) (China challenges the rights hypothesis of growth “as the country has experienced a record-breaking growth rate with very weak legal institutions”); Franklin Allen, Jun Qian \\& Meijun Qian, \textit{Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China}, 77 \textit{J. FIN. ECON.} 57, 57 (2005) (“China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law, finance, and growth literature: neither its legal nor financial system is well developed by existing standards, yet is has one of the fastest growing economies.”).
  \item 14. See infra Part II.B.
  \item 15. This is not to say that it is easy to build a functioning criminal justice system—many countries with advanced economies still struggle with how to mete out criminal justice in a fair and efficient manner. Nonetheless, this Article posits that it is likely more challenging to construct multiple complex, specialized bureaucracies that can effectively address issues like environmental harms, intellectual property violations, and workplace safety standards.
  \item 17. There is, of course, no pure market-driven economy where the state merely sets ground rules and then fully extracts itself. A certain amount of state intervention inevitably occurs, though the neoliberal view seeks to heavily constrain that intervention. See David M. Trubek, \textit{The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The
law is not the province of private actors; the state is an indispensable party.\textsuperscript{18} Overlooking criminal law because it operates outside of the market structure creates a blind spot to how this critical area of law intersects with economic growth. This is not to say that a strong system of contract\textsuperscript{19} and property rights that is enforceable through the civil and administrative court systems is unimportant. The choice between civil and administrative law on the one hand and criminal law on the other is not either-or. When the legal system for resolving disputes between private parties is weak, criminal law can act as an alternative mechanism, albeit incomplete and imperfect, to foster development. As argued herein, that is certainly the case with China.\textsuperscript{20}

China is an instructive test case for broadening the law and development debate to include criminal law for three reasons. First, law in China has generally been understood to foster development,
not to constrain the state.\textsuperscript{21} Most literature on China, however, discusses this development-enhancing view of law in the context of civil and commercial law.\textsuperscript{22} Other than passing references to the need for stability after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, scholars have not linked criminal law to broader questions of law and development.\textsuperscript{23} Second, when economic reforms took off in the late 1970s, China had been without formal criminal law for three decades.\textsuperscript{24} China's economic development has occurred directly alongside the development of its criminal law. Third, China has long been viewed as a test case for the rights hypothesis.\textsuperscript{25} Once the discourse is broadened to consider criminal law, previously overlooked ways in which law interacts with development become apparent.

As an initial clarification, this Article uses an expansive view of "criminal law" to include both blackletter laws and deviations from the formal criminal justice system that are nonetheless important ways in which the state exercises its coercive power—for example, Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) disciplinary procedures, administrative detention, and extralegal measures.\textsuperscript{26} Since the late 1970s, constructing a legal system has been a priority for the PRC government.\textsuperscript{27} Changes to blackletter criminal laws over the past three decades, which occurred in tandem with development of laws more overtly geared toward creating a legal framework for market activity, reflect the leadership's desire to put criminal laws on the books that serve economic ends.\textsuperscript{28} While proposing this top-down, instrumentalist\textsuperscript{29} story of the role of blackletter laws in China's

\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Clarke, Murrell & Whiting, supra note 11, at 377 ("Economic reform in China was marked from the beginning by a recognition that law had a new and important role to play.").

\textsuperscript{22} See infra notes 82–85 with citations to recent works on China and law and development.

\textsuperscript{23} See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{24} See infra note 137 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{25} See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{26} See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Legal Systems in China, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE CRIMINOLOGY 51, 59–61 (Liqun Cao, Ivan Y. Sun & Bill Hebenton eds., 2013) (discussing deviations from the formal criminal justice system).


\textsuperscript{28} See Hualing Fu, Autonomy, Courts, and the Politico-Legal Order in Contemporary China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 76, 84 ("After China initiated market reform in the 1990s, the rule of law was revived to serve primarily the economic function."); see also infra Part III.

\textsuperscript{29} See BRIAN Z. TAMANAH, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 6 (2006) ("An instrumental view of law means that law—encompassing legal rules, legal institutions, and legal processes—is consciously viewed by people and
stellar economic growth, it is also important to recognize exercises of state power that diverge from the formal criminal justice system. The strength of China's political apparatus comes to the fore when the leadership sees a threat to Party rule that requires immediate and severe intervention, as most dramatically seen in the violent response to the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square. Following the initial crackdown, the leadership turned to criminal law to punish protestors—both as counterrevolutionaries and common criminals—while concurrently using "administrative" sanctions to silence others. This is but one example of how China's formal criminal justice system is inextricably linked with quasi-criminal means of social control. Accordingly, this Article is primarily interested in the PRC leadership's decisions with respect to laws on the books but recognizes that this view is unduly narrow and must be supplemented by analysis of policy decisions to use the coercive power of the state outside of those confines.

Part II provides context with respect to the general law and development debate, including the dearth of analysis regarding the role of criminal law (Part II.A). It next addresses China's role in the law and development literature (Part II.B). This Part also introduces the criminology literature that addresses how China's changing social and economic structures have influenced the nature of crime (Part II.C).

With Part II as a backdrop, Part III takes a retrospective view and analyzes how the PRC leadership has used criminal law in...
service of economic ends, particularly since the late 1970s. In recounting this history, this Article fully recognizes the many challenges of making causal arguments in the law and development field. It is impossible to ascribe a certain percentage of China's economic growth to instrumental use of criminal law. However, this Article posits that the PRC government has at a minimum used criminal law to help create an environment that is conducive to economic growth. This strategy includes both penalizing certain activities (e.g., imposing the death penalty for serious theft) and refraining from targeting other activities (e.g., lax enforcement of environmental standards and intellectual property rights). The primacy of the state in driving economic growth is crucial to understanding China's overall development strategy and the specific role of criminal law in that strategy. Because the activist Chinese state sees itself as taking the lead in driving economic growth, it also sees itself as having a primary role in protecting the economy from the crime-related social fallout of rapid change.

Part IV explores how criminal law will likely play a multifaceted role in the leadership's strategy to sustain growth. The new leadership's rhetoric and actions since rising to power in late 2012 indicate that China will continue to use a distinctly hands-on approach to protecting social order through crime control. This Article argues that what is needed is more thoughtful, targeted use of the state's coercive power, especially in areas where criminal law might effectively fill gaps in the relatively weak civil and administrative law systems. China's long-term economic prospects would be better served if the leadership harnessed criminal law to address activities that weaken the fabric of China's future economic health, such as environmental degradation and financial crimes, instead of as a convenient tool to silence people who expose festering problems. Put simply, the target should be the polluters themselves, not the people drawing attention to the pollution.


34. In other words, the strategy is one of using punishment to deter certain acts and, conversely, not punishing acts that are seen as economically beneficial. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1286–87 (Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (explaining “general deterrence” as “[k]nowledge that punishment will follow crime deters people from committing crimes, thus reducing future violations of right and the unhappiness and insecurity they would cause”). There is much debate, however, over whether deterrence theory works. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818 (2010) (noting that we have “no real knowledge base about the celerity of punishment” but “there does seem to be a modest inverse relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and crime”).

35. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
Part V concludes by raising questions for future study. Looking beyond China, perhaps criminal law has made an underappreciated contribution to other countries' economic development as well. When writing about the early years of America's legal system, Lawrence Friedman noted, "Criminal laws naturally expressed economic policy in societies with a strong sense of authority and few special agencies of economic control." It is past time to broaden the law and development literature to consider more fully how criminal law complements, and even fills gaps in, the civil and administrative law systems that are more commonly associated with fostering economic growth.

II. CRIMINAL LAW, CHINA, AND THE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

Over the past half century, the law and development field has survived a rocky road as initial projects came under heavy scrutiny leading to much handwringing, a reevaluation of goals and assumptions, and efforts to pursue new areas of inquiry. This Part briefly introduces the general law and development literature, including the thin analysis with respect to criminal law (Part II.A). It next addresses China's role in the literature (Part II.B). To date, criminal law has played at most a minor part in the law and development debate. In contrast, economics and crime have been frequently intertwined in the criminology literature that focuses on how China's changing social and economic structures have influenced the nature of crime (Part II.C).

A. Criminal Law and the Law and Development Literature

When the law and development movement first arose in the 1960s, its proponents sought to use law, and particularly laws from Western models, to help countries that were struggling economically. The basic idea was that laws and supporting institutions could be transplanted and, once they had taken root,
development would follow. As the 1970s progressed, enthusiasm waned when the expected gains failed to materialize. In hindsight, scholars who supported the initial wave recognized the lack of a coherent strategy, with David Trubek noting, "Beyond a general belief in the importance of law, the relevance of western models, and the importance of a modern legal culture, it was all ad hoc and pragmatic."

After a period of relative hibernation, law and development reemerged in an altered form. The new wave drew on Max Weber's conceptualization of law's relationship to economic growth. Proponents further looked to Friedrich Hayek's belief in the importance of minimizing government intervention in private economic transactions. The neoliberal pro-entrepreneurial and pro-minimalist-state approach reduced law "to an instrument that facilitated private transactions (for example, by creating incentives for market actors) and limited state intervention." Adherents of this approach touted the values of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization in kick-starting ailing economies. This pro-free-market
approach did not incorporate a discussion of criminal law—an understandable omission considering that criminal sanctions are a direct and severe form of government intervention.

Nobel Prize–winning economic historian Douglass North championed the view that governments need to provide a stable framework of contract and property rights within which economic transactions can flourish, but, beyond creating that structure, governments should not meddle in private economic affairs. North's emphasis on a market-facilitating view of law stressed the need for growth-supporting "institutions," hence the name "new institutional economics" (NIE). The state is seen as having a vital, though limited, role in creating an environment in which institutions can thrive. Of particular concern for adherents of NIE is the role institutions play in protecting property rights.

This turn toward free markets—albeit supported by an infrastructure of institutions that require at least some state involvement—as the answer for sluggish development became known as the Washington Consensus, so named because the idea's main supporters, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are based in the District of Columbia. In the 1990s, development programming increasingly shifted toward an emphasis on how laws could support efficient transactions among private actors, and buzzwords like "good governance" and "rule of law" came to the fore. The focus of development projects turned toward the implementation of a package of legal reforms that supported this end, including "laws on incorporation, securities, antitrust, banking, intellectual property, commercial transactions, protections for foreign investors, as well as property rights and contract enforcement."

47. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (seeking to explain the vastly different performances of economies over long periods of time).


49. See Tamanaha, supra note 40, at 226–27 (noting the NIE view that "development of legal institutions, particularly the protection of property, is an essential concomitant of economic development").

50. See Spalding, supra note 46, at 362 ("This paradigm also came to dominate the agendas of the two leading global financial institutions, both of which were headquartered in Washington, D.C.: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),").

51. Thomas, supra note 33, at 968–69; see also THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 168–70 (1999) (critiquing foreign rule-of-law assistance in which aid is directed toward groups "that use law to pursue social and economic goals").

52. Tamanaha, supra note 40, at 225.
Like the disenchantment over the first wave of law and development, the Washington Consensus's approach has come under fire. Critics have questioned whether this approach indeed fosters growth. And, even if there are macroeconomic gains, distributional concerns remain. Most famously, Amartya Sen criticized a narrow focus on macroeconomic growth and instead championed a broad view of development "as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy." He incorporated a social vision into the rubric of law and development and broadened the discussion to include wealth distribution and protection of human rights. Today, the landscape is increasingly textured; people speak in terms of a post-Washington Consensus approach and the emergence of a "Third Moment" in law and development theory.

Throughout the various twists and turns in the debate, the role of criminal law has been ignored or, at most, addressed only in passing. Scholars have noted the property-protecting function of

53. See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 223, 252 (2011) ("This formula for state disempowerment in economic affairs has been undermined by perceptions that it has not served to raise all boats as anticipated.").

54. See Krever, supra note 39, at 299 ("Dissent [from the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus] stemmed in the first place from the apparent failure of neoliberal policies to achieve promised growth.").

55. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, An Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 37, at 1, 11 (noting incorporation into "the new development theory mainstream" of social concerns like direct poverty alleviation).

56. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999).

57. See id. (noting that there are several determinants of development as freedom, including "social and economic arrangements . . . as well as political and civil rights"). The broad Senian conceptualization of development as increasing "freedom" no doubt involves issues of criminal law (the most direct and severe route by which a state can restrict people's freedom), but this Article is primarily concerned with economic growth. The omission of a broader view of development is not meant to deny its importance but rather to address directly the substantial body of economic development literature. Moreover, focusing on economic indicators is appropriate given that the inquiry is aimed at the PRC government's intentions with respect to using criminal law to support its stated goal of economic growth. See Hongming Cheng & David O. Friedrichs, White-Collar and Corporate Crime in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 238, 246 ("Economic goals are assigned high priority in comparison to non-economic or social goals.").


60. See generally Trubek & Santos, supra note 55, at 1–18.

61. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 397, 464 (2008) ("A functional police force is another institution that plays a critical role in enforcing and realizing the benefits of strong property rights."). For another view on
criminal law.\textsuperscript{62} Other scholars have acknowledged the need for state force when interactions between private individuals fail to secure property rights.\textsuperscript{63} And still others have pointed out that "[a]n effective criminal justice system is also conducive to economic growth because high crime rates tend to deter investment and deplete both human capital and governmental capacity."\textsuperscript{64} In general, however, criminal law is at most lurking in the background. The decades-old law and development conversation has also paid limited attention to China.\textsuperscript{65}

As discussed below, an early avoidance of China was understandable for historical reasons. More recently, scholars have begun to question how, if at all, China fits the standard law-and-development narrative. The next Part surveys efforts to use law and development theory to explain China's development path.

B. China and the Law and Development Literature

Explaining China's economic success has posed a challenge since the inception of the law and development movement. China was closed to foreign aid and almost all foreign contact during the first wave of law and development. Accordingly, there was little engagement with China and little attempt to explain how China might fit the thesis that transplanting foreign (primarily Western) legal norms was a development-enhancing endeavor.

By the time that the law and development movement had shifted to a focus on a market-based economy, China too had transformed. When Deng Xiaoping took the helm in the late 1970s, China quickly embarked on a path of welcoming foreign investment and embracing the role of crime in development, see Clarke, \textit{supra} note 19, at 91 n.14 (noting that criminal gangs cannot be viewed as an informal rights-enforcing mechanism because they enforce demands, not legal rights).

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{See} Tamanaha, \textit{supra} note 40, at 226–27 ("Criminal law maintains social order, provides security, and saves people from expending resources to protect themselves or their property."); Richard A. Posner, \textit{Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development}, 13 \textit{WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER}, Feb. 1998, at 1, 9 ("In such countries [facing rampant acquisitive crime] a strict criminal law and a corresponding de-emphasis on the protection of civil liberties may be an important part of legal reform and an important tool for the protection of property and contract rights.").

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{See} Ronald J. Daniels \& Michael Trebilcock, \textit{The Political Economy of Rule of Law Reform in Developing Countries}, 26 \textit{MICH. J. INT'L L.} 99, 118 (2004) ("[P]rivate law ultimately depends on public enforcement of its norms through the application of force or coercion, if necessary, by agencies of the State."); Clarke, \textit{supra} note 19, at 89 ("An important school of thought in institutional economics holds that economic growth requires a legal order offering stable and predictable rights of property and contract because the absence of such rights discourages investment and specialization.").

\textsuperscript{64} Kevin E. Davis \& Michael J. Trebilcock, \textit{Legal Reforms and Development}, 22 \textit{THIRD WORLD Q.} 21, 23 (2001).

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{See} Upham, \textit{supra} note 10, at 577 ("Although the general law and development literature may not pay a lot of attention to Chinese law, those writing about Chinese law have paid attention to law and development.").
a more vibrant, albeit limited, role for the private sector. Deng further ushered in a wave of new laws that gave structure to foreign direct investment and began to clarify relationships between private entities. Yet China stopped far short of giving free rein to market forces and instead maintained a strong government hand over the economy. Furthermore, unlike other law and development projects largely driven by foreign actors, “Chinese leaders themselves decided that they wanted to revise their institutions.” When the Washington Consensus emerged in the late 1980s, China had only a fledgling private sector and remained a developing economy that was dominated by gigantic state-owned enterprises. Even for the limited segment of China’s economy that was open to private activity, the legal system failed to provide reliable protection of property and contract rights. China had an increasing number of formal laws addressing economic matters on the books, but these nascent laws appeared to create little in the way of constraints on the behavior of private parties or the government. Despite this blatant divergence from the rights hypothesis, China’s economy flourished.

More than three decades after Deng’s initial surge of economic reforms and the concomitant changes to the legal system, the PRC government has not released its tight grip on economic activities. It


68. See Naughton, supra note 66, at 95 (“Reorientation was marked by direct government intervention in many aspects of the economy. . . . There was never a period of hands-off policymaking in the Chinese reform.”).


70. See Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth 298 (2007) (“A variety of ownership forms began to develop in Chinese industry during the 1980s, and only gradually was the diverse ownership structure that we see today created. Thus, while the scale of change has been enormous, there has also been continuity, most strikingly in the continued role of [state-owned enterprises].” (internal citation omitted)).

71. Cf. Upham, supra note 10, at 577 (“Even after the government started promulgating law-like rules and regulations in the 1980s, legal entitlements to important economic assets remained sketchy at best.”).

72. Cf. Clarke, Murrell & Whiting, supra note 11, at 403 (“In sum, our tentative conclusion is that passably secure property rights might have provided a basis for China’s economic growth during the first two decades of reform, but the legal system probably had little to do with the creation and enforcement of these rights.”).

73. See world bank, supra note 8, at 5 tbl. 1 (charting China’s increase in GDP from 1960 to 2010).

74. See, e.g., id. at 26 (“Reforms in the enterprise sector must begin with the recognition that government ownership is widespread and varied, covering most sectors and ranging from outright ownership to controlling interest to minority shareholder.”).
is not surprising that China's at least nominally communist government has not fully embraced free-market mechanisms. Rather than following the Washington Consensus, some scholars have argued that China has created its own consensus that focuses on economic development as guided by the government's heavy hand: "The China Model, or Beijing Consensus, features an all-powerful political leadership that effectively manages social and economic affairs." 75

When scholars have addressed China's impressive growth, they have often noted the puzzle 76 of squaring China's experience with the beliefs of the Washington Consensus. 77 China has been heralded as a challenge and important counterexample to the rights hypothesis. 78 Others have noted that China achieved its impressive economic growth "without a legal system worthy of the name." 79 While acknowledging that China has very noticeably deviated from the standard law and development narrative, this Article does not want to suggest that China is a lone outlier. Each country's story of development is unique and none has strictly adhered to the Washington Consensus's blueprint of free market ideology. 80

75. Kenneth Lieberthal & Jisi Wang, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust 10 (John L. Thornton China Ctr. Monograph Series no. 4, Mar. 2012); see also Teemu Ruskola, Where is Asia? When is Asia? Theorizing Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 879, 888-89 (2011) ("Much like Asian Values, the Beijing Consensus prescribes economic development without democracy, offering China as a global model.").

76. See, e.g., Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 58, at 934 ("[T]he most radical interpretations of China's recent astounding rates of economic development, despite weak ratings on most conventional criteria for quality of laws and legal institutions (the so-called 'China Enigma'), suggest that formal laws and legal institutions are not central determinants of a country's economic development.").

77. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 19 (2002) (commenting that economists, political scientists, and legal scholars are left "to puzzle over the success of China's economy despite market and legal imperfections"); see also YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE, at xiii (2008) ("Much of the economic research on the Chinese reforms revolves around the following question: Given the manifest inefficiencies in the Chinese economy, how do we explain its growth?"); Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 61, at 427 ("China is an important case study in the examination of the relationship between protection of property rights and economic development, given that it has achieved dramatic rates of economic growth despite weak formal property rights protection.").

78. See generally Demsetz, supra note 12 (articulating the rights hypothesis).


Compared to the development of other countries, China's experience has just been more obviously at odds with the prescription of the Washington Consensus, and this divergence is all the more apparent because of the great attention paid to China's meteoric economic rise in recent decades.

A number of scholars have flagged China's development path as at least inconsistent with the rights hypothesis, but, until recently, few have delved into substantive analysis.81 A small group of scholars has started to take an in-depth look at China’s relationship to the broader law and development field. For example, scholars have analyzed how changes to China's formal property law regime interact with the rights hypothesis.82 Others have questioned whether China's economic success can be explained by a reliance on interpersonal norms outside of the formal legal system.83 This approach leaves open the possibility that the legal system will eventually take on a more important role, and, at that time, China's experience might start to align with the rights hypothesis. Still others have proposed that China has flipped the rights hypothesis on its head and questioned whether China's economic growth might have spurred legal developments instead of the other way around.84 There continues to be a dearth of empirical analysis to back up the various claims, in significant part due to the substantial challenges that conducting research about China poses.85 There is considerable skepticism regarding the accuracy of available macroeconomic figures, and it is that a principal failing of such programs has been their tendency to treat situations fraught with complex political and normative considerations as amenable to relatively formulaic solutions . . . .

81. See Upham, supra note 79, at 13 (“No one would claim that China has had the legal institutions envisioned by the World Bank during most of this period, and yet, except for a series of conferences by the Asian Development Bank, there has been little interest in finding out how this has been done or whether it can be replicated elsewhere.”).

82. See generally Upham, supra note 10, at 556 (arguing that “China does not need property law to create wealth, but to manage it and to provide some measure of justice in the face of the social dislocation that inevitably accompanies rapid economic growth”).


84. See Clarke, Murrell & Whiting, supra note 11, at 420 (“If anything, economic success has fostered the development of law, rather than the reverse.”).

85. A notable exception is Professor Xin He who undertook an empirical study of the economic performance of two basic-level courts. Xin He, A Tale of Two Chinese Courts: Economic Development and Contract Enforcement, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 384, 384–409 (2012). Professor He suggests that both economic and non-economic factors are responsible for improvements in formal contract enforcement. Id. at 405.
unclear how to determine empirically whether law influences those figures.86

Policymakers at international organizations have likewise failed to grapple with the role of criminal law in China’s economic development. In 2013, the World Bank and the PRC’s Development Research Center of the State Council released a joint report that sought to develop “a strategic framework for reforms that could assist China’s policy making as well as guide future China–World Bank relations.”87 That report mentions criminal law only once in passing, in the midst of a section praising China’s progress in protecting intellectual property rights.88 The report, which is nearly four hundred pages long, addresses neither the contribution of criminal law to China’s economic growth to date nor the role that it might play in creating “a new development strategy for 2030.”89 The report instead focuses on the standard prescriptions of the rights hypothesis: “As the government transitions away from direct intervention in enterprise and market activities and toward creating a policy and regulatory environment supportive of free and fair competition, it must also safeguard the rule of law.”90 Admittedly, criminal law has not been within the standard purview of the World Bank’s work, and no organization can do everything.91 While acknowledging these limitations, the unduly narrow rights hypothesis has had too strong a hold on the law and development narrative. Recent indications are that the World Bank is recognizing the need to expand the discussion and is starting to explore what role criminal law might play in its work.92

The literature on China’s relationship to the law and development field has not reached a uniform conclusion regarding whether China merely deviates from the general assumptions or fundamentally undermines their basic underpinnings.93 Nor can one

87. WORLD BANK, supra note 8, at xiii.
88. Id. at 177–78 (“Not only did China launch reforms in 2008 to support the creation, utilization, management, and protection of intellectual property, but it may be the only country to have criminalized violations of intellectual property rights.”).
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 20; see also id. (“Where contract disputes arise, whether between private parties or between private entities and the State, the disputants should have access not only to legal recourse but also to a transparent and effective judicial system that imparts justice without fear or favor.”).
91. WORLD BANK, LEGAL NOTE ON BANK INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR 1 (Feb. 9, 2012) (“[W]hile the Bank has been engaged in justice reform for over twenty years, the Bank has only more recently become involved in the criminal justice sector as a logical continuation of its overall justice reform work.”).
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
expect the causal interplay between development and law to be crystal clear because there remain too many variables and complex interactions. The experience of China’s booming economic growth is not an easily observed and analyzed interaction in a controlled Petri dish. These limitations, however, do not explain the failure even to question what role the PRC government’s choices with respect to criminal law may have played in the story of China’s economic growth.

C. Literature on China’s Economic Growth and Crime

Compared to the relatively thin literature addressing how China’s experience diverges from the standard law and development narrative, there is a selection of work analyzing how crime changes with economic development both across countries and specifically in China. 94 China’s economic boom brought both legal and illegal entrepreneurial activity, and China has continuously revised its criminal law to adapt to these changing circumstances.95 There was little need for an anti-money-laundering law in Mao-era China when the government tightly constrained the circulation of money and used rationing to distribute consumer goods.96 And, especially during the height of the People’s Communes—large rural organizations that managed practically all economic and social activities—acquisitive crime was not a major concern when there was little to steal and

94. See, e.g., Shanhe Jiang, Social and Crime Control with Chinese Characteristics, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 27 ("Since economic reform commenced in 1978, China’s gross domestic product has increased by an average of more than 9 percent annually. At the same time, China’s crime rate has had a striking increase." (internal citation omitted)); Richard R. Bennett, Development and Crime: A Cross-National, Time-Series Analysis of Competing Models, 32 THE SOC. Q., Autumn 1991, at 343 (evaluating “competing explanatory models by analyzing the effects of level of development and rate of growth on crime rates”); Paolo Buonanno, The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime: A Review of the Literature (Working Paper, Series 2003) (discussing theoretical and empirical papers regarding the economics of crime); Jianhong Liu, Crime Patterns During the Market Transition on China, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 613, 626 (2005) (positing that crime data “shows that economically motivated crimes have generally increased faster than less or non-economically motivated crimes”).

95. See Susyan Jou, Bill Hebenton & Liqun Cao, The Development of Criminology in Modern China: A State-Based Enterprise, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 16 ("Rising crime rates, however, have also been one of the accompaniments in China’s march to market liberalization and economic prosperity."); DUTTON, supra note 31, at 257–58 (graphically noting a low crime rate in 1967–68 of 21 per 100,000 people as compared with 294 per 100,000 people in 2000).

collective living arrangements made it difficult to squirrel away stolen property for future use. The situation is strikingly different today. For instance, opportunities for theft tied to complex financial transactions have blossomed, with the PRC government seeking the return of Chinese nationals who allegedly absconded to the United States after defrauding the Bank of China of approximately $485 million. As Professor Susan Trevaskes explained:

Chinese authorities have been all too aware of the social impact of this exponential growth in the incidence of particular types of serious crime that is a corollary of China’s post-Mao economic transition towards the market. The timing and nature of the emergence of this serious crime phenomenon indicate that, in China as elsewhere, serious crime is both enabled by and linked inextricably with national economic growth and rapid social change.

While this Article’s focus is on how the PRC government’s choices with respect to criminal law can at least in part be explained by a desire to fuel economic growth, it recognizes that reality is more complicated. It is insufficient to merely say that criminal laws can curb activities that are detrimental to a country’s economic success and can encourage a more stable atmosphere for growth. As the economy grows, further changes to the criminal law are needed. Indeed, as China’s economy has grown, so have the opportunities for new and more expansive criminal activity, which has combined with the challenges of social upheavals accompanying rapid growth. For example, China has toughened its approach to drunk driving in recent years. By definition, the offense of “driving while intoxicated” requires both vehicles (usually cars) and intoxicants (usually alcohol). Only when an economy reaches a level where both

97. Cf. Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 61, at 427 (citing the effective abolishment of private property in rural land by 1956).
100. See, e.g., Yue Ma, The Police System in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 64, 67 (“The implementation of the policy of economic modernization brought about rapid economic development. This economic development in turn brought about changes in socioeconomic conditions and an unprecedented rise in crime.”).
cars and alcohol are readily available does drunk driving become a widespread concern.  

In other words, criminal law is neither wholly reactive nor proactive: the PRC government has continuously adapted criminal law to address emerging issues by both reacting to unforeseen problems and anticipating problems on the horizon. This ongoing dynamic between economic development and criminal law is a universal issue, and there remains much debate regarding how economic development generates new types of crime and more crime overall.

China presents a special challenge to criminologists' efforts to explain crime rates because of its lack of transparency with respect to how statistics are compiled, combined with concerns of underreporting. Although underreporting of crimes is not unique to China, the problem is estimated to be particularly acute in China because of the incentive system under which police operate. The fact that what might be considered a "crime" in other countries is classified as an administrative penalty under China's Security Administration Punishment Law or one of China's other quasi-criminal law schemes further complicates efforts to quantify crime rates. In addition, while it is a truism that China is a large and complex country, this reality greatly hinders the compilation of accurate data from the numerous local public security offices on up. Scholars have further raised concerns that official statistics

102. Cf. JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at xiv (1989) ("For those who are not alcohol abstainers, active participation in American social life practically ensures a high probability of at least occasional driving after drinking."").

103. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke & James V. Feinerman, Antagonistic Contradictions: Criminal Law and Human Rights in China, 141 CHINA Q. 135, 135 (1995) ("Newer and more sophisticated studies found the roots of crime in features of contemporary Chinese society such as rising expectations and dissatisfaction with poverty, the transitional structures of economic reform such as the dual price system, and the overcentralization of power and the inadequacy of supervisory institutions.").

104. See Phil He, The Politics of Numbers: Crime Statistics in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 147, 152 ("[V]ery few published technical notes are available on how the Chinese crime statistics are recorded, compiled, and validated.").

105. See generally Olivia Yu & Lening Zhang, The Under-Recording of Crime by Police in China: A Case Study, 22 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 252, 253 (1999) ("[W]e suggest that the observed problem of crime statistics is a result of police responding to the social and organizational pressures they encounter in a fast changing period of China's history.").

106. Id. at 255 (discussing low reporting rates by PRC police).

107. See generally BIDDULPH, supra note 32.

regarding criminal justice in China might well say more about what the government wants to convey than what is actually occurring.  

With this recognition of the complex bidirectional interplay between economic growth and crime as a backdrop, the next Part examines how criminal law is a part of China's law and development experience. It looks retrospectively to explain how the PRC leadership has used criminal law in service of economic ends, particularly since the late 1970s.

III. THE HISTORICAL VIEW

Since the reform era began, the PRC government has used criminal law toward economic ends. This is not to say that the sole driving force behind criminal law reforms over the past three decades has been to create an environment that is conducive to economic growth. Development goals, however, are part of China's criminal law story. What is lacking in the law and development literature—and a gap that this Article seeks to fill—is a detailed discussion of the relationship between criminal law and China's economic growth strategy. Beijing has used law to fuel its economy, but not necessarily as the Washington Consensus encourages.

In simple terms, criminal law has helped to provide structure to society or, as termed herein, layers of stability that are a crucial foundation for a vibrant economy. This Article proceeds from the hopefully uncontroversial premise that chaos is not conducive to a healthy economy. Kinship ties or other non-state-sponsored institutions can help create a stable base for economic transactions, but the strength of these bonds becomes strained as

109. See, e.g., Daniel J. Curran, Criminological Research in China: Challenges, Rewards, and the Need for Sensitivity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 160, 166 ("It is fair to say that crime statistics are often filtered through an official lens for public consumption.").

110. See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 288 (2008) (Economic development has since 1978 remained a top priority for the post-Mao leadership. Crimes against such development are thus treated seriously and punished heavily; see also supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text (defining use of "criminal law").


transactions increasingly occur between people who do not share close familial or geographic bonds. At this point, the state can step in and impose order, possibly through policy edicts with no basis in formal law passed by the legislature. Alternatively, the state can grant property and contract "rights," meaning not just general assurances of stability in economic assets but stability because those "rights" are backed up by courts or other vehicles of legal enforcement. Of course, too much order—in the form of a totalitarian state along the lines of North Korea—can inhibit growth by squelching nearly all economic activity. The PRC government's challenge has been to find the growth-enhancing sweet spot on the continuum between a societal free-for-all and an overwhelmingly repressive state.

This Part explains how, since the reform era began, the PRC government has used criminal law to establish a fundamental sense of security in people's lives, strengthen people's ability to obtain and maintain property, and, more generally, nurture an increasingly complex economy. It addresses three layers of stability and argues that China has used criminal law to enhance each type: basic (Part III.A), property (Part III.B), and market (Part III.C). All three of these layers are reflected in the purposes stated in Article 2 of the PRC Criminal Law, which makes apparent the Law's assumed role as a mechanism for protecting both the political power of the state and state-driven economic development. The stated purposes include defending the security of the socialist system (basic stability); protecting property owned by the state, collectively owned by the working people, and privately owned by citizens (property stability);
and maintaining public order and economic order, and safeguarding the smooth progress of socialist construction (market stability).\textsuperscript{117}

The focus here is on China's central government and its top-down approach to criminal law. Though implementation may differ on the local level, the formal criminal laws emanate from Beijing.\textsuperscript{118} The central leadership has allowed limited local experimentation but has both retained formal lawmaking power and directed macro-policy decisions.\textsuperscript{119} Moreover, this Article adopts an instrumentalist view.\textsuperscript{120} The primacy of a strong central government and the lack of separation of power leaves little, if any, doubt that legislation reflects the central leadership's priorities. This view of a strong governmental hand in using criminal law for economic gains comports with the conventional account of China in the reform period as pursuing legal reforms in service of economic ends while still holding tightly to societal reins and successfully maintaining a single-party state.\textsuperscript{121}

**A. Basic Stability**

The PRC government first used criminal law to create a fundamental sense of security upon which economic activity can grow. This "basic stability" is necessary for society to function in an orderly manner and not in some variant of a Hobbesian state of nature.\textsuperscript{122} In other words, this Article refers to basic stability as a core sense of security that enables people to not need to sleep with one eye open. The law and development literature has recognized the need for a minimal level of social order for economic growth,\textsuperscript{123} and this need is universal. What distinguished China in the late 1970s when economic reforms took off was the pressing need for order after decades of turmoil, including a protracted conflict with Japan prior to and during World War II, a civil war, and further domestic upheavals after the founding of the PRC, culminating in the tumultuous years of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} PRC Criminal Law, supra note 115, at art. 2 (2011 version).
\item \textsuperscript{118} See CHEN, supra note 110, at 262–66 (charting promulgation of the Criminal Law by the NPC in 1979 and subsequent revisions).
\item \textsuperscript{119} The primacy of planning by the central leadership has been recently underscored by the push for "top-level design" that emphasizes macromanaging in hopes that "China would seek to overcome the 'fragmented authoritarianism' that characterized policymaking since reforms began in favor of a more centralized developmental state." Bruce Gilley, Policy Reform Measures Highlight Potential for Transformation, CHINA BRIEF, Mar. 28, 2013, at 5.
\item \textsuperscript{120} See supra note 29.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Cf. Peerenboom & Bugaric, supra note 59, at 5–8 (China and the East Asian Model).
\item \textsuperscript{122} See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 174–203 (The Floating Press 2009) (1651).
\item \textsuperscript{123} See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 3–4 (1973) (citing suppression of piracy as example of property protection that helped the rise of the West).
\end{itemize}
the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{124} At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the government-run \textit{People's Daily} went so far as to publish an editorial "In Praise of Lawlessness" that celebrated the chaos into which society had fallen.\textsuperscript{125}

Consequently, when Deng took the helm, the leadership was not merely in the position of attempting to replace informal kinship ties with state-provided mechanisms for creating stability, such as policy edicts or laws backed up by credible enforcement. Instead, it needed to chart a path out of the havoc of the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{126} Deng himself frequently emphasized the need for stability at all costs, as vividly captured in his 1989 phrase, "stability above everything."\textsuperscript{127} To the extent there were structures for social order during the Cultural Revolution that at least kept trains running and electricity flowing,\textsuperscript{128} they "would begin to crumble because they had been built upon the political activism of local, Maoist-inspired mass-line organs and been kept in place by a tight system of demographic policing organized around the household register."\textsuperscript{129}

A brief historical synopsis is helpful to understanding the disarray prior to the reform period of the late 1970s. After Mao Zedong established the PRC in 1949, the new communist government worked to bring order to a vast country that had been wracked by decades of war and internal strife.\textsuperscript{130} This control was without basis in formal laws passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) but...
rather was based on Party directives and other informal assertions of the communists' control. The new government rejected the laws put in place by the Republic of China government—laws that were carried by Chiang Kai-shek and his ruling Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang) to Taiwan—but failed to supplant them with new laws. Until Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, China operated largely in a legal vacuum, often with ruthless consequences. As documented by historian Frank Dikotter in his book on the period from 1945 to 1957, "[T]he Chinese Communist Party refers to its victory in 1949 as a 'liberation'. . . . [I]n China the story of liberation and the revolution that followed is not one of peace, liberty and justice. It is first and foremost a history of calculated terror and systematic violence."

Although there were glimmers of rhetoric that focused on the need to foster economic growth, the Mao years placed ideology above pragmatic concerns about development. During the early years of the PRC, the government waged campaigns against the "three evils" (corruption, waste, and bureaucratism) and "five poisons" (bribery, tax evasion, stealing state property or obtaining it by fraud, cheating in workmanship and materials, and stealing state economic intelligence). The new government lauded the economic and thought-reform benefits of these campaigns. Early attempts to use the coercive force of the state—even if not formal law—to right China's economic ship were jettisoned in favor of grandiose ideological campaigns. For instance, the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and concomitant famine not only failed to be growth supporting but was actually growth destroying, resulting in the deaths of an estimated tens of millions of people.

For decades the PRC operated without a formal criminal law, criminal procedure law, or laws directed at economic activities. Instead, the leadership put in place a patchwork of regulations, such as the 1951 Regulations on the Punishment of Counter-

131. See CHEN, supra note 110, at 261 ("[I]t took some 29 years for the communist authorities to finally produce a comprehensive criminal code.").
134. COHEN, supra note 130, at 312–13.
135. See id. at 314 (noting government praise for the programs because they improved the country's economic situation).
137. See CHEN, supra note 110, at 261, 300 (describing the enactment of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law); see also Clarke, Murrell, & Whiting, supra note 11, at 381–87 (charting the development of Chinese economic laws from 1978 to 2004).
Revolutionaries, combined with various Party rules and directives.\textsuperscript{138} Mao went so far as to openly discourage efforts for a more systematic legal system: people who had the audacity to suggest legal reforms were among the many targets of the Anti-Rightest Movement in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{139} Early efforts to establish even basic stability deteriorated as China entered the traumatic years of the Great Leap Forward.\textsuperscript{140} Not long thereafter, any attempts to build a legal system that supported a stable environment were obliterated during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The primacy of fickle ideological battles over reliable laws is illustrated by the Mao-era approach to combating corruption:

\begin{quote}
[P]rior to 1979, China did not have a formal criminal code that defined corruption and differentiated it from other offenses. During the Cultural Revolution period, the definition of corruption was only ad hoc and tended to involve political criteria linked to the intense factional and class struggles of the times.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

Mao himself commented, "[T]he Civil Law, the Criminal Law, who remembers those texts? I participated in the drafting of the Constitution, but even I don't remember it."\textsuperscript{142}

When Deng reemerged on the scene in the late 1970s, China's economy was in shambles and the populace was exhausted after years of constant upheavals, culminating in the "disastrous Cultural Revolution".\textsuperscript{143}

Due to the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, by the end of the 1970s, China's economy was on the verge of utter disaster. In 1978, China was considered one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita [GDP] of only [Renminbi (RMB)] 379. The legal system was a complete wreck. In 1978, the Standing Committee sorted out all the previously promulgated legislation and discovered that out of 134 laws

\begin{footnotes}
\item[138.] See Kuisong Yang, \textit{Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries}, 193 \textit{China Q.} 102, 105–106 (2008) (discussing the implementation of the campaign); see also Mühlhahn, \textit{supra} note 125, at 179 (noting that in the early years of the PRC, "some of the most frequent crimes, including theft, robbery, and rape, were not covered by any laws made public during this period of time").

\item[139.] See Cohen, \textit{supra} note 130, at 14 (describing the targets of the anti-rightest movement); see also Pantsov, \textit{supra} note 125, at 407 ("During the next two years [1955–57] more than eighty thousand 'counterrevolutionaries' were subject to repression. . . . More than four thousand people committed suicide. The ideological campaign among intellectuals also accelerated.").

\item[140.] See generally Yang, \textit{supra} note 136 (analyzing the events that lead to the 1958–1962 famine and the consequences thereof); see also Naughton, \textit{supra} note 70, at 72 ("It was the largest famine of the twentieth century, anywhere in the world.").

\item[141.] Andrew Weideman, \textit{Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China} 86 (2012).


\item[143.] Ezra F. Vogel, \textit{Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China} 53 (2011).
\end{footnotes}
and regulations, 111 were already ineffective; only twenty-three were still in effect.\textsuperscript{144}

Deng summarily rejected Mao’s path and used the state’s power to create order instead of revolution: “Deng’s vision was that economic prosperity would stabilize society and preserve the state’s power. Economic growth, then, became the political purpose of business.”\textsuperscript{145}

A first order of business was to restore a sense of stability that was lacking during the years of revolutionary fervor. Deng looked to law as one means of doing so.\textsuperscript{146} Prominent academic and public intellectual, He Weifang, explained the post-1979 period of legal-system construction as “inextricably linked to the bitterness of lawlessness” that national leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen experienced during the ‘Cultural Revolution.’\textsuperscript{147}

Under Deng’s leadership, the NPC quickly enacted a new criminal law and criminal procedure law, and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and her cohorts, who were responsible for some of the most vicious attacks during the Cultural Revolution, were brought to trial.\textsuperscript{148} This largely ceremonial “Gang of Four” trial (guilty verdicts were never in doubt) received extensive media coverage.\textsuperscript{149} Seeing a court lock away people who were accused of destroying thousands of lives finally allowed the Chinese people to see an end to widespread chaos and to believe that the government was restoring a sense of fundamental security to their lives.\textsuperscript{150} The members of the Gang of Four were convicted with sentences ranging from 20 years in prison to death, which was later commuted to a lengthy prison sentence.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{144} Dai, supra note 6, at 158.

\textsuperscript{145} Spalding, supra note 46, at 389.

\textsuperscript{146} Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee (Dec. 22, 1978), available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-10/10/content_156226.htm [http://perma.cc/97LW-JV7G] (archived Jan. 19, 2014). (’’[T]here must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict and law breakers must be dealt with.’’).


\textsuperscript{148} See CHEN, supra note 110, at 262–63 (describing the enactment of the 1979 Criminal Law); id. at 300–02 (describing the enactment of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law); Dai, supra note 6, at 165 (noting that Jiang Qing’s trial “attracted worldwide attention”); VOGEL, supra note 143, at 175–83 (recounting the arrest and trial of the Gang of Four).


\textsuperscript{150} See id. (explaining that the trial “allowed the Chinese to demonstrate that the lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution was over and that a period of law and order based on specific legislation was now beginning”).

\textsuperscript{151} See China: Member of China’s Notorious Gang of Four Dies (Zhang Chunqiao), FIN. TIMES (May 10, 2013, 12:33 AM), http://www.freerepublic.com/
Beyond using criminal law to instill confidence in the ability of the new leadership to protect people from the worst excesses of government officials, the emphasis on combating crime served a more general goal of creating a stable base for economic growth. A heavy emphasis on cracking down on crime "promoted social stability as the means for ensuring economic success in this crucial era of unprecedented economic growth."\(^{152}\) In part, the government relied on means that were at most thinly cloaked as formal "law." For instance, the use of "strike hard" campaigns against various types of crime beginning in the early 1980s is well documented by Professor Trevaskes.\(^{153}\) She recounts how the leadership struggled to respond to the increasing opportunities for crime during the early days of dramatic economic growth.\(^{154}\) As the leadership adapted to the new reality, "[c]last as a means to help achieve Reform, campaigns employed the flagrant regulatory potency of 'severe and swift punishment' to help secure the social stability on which China's burgeoning market economy depended. Social stability was elevated as a primary precondition to economic prosperity."\(^{155}\) While this campaign approach stretched the bounds of the legal system and sometimes flagrantly flouted the formal law, the government nonetheless maintained a commitment to using the legal system as a primary component of its strategy for establishing basic security.\(^{156}\) "A significant expectation was placed on police, prosecutors and judges who were to play a key role in guaranteeing a successful transition to economic modernization by ensuring a zero tolerance towards criminal deviance."\(^{157}\)

The Deng government could have continued the Mao-era practice of exclusively relying on campaigns based on Party policy, but it did not choose this path. Instead, blackletter criminal laws—as enforced

\(^{152}\) TREVASKES, supra note 99, at 7.

\(^{153}\) See generally id. at 3 ("Th[e] rollercoaster ride of successive campaigns against serious crime served to entrench an ethos of harsh punishment in the Chinese context. 'Strike Hard' is a term that encapsulates this punitive approach.").

\(^{154}\) Id. at 7.

\(^{155}\) Id. at 9; see also id. at 25–26 ("The targets of the 1983 [strike hard] campaign were individuals and groups who endangered economic reform and social stability, specifically criminals whose crimes disrupted the public order or the social order.").

\(^{156}\) See Dai, supra note 6, at 162 (listing as a major characteristic of the 1979 Criminal Law the need to "earnestly protect social order, production order, working order, order within science and education, and order for the daily lives of people").

\(^{157}\) TREVASKES, supra note 99, at 7.
by the trifecta of public security forces, procuratorates, and courts—were an increasingly prominent part of the government’s strategy to establish basic stability upon which the economy could grow.\(^{158}\) To be clear, this Article does not argue that early-reform-era government shaped criminal law based on purely instrumental economic goals; concerns like not wanting people to suffer physical and emotional harms from homicides, rapes, and other crimes were surely on the leaders’ minds as well. Yet the government’s rhetoric and actions indicate that economic goals were a prominent consideration during the legal codification efforts of the early post-Mao years. As stated by the president of the Supreme People’s Court in a 1986 speech to the Standing Committee of the NPC: “Combating serious economic crimes is directly defending the struggle of socialist economic system reforms and construction.”\(^{159}\)

In addition to reforms in the early post-Mao years that were more overtly geared toward supporting economic activity,\(^{160}\) criminal law was an essential part of the government’s strategy to bring order out of chaos.\(^{161}\) The Deng government decisively turned from Mao’s emphasis on class struggle and revolution to instead make economic development the paramount goal.\(^{162}\) As Deng’s leadership wore on through the 1980s and lingered in the early 1990s, basic stability became ingrained and concerns faded that a Mao-like revolutionary campaign might again engulf society.\(^{163}\) People could sleep at night knowing that all was no longer chaos under heaven.\(^{164}\) They could

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\(^{160}\) See Lubman, supra note 67, at 173–216 (discussing the outpouring of legislation designed to reform the economy).

\(^{161}\) See McConville, supra note 158, at 5 (“The introduction of a new Criminal Law (CL) and Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in 1979 was seen by many as constituting a welcome break from a past marked, even discounting the Cultural Revolution, by arbitrariness in decision-making, torture of suspects and ‘demonstration trials’ in which the outcome had already been decided . . .”).

\(^{162}\) See Naughton, supra note 70, at 79 (“Finally, at the end of 1978, political factors came together in a way that allowed a fundamental departure from the economic and other policies of the Cultural Revolution era.”).

\(^{163}\) See Huang, supra note 77, at 35 (“The Chinese political system circa 1980, as arbitrary and as absent of self-constraints as it was, marked a substantial marginal change from the status quo ante of the Cultural Revolution. The incentive effects—that the would-be private entrepreneurs felt increasingly assured of the safety of their assets—came from this dynamic development.”).

\(^{164}\) Cf. id. (describing the Cultural Revolution as “a period during which Chinese politics can be safely described as ‘nasty, brutish and short’ in the Hobbesian sense”).
turn their energy to other pursuits besides meeting basic daily needs and avoiding falling victim to persecution as a class enemy.\textsuperscript{165}

B. Property Stability

Moving a layer beyond the need to provide basic stability, criminal law can be directly targeted at increasing people's confidence in their ability to maintain property, i.e., what this Article terms property stability. "Property" here is meant in its broadest sense to include "real property" (interests in land and improvements on that land), "personal property" (items of tangible movable or immovable property), and money. Criminal law does not define property rights but rather offers a means of protecting those rights once granted.\textsuperscript{166} As with basic stability, a property rights regime backed by criminal sanctions—most clearly seen in laws against theft—is not unique to China. What is notable is that China did not have a comprehensive criminal law or criminal procedure law for 30 years (1949-1979), and it instituted these laws at the advent of the economic reform period.\textsuperscript{167} Deng and his successors had a challenge: "The post-Mao economic reforms required a legal system for protecting property and contract relations."\textsuperscript{168} One means of protection has been through criminal law. Although China's at least nominally communist system has fueled a complicated debate over the concept of property ownership,\textsuperscript{169} even the 1979 Criminal Law recognized the stealing of both public and private property as crimes.\textsuperscript{170}

More specifically, property stability requires that the lawful holder of property feels secure against two threats: infringement of property rights by private entities and reneging by the government on its promise to respect private property rights.\textsuperscript{171} This second

\textsuperscript{165} Cf. Dai, \textit{supra} note 6, at 157 ("Criminal law during the period [of the Cultural Revolution] was frequently used as a tool for attacking people; people used their power to manipulate others and have them thrown into prison. Even the head of state, as defined by the Constitution, was deprived of his freedom and jailed without going through any legal procedures.").

\textsuperscript{166} See Calabresi & Melamed, \textit{supra} note 19, at 1090 ("Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that choice. Simply setting the entitlement does not avoid the problem of 'might makes right'; a minimum of state intervention is always necessary."); \textit{id.} at 1126 ("In other words, we must impose criminal sanctions as a means of deterring future attempts to convert property rules into liability rules.").

\textsuperscript{167} See Dai, \textit{supra} note 6, at 159–61 (explaining the passage of the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law at the beginning of the economic reform period).


\textsuperscript{170} PRC Criminal Law, \textit{supra} note 115, at art. 150 (1979 version).

\textsuperscript{171} See Posner, \textit{supra} note 62, at 7–8 (property rights enforceable against private parties "may mean little if the state can seize the fruits of successful
threat is the concern that the government will compromise the property rights that it defined in the first place. China has used criminal law to counter both types of threats.

Beginning with the private threat, as the economy grew and there became more to steal, the need for a credible response to theft became all the more pressing. A Ministry of Public Security document from the 1980s warned that “[t]here are increased losses caused by criminal offences to the lives and property of the state and the masses.” 172 Examples ranged from the low-tech method of pickpocketing to more complex methods of stealing property, such as with fake commercial contracts. 173 The government took a straightforward step against property crimes in the 1979 Criminal Law, which provided: “Whoever takes public or private property by force, threat or other methods shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than ten years.” 174 The government followed up by mobilizing even the harshest of punishments, the death penalty: “Deng called directly for increased use of the death penalty, and advocated extending its use to cases involving major theft, corruption, recidivism, and a range of crimes where it had not been readily used in the past.” 175 In line with Deng’s emphasis on protecting property, the number of death-eligible offenses in the Criminal Law increased from fifteen in the 1979 Criminal Law to sixty-eight in the 1997 version, including use against robbery and theft. 176 Today, Section V of the Criminal Law addresses a variety of crimes involving property violations by private parties, including theft, robbery, and fraud. 177 In line with broader efforts to decrease executions, the most serious thefts can now result in life imprisonment but no longer are subject to the death penalty. 178

Turning to the threat from the government, especially in light of concerns during the Mao years that no property was safe from state expropriation, 179 people desperately needed credible assurances that
the state would respect their rights to obtain and retain property.\footnote{180} One of the early regulations issued by Mao's government was the 1951 Stipulations on Confiscating Property of Counter-Revolutionary Criminals,\footnote{181} with the label "counter-revolutionary" applying to people in part based on economic background because it included those who were deemed "feudal landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists."\footnote{182} The "commitment problem"\footnote{183} arising from this antagonistic history toward private property first required that the post-Mao government not change the rules such that assets were suddenly transferred from private hands to the state, either through a direct nationalization of assets or more subtly by changing tax or fee structures. In 1988, the constitution was amended to allow for the existence of the private sector, which was followed by regulations that allowed for ownership and transfer of property by private businesses.\footnote{184} The government took significant steps forward in signaling its respect for private property by acknowledging property rights in 2004 amendments to the PRC Constitution\footnote{185} and by passing a comprehensive Property Law in 2007 that clarified people's rights to real property.\footnote{186}

The PRC government has likewise signaled its respect for property by enacting criminal laws recognizing that the government itself poses a threat. Not surprisingly, the government has not said that, if it issues an official edict and nationalizes property, it will then

\begin{footnotes}
\footnottemark[180]{See Clarke, supra note 19, at 96 ("[T]he fear of confiscation of one's property by government makes a very large number of growth-enhancing investments impossible.").}
\footnottemark[181]{See Jianxiong Zhai, A Bibliographic Guide to the Criminal Law Literature of the People's Republic of China: 1949–2000, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 118, 123 (2008) (noting that the Stipulations were adopted on June 22, 1951, at the 90th Administrative Meeting of the Government Administration Council and promulgated the same day).}
\footnottemark[182]{COHEN, supra note 130, at 299 (quoting the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Sept. 29, 1949).}
\footnottemark[183]{See Huang, supra note 77, at 34 (noting that the "commitment problem" paradoxically did not deter investment when China introduced modest economic reforms); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995) ("A government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contract rights is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.").}
\footnottemark[184]{See Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 61, at 439 (citing Vai Io Lo & Xiaowen Tian, Property Rights, Productivity Gains and Economic Growth: The Chinese Experience, 14 POST-COMMUNIST ECONS. 245, 249 (2002)).}
\footnottemark[185]{XIANFA art. 13 (1988) (China) ("The state protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.").}
\end{footnotes}
subject itself to criminal punishment. What China has addressed through criminal law is the concern that individual government officials will unlawfully take property through corrupt dealings, though the government has failed to fully harness the power of criminal law to tackle corruption.\textsuperscript{187}

The definition of corruption is much debated.\textsuperscript{188} At base, corruption involves public officials using their positions for private gain.\textsuperscript{189} In China, corruption is commonly defined to include more than an unlawful seizure of private or public assets,\textsuperscript{190} and thus further connects to broader “economic crimes” discussed in Part III.C below.\textsuperscript{191} On a general level, corruption can erode confidence in the government’s ability to accomplish its ends since bribery undermines government policies, and it can also foster inequality not based on merit and therefore destabilize the government.\textsuperscript{192} In addition, what

\begin{footnotes}
\item[187] See infra Part IV.B.
\item[188] See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring & David T. Johnson, On the Comparative Study of Corruption, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE CRIME 456, 458–59 (Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds., 2007) (discussing various types of crimes that might be considered “corruption” and adopting definition of “the illegal use of power for personal gain”).
\item[189] Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corO2.htm#note1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (“We settled on a straightforward definition—the abuse of public office for private gain. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues.”) (internal citations omitted); Hilary K. Josephs, The Upright and the Low-Down: An Examination of Official Corruption in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L & COM. 271, 279 (2000) (“Corruption as the use of public office for private gain is a general definition which adequately describes conduct proscribed by law as well as practices which social scientists identify as “corrupt.””).
\item[190] See WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 124 (defining forms of corruption under Chinese law: “graft (tanwu), which involves the theft of state property and assets by officials . . .; bribery (huilu), which [involves] the commodification and sale of public authority; and misappropriation (nuoyong gongkuan), which . . . [involves] the illegal lending and investment of public money”).
\item[191] Even once defined, corruption is difficult to measure. One indicator is prosecutions for corruption-related offenses, which provide at least some sense of how seriously the government is taking anticorruption efforts:

The number of economic crime cases “filed” by the procuratorate (i.e., cases in which a criminal indictment was handed down) increased dramatically, rising from 9,000 in 1980, the first year that China’s first Criminal Code was in force, to 28,000 in 1985, and nearly doubling the following year when the Communist Party launched its second post-Mao, anticorruption campaign.

\textit{Id.} at 1–2; see \textit{id.} at 94 (showing economic crime prosecutions, 1980–2007).
\item[192] For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized how corruption can undermine government legitimacy. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political \textit{quid pro quo} from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
\end{footnotes}
is of interest with respect to property stability is that officials can misuse their positions to take property that private citizens rightly hold. In other words, if government officials are able to use their positions simply to grab private property without any negative repercussions, people's confidence in their ability to maintain property will decrease.

A glaring example of corrupt dealings undermining property stability occurred in 2011 when villagers in Wukan physically expelled local officials after they reportedly sold village land to developers without providing proper compensation to residents. The Party discipline apparatus punished twenty officials, with the two top officials being expelled from the Party and required to return at most the equivalent of $30,000. The daughter of a village activist who died while in police custody told reporters: "The illegal gains are much more than these . . . . This is almost an invitation to more corruption." The blackletter criminal law includes provisions that apply to the Wukan officials' activities, such as crimes of dereliction of duty. However, according to public reports, the corrupt officials have yet to face criminal charges despite substantial evidence that the amount of money involved far exceeded the reparations required as part of the Party disciplinary process.

If such a well-publicized instance of official malfeasance results in relatively lenient punishment, one wonders what incentives other corrupt officials will feel to curtail their behavior, especially if they believe that they can continue to shield their misdeeds from public scrutiny. Yet, as Professor Andrew Wedeman has argued, "While imperfect, China's anticorruption efforts have also been significant in that they created resistance against increases in the level of

193. *See* Keith Hand, *Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value of the Constitution Outside the Courtroom*, CHINA BRIEF, Feb. 3, 2012, at 5 ("After months of tension, thousands of villagers angry over the seizure of their land, inadequate compensation and the death of a village in police custody expelled village officials . . . . "). The Wukan incident is but one example of widespread questionable land takings. *See* Keith Hand, *Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China*, 7 U. PENN. E. ASIA L. REV. 51, 116 (2011) ("A constellation of factors has generated a wave of takings in China over the past two decades. China's rapid economic growth, urban development and expansion, skyrocketing land prices, and local corruption have fueled demand for land and in turn have led to mass displacements.").


195. *Id.*


197. *See* Wukan Former Officials 'Should Stand Trial,' RADIO FREE ASIA (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f9a/00144feadb49a.html [http://perma.cc/A68R-77HP] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("Wukan villagers said the punishments were too light, because the officials had disposed of almost all collectively owned village farmland during their 40-year stranglehold on power.").
corruption. If nothing else, they made corruption risky. Officials contemplating corrupt acts face the possibility of severe punishment, including execution, and substantial numbers are punished every year.\textsuperscript{198} At a minimum, if China did not have criminal laws in place that seriously punish officials for using their positions of power to take property, Chinese citizens would likely feel less secure in their ability to protect property against rapacious bad apples in the government's ranks.

Related to enhancing people's confidence in their ability to maintain property is confidence that people will not be criminally punished simply for acquiring property. Put another way, shifts in the post-Mao-era criminal justice policy not only moved toward punishing people for stealing the property of others but also shifted toward not punishing people for acquiring property through entrepreneurial activities:

The security of the proprietor is the necessary condition for the security of his or her property. China then and now does not have well-specified property rights security. But, China in the early 1980s moved very far and fast toward establishing security of the proprietor. One should never underestimate the incentive effect of not getting arrested.\textsuperscript{199}

Especially in the early days of the PRC, aspirations to acquire wealth were viewed disapprovingly, and any entity resembling a private business was tightly constrained by law.\textsuperscript{200} Former landlords and rich peasants were among the categories of people discriminated against in the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{201} As China's leaders shifted their focus increasingly from ideology to economic growth, so too did they shift their view of wealth acquisition.\textsuperscript{202} Instead of incurring condemnation, entrepreneurial activities gradually became viewed in a more positive light.\textsuperscript{203} Reflecting this trend, one creative defense

\textsuperscript{198} WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 11; see id. at 117 ("China's ongoing war on corruption may not have greatly reduced the actual level of corruption, but it has had a positive effect. At a very basic level, it appears to have prevented corruption from spiraling out of control.").

\textsuperscript{199} HUANG, supra note 77, at 36.

\textsuperscript{200} See id. at 94 (offering contrasting scenarios of arrests for engaging in private commerce during the Cultural Revolution and allowance of private entrepreneurial activities in the 1980s: "The incentive effect between being arrested and not being arrested must have been massive."); cf. Donald C. Clarke, \textit{Legislating for a Market Economy in China}, 191 CHINA Q. 567, 572 (2007) (citing the 1999 constitutional amendment that "legitimized income such as interest and dividends (which had not been unlawful before, but lacked such high-level sanction)").

\textsuperscript{201} See Chiu, supra note 128, at 4 ("Persons in one of the five categories—former landlords, former rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, and bad elements—or their descendants, were discriminated against in an administration of justice that rejected the principle of equality of all persons before the law.").

\textsuperscript{202} See HUANG, supra note 77, at 35 (noting "incentive effects" in the 1980s as "would-be private entrepreneurs felt increasingly assured of the safety of their assets").

\textsuperscript{203} Although the phrase "To get rich is glorious" is commonly ascribed to Deng Xiaoping, the actual source of the phrase remains a mystery. See Evelyn Iritani, \textit{Great
raised by the defendant's wife in a 1983 prosecution of a businessman was "his business activities had benefited the peasants." 204 Liu Chuanzhi, the founder of Lenovo, recalled changes under Deng's leadership that opened the door to entrepreneurial activity without the threat of punishment hanging over one's head:

I remember that it was in 1978. There was an article in People's Daily about raising cows. I got so excited upon reading it. During the Cultural Revolution, every newspaper article was about revolution and class struggle, non-stop, only editorials. At that time, raising chickens or growing vegetables were viewed as capitalist tails to be cut. Now the People's Daily has an article about raising cows. Things have definitely changed. 205

Indeed, in the early 1980s, the Deng government rehabilitated more than a hundred people who had been persecuted as part of the Cultural Revolutions' "anti-capitalist tail" campaign. 206

Far from punishing people for acquiring wealth, in 2000 President Jiang Zemin introduced the "Three Represents," which called for the Party to represent advanced social productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority. 207 In practice, this theory opened up Party membership to businesspeople who, in earlier times, would have been viewed as class enemies. 208 Extremely wealthy individuals now have a prominent presence in the leadership. At the 2012 Party Congress, "34 private entrepreneurs [were] chosen as delegates to the Congress, up from just 17 at the 17th Party Congress in 2007." 209

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205. HUANG, supra note 77, at 85 (citing XIAOBO WU, JIDAN SANSHI NIAN [SIGNIFICANT THIRTY YEARS] (2006)).

206. Id. at 95.


208. Hepeng Jia, The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrine the Capitalists?, 24 CATO J., no. 3 (Fall 2004), available at object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato.../11/cj24n3-5.pdf ("In the speech [highlighting the Three Represents], Jiang also urged the capitalists and other elites to be allowed to join the party.").

meeting of the NPC, a reported eighty-three delegates were billionaires.210

Today, aspiring for great wealth lacks the perils of the Mao era, but admittedly it is not without risk. In his memoir, famed fiction writer Yu Hua describes the “Rich List” of China’s richest individuals as being “popularly known as the Pigs-for-Slaughter List. In China there’s a saying, ‘People fear getting famous just as pigs fear getting fat,’ reflecting the observation that fame invites a fall just as a fattened pig invites the butcher.”211 Considering the vast wealth creation of many in leadership positions, fear of a fall from a position of great wealth perhaps has less to do with an orchestrated government policy than some variant on schadenfreude or cultural inclinations.212 What is apparent over the past three decades is that the PRC government has shaped criminal law in hopes of increasing people’s confidence in their abilities to first acquire property and then protect it from both other people and government acquisition. Harkening back to the words of Liu Chuanzhi, you not only can raise a cow without fear of government reprisal, you also can create a global computer company and hang on to it.

C. Market Stability

Beyond a state effort to protect property from private theft and government corruption, the PRC government has used criminal law to target a broader array of activities that are detrimental to economic growth. In China, this third layer of stability is more precisely understood as promoting stability of the “socialist market economy”—the official terminology adopted by the CCP in 1992—213


211. YU HUA, CHINA IN TEN WORDS 169 (Allan H. Barr trans., 2011); Xianjie He, Oliver Rui & Tusheng Xiao, The Price of Being a Billionaire in China: Evidence Based on Hurun Rich List 21–22 (July 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102998 [http://perma.cc/5UTB-SQUG] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) (“We also find that, after being included on the list, entrepreneurs are far more likely to be investigated, arrested and charged compared to other private entrepreneurs.”).

212. See He, Rui & Xiao, supra note 211, at 8 (“Influenced by Confucian culture, the public in China generally hold the attitude of having ‘resentment against the rich.’”).

213. When speaking to the terminology, scholar Barry Naughton notes:

Outside China, the juxtaposition of the two words socialist and market can seem confusing or unclear, but within China the meaning is unambiguous. China has been socialist for forty years, and during that time the word socialist has been drained of all concrete meaning. By contrast, the market economy is
but "market stability" is used here as shorthand. Although the PRC
government did not openly embrace the term "socialist market
economy" until the early 1990s, as explained below, criminal law
was used to support the fledgling market economy far earlier.

As previously noted, a comprehensive criminal law and criminal
procedure law were part of the initial legal reforms adopted when
Deng ushered in the policy of "Reform and Opening." Shortly after
issuance of these laws in the late 1970s, "the politico-legal authorities
began to launch anti-crime drives that targeted crimes against the
economic and social order." Deng himself emphasized the need to
attack economic crimes: "In a 1982 speech against economic crime,
Deng Xiaoping advocated that the 'struggle will have to be waged
daily for 18 years' to be won before the end of the millennium." The
term economic crime is not defined by law but is generally understood
to include at least "graft, bribery, misappropriation of public property,
copyright theft and fraud, tax evasion and tax resistance." The
term overlaps with, but is not coextensive with, the term white-collar
crime, which is fraught with its own definitional issues.

A comprehensive survey of individual provisions in the 1979
Criminal Law is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, even a
few examples illustrate the connection between the formal criminal
laws and economic goals in the early days of the reform era. The 1979
law included a chapter on Crimes of Undermining the Socialist
Economic Order and specifically criminalized speculation on
monetary affairs, smuggling, counterfeiting ration coupons, and tax

Naughton, supra note 66, at 289.
214. See Clarke, supra note 200, at 571 (explaining that the CCP endorsed 'the
'socialist market economy' at its 14th Congress in October 1992' and added it to the
Constitution in 1993).
215. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
216. Trevaskes, supra note 99, at 17 ("It is now well established in the
literature that in 1979 the PRC's first Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law were
introduced, and shortly thereafter the politico-legal authorities began to launch anti-
crime drives that targeted crimes against the economic and social order.").
217. Bakken, supra note 175, at 46 (citing Deng Xiaoping, Combat Economic
(1982)).
219. See Cheng & Friedrichs, supra note 57, at 239 ("Chinese scholars and legal
practitioners have generally invoked the phrase 'economic crime' to refer to most white-
collar and corporate crimes."). For a more general discussion, see Stuart P. Green, A
Normative Approach to White-Collar Crime, in International Handbook of White-
Collar and Corporate Crime, supra note 188, at 223, 223–24 (acknowledging
definitional controversy and listing example offenses such as fraud, insider trading,
and tax evasion); Zimring & Johnson, supra note 188, at 458–59 (discussing problems
of definition and classification).
evasion. As early as 1980, media reports stated that "Government officials specifically emphasized that economic crimes threatened the four modernizations" and went so far as to use the colorful language that economic criminals were "maggots that devour the people's property."221

China, like every other country in the world, has been less than wholly successful in suppressing economic crimes, but issues with efficacy do not undermine the argument that the leadership's goal when criminalizing activities like monetary speculation was at least in part to support the burgeoning economy. Looking beyond the blackletter law to actual implementation, the government's efforts to combat economic crimes, though far from perfect, have had bite: "Between 1980 and 2006, the People's Procuratorate, the judicial institution responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal activity, has filed criminal charges in more than 1.1 million cases involving 'economic crime' and indicted approximately 30,000 senior officials, including roughly 60 officials holding the rank of deputy minister or above."222

As the 1980s wore on, it became increasingly clear that "the deepening of economic reform also led to certain economic crimes that were not anticipated in the 1979 Criminal Law."223 This prompted the government to supplement the Criminal Law with subsidiary legislation adopted by the NPC Standing Committee, which is convened between plenary sessions of the NPC.224 In 1982, the Standing Committee issued the Decision on Severely Punishing Criminals Who Gravely Endanger the Economy.225 The Decision supplemented the Criminal Law's provisions on offenses like smuggling and larceny and even allowed for use of the death penalty.226 Thereafter, "[i]n 1985, the Resolutions of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate Concerning Certain Questions on the Practical Application of the Law in the Present Adjudication of Cases of Economic Crimes (Trial Implementation) [(the 1985 Resolution)] expressly affirmed the

222. WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
223. CHEN, supra note 110, at 263.
224. See id. at 179 ("The [NPC] is responsible for basic laws governing criminal and civil matters, basic economic systems and state structures, and the [Standing Committee] for other laws as well as partial supplementation and revision of basic laws when the NPC is not in session.").
225. Dai, supra note 6, at 173.
226. Id.
criminal liability of legal persons guilty of certain economic crimes." During a press conference, representatives of the issuing bodies noted the importance of using legal measures to strike at economic crimes in order to safeguard the policies of opening China to the world, improving the domestic economy, and supporting the smooth operation of the economic system. Official statements during this period by high-ranking officials involved with criminal justice further highlighted the government's emphasis on economic crimes: "Over the past year, procuratorial organs at all levels across the country have strengthened their work against economic crimes, there has been new progress in the fight against serious economic crimes, and they have achieved notable results."

During the 1980s, the government also stepped up its rhetoric regarding corruption. As previously discussed in Part III.B, the detrimental impact of a corrupt seizure on the individual, or collective, who had the lawful right to the seized assets is readily apparent; the loss is often more diffuse, and thus less easily perceived, when officials misappropriate state assets. Put simply, it is generally harder to detect when an official is taking a cookie from the state's gigantic cookie jar than when he grabs a cookie from a citizen's hands. Difficulties in drawing lines between what is acceptable grey income and what is a corrupt taking of state assets further complicates matters. And, despite calls for anticorruption drives in various countries as a means of spurring development, "the connection between eliminating corruption and 'development'"

227. CHEN, supra note 110, at 275; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Dangqian Banli Jingji Fanziu Anjian Zhong Juti Yingyong Falü de Ruogan Wenti de Jieda (Shixing) (最高人民法院最高人民检察院关于当前办理经济犯罪案件中具体应用法律的若干问题的解答 (试行)) (July 8, 1985).
230. See e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. Econ. Literature 1320, 1327 (1997), available at http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/resources/economic-growth-a-development (noting in reviewing impact of corruption on economic growth that "corruption has its adverse effects not just on static efficiency but also on investment and growth").
231. See Mimi Lau, For Officials, the Colour of Money is Too Often Grey, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 30, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article/974856/officials-colour-money-too-often-grey [http://perma.cc/MWY9-FBEE] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("[B]esides high salaries and generous perks which include housing and cars, officials have various ways to embezzle public money and take bribes. That's where grey income comes in, and it is doled out systematically across the mainland.").
remains obscure.” While there is debate regarding the actual effect of corruption on economic growth, official statements underscore that the PRC government saw corruption as having a deleterious impact on China's economic prospects. For instance, a 1989 report by the Supreme People's Procuratorate emphasized that guiding principles for their work in 1990 included resolutely punishing embezzlement and bribery as well as promoting economic stability and development. In 1988 rules regarding corruption-related offenses, the government included a provision on illicit enrichment—a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot explain in relation to lawful income. China later added the crime of illicit enrichment to the 1997 Criminal Law.

Writings by scholars in the China Law Yearbook during the 1980s further emphasize the use of formal criminal law to support economic growth. Professors Gao Mingxuan and Zhao Bingzhi listed the need to combat economic crimes and ensure the smooth operation of the economic system as the first issue of debate among criminal law circles in 1986. An article in the 1989 China Law Yearbook by the secretary-general of the NPC called for using “legal weapons” to strike at economic crimes so as to put the economic environment in

232. David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 37, at 95, 145. In part, the causal link between development and corruption may depend on the type of corruption. See WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 50 (distinguishing between “degenerative corruption” and “developmental corruption” in explaining how different types of corruption may impact economic growth).

233. See Liu Fuzhi (刘复之), Guanche Shisan Jie Wu Zhong Quanhui Jingshen Yanli Chengchu Tanwu Huilu he Xingshi Fanzui Huodong (贯彻十三届五中全会精神严厉打击贪污贿赂案件和刑事犯罪活动) [Implementing the Spirit of the Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Severely Punish Embezzlement, Bribery and Criminal Activities], in LAW Y.B. CHINA (Zhongguo Fali Nianjian, 中国法律年鉴), 1990 no. 1, at 780.


order. Similarly, a report on a meeting of the Supreme People's Court regarding economic crimes celebrated the courts' contributions in building the economy. Concurrently, growing concerns about crimes committed by business entities—under the general heading of danwei ("unit") crimes—prompted the government to augment the criminal law. The 1985 Resolution further clarified that legal persons could be guilty of certain economic crimes.

Turning to the 1990s, as China ramped up efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the PRC leadership introduced a number of reforms aimed at expanding the role of market forces and "emphasized the importance of a privatized economy and its inextricable link to China's modernization and other economic reform efforts." Professor Fu Hualing explains the impact of these changes: "After China initiated market reform in the 1990s, the rule of law was revived to serve primarily the economic function". More specifically of interest to this Article, the 1990s brought vocal calls to overhaul the increasingly outdated 1979 Criminal Law. Members of the drafting committee of the 1997 Criminal Law explained, "The guiding principle for the reform has been clear: a new criminal law should serve economic restructuring rather than politics; and it should be democratic, scientific and consistent with international standards."
The 1997 Criminal Law included a number of new offenses aimed at nurturing the socialist market economy. Among the death-eligible offenses in the 1997 Criminal Law were fifteen under the heading "Crimes of Undermining the Socialist Market Economic Order." The revised law also included twelve articles under the heading "Crimes of Undermining Company and Enterprise Administrative Orders." Originally formulated in an NPC Standing Committee decision following adoption of the PRC Company Law in 1993, the new provisions included possible imprisonment for people in charge of state-owned enterprises who acted deceptively for their own benefit and consequently caused "large damages to the state's interests"; people who made false declarations regarding registered capital when applying for company registration; and people who concealed material facts when writing share-soliciting prospectuses.

After overhauling the Criminal Law in 1997, China repeatedly revised the Law to address specific areas of economic concern. For example, the first amendment in 1999 sought to strengthen the economic order by imposing more severe punishments on economic crimes. The fifth amendment in 2005 targeted credit card fraud. And the sixth amendment in 2006 revised a number of provisions, including increasing punishments for crimes connected with undermining the financial management of organizations, harming the interests of listed companies, and embezzling from commercial enterprises. In 1998, the Standing Committee issued a separate Decision Concerning Punishment of Crimes against the Company Law "in order to uphold economic and social order as well as protect the legal rights of enterprises and punish illegal behavior ...." Along with these post-1997 amendments to the blackletter criminal law, Chinese leadership has vocally connected criminal law with supporting economic growth. In 2002, the government called for renewed targeting of economic crimes as China continued "its efforts
to rectify and regulate the market and economic order this year."²⁵⁶

In line with general policy statements, government bodies that implement the Criminal Law, such as the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security, continued to clarify provisions regarding economic crimes and emphasize their importance.²⁵⁷ The public security force’s work report in the 2008 China Law Yearbook cited striking hard at economic crimes as a focal point of their work the prior year.²⁵⁸ The Yearbook also regularly reports prosecutions for crimes that have a tight nexus with the economy, such as crimes involving financial management.²⁵⁹

Foreign scholars have commented that the Chinese government has in fact followed through on its emphasis on using criminal law for economic ends: “In China, rapid economic growth has coincided with an increase in prosecutions for financial crimes and the creation of new offences.”²⁶⁰ One popular blog written by foreign lawyers cautioned,

> In the U.S. and in Europe, it is quite uncommon for a dispute between two business people to become subject to criminal law enforcement. This is not true in China. In doing business in China, you need to be aware of two things: the scope of economic crime there is far broader than you probably expect and the Chinese party with whom you are conducting business is far more likely to pursue a criminal complaint than you would expect.²⁶¹

The intersection of foreign business and criminal law came to the fore in 2010 when Stern Hu, the chief representative in China for the Anglo-Australian mining company Rio Tinto and an Australian citizen, was convicted of accepting bribes and stealing commercial secrets.²⁶² Hu and several colleagues allegedly received bribe...
payments from steelmakers in Northern China. More recently, in July 2013, senior managers in China for the British pharmaceutical firm GlaxoSmithKline were detained on allegations that they bribed officials, and the government announced a wider crackdown on the pharmaceutical industry. The apparent selective use of harsh criminal sanctions against foreign companies has led some to question whether these companies are becoming scapegoats for broader problems, being targeted in hopes of boosting certain key domestic enterprises, or both.

The primacy of the state in directing economic growth might have its drawbacks, but it is uncontrovertibly the approach that the Chinese leadership has unwaveringly pursued. One tool in this state-driven approach has been criminal law. Today, there is an array of criminal provisions regarding activities that impact market stability: the current version of the Criminal Law includes nearly one hundred “Crimes of Undermining the Order of the Socialist Market the international community for its lack of transparency and procedural deficiencies, in part stemming from the original charges including stealing “state secrets.” Stanley Lubman, *Rio Tinto Trial Shines Harsh Spotlight on Chinese Criminal Justice*, EAST ASIA FORUM (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/29/rio-tinto-trial-shines-harsh-spotlight-on-chinese-criminal-justice/ [http://perma.cc/L2CG-ETLP] (archived Jan. 19, 2014).

263. Zhao, Yan & Ma, supra note 262, at 35.


267. See Clarke, supra note 200, at 568 (explaining state-driven development versus market-driven development and arguing that “China’s path so far has been almost exclusively that of the model of state-driven development, and that more balance is desirable”).

268. Id.
Economy.”269 As discussed in Part IV below, the question now is how the new leadership will use criminal law going forward.270

IV. THE PROSPECTIVE VIEW

The once-a-decade leadership transition in China presents an opportune time to consider how the interaction between criminal law and economic growth might play out in the future. This Part explores three ways in which criminal law might factor into the leadership's strategy to sustain growth: (A) a more calculated use of criminal law to target certain types of activities that are detrimental to the long-term, healthy functioning of China's socialist market economy; (B) a limited embracing of criminal law to address questionable, if not overtly illegal, financial dealings by government officials; and (C) a targeted use of criminal law, including pretextual prosecutions for economic crimes, to silence people who are seen as exposing problems that might engender social unrest and, consequently, derail economic growth.

Regarding the first category (Part IV.A), recent events indicate that the PRC government not only is continuing to use criminal law in service of economic ends but also is doing so in new and varied ways. From a normative perspective, this Article is not advocating a categorical “more is better” approach with respect to criminal law. Instead, it encourages a more thoughtful, targeted use of the state's coercive power, especially in areas where criminal law might effectively fill gaps in the relatively weak civil and administrative law systems. When addressing the main features of a “Post Washington, Post Beijing Consensus,” Randall Peerenboom and Bojan Bugaric similarly note, albeit not in the context of discussing criminal law, “What is required now is a smart state with a light touch able to address deficiencies in the market and adopt a long-term perspective


270.  There is a further question whether, when using criminal law, the PRC leadership will respect rights guaranteed in China’s formal laws and in international norms to which China subscribes. An in-depth analysis of concerns about the procedures used when the government decides to deprive people of property, liberty, and life is well documented elsewhere. See, e.g., BIDDULPH, supra note 32; McCONVILLE, supra note 158 (examining these concerns from an empirical perspective). Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the shortcomings of the current system from a human rights standpoint.

271.  Although there is no set definition regarding what “long term” means, it is used here to mean at least longer than a one-year period (i.e., beyond the horizon of annual GDP growth and other immediate economic indicators) and, more generally, looking at the extended economic trajectory that extends five or ten years down the road.
that facilitates sustainable growth."\textsuperscript{272} In particular, for areas like intellectual property rights, environmental protection, and employment practices, China is at a critical juncture: historically, a lax regulatory approach appears to have helped fuel China's economy.\textsuperscript{273} The benefits of turning a blind eye to infractions now appear to be waning.\textsuperscript{274} Applying a stronger state touch to these areas in the form of strategic use of criminal law could help chart China's future economic path.

Second, although Xi Jinping himself quickly and vocally targeted lavish spending by government officials after taking office,\textsuperscript{275} the new leadership's actions indicate an ongoing hesitancy to expose financial misdeeds of government officials (Part IV.B). This Article cautions that there are risks to this approach: although many of those misdeeds may at least temporarily be swept under the proverbial rug, a failure to punish corrupt officials threatens the government's legitimacy. The public is increasingly able to share stories of corruption through social media, and a greater use of criminal law could actually serve to enhance the new leadership's support. The new leadership faces the challenge of convincing people that the cancer of corruption is not so deeply rooted that it is impossible for the government to surgically remove the diseased elements while still keeping the CCP's monopoly on power intact.

Finally, the PRC government has not backed away from using criminal law to target people seen as threatening the social stability upon which economic growth depends (Part IV.C). This Article questions the efficacy of this approach: silencing these voices might bolster social stability in the short term but could backfire. Using criminal law against government critics could create public resentment as stories of these cases circulate and dampen China's economy, since the problems that these perceived destabilizing agents are exposing threaten China's long-term economic growth. Surely the people who are calling attention to festering problems such as food

\textsuperscript{272} Peerenboom & Bugaric, \textit{supra} note 59, at 9.

\textsuperscript{273} See Peter Navarro, \textit{The Economics of the "China Price"}, \textit{China Perspectives}, no. 68, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 13 (ascribing China's economic success in export market to eight major "economic drivers" including low wages, counterfeiting and piracy, minimal worker health and safety regulations, and lax environmental regulations and enforcement).


safety and corruption would argue that their goals also are to promote development and that a system that continues to have such problems cannot sustain economic growth. In addition to the questionable economic benefits of silencing these voices, the manner in which China is doing so raises serious human rights concerns.\textsuperscript{276} China's failure to give full force to protections in the Criminal Procedure Law—and continuing use of police-controlled sanctions that fall outside the law's purview\textsuperscript{277}—remains a pressing concern.\textsuperscript{278}

A. Activities Detrimental to the Socialist Market Economy

As China's economy has grown larger, it has also grown more complex. For instance, the establishment of China's first stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 opened up the possibility for crimes related to listings on these markets.\textsuperscript{279} China added "insider trading" to the 1997 revision of the Criminal Law but failed to elaborate the elements of this crime and basically failed to prosecute.\textsuperscript{280} Thus, while China has gradually updated the Criminal Law and supporting rules and regulations to include crimes made possible by China's increasingly complex economy, there is still much work to be done legislatively.\textsuperscript{281} Even more pressing than putting more laws on the books is the need to use what is already there. The PRC government is using criminal law to address harmful economic

\textsuperscript{276} See supra note 270 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{277} See generally JEROME A. COHEN & MARGARET K. LEWIS, CHALLENGE TO CHINA: HOW TAIWAN ABOLISHED ITS VERSION OF RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOR 6–13 (2013) (explaining failure to follow through on several false starts in eliminating reeducation through labor, a police-controlled sanction that allowed detention of up to four years). Reeducation through labor was abolished at the end of 2013, see supra note 32, but concerns about other police-controlled sanctions remain. See "Custody and Education": Arbitrary Detention for Female Sex Workers in China, ASIA CATALYST (Dec. 2013), http://asiacatalyst.org/blog/2013/12/report-custody-and-education-arbitrary-detention-for-female-sex-workers-in-china.html ("However, largely unknown to the general public, similar administrative penalties [to reeducation through labor] remain in effect, including the Custody & Education (C&E) system targeting commercial sex workers and their clients.").


\textsuperscript{280} Nicholas Calcina Howson, Enforcement Without Foundation? Insider Trading and China's Administrative Law Crisis, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 955, 961, 985 (2012).

\textsuperscript{281} See, e.g., Zhang & Zhao, supra note 241, at 666 ("Corporate crime is a new type of crime which is not clearly defined in China's legal statutes.").
activities, but there remains untapped potential. China has yet to develop resources within the criminal justice system that are adequately prepared and incentivized to apply even existing criminal provisions.

This Part briefly highlights five areas where more strategic use of criminal law could benefit long-term economic growth: (i) crimes related to financial transactions, such as financial fraud; (ii) crimes related to tainted food and other consumer products, (iii) intellectual property violations, (iv) environmental crimes, and (v) crimes related to particularly egregious employer practices.

1. Financial Crimes

China has used special task forces to tackle economic crimes in the past, but recent efforts appear qualitatively different in that they are bringing together more substantial expertise and coordination. One prominent example is the 2012 white paper on financial crimes issued by the Pudong Procuratorate (a district in Shanghai). The white paper announced an agreement by seven government bodies involved in financial oversight to work together. The Pudong Procuratorate heralded the new collaboration as a way to more effectively promote the construction of the financial rule of law.

Collaboration among the various entities involved in financial oversight bodes well for prosecutors to be able to both ferret out and build cases against people who are engaged in illicit financial dealings. Only time will tell whether the initiative bears fruit, yet

282. See id. at 669 ("In 2003, there were a total of 14,755 cases reviewed by courts involving unsafe products, smuggling, securities and fiduciary fraud against the free market, with 19,197 individuals criminally convicted and 15 billion yuan recovered.").

283. See, e.g., Cheng & Friedrichs, supra note 57, at 244 ("Although China has criminalized insider trading by legislation in a more severe way than many other countries, the enforcement has done little to eradicate what has become an entrenched feature of the Chinese securities market.").

284. For current provisions on financial fraud (金融诈骗罪), see PRC Criminal Law, supra note 115, at arts. 192–200 (2011 version). For definitional issues with the term fraud more generally, see Green, supra note 219, at 229–33.


even the agreement’s establishment signals a government push to more assertively address financial crimes.

Prosecuting complex financial crimes is an example of how the state can play a helpful and unique role in economic development even when there is a strong, well-established civil law system. Some market disruptions can be dealt with through lawsuits between private parties, such as shareholder derivative suits, though that is a limited vehicle in China.288 When people have flagrantly harmed economic interests, however, criminal law has the benefit of threatening incarceration and other punishments beyond mere civil penalties. In China, where the civil law system remains weak, reliance on criminal law becomes all the more important. The Chinese government has periodically emphasized the need to crack down on illegal financial dealings, such as in a 1998 State Council order banning illegal finance activities.289 And there are occasional high-profile cases of financial fraud, as seen in the 2012 suspended death sentence handed down to a former bank president who diverted bank funds to his personal use.290

In general, however, “[i]nvestors have lost billions investing in Chinese companies, due to fraudulent financial statements and fudged books, as well as outright theft of company assets by insiders. To date, there has been relatively little regulatory oversight in this realm.”291 What has been lacking thus far is a sustained, rigorous effort to identify and prosecute financial crimes outside of intermittent high-profile cases and campaign-style strike hard initiatives.292 When a prosecution for financial crimes hits the news, questions arise whether it is the beginning of a true reform campaign,
or simply a one-off effort to calm public outcry over a specific incident, or perhaps even evidence of bureaucratic infighting. It is unclear whether the current leadership has resolutely decided to prosecute financial crimes as a way to push, or at least to reinforce, financial reforms, but the Shanghai initiative is an encouraging step. Also promising are recent reports of a new nationally streamlined system of financial and real-asset registration, which could use the consolidation and clarification of asset holdings to complement efforts to expose financial misdeeds. Increased transparency regarding asset holdings is also a crucial step to giving greater force to the Criminal Law's provisions on illicit enrichment.

In addition to the Shanghai example, efforts by the central leadership in Beijing indicate new scrutiny of financial transactions. In spring 2013, several bond fund managers were taken into custody "after speculation that the regulatory authorities, including the central bank, would carry out a massive investigation into illegal bond trading." These investigations have been directly tied to Wang Qishan, the current head of the Party's disciplinary apparatus, who previously served in high-ranking posts covering economic matters. Concerns are also on the rise regarding illegal capital outflows, especially as people attempt to hide the proceeds of illicit activities. The state-run media has further reported an uptick in prosecutions for "illegal fundraising" because, as noted by Liu...
Wenxi, deputy director of the economic crime investigation bureau under the Ministry of Public Security, “Illegal fundraising severely disrupts the country's economic and financial order, and harms the interests of the public, and we should resolutely crack down on such crimes.”

Taken together, these developments indicate a possible turn to a sustained, sophisticated, and resolute response to financial crimes instead of the sporadic crackdowns that have thus far punctuated the decades of China’s rapid economic growth.

If indeed the PRC government steps up use of criminal law to rein in financial crimes, a concurrent challenge will be to create accessible legal channels for financing so that private businesses can flourish. For example, underground or “shadow” banking has come under increasing scrutiny. The exact scale of this practice of bypassing normal lending procedures is unknown precisely because it is done in the proverbial “shadows,” but it is widely recognized that a substantial amount of lending in China does not conform to banking regulations. While a portion of shadow lending is no doubt being used to facilitate projects with little benefit to the overall economy, it has also been a vital source of capital for private enterprises that do not have access to standard bank loans. The government appears

[http://perma.cc/Z825-H62S] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("Chinese courts have sentenced 1,449 people to prison terms of more than five years for involvement in illegal fundraising . . .").

299. Id.


301. See Charles Riley, China Targets Shadow Bankers in Credit Squeeze, CNN MONEY (June 25, 2013, 6:21 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/25/news/economy/china-shadow-banking/ [http://perma.cc/8KBB-9P9A] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("This is no small operation. The shadow banking sector’s exact reach is unknown, but the Fitch ratings agency estimates its size has reached roughly 60% of China’s GDP.").


to have tolerated shadow banking to date in part because it is needed for economic growth.\textsuperscript{304} If access to unregulated loans is curtailed, the government will need to either reform the banking sector to create expanded opportunities for private enterprises or risk dampening the vibrancy of the burgeoning private sector.

2. Tainted Consumer-Product Crimes

The PRC government has occasionally used criminal law to address flagrant, intentional meddling with consumer products, as conspicuously seen in cases like the 2008 milk powder scandal when people were executed for taking bribes that led to infants dying from melamine-tainted formula.\textsuperscript{305} Similarly, "Zheng Xiaoyu, former head of the [State Food and Drug Administration], was executed in 2007 for accepting $850,000 in bribes in exchange for granting approval for hundreds of medicines, some later found to be dangerous."\textsuperscript{306} In light of continuing reports of people dangerously altering consumer products, the time is ripe to consider whether China should put more resources toward prosecuting the culprits, though use of the death penalty is an excessively harsh penalty that is out of step with international trends.\textsuperscript{307}

One explanation for the use of harsh punishments in the tainted food and medicine examples is a retributive sense of moral indignation for the physical harm that the perpetrators' conduct caused. The criminal charges in the aforementioned cases were not framed as murders based on the theory that the tainted products

\textsuperscript{304} See CONG. EXEC. COMM'N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 148 (2013), available at http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2013-annual-report ("Faced with difficulties securing financing, some smaller businesses in recent years reportedly have relied on lending outside the regulated banking system, some forms of which are referred to as 'shadow banking.' A May 2013 report by JP Morgan Chase Bank, Hong Kong, estimated 'shadow banking' in China at 69 percent of GDP and 27 percent of bank assets at the end of 2012.") (internal citations omitted).


\textsuperscript{306} Cheng & Friedrichs, supra note 57, at 242 (internal citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{307} Cf. DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA, at xi (2009) ("Over half the world's nearly 200 nations have abolished the death penalty, and another 44 have stopped executing in practice . . ."); see generally SUSAN TREVASKES, THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 14 (2012) (analyzing how PRC Government policy has ensured "continued use of the death penalty as a mainstay of criminal punishment in rapidly transforming China").
caused the death of people who ingested them.\textsuperscript{308} Rather, the charges were generally based on accepting money for putting the tainted products in the supply chain.\textsuperscript{309} Today, prosecutors may also charge for the food safety violations themselves, with the 2011 revision to the Criminal Law including several new offenses.\textsuperscript{310} However, it was only in May 2013 that the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued the "Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Food-Related Criminal Cases," which provides much-needed concrete guidance on how prosecutors and courts should apply the criminal provisions.\textsuperscript{311} It is too early to know how this guidance will shape the courts' handling of individual cases.

At a minimum, indications are that prosecutions are on the rise. An article in China Daily noted that figures on the number of food safety cases are not publicly available, but, "[i]n 2012, cases concluded by the courts rose 224.62 percent compared with 2011, and 257.48 percent more suspects were convicted."\textsuperscript{312} The problem is that, without actual numbers, these seemingly dramatic percentage increases could mean that only a small number of cases are actually being prosecuted. A 2012 article analyzing the Food Safety Law questioned whether "prosecutions will serve as a consistent deterrent of perverse conduct, rather than a mere way to set an example of severe consequences."\textsuperscript{313} From a utilitarian perspective, harsh, well-publicized punishments might deter others from distributing tainted products, especially if prosecutions are prevalent enough to be a

\textsuperscript{308} LaFraniere, \textit{supra} note 305.

\textsuperscript{309} Id.


credible threat as compared with the legal equivalent of being struck by lightning. If potential wrongdoers are deterred, that will help protect people's physical wellbeing. Taking the utilitarian goals one step further, severe punishment in these cases may also serve a positive end of supporting the economy: people are hesitant to buy milk powder on the Mainland because of fears that even apparently reputable brands might be fake. As a result, Hong Kong faced a shortage of infant formula that prompted legal limits on the amount of formula that could be taken from the territory. Despite the PRC government's assurances that it is addressing problems in the formula industry, parents in the Mainland have good reason to be concerned.

This is not to say that the PRC government does not care about the physical harm caused by tainted products. Instead, it merely posits that the harsh punishments are better understood as also serving the derivative goal of bolstering consumer confidence and, in turn, benefiting the economy. In light of the widespread concerns about consumer products, sporadic prosecutions and assurances from government officials that the food safety situation is "overall stable and getting better" are unlikely to be sufficient to quell concerns: a more comprehensive response is needed. Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, cites the lack of regulatory capacity in China today as a key problem with food safety. Criminal law presents an alternative means of addressing tainted consumer products until such time as the administrative law system is up to the task. Seeing as the
number of criminal prosecutions for food and safety cases is not even publicly available.\(^{320}\) It is hard to see how the threat of prosecution can act as a credible deterrent. One option to consider is developing specialized units within the police and procuratorates that would systematically investigate instances of people adulterating products. Such efforts could help to assuage concerns not only within China but outside as well, as highlighted by the vocal opposition in the United States to the proposed purchase by China’s Shuanghui International of the United States’ Smithfield Foods.\(^{321}\)

To be sure, the government’s choices with respect to using criminal law in service of economic ends is complex: if punishing people who sell tainted consumer products increases consumer confidence, then one might predict that the government would welcome efforts to expose the intentional selling of unsafe products so it could swiftly prosecute and punish the culprits. Yet, if the problem is widespread enough that candid reports of safety violations would make consumers lose faith in the system entirely, then the incentives shift toward punishing those offenders who are in the public eye while trying to squelch reports that might still be kept under wraps. This latter possibility is discussed in Part IV.C below.

3. Intellectual Property Crimes

A third area where more prominent use of criminal law could benefit long-term growth is intellectual property violations. China has long been a source of counterfeit goods, as vividly illustrated by the flood of fake “Beanie Baby” stuffed animals emanating from China in the 1990s, several dozen of which then-U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshevksy embarrassingly brought back from an official trip to China.\(^{322}\) The historical lack of offenses concerning intellectual property is understandable because China traditionally did not share the Western concept of “intellectual

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\(^{320}\) See supra note 312 and accompanying text.


\(^{322}\) See ANDREW C. MERHTA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (2005) (discussing the 1998 “Beaniegate” scandal, in which Barshefsky, who played a “pivotal role in pressuring Beijing to strengthen China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) regime,” purchased forty counterfeit toys in Beijing, violating a U.S. customs rule that prohibited purchasing more than one Beanie Baby abroad).
property," and because it served economic development goals not to enforce intellectual property rights. Admittedly, the emphasis on intellectual property rights by the United States and other Western countries has limited historical roots: the United States' economic development benefited from intellectual property theft early in its history. Foreign pressure and China's desire to join the WTO have helped push the Chinese government to introduce legal protections for intellectual property, though reports of rampant violations persist. In 2009, in response to a claim brought by the United States, a WTO dispute settlement panel found that China's intellectual property rights regime was inconsistent with its

323. See William P. Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 15 (1995) ("Although prior to the twentieth century, the Chinese state oversaw matters of commerce and industry more closely than has typically been recognized, it did not develop comprehensive, centrally promulgated, formal legal protection for either proprietary symbols or inventions.").

324. See, e.g., Alan Cox & Kristina Sepetys, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Litigation, Economic Damages, and Case Strategies, in Doing Business in China § 11.403 (Thompson/West, Supp. 4, 2006) ("From an economic point of view, it may be optimal (in a social welfare sense) for a government to provide only weak IPR early in a country's development, given the substantial consumer surplus costs to IPR protection.").

325. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It Till You Make It: The Good News About China's Knockoff Economy, Foreign Aff., July–Aug. 2013, at 25, 29, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139452/kal-raustiala-and-christopher-sprigman/fake-it-till-you-make-it [http://perma.cc/F9HN-R3PW] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("When the United States was just beginning its rise to wealth and power, it was every bit as much a pirate nation as China is today. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United Kingdom was the primary target of thieving Americans, who focused their economic espionage on the British textile industry.").

326. See Alford, supra note 323, at 30–55 (exploring efforts by foreigners and Chinese reformers to introduce Western ideas of intellectual property in a chapter entitled “Learning the Law at Gunpoint: The Turn-of-the-Century Introduction of Western Notions of Intellectual Property”); Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? 76 (2007) ("Implementation of intellectual property rights remains a concern, although China has now bowed to pressure from the US and other developed countries to rely more heavily on criminal punishments to deter IP violations.").


328. See Bryan Mercurio, The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property in China Since Accession to the WTO: Progress and Retreat, China Persp., no. 2012/1, 2012, at 23, 24, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152429 [http://perma.cc/6M XC-KHKK] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) ("Membership in the WTO has done nothing to curtail the infringements; ironically, liberalised trade policies...coupled with the rise of the Internet and e-commerce has led to a dramatic rise in counterfeiting and piracy over the last decade."); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 325, at 25 ("Although estimates of the cost of Chinese piracy to the U.S. economy vary widely and are sensitive to assumptions, the U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that in 2011 alone, the figure was nearly $50 billion.").
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.329

The Chinese government’s hesitancy to use the full force of criminal law against intellectual property violations is understandable because this approach has historically benefited economic growth: “The China State Council in 2003 estimated that the market value of counterfeit goods was $19–24 billion annually. Based on the $7 trillion worth of total retail sales of consumer goods in China, counterfeiting is a very sizeable activity in the nation’s economy.”330 This calculus may finally be changing: if China succeeds in turning itself into an innovation economy and in developing name brands with domestic and global appeal,331 then the government may have greater incentives to suppress counterfeit goods.332 Beyond counterfeit consumer goods, as China continues its push to increase the number of patents and to develop other forms of intellectual property held by Chinese firms,333 greater incentives to use criminal law might follow.334 In the United States, the Department of Justice


332. Here, Taiwan’s experience might be instructive: Taiwan expanded intellectual property protections over the past two decades in part because of foreign pressure but also because of domestic constituents’ concerns. See ALFORD, supra note 323, at 108 (“Taiwan’s explosive economic expansion, increasing awareness of the need for indigenous technology, ever-more-pluralistic political and intellectual life, growing commitment to formal legal processes, and international aspirations have made evident the need for intellectual property law and nurtured domestic constituencies with good reasons for supporting it.”).


334. See, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra note 70, at 365 (“[C]hinese inventors are beginning to find it worthwhile to start protecting their own intellectual property.”);
has stepped up protection of trade secrets by using the Economic Espionage Act. As China deepens its domestic intellectual property, perhaps a Chinese version of the Economic Espionage Act will be on the not-so-distant horizon.

Avenues for protecting intellectual property rights will become increasingly of concern as China cultivates indigenous intellectual property. As in other countries, private suits might become an important channel for resolving disputes. China's 2012 white paper on intellectual property rights protection reports that, in 2012, there were 87,419 civil cases involving intellectual property issues, an increase of 46 percent year-on-year. Yet the relatively weak civil courts may not be fully up to the task. The 2012 white paper further reports that the number of criminal cases involving intellectual property hit 13,104 in 2012, up 130 percent year-on-year.

The PRC government already has the ability to subject intellectual property violations to extremely harsh punishments, as seen in the case of Xiao Zhenjiang, who was sentenced to life in prison in 2012 for counterfeiting Hermès bags. The sentence appears to be based on a violation of Article 140 of the Criminal Law, which criminalizes "Producing and Marketing Fake or Substandard Commodities" and calculates the length of sentence based on the estimated value of the goods. Nonetheless, the attention paid to this case suggests that such prosecutions remain relatively rare. If the significant percentage increase in criminal intellectual property cases in 2012 continues, criminal law may play an increasingly prominent role in a long-term strategy to protect intellectual property rights.

Cox & Sepetys, supra note 324, § 11.403 ("Although a weak IPR regime may support technological growth and development in the short run through imitation, it also serves to discourage domestic innovation, which is a long-run driver of economic growth.").


337. Id.


4. Environmental Crimes

Environmental harms are ripe for more thoughtful use of criminal penalties because of their nexus with economic growth. As with intellectual property violations, this is an area where a lax approach might have actually benefitted economic growth to date:

As has been long true in the United States, Canada, and other Western nations, Chinese industrial enterprises have privileged maximizing productivity and profit over protecting citizens from the harmful consequences of exposure to pollution. In the Western nations, however, more egregious forms of industrial and business-related polluting have been criminalized since the 1970s. In China, legal constraints on polluting have been largely absent. Environmental crime law has only been adopted in China fairly recently.\(^340\)

However, the era of "pollute first, control later" is waning, and the push to develop at the expense of the environment is shifting.\(^341\) Reports that living in Beijing's noxious air is at times worse than living in a smoking lounge are but one example of the severe environmental strain that threatens the health of China's citizens, China's production capabilities (e.g., pollution as threatening production processes that require clean water), and China's ability to retain and draw human capital.\(^342\) The PRC government can no longer convincingly say that environmental protection must wait until China reaches some future benchmark of economic development. The dire state of China's environment even threatens to erode progress made to date.\(^343\)

China has adopted various environmental laws and regulations since the draft version of the Environmental Protection Law was first

341. See Sterne, supra note 142, at 25 ("The 1980s and 1990s was the era of 'pollute first, control later' (xian wuran, hou zhili) and, especially in rural areas, industrialization was key to economic expansion.").
343. See Elizabeth Economy, The Great Leap Backward? The Cost of China's Environmental Crisis, 86 FOREIGN AFF., no. 5, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 38 ("As Pan Yue, a vice minister of China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), warned in 2005, "The [economic] miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace."); see also Zhang, supra note 274.
implemented in 1979. Yet, it was not until the Hu-Wen government that the PRC leadership stepped up environmental rhetoric with, for example, former Premier Wen Jiabao stressing in a 2006 speech “the importance of moving from a mindset of cleaning up after economic development to a simultaneous emphasis on environmental protection and economic growth.” The mindset is slow to change in part because evaluation systems for local officials continue to prioritize economic growth over environmental protection, though environmental targets have been elevated in the evaluation system. Consequently, while there is no shortage of environmental laws on the books, implementation of those laws remains limited.

The 1979 Criminal Law did not use the term environmental crimes, though broad provisions like Crimes of Endangering Public Security could include environmental damage, such as spreading poisonous materials. The current Criminal Law includes a section on “Crimes of Impairing the Protection of Environment and Resources,” which provides for up to 7 years in prison for people who discharge pollutants. A separate section, under “Crimes of Endangering Public Security,” even permits use of the death penalty for anyone who “sets fire, breaches dikes, causes explosions, and spreads poison; employs other dangerous means that lead to serious injuries or death; or causes public or private property major losses . . . .” The first reported conviction under this provision occurred in 2011 when the chairman of Biaoxin Chemical Company was sentenced to 11 years in prison for “spreading poison.” A provision under “Crimes of Dereliction of Duty” authorizes prison time for “[w]ork personnel of state organs in charge of environmental protection and supervision, whose serious irresponsibility has

344. See STERN, supra note 142, at 38 (listing topic-specific environmental laws, such as the 1982 Marine Pollution Law and the 1984 Water Pollution Law).
345. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
346. See id. at 27 (“The nub of the problem is an evaluation system that ties officials’ career prospects to goals that prioritize economic growth and tamping down protest.”); Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 365 (“[E]xamining why and how Chinese leaders have elevated environmental priorities through the cadre evaluation system.”).
347. Wang, supra note 346, at 367 (“Although China has constructed an expansive environmental law framework over the past 30 years, implementation of laws and regulations in practice has been notoriously weak.”); see also id. at pt. 3 (explaining recent elevation of environmental priorities that have “expanding, however modestly, environmental protection as a stand-alone normative value”).
350. Id. at art. 115.
351. STERN, supra note 142, at 41.
resulted in serious consequences, including severe environmental pollution that causes serious damages to public and private property or human casualties . . . "352 References to criminal sanctions are also found in laws directed at environmental protection.353

The pressing question is whether these laws are being strategically used against serious large-scale polluters or rather only in a scattershot manner against small-scale polluters. As with food safety cases, the nationwide number of criminal environmental cases is unclear, though the Ministry of Public Security noted in July 2013 that it has “finished investigating 112 environmental pollution cases since January.” A study by Professor Rachel Stern of court decisions from an environmental court in Guiyang City found that “the typical environmental criminal had no more than a middle school education and lacked legal representation.”355 Based on this snapshot of one court, Stern raised the concern that “[t]he majority of defendants are not hardened polluters, but some of China’s least educated, most disadvantaged citizens.”356 While recognizing the limits of extrapolating from this one data point, the findings at least raise concerns regarding whether China is effectively using criminal law in the environmental sphere. If China is to seriously address its brewing environmental catastrophe and work toward true environmental, and in turn economic, sustainability, a more assertive use of criminal law could well be in order. But the focus should be on the major polluters, like the Biaoxin Chemical Company chairman, not on poor, rural residents who accidentally set fires or engage in small-scale illegal logging.

Developments in the summer of 2013 indicated that the PRC government may step up its use of criminal law against polluters. A July 17, 2013, opinion piece in the Legal Daily called for the revised Environmental Protection Law to “grow teeth” by including clearer punishments besides fines.357 On June 17, 2013, the Supreme

353. See Yang, Head & Liu, supra note 348, at 157 (“Several of these environmental laws include provisions for criminal sanctions. Typically, however, the provisions do not specify in detail either the elements of the crime or the punishment to be imposed.”).
356. Id.
357. See Liu Wujun (刘武俊), Rang Xin Huanbao Fa Zhang Chu “Yachi” Lai (让环保法长出“牙齿”来), Fazhi Ribao (法制日报) [Let the New Environmental Protection
People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate jointly issued an interpretation detailing standards for handling criminal cases of environmental pollution. When releasing the interpretation, an official from the Supreme People's Court stated, “At present, environmental pollution is very serious across the country, which seriously harms the ecological environment and poses a great threat to people's health and property safety.” The interpretation clarifies the evidentiary standards for proving serious environmental harms, which indicates a move to make it easier for prosecutors to use the Criminal Law in pollution cases. Regarding property damage, the interpretation clarifies that the phrase “especially serious consequences” in Articles 338 and 339 of the Criminal Law regarding dumping of hazardous or solid waste includes when public economic losses are more than 300,000 Renminbi ($49,000). The most serious incidents of pollution are even subject to the death penalty.

While it is questionable whether the death penalty is ever an appropriate punishment, imposing severe punishments short of execution is understandable in light of increasing evidence that pollution is significantly reducing people's lifespans. Even if a polluter's intent is not to cause physical harm, Should it be criminal


358. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Huanjing Wuran Xingshi Anjian Shiyoung Falu Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理环境污染刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Environmental Pollution], (June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Environmental Interpretation].


361. Environmental Interpretation, supra note 358, at art. 3.

362. See Pollution Crimes to Be Severely Punished, CHINA DAILY (June 19, 2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-06/19/content_16638624.htm [http://perma.cc/JAK3-VL6Y] (archived Jan. 19, 2014) (“In the most serious cases the death penalty could be handed down.”).

363. See Yuyu Chen et al., Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to Air Pollution on Life Expectancy from China's Huai River Policy, PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., May 28, 2013, at 1 (stating in a study of suspended particulates air pollution that, “the analysis suggests that long-term exposure to an additional 100 μg/m3 of TSPs is associated with a reduction in life expectancy at birth of about 3.0 y”); see also Darren Weedarren, Ex-Health Minister Endorses Finding China's Smog Kills 350,000 a Year, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 7, 2014) (“Air pollution causes 350,000 to 500,000 premature deaths on the mainland a year, according to an article co-written by a former health minister.”).
homicide based on negligence or recklessness to end someone’s life prematurely as a result of pollution?

5. Employment-Related Crimes

Lax enforcement of wage and workplace standards may have helped China’s economic growth to date, but more stringent standards could now benefit the sophisticated, higher-value-added economy that China’s leaders are working to build.\(^{364}\) Turning a blind eye to unsafe working conditions allows for cost cutting in the production process, which in turn arguably helped fuel China’s economy, particularly with respect to the export market.\(^{365}\) At the same time, failing to take stern measures to discourage egregious employer practices can lead to disastrous consequences, as when over a hundred people died in a fire at a poultry processing plant.\(^{366}\) That fire was reminiscent of the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in New York City\(^{367}\) where reportedly all but one exit was locked and managers had failed to hold required safety drills.\(^{368}\) In early June 2013, high-level employees were taken into criminal custody in

\(^{364}\) Cf. Karel Eloot, Alan Huand & Martin Lehnich, A New Era for Manufacturing in China, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/manufacturing/a_new_era_for_manufacturing_in_china (“As labor costs rise and slowing growth dampens the ability of China’s steadily rising industrial output to deliver regular productivity gains, manufacturers there will need to strive for global levels of operational excellence.”).

\(^{365}\) See supra note 273 and accompanying text.

\(^{366}\) See Jilin Bao Yuan Feng Qin Ye Youxian Gongsyi Huozai Yi Queren Zaocchong 119 Ren Siwang (吉林宝源丰禽业有限公司火灾已确认造成 119 人死亡) [119 People Already Confirmed Dead in Fire at Jilin Bao Yuan Feng Poultry Co. Ltd.], (June 3, 2013), http://www.infzm.com/content/91201. As a separate, less expansive, example, at the time of writing, labor groups were raising allegations that workplace conditions were responsible for deaths at facilities in China that manufactured iPhones, though the manufacturers contend that the deaths were not work related. See Eva Dou & Paul Mozur, IPhone-Factory Deaths Dog Apple and Supplier, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023042022045792519138985555706.


In another extreme case from 2007, forced labor in brick kilns that was enabled by lax, if not blatantly corrupt, officials led to only a handful of prosecutions and resulted in public outrage.\textsuperscript{370}

Workers' more common complaints involve less severe grievances regarding health and safety conditions as well as unpaid wages.\textsuperscript{371} Grievances against employers have generally not resulted in criminal cases, though the tides may be turning: a new provision on malicious failure to pay wages was introduced to the Criminal Law in 2011.\textsuperscript{372}

In January 2013, the Supreme People's Court issued an interpretation clarifying language in the new provision, including what circumstances are serious enough to warrant the most severe penalty of 7 years in prison.\textsuperscript{373} In part, a new push for greater labor protection might come from rising expectations of workers who are no longer satisfied to simply have a job, even if it entails poor working conditions.\textsuperscript{374} Perhaps criminal law will act as a temporary backstop if the current cumbersome process of settling labor disputes through mediation and arbitration is not satisfying increasing worker demands.\textsuperscript{375} And, if China is to fulfill its leaders' stated goals of
becoming a "moderately prosperous society" by 2020,\textsuperscript{376} perhaps greater emphasis on satisfactory working conditions is needed as China moves up the value chain from labor-intensive to more skill-intensive activities.

6. Summary: Supporting the Socialist Market Economy

With all of the above five areas, criminal law provides a direct mechanism for the government to deter activities that threaten to impede China's economic prospects. Despite occasional use of criminal law, there appears to be significant room for China to mount a more assertive attack on these areas, which will require greater resources and willpower. A lax approach toward regulating financial markets, poor environmental controls, unpunished intellectual property violations, and unregulated workplace conditions might have helped China's economic success story over the last 35 years. Recent trends suggest that this recipe for success may have run its course and a new approach might be warranted.

If China seeks to rethink its use of criminal law, foreign examples could be useful. Although the wholesale transplantation of foreign laws has proven problematic at best, China's exploration of new ways to target economic misdeeds is an area where foreign assistance could be helpful. For example, in 2011, China enacted a law that bars bribery of foreign officials.\textsuperscript{377} This new law has parallels in the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).\textsuperscript{378} The U.S. Department of Justice has decades of experience with prosecutions under the FCPA and has used the law with renewed vigor in recent years.\textsuperscript{379} Similarly, perhaps prosecutors from the


\textsuperscript{379} See, e.g., Benjamin Gruenstein, Upswing in FCPA Cases Results in Increased Judicial Oversight, N.Y. L.J. (SPECIAL SECTION), July 8, 2013 (noting the frequency of FCPA cases).
Southern District of New York, which includes the financial hub of Manhattan, could be of help to their counterparts in Shanghai. Academic exchanges offer another fruitful avenue for cooperation. For example, in March 2013, “Emory Law faculty traveled to Shanghai to train the financial crimes unit of the Shanghai prosecutor’s office on the investigation of insider trading claims.” At a minimum, greater consideration of how foreign experience can be helpful to China in discrete areas of law, as opposed to wide-scale legal reforms, is worth further study.

B. Limited Exposing of Financial Misdeeds by Officials

Despite indications of increased interest in targeting financial crimes, the government has stopped far short of using the full capabilities of criminal law to address financial misdeeds by those in its ranks. Chinese leaders are not alone in having amassed significant wealth after taking office but there are serious questions about whether that wealth is from entirely legal dealings.

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382. Andrew Wedeman, Xi Jinping’s Anti-corruption Campaign and the Third Plenum, UNIV. OF NOTTINGHAM (Nov. 15, 2013), http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/15/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-and-the-third-plenum/reviewing-prosecutions-for-corruption-in-2012-and-the-first-8-months-of-2013-and-commenting-that，“[i]f the two sets of data are comparable,. . . the more recent data would suggest that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has not produced much of an increase in the number of officials charged with corruption.”); id. (“At the Third Plenum in November 2013, corruption received surprisingly little attention. . . . The lack of attention to corruption during the plenum likely signals Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has run its course and that it will be allowed to quietly die down.”).

383. For U.S. presidents, the most significant gains appear to occur after they leave office. See Richest Presidents from Washington to Clinton, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/02/16/richest-usapresidents/1923739/ [http://perma.cc/XBF5-B48R] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (“One thing remains clear: it pays to be president, especially after leaving office.”).

As discussed in Part III.B above, corruption is by its nature difficult to measure because, when successful, it is conducted in the dark. Despite the lack of accurate data, the general perception among the PRC populace is that the prevalence of corruption is on the rise. 385 The scale of corruption might also be in flux. 386 The leadership understandably fears that exposing corrupt officials might backfire and, instead of enhancing public support, lead people to conclude that the government is rotten to the core. 387 Recent rhetoric nonetheless suggests that the new leadership might take a harder stance. Xi Jinping has talked of using a “cage of regulations” to curtail corrupt dealings. 388 And initial moves to curb extravagant banquets and other perquisites of government jobs signal that President Xi’s words might have real force. 389 Nevertheless, the Party’s hesitancy about exposing misdeeds among its own counsels that his words should be taken with cautious enthusiasm.

This is not to say that the PRC leadership has been completely lax with respect to corruption:

In sum, the data on cases handled by the judicial system reveal that on average 20,000 individuals are convicted on corruption-related charges each year and that about half of these go to prison. Furthermore, we have evidence that hundreds of officials have either been executed or sent to prison for life after being convicted of corruption. The claim that corrupt officials get off with a mere slap on the wrist is thus unsustainable. 390


386.  See Wedeman, supra note 218, at 895 ("Corruption thus ‘intensified’ in the sense that high-level, big-stakes corruption increased more rapidly than ‘ordinary’ corruption and other forms of official malfeasance.").

387.  Wedeman, supra note 382 (quoting Xi Jinping as stating that “[a] mass of facts tells us that if corruption becomes increasingly serious, it will inevitably doom the party and the state. We must be vigilant. In recent years, there have been cases of grave violations of disciplinary rules and laws within the party that have been extremely malign in nature and utterly destructive politically, shocking people to the core.").


390.  WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 152.
Then-Premier Zhu Rongji made this point bluntly when responding to a question by a German journalist at a 2000 press conference: "The Chinese have made tremendous achievements in its anti-corruption fight in recent years. Did your countries execute as many corrupt criminals as we did?" In the limited cases where the PRC government decides to prosecute its own, it arguably does so with greater vigor than cases against government officials in other countries. That said, a basic premise of deterrence is that not only must the threatened punishment be severe enough to deter criminal behavior, but the would-be criminal must also believe that there is a credible threat that his behavior will be discovered and prosecuted. The Chinese idiom expressing deterrence, "killing the chicken to scare the monkey" (sha ji jing hou, 杀鸡儆猴), only works when the monkey actually believes he too might share the chicken's fate. As the Wukan example discussed in Part III.B indicates, at present, the proverbial monkeys do not seem particularly scared.

The failure of the government to use criminal law aggressively against its own members is not due to a lack of legal tools by which to do so. For instance, as previously mentioned, the Criminal Law criminalizes illicit enrichment—a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he cannot explain in relation to his lawful income. The law even gives prosecutors a helping hand by partially shifting the burden of proof: if the government shows there are disproportionate assets, the defendant must explain the sources of these assets. The government has used this provision sparingly. Nor has the government made substantial use of prophylactic measures such as requiring that officials and close family members


392. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 77, at 133 ("In some ways, China takes corruption more seriously in that corrupt officials are more likely to be prosecuted based on the core offense rather than ancillary crimes such as fraud or tax evasion, and serious offenses carry the death penalty, whereas in the USA the worst punishment is a definite term of imprisonment.").

393. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 2-3 (1998) (explaining literature "on the link between perceptions of sanction risk and severity to self-reported crime and delinquency" and noting that, "with few exceptions, the perceptual studies find that self-reported criminality is lower among people who perceive that sanction risks and costs are higher").


395. See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.

396. Lewis, supra note 294, at 338–40.

397. Id. at 334 n.187.
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publicly disclose assets. When the chief editor of the Global Times, a government-run newspaper, posted on his weibo microblog that he thought "it is unrealistic to immediately have all officials publicly disclose their assets," a slew of angry comments followed. The post was deleted by the following morning.

It must be highlighted that, in addition to the formal criminal law, the Party's own disciplinary process serves as a quasi-criminal justice system for Party members, as mentioned with regard to the Wukan example. It is common practice for misdeeds by Party members, especially high-ranking ones, to be dealt with first, and potentially exclusively, by the Party apparatus. The Party can revoke Party membership and official posts (shuangkai, 双开) and detain members for questioning at a designated time and place (shuanggui, 双规) for months or even longer. Formal criminal punishment requires transferring the case to the procuratorate for handling. If and when this transfer occurs, the suspect's fate is largely a foregone conclusion. The intersection of Party and criminal measures received international attention in 2012 when Bo Xilai, the former head of Chongqing municipality and rising star in the Party, was ousted from his government posts and stripped of his high-ranking positions because of allegations of...
corruption and abuse of power. Bo was not formally indicted until July 2013. Following his August trial, Bo was convicted of taking bribes, embezzlement, and abuse of power and was sentenced to life in prison. The Party discipline procedures were also invoked in the high-profile cases of a former Shanghai Party secretary, Chen Liangyu, and a former Beijing Party secretary, Chen Xitong.

Outside of such high-profile cases that receive protracted media attention, it is difficult to know how Party disciplinary procedures are used because of the lack of transparency. According to a China Daily report, “Nearly 73,000 people were punished for corruption or dereliction of duty in 2012.” The report did not specify how many of those people also faced criminal charges.

It is possible that the current combination of Party sanctions, administrative sanctions, and use of the formal criminal justice system will be enough to placate the Chinese people that the leadership is mounting a sufficient attack against corruption. More likely, however, is that Xi Jinping and his colleagues will face increasingly vocal demands to root out and punish corrupt officials. The leadership’s challenge, and a tricky one at that, will be to do this while simultaneously convincing the public that the CCP’s monopoly on power should continue.

The new top leaders are arguably in a better position to do this early in their tenure because, while they were all high-ranking officials before being elevated to top posts, it


410. See WEDEMAN, supra note 141, at 11 (explaining uncertainties in data regarding CCP disciplinary actions). As another alternative to criminal sanctions for corruption involving state officials, the Ministry of Supervision lacks judicial authority but can impose “various administrative sanctions, with dismissal from office being the harshest.” Id. at 146.

411. Xi Jinping Vows “Power Within Cage of Regulations,” supra note 388.

412. Cf. Minxin Pei, China’s Three Challenges in 2014, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 12, 2014), http://thedipломат.com/2014/01/chinas-three-challenges-in-2014/ (“The second major challenge that Xi faces in 2014 is sustaining his highly popular—and hugely risky—anti-corruption campaign. Given that Xi has ruled out mobilizing the Chinese public to support his reform plans, his only means of forcing the bureaucracy to comply with his agenda is the threat of corruption investigations and prosecutions.”).
was only after rising to the pinnacle of power that they had the stature to mount a more widespread, vigorous campaign.\textsuperscript{413}

President Xi himself was quick to state that he would take down both “tigers and flies” (laohu cangying, 老虎苍蝇), a reference to high-ranking officials and lowly bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{414} Bo Xilai’s conviction was a very high-profile downfall of a tiger, though questions persist as to whether Bo’s fate is more of an indication of a purge of Xi Jinping’s political foes than a broader effort to root out corruption.\textsuperscript{415} Even if President Xi’s campaign manifests as a selective political purge rather than a broad-scale attack on corruption, considering the current vacuum when it comes to an alternative to CCP rule, a “better the devil you know” attitude might add to the current government’s resilience in the face of public pressure. What no one knows is how far China’s “resilient authoritarianism” can stretch before it cracks.\textsuperscript{416} Before this point, the new leadership needs to convince the public that they are charting a course for continued economic growth in an atmosphere not beset by corruption.

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C. Targeting Potentially Destabilizing Elements
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In view of the government’s overriding concern with maintaining social stability as a foundation for stable economic growth, the PRC leadership has leaned on criminal law as a convenient tool to silence people who expose problems that might engender social unrest.\textsuperscript{417} There is no indication that the new leadership has renounced this practice and, in light of widespread concerns over issues like pollution and food safety that threaten the government’s legitimacy, there is

\textsuperscript{413} For a discussion of the shift in power from the fourth to fifth generation leaders and speculation about the continuing influence of retired leaders, see China’s New Leadership and Implications for the United States: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n (Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Christopher K. Johnson, Senior Advisor and Freeman Chair in China Studies, The Center for Strategic and International Studies) (“Although it is unclear whether Xi will face the same kind of substantial meddling from his retired predecessors that seemingly plagued Hu’s tenure, early indications would suggest otherwise.”).


\textsuperscript{417} See infra note 420–31 and accompanying text.
reason to be concerned that the leadership might increasingly invoke criminal sanctions.

Here, criminal law is not necessarily being used to directly target activities that are seen as detrimental to the economy but rather to keep a lid on greater social tensions that might derail growth. Moreover, when used in this fashion, criminal law is not targeting people who are creating the social harm (e.g., the polluted water or poisonous vegetables). Instead, the focus is on people who are exposing the social harm. China is far from alone in bringing specious criminal charges against people who challenge the government, but pressing concerns about a slowing economy and accelerating social unrest make an inquiry into criminal law's relationship with stability and economic growth particularly timely.

Interestingly, in targeting people seen as potentially destabilizing elements, the government has sometimes prosecuted economic crimes in a manner that suggests the real concern is not the defendant's alleged financial misdeeds but rather other activities. This approach was prominently seen in three cases involving economic crimes with the subtext that the government was concerned that the activities were inciting public anger toward the government. First, artist and vocal government critic Ai Weiwei received international attention when he was detained on suspicion of economic crimes. In an interview with the New York Times, Ai's mother stated, "Economic crimes! They say one thing now and another later. It's ridiculous." Second, in 2009, Xu Zhiyong, a public interest lawyer and founder of the Open Constitution (Gongmeng) legal group, was...

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419. See A Lot to be Angry About, THE ECONOMIST (May 1, 2008, 12:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/11293734 (archived Jan. 19, 2014) (analyzing China's tactics of persecuting activists to quell social unrest); see also CONG. EXEC. COMM'N ON CHINA, supra note 304, at 87 ("A prominent Guangdong province-based Buddhist leader, Wu Zeheng, also known as Zen Master Xing Wu, has been monitored and harassed since his release from prison for 'economic crimes' in 2010.").


421. Id.
arrested for tax evasion. 422 Xu had come under increasing government scrutiny for his involvement in sensitive cases, such as the 2008 milk powder scandal. 423 The charges were eventually dismissed, but Xu later faced other criminal charges, including “inciting subversion of state power,” in connection with his legal advocacy. 424 In 2013, Xu continued to criticize the government’s actions when speaking to reporters while under house arrest: “The party promised to publish officials’ assets 30 years ago, something it has yet to do . . . Clearly the government is afraid of this demand.” 425 The government was afraid enough to arrest him in July 2013 on trumped up charges of gathering people to disturb public order. 426 In January 2014, Xu was sentenced to 4 years in prison. 427

Third, in 2007, after exposing severe industrial pollution in Lake Tai, environmental activist Wu Lihong was sentenced to 3 years in

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427. Eva Pils & Joshua Rosenzweig, Beijing Confronts a New Type of Dissent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2014, at A11 (“[T]he Chinese authorities have made it clear that they will not tolerate the New Citizen Movement he helped to launch, because the kind of China it advocates . . . would be a radical departure from what China is now.”).
prison for allegedly extorting money from one of the polluters.\textsuperscript{428} According to censorship watchers, Wu's case was on the official list of topics that should be removed from websites.\textsuperscript{429} Rather than use criminal law to target polluters, here the government targeted a person exposing pollution. The possibility that others could follow in Wu Lihong's footsteps is very real: a Chinese lawyer was told in 2013 that the extent of soil pollution remains a state secret—\textsuperscript{430} simply having state secrets in one's possession can lead to a three-year prison term under the Criminal Law.\textsuperscript{431}

In all three of these cases, the government's underlying concern appeared to be that the wheels were going to come off the current governmental structure, and criminal law was a convenient way to quiet people who were vocally challenging the government's lack of action to redress problems. Ai Weiwei may indeed have deprived the state of funds that were legitimately owed and thus have committed the criminal offense of tax evasion.\textsuperscript{432} Even if those allegations are true, however, his case is better understood as addressing the destabilizing threat he poses far beyond the dollar amount of the alleged criminal infraction. More recently, a spate of arrests of anticorruption protestors (including Xu Zhiyong) in 2013 indicates that, despite President Xi’s calls for a stepped-up response to corruption, criminal law may be used against people who expose corruption rather than people who engage in corrupt activities.\textsuperscript{433} There is admittedly the possibility that people are not exposing government misdeeds for altruistic reasons but instead for personal


\textsuperscript{431} PRC Criminal Law, supra note 115, at art. 282 (2011 version).


gain—or even that people will fabricate “evidence” to blackmail officials. This possibility is reason to encourage more careful analysis of allegations but should not be used as an excuse to attack a wide swath of people who are voicing what could well be legitimate complaints.

Using criminal law to silence the government’s critics could enhance social stability in the immediate term and, in turn, help economic growth. Completing this feedback loop, economic growth could then help enhance social stability. Deng Xiaoping captured this stability-enhancing function of economic growth in a statement made shortly before the military opened fire on protestors on June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square:

The economy is still the base; if we didn't have that economic base, the farmers would have risen in rebellion after only ten days of student protests—never mind a whole month. But as it is, the villages are stable all over the country, and the workers are basically stable too.

The question is whether, at some point, the general populace will have an “emperor has no clothes” moment and fundamentally question the government’s tactics: Will a critical mass challenge the leadership to explain why they are silencing people who are exposing societal ills that threaten to impede China’s long-term, healthy economic growth? Surely Xu Zhiyong and others who have put themselves personally at risk of government retribution would say that the disclosure they advocate is essential for China’s sustained growth. More generally, a crucial question going forward is to what extent criminal law can serve as a strategic means of perpetuating the Party’s lock on power.

Preliminary statements by Xi Jinping hinted that the new leadership might move away from the prior administration’s emphasis on sternly enforced “stability maintenance.” As with skepticism surrounding the recent anticorruption rhetoric, history cautions that the government is unlikely to relax its tight grip on


436. See Willy Lam, Beijing Plays Up the Carrot While Still Wielding the Stick, CHINA BRIEF, July 19, 2012, at 3–5 (describing the CCP’s strategy for handling opposition with more conciliatory responses).
society by, for example, allowing for greater freedoms of speech and assembly.\textsuperscript{437} Only time will tell whether a myopic focus on short-term growth will slow China from addressing festering problems that will impede long-term economic prospects.\textsuperscript{438}

V. CONCLUSION

In short, criminal law matters in China's story of economic development. This Article has sought to conceptualize criminal law in China as a partial alternative to functioning administrative and civil law systems. In doing so, it is but an opening salvo fired in hopes of broadening the law and development discourse with respect to both China and other countries.

Specifically regarding China's reform path, the 2013 report on China's future economic prospects by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China's State Council asserts, "Over the past three decades, proactive policy change has been key to China's economic success, and the calls for reforms within the country have never been louder."\textsuperscript{439} Accordingly, this Article has argued that policy choices with respect to criminal law have been an underappreciated aspect of China's past economic success.

Turning to the future, if the economy slows, Will the government look more to criminal law to clamp down on dissent if the implicit bargain of a populace accepting limited civil and political rights in exchange for an increased standard of living breaks down? Will prosecutions for economic crimes increasingly become a substitute, albeit a questionable one, for broader reforms? Perhaps only limited reforms are possible under the current CCP-run government and deeper political change is needed before criminal law will sincerely and robustly be used to address areas that threaten long-term economic growth, such as corruption and food safety. Even within the limitations of the current government, there is arguably much that the government can and should do to be smart in using criminal law to encourage a thriving economy. At the same time, there is much that the leadership should not do, including, most notably,


\textsuperscript{438} Cf. Minzer, supra note 69, at 960–62 (warning that long-term stability is threatened because of the government's approach of using "a short-term reaction to particular expressions of social unrest or public outrage, not a response to the underlying cause").

\textsuperscript{439} World Bank, China 2030, supra note 8, at 65.
aggressively clamping down on citizens who are exposing problems that threaten to decelerate China's economy.

Forecasting China's future is a tricky business. That said, this Article anticipates that the PRC government will react to public dissatisfaction with the economic environment by pursuing a two-prong approach. First, the government will continue to use criminal law in the ways outlined above to promote economic growth as measured by macroeconomic indicators. Second, as indicated by government statements, China will simultaneously start to pay more attention to a broader conception of development that goes beyond sheer GDP to incorporate distributional concerns. It has been nearly 30 years since Deng Xiaoping said that China should “let some people get rich first” (rang yibufen ren xian fu qilai, 让一部分人先富起来). Today, many people are left wondering whether, in reality, the statement is more accurate without the “first.” The PRC government is grappling with the difficult task of trying to convince the public that it can deliver not only sustained economic growth but also more balanced economic growth. As China's new leaders chart a path toward more equitable growth, the question remains whether they will harness the power of criminal law against people engaging in corruption, fraud, and other economically detrimental activities while simultaneously giving space for more vocal participation by...
citizens exposing conduct that is eating at the fabric of China's future economic health.

Widening the lens, China's experience raises the question of whether criminal law has made an underappreciated contribution to other countries' economic development. Even if that contribution is difficult to quantify, at a minimum it is worth exploring in more depth what economic goals might be behind governments' decisions when shaping criminal law. As a historical example, "[i]n England, death was a possible punishment for many thieves; in [colonial] Massachusetts, only for repeaters." To what extent does severe punishment of theft express the community's moral outrage as compared with more instrumental goals of supporting economic ends: "In [colonial] Virginia, hogs were more vital than sheep; stealing hogs, then, was a more serious crime than stealing sheep." In today's world of complex financial transactions far beyond the trading of livestock, the ways in which criminal law may foster economic growth are tremendously textured and varied, as China's example suggests. How countries balance the possible economic benefits of harsh, swift punishments with other values, such as support for procedural due process and concerns about overincarceration, is an ongoing challenge that deserves greater study.

A 2012 legal note by the World Bank indicates that perhaps the conversation may be widening to address criminal law in a direct manner: "Bank interventions in the criminal justice sector are permitted under the Bank's mandate," provided the Bank is satisfied that: "(a) the proposed intervention is grounded in an appropriate and objective economic rationale showing that the intervention is relevant to the overall economic development of the country in which it is to be carried out . . . ." Having now recognized that the World Bank can take a more active role in issues involving criminal law, the more exciting question is whether it will indeed take on this role. The 2013 joint China-World Bank report is ripe for a criminal law addendum.

444. FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 33.
445. Id. at 37–38.
446. WORLD BANK, supra note 91, at 6, 14.