The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War

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I. INTRODUCTION

The War of 1812 seems an improbable source for answers to modern questions about the President’s power as Commander in Chief.1 James Madison was not a strong wartime President and the office of Commander in Chief did not really come into its own until Lincoln took the helm almost half a century later.2 Modern scholarship on the President’s war powers has little time for the first declared war of the new republic,3 dubbed “Mr. Madison’s war” by contemporaries who opposed it.4

The war on terrorism—so different from the rows of British soldiers descending on America from the North during the winter of 1813—has, however, generated a series of federal court cases that find interesting parallels in state court cases from that first declared war. These modern cases challenge the military detentions in the United States of those deemed “enemy combatants,”5 confronting us with pressing and difficult questions

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1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
4 See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 537 (1971).
5 The term “enemy combatant” refers broadly to those captured during wartime who are affiliated with the enemy. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III) (“Persons captured during wartime are often referred to as ‘enemy combatants.’”); see also American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants 7 (August 8, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy_combatants.pdf (“The term ‘enemy combatant’ is not a term of
about the President’s power as Commander in Chief. These questions include the scope of the President’s inherent authority to detain U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants,” the importance of congressional authorization in determining the scope of the President’s constitutional authority, and the appropriate role of international law in domestic constitutional interpretation. During the War of 1812, the young nation faced similar issues. Over the course of that war, courts issued writs of habeas corpus to and awarded damages against military commanders in the field who detained U.S. citizens suspected of aiding the enemy. These early cases thus suggest that the President lacks inherent constitutional authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. Cases from the War of 1812 also engaged other key questions of relevance today. An 1814 U.S. Supreme Court case, for example, used international law to help interpret the scope of the President’s constitutional authority during war. The modern enemy combatant cases flirt with this idea, often vaguely invoking international law without explaining why. Then, too, cases arising out of General Andrew Jackson’s military rule in New Orleans provide a counter-history to modern dogma about judicial restraint in the face of military authority during times of war.

Although perhaps tempting, it would be wrong to dismiss these cases as mere anachronisms. Fought on our own territory against a powerful adversary, the War of 1812 allows us to consider judicial responses to military authority in a time of grave national peril. Moreover, the War of 1812 is the only declared war from which we might draw even arguably contemporaneous conclusions about the founding generation’s view of the relation-


7 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); see infra Part IV.A.

8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi IV) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (reasoning that “Hamdi is being held according to the time-honored laws and customs of war”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530–31, 532 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that, based on the particular facts, the requirements of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War had not been met with respect to Hamdi, reasoning that “any determination of these issues would be premature,” and then noting that meaningful constitutional review must involve a determination of U.S. treaty requirements, but never explaining exactly why and how U.S. treaty requirements were relevant to its analysis); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590, 592 (using the law of war to determine whether the President may exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers absent a congressional declaration of war without exploring why international law is relevant to this issue); Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283 (relying on principles of international law discussed in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1942), without identifying them as principles of international law or explaining why international law is relevant to the constitutionality of Hamdi’s detention).
ship between the courts and military authority. As an attorney for one detainee during the War of 1812 wrote: "It is a matter of astonishment" that "in the life of the men who framed [The Declaration of Independence], it should be urged in a Court of justice, that this military power can be exercised in this country." Most importantly, these cases are not obsolete; instead they engage the very themes—congressional authorization, international law, the institutional role of courts in times of war—that shape the courts’ modern approach to the President’s war powers. Yet the cases on which this Article focuses are generally neglected in modern scholarship and form no part of the contemporary canon on the scope of the President’s war powers.

Part II of this Article introduces the modern enemy combatant cases, briefly summarizes the litigation in the Fourth and Second Circuits, and distinguishes a key case upon which the government relies: Ex parte Quirin. Part III demonstrates that the declaration of war in 1812 did not itself give the President the power to detain U.S. citizens captured in the United States during that conflict, no matter how pressing the military justification. These cases, considered with more recent precedent, suggest that the President lacks the constitutional power to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. As Part IV details, the recent enemy combatant cases have sought constitutional traction from international law by reasoning that the deten-

9 See David P. Currie, Rumors of Wars: Presidential and Congressional War Powers, 1809-1829, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (reasoning that events from President Madison’s Administration can “greatly enrich our understanding of the original understanding of the division of war powers between the President and Congress”); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 174–75 (1998) (using the first fifty years of post-ratification history as indicative of the original constitutional understanding).

10 Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815). The full quote reads “[i]t is one of the very grievances enumerated in the declaration of independence, that the king had affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. It is a matter of astonishment, that in less than forty years, and in the life of the men who framed the instrument, it should be urged in a Court of justice, that this military power can be exercised in this country: in England it would not even be debated.” Id. The Declaration of Independence itself accused the King of “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.” The Declaration of Independence, quoted in Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002). Professor Turley documents in detail the concern with military power and its abuses that animated the drafters of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution. Id. at 15–25.

11 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

12 The detainees have argued that the current armed conflicts are not the constitutional equivalent of a declared war, see, e.g., Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588–90, and some scholars agree, see, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1284–85 (2002); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346–50 (2002), but the courts have rejected this argument. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (claiming to have no authority to determine whether “undeclared war exists between al Qaeda and the United States”). This Article assumes that these armed conflicts are the constitutional equivalent of a declared war.

1569
tions are justified because they comply with the "law of war." Where the detentions potentially violate international law, however, the modern cases dismiss it as irrelevant. Cases from the War of 1812 suggest that international law can function both to support and to cabin the wartime authority of the President, an issue of contemporary significance in other areas of constitutional interpretation as well.

Finally, Part V considers the key remaining argument made in favor of the detentions: deference to the political branches requires that the courts permit this exercise of the President's authority. Ironically, the very values that the Fourth Circuit seeks to preserve by leaving such issues largely to the "political branches" are undermined by its own ruling. If the courts refused to defer, the President could still take the political risk of acting contrary to the courts, or he could seek specific authorization from Congress, in which case the political branches would work together to develop at least the initial standards governing such detentions. Instead, the courts have taken that task for themselves. Cases from the War of 1812 help illustrate both the plasticity of deference-based arguments and the institutional advantages of refusing to defer. This discussion, too, has broad implications for the courts' role in evaluating other uses of power by the President during war.

II. THE MODERN ENEMY COMBATANT CASES

A. Background

The Department of Defense ("DOD") has publicly announced the detention of three people in the United States as "enemy combatants." Two of these, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, are U.S. citizens, while the third, Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, is a citizen of Qatar. Hamdi, according to

13 See, e.g., Hamdi IV, 337 F.3d at 341 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi III); see also infra Part IV.A. The term "law of war" refers to a broad subset of international law that includes the rules governing the conduct of armed conflict. See generally MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 168-82 (3d ed. 1999).

14 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing a case from the European Court of Human Rights in a discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with this use of sources from outside the United States); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (referring to foreign practices in the Eighth Amendment context); id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (rejecting as irrelevant sentencing practices of other countries); id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that foreign sources are relevant to the Eighth Amendment and relying in part on treaties not ratified by the United States).

15 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463.

16 Thousands of people have been arrested and detained in the United States since September 11, 2001, but the Justice Department has refused to provide an exact count of or information about many detainees, particularly those who are not U.S. citizens. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2003).
DOD officials, was captured in Afghanistan when his Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance troops; he has since been moved to a detention facility in Virginia.\(^\text{17}\) Justice Department officials arrested Padilla in Chicago on a material witness warrant, but about a month later, turned him over to the DOD who transferred him to South Carolina.\(^\text{18}\) Al-Marri was also arrested in Illinois as a material witness and formally charged with lying to the FBI, but as trial approached the government dropped the charges and turned him over to the DOD in June 2003, almost eighteen months after his arrest.\(^\text{19}\) Al-Marri, too, was immediately transferred by the DOD to a detention facility located within the Fourth Circuit.\(^\text{20}\) A habeas petition filed in federal court in Illinois challenged Al-Marri’s detention, but the court dismissed for lack of venue.\(^\text{21}\) Neither Hamdi nor Padilla has been charged with a crime and, as U.S. citizens, neither will be tried by the military commissions authorized by President Bush’s order of November 13, 2001.\(^\text{22}\) All three have challenged their detention in court through next friends.\(^\text{23}\)

The Fourth Circuit has considered Hamdi’s detention four times. In \textit{Hamdi I} the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Hamdi’s father could bring a habeas petition on his behalf but that a federal public defender and private citizen lacked standing to do so.\(^\text{24}\) \textit{Hamdi II} reversed the district court’s order giving Hamdi access to counsel and remanded the case instructing the trial court to show greater deference to the government.\(^\text{25}\) On remand, the district court ruled that the government’s affidavit, standing alone, provided insufficient grounds on which to detain Hamdi and ordered the government to produce more evidence.\(^\text{26}\) \textit{Hamdi III} reversed again, holding that the affidavit provided sufficient justification for detaining Hamdi as an “enemy

\(^\text{17}\) Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 472.


\(^\text{19}\) Susan Schmidt, \textit{Qatari Man Designated an Enemy Combatant}, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at A01.


\(^\text{22}\) Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). As a non-U.S. citizen, Al-Marri could be tried by such a commission, but the government has not suggested that it will do so.


\(^\text{24}\) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi I).

\(^\text{25}\) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi II).

combatant,” and ordering the petition dismissed.\textsuperscript{27} The court explicitly limited its holding to those captured in a foreign theater of war during active hostilities.\textsuperscript{28} In \textit{Hamdi IV} the Fourth Circuit denied re-hearing \textit{en banc}, and issued four separate opinions.\textsuperscript{29} Hamdi’s case is currently pending before the Supreme Court, with an opinion expected by Summer 2004.

In Padilla’s case, Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York refused to dismiss Padilla’s habeas petition, but also ordered the government to provide Padilla with an attorney.\textsuperscript{30} The opinion concluded that the President has the authority to detain U.S. citizens caught on American soil as unlawful combatants, that the court would use the “some evidence” standard to review the government’s determination as to combatant status, and that under the habeas statute Padilla had the right to an attorney.\textsuperscript{31}

The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the President lacked inherent constitutional authority to detain Padilla at all and that Congress had not authorized his detention.\textsuperscript{32} The panel reasoned that the Constitution vests in Congress, not the President, the “emergency powers” necessary for “domestic abridgements of individual liberties,”\textsuperscript{33} relying in part on Congress’s power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,\textsuperscript{34} to make laws permitting the quartering of troops in times of peace,\textsuperscript{35} and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, the panel reasoned, Congress passed legislation in 1971 directing that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”\textsuperscript{37} Because no Act of Congress authorized these detentions, the panel concluded, such authority would have to come from the President’s own powers, which do not extend to the detention of Padilla.\textsuperscript{38} The opinion is carefully limited to the detention of a) U.S. citizens who are b) captured in the United States outside “a zone of combat.”\textsuperscript{39} The opinion used these factors to distinguish Padilla’s case from that of Yaser Hamdi.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Hamdi III}, 316 F.3d at 450.
\textsuperscript{28} Id. at 465, 473, 476.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Hamdi v. Rumsfeld}, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi IV). Judges Wilkinson and Traxler, both on the original panel, each issued an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing \textit{en banc} and Judges Luttig and Motz, neither of whom were on the panel, each issued an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing \textit{en banc}.
\textsuperscript{31} Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588–607.
\textsuperscript{32} Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718, 724.
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at 714.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{See} U.S. \textit{Const.} art I, § 9, cl.2.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{See} U.S. \textit{Const.} amend. III.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{See} U.S. \textit{Const.} art I, § 8, cl.10.
\textsuperscript{38} Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714–16 (2d Cir. 2003).
\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 698, 715 n.24.
The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants"
whose detention was upheld by the Fourth Circuit.

Judge Wesley dissented, arguing both that the President has inherent constitutional authority to detain Padilla as an "enemy combatant" and that Congress "clearly and specifically" authorized the President's detention of Padilla. As Commander in Chief, the dissent reasoned, the President has the power to "protect the nation when met with belligerency and to determine what degree of responsive force is necessary." The majority's reliance on the "zone of combat," the dissent reasoned, was misplaced, for the President, not Congress, should have the power to make such a designation, which might include the United States. Finally, Judge Wesley concluded that Congress had authorized the detention of Padilla when it passed the September 14, 2001 Joint Resolution authorizing the use of force "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States." Padilla's case, too, is currently pending before the Supreme Court with an opinion expected by Summer 2004.

The War of 1812 cases provide important insight on the issues dividing the federal courts, including the inherent power of the President to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, the role of congressional authorization, and the purported distinction between those captured within and without the "zone of combat." They also help clarify other issues with which the courts have struggled, such as the appropriate place of international law in such cases, and the institutional role of courts in times of war. Before describing the War of 1812 cases, however, one vitally important modern case merits discussion as background: Ex parte Quirin. The government and the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Quirin, Judge Wesley used it in his dissenting opinion, and the Department of Defense has even cited the case by name at general press conferences on military detentions and tribunals. If Quirin were indeed on all fours with the modern enemy combatant cases, then older cases from the War of 1812 might add little to the current debate. But as the next section details, Quirin is distinguishable based both on the

40 Id. at 726–28 (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 717.
42 Id. at 728.
44 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
45 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi II); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 471–76 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III); Padilla, 352 F.3d at 710–12.
46 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 732 (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1573
issue of congressional authorization and on how it employs international law.

B. Ex parte Quirin

The Quirin case is as dramatic as any World War II spy thriller, and it is true. German saboteurs traveled by U-Boat to the Florida and New York coasts where they disembarked bent on destroying U.S. military and industrial installations only to be turned in by one of their own.48 A secret trial by military commission followed, complete with accusations of an FBI cover up.49 The commission sentenced the saboteurs to death50 and the Supreme Court upheld the commission’s actions in a much-maligned opinion tainted by charges of improper influence and arm-twisting by the Roosevelt administration.51 Although some scholars provide strong arguments to discredit the opinion entirely,52 even on its face the opinion provides little support for the modern detentions.

The Quirin defendants, at least one of whom claimed U.S. citizenship,53 argued that their trials by military commission exceeded statutory authorization and violated the Constitution.54 The Court rejected these arguments, reasoning that Congress, in a federal statute called the Articles of War, had explicitly “authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions.”55 The defendants, the Court reasoned, were triable by military commission under the “law of war” because they were

49 See Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations, supra note 48, at 736.
50 Id. at 739. The President commuted two of the sentences to imprisonment. Id.
51 Id. at 737–43.
53 Quirin, 317 U.S at 20.
54 Id. at 8–9.
55 Id. at 27. Article 15 provides that the Articles of War do not “deprive[] military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction” over “offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions.” Id. Although article 15 could be read simply as a refusal to limit the use of military commissions that are based on some other source of authority, Quirin interpreted article 15 as an affirmative grant of authority from Congress to the President. Id.; see also Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249, 253 (2002).
unlawful combatants. The trials accordingly came within Congress’s express authorization for such commissions.\(^6\)

Although the government has relied extensively on *Quirin* to support the detention of enemy combatants, the case is distinguishable in two critical respects.\(^5\) First, as the Second Circuit reasoned in *Padilla*,\(^5\) the detention of enemy combatants is not specifically authorized by congressional legislation, unlike the military commissions upheld by *Quirin*. Congress, on September 14, 2001, authorized the President:

> to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks, . . . or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future attacks of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.\(^5\)

Even assuming that this authorization is the constitutional equivalent of a declaration of war for the purposes of the Commander-in-Chief power, it nonetheless lacks explicit provision for long-term detention of American citizens. The Court in *Quirin* could have relied on Congress’s declaration of war against Germany as providing the President with authorization to try the saboteurs, but it did not. Indeed, had the Court done so, it would have avoided very difficult interpretive questions about the Articles of War.\(^6\) Instead, almost the entire case involves a detailed interpretation of the Articles of War.\(^6\)

\(^6\) Just to make sure the point was not lost, the Court added, “[I]t is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation.” *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 29; see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 52, at 326–27 (“The Supreme Court purposefully resolved the appeal on the narrowest conceivable grounds.”).


\(^5\) Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 732 (2d Cir. 2003).


\(^6\) See White, supra note 52, at 429–31, 436 (describing the difficulties the Court faced in reaching the decision in *Quirin*, including the problem that Roosevelt’s executive order had not provided adequate review of the decisions of the commission as required under the Articles of War). As Professor White notes, some Justices did not want to rely on the President’s own powers, because “[a]s [Justice] Black had pointed out, the argument suggested that a President might have the power to subject American citizens to trial by military commission for a variety of unspecified ‘law of war’ offenses.” *Id.* at 431. This Article puts aside questions about whether the *Quirin* Court correctly interpreted the Articles of War as authorizing the trials by military commission in that case; the point here is that *Quirin* relied on the specific authorization that it found in the Articles of War, rather than on the declaration of war by Congress even though this interpretation of the Articles of War presented significant problems.

\(^6\) As the Court explained: “[B]y the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.” *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (emphasis added).
The constitutional importance of specific legislative authorization is arguably even more acute with respect to the modern detentions than it was for the use of a military commission in *Quirin*, because in 1972 Congress passed legislation explicitly requiring congressional authorization for any detentions of U.S. citizens. The government has relied on the September 14 Joint Resolution as itself providing legislative authorization for the detentions and the Fourth Circuit and Judge Wesley agreed, citing in part to *Quirin*. The *Hamdi III* opinion reasoned, for example, that “capturing and detaining enemy combatants is an inherent part of warfare” and that the authorization for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” includes the “capture and detention” of “hostile forces.” *Quirin* itself actually undermines this reasoning by refusing to find congressional authorization for military commissions in the general declaration of war. Judge Wesley, dissenting from the panel opinion of the Second Circuit, called it “curious” to conclude that the Joint Resolution “authorized the interdiction and shooting of an al Qaeda operative but not the detention of that person.” Yet the Court in *Quirin* refused to read the declaration of war as authorizing the military trials, although that declaration certainly authorized the use of force against Nazis, including interdiction and shooting.

The government and the courts have misapplied *Quirin* in a second way. Much of the *Quirin* opinion interprets the law of war. Congress, af-

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63 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 726–29 (2d Cir. 2003); (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamdi II) (“[W]here as here the President does act with statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more reason for deference.”); Padilla *ex rel. Newman v. Bush*, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In the decision to detain Padilla as an unlawful combatant, for the reasons set forth above, the President is operating at maximum authority, under both the Constitution and the Joint Resolution.”). *Hamdi III* reasons elsewhere that “Hamdi’s petition places him squarely within the zone of active combat and assures that he is indeed being held in accordance with the Constitution and Congressional authorization for use of military force in the wake of al Qaida’s attack.” 316 F.3d at 474 (citing *Quirin*).

64 The Fourth Circuit supported this reasoning in part with the deference-based arguments discussed infra Part V, in part by citing to *Quirin*, in part with references to *In re Territo* and *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, see infra text accompanying notes 76–82, and in part based on references to international law, infra text accompanying notes 156–178. *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 467 (citations omitted); *Hamdi II*, 296 F.3d at 281–82. None of these arguments provides strong support for the claim that the Joint Resolution should be read to authorize the long-term detention of U.S. citizens, particularly when such detention violates international law. *Quirin* involved specific congressional authorization, *Territo* involved POW detention authorized by the Senate-confirmed Geneva Conventions, and *Johnson* involved only aliens captured and detained abroad.

65 *Padilla*, 352 F.3d at 730–31 (Wesley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

66 The enemy combatant cases have thus misapplied *Quirin* by failing to acknowledge that *Quirin* was based on specific congressional authorization and by applying *Quirin*’s interpretation of the law of war, even though today no statute makes the law of war relevant. These points are related in an interesting way that suggests a distinction between *Quirin* and the enemy combatant cases. The Constitution grants Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” U.S. CONST.
ter all, authorized trials by military commissions as permitted under the law of war. But the *Hamdi* and *Padilla* opinions have taken language analyzing the law of war and applied it as a direct interpretation of the scope of the President’s constitutional power. This does real interpretive violence to *Quirin*. For example, *Hamdi II* reasons that:

> It has long been established that if Hamdi is indeed an “enemy combatant” who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government’s present detention of him is a lawful one. See, e.g., *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 31, 37, 63 S. Ct. 2 (holding that both lawful and unlawful combatants, regardless of citizenship, “are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces”).

But the passage quoted from *Quirin* (pure dicta with respect to detentions) discusses not the constitutional power of the President to detain lawful and unlawful combatants, but whether the law of war permits the detention and trial of unlawful combatants by military commission. The full quote from *Quirin* makes clear that the Court is interpreting the law of war:

> By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between . . . those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.

The law of war was relevant in *Quirin* because the federal statute in question, the Articles of War, made it relevant as a matter of positive law. Because the conduct was a violation of the law of war, it was within the statutory authorization for military tribunals. But why is this interpretation of the law of war relevant in *Hamdi II*? The opinion provides no explanation. The *Padilla* court also quotes this language from *Quirin* and it, too, neglects to mention that here *Quirin* interprets the law of war made relevant by federal statute.

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art. I, § 8, cl. 10, which includes the law of war. See *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The Supreme Court has read *Quirin* to mean that Congress exercised this specific Article I power when it authorized trials by military commission. *Id*. Congressional authorization might be specifically required under Article I for the trials at issue in *Quirin*, but not for the detention of the enemy combatants because they are not being “punished” for offenses against the Law of Nations. Thus, under this reading, specific congressional authorization was required in *Quirin*, but not in the detention cases. Note, however, that this point turns on its head the interpretation that the *Hamdi* and *Padilla* opinions gave *Quirin*: where they have read *Quirin* to support the President’s power in times of war, this interpretation reads *Quirin* to stand for the specific power of Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.

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67 *Hamdi II*, 296 F.3d at 283.

68 *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942). These lines are quoted in part and discussed in *Hamdi II*, 296 F.3d at 283 and cited in *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 469.

The Fourth Circuit made the same mistake in *Hamdi II*. The opinion quotes the following from *Quirin* but fails to include the last clause: "'Citizenship in the United States of any enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful [because it is in violation of the law of war].'"

In this passage the *Quirin* opinion interprets the law of war as made applicable through a federal statute. In *Hamdi III*, Hamdi argued that because he is a U.S. citizen the President cannot constitutionally detain him. In response, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Hamdi's citizenship does not affect his detention because "[h]e is being held as an enemy combatant pursuant to the well-established laws and customs of war" and cites *Quirin* as raising "this same issue." But this reasoning fails to make clear why *Quirin*’s interpretation of the law of war applies in the absence of a federal statute that incorporates it. The Constitution, the Fourth Circuit appears to reason, does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens because the law of war does not make that distinction. This is an interesting and perhaps very powerful proposition—one that even finds some support in other parts of the *Quirin* opinion—but *Quirin* was careful to distinguish between its use of international law as incorporated by statute and its discussion of whether the statute was constitutional. To be sure, pursuant to *Quirin*, Congress may authorize the military trial of both citizens and non-citizens alike for offenses against the laws of war, but in the modern enemy combatant cases the President has no specific grant of authority from Congress that authorizes his actions (and guides the courts’ inquiry), nor is that authority explicitly cabined by the laws of war.

Although *Quirin* is said to provide the key bulwark in the defense of the detentions, several other cases are pressed into service as well. The

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70 See generally *Hamdi III*, 316 F. 3d at 461.
71 Id. at 475 (quoting Ex parte *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 37).
72 The *Quirin* opinion repeatedly makes clear that it is applying the law of war because Congress incorporated it by federal statute. The same discussion, for example, refers to the "nature of the offense which the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by incorporating the law of war, punishes." 317 U.S. at 38.
73 *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 475.
74 Two paragraphs later, the *Hamdi III* opinion confuses matters further by reasoning that the "Quirin principle applies here" so that "[o]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such." Id. Here the international law piece has dropped out entirely, making the reference all but unintelligible. *Quirin* held that a federal statute permitting trial by military against those who violated the law of war included U.S. citizens within its purview. *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 37-38. *Hamdi III* appears to attempt to apply this reasoning to detentions where no statute applies and regardless of whether the law of war was violated.
75 See infra text accompanying notes 221–227.
76 The cases also rely, for example, on *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), to support the President's power to detain Hamdi and Padilla. See, e.g., *Hamdi III*, 316 F. 3d at 465–66; *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 337 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi IV) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehear-
Fourth Circuit, for example, relied on the Ninth Circuit's opinion In re Territo. The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants"

Gaetano Territo, a prisoner of war captured in a 1943 battle fighting for the Italian army, petitioned the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus. Territo argued that as an American citizen he could not be held as a prisoner of war. The district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected this claim (and his others), reasoning that Territo's citizenship did not affect his status as "one captured on the field of battle." The opinion upheld Territo's detention although it lacked specific statutory authorization. This might lend some support for the President's inherent authority to detain U.S. citizens, but the United States and Italy were both parties to the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, and, as the Ninth Circuit noted, Territo's capture and detention as a prisoner of war by American military authorities was "valid and legal" under that Convention.

The Territo opinion goes on to discuss international law without explaining exactly why it is relevant. "Those who have written texts upon the
subject of prisoners of war agree,” the opinion concludes, that people actively opposing an army in war “may be captured and except for spies and other non-uniformed plotters” may be held as prisoners of war. citing Quirin, the opinion also reasons that under the law of war, citizenship in the United States does not “relieve” a prisoner of the “consequences” of an unlawful belligerency. the Ninth Circuit appears to reason that international law is directly relevant in interpreting the scope of the President’s power to detain U.S. citizens, but does not make this connection explicitly.

In short, neither Quirin, nor Territo, nor the other cases, support the long-term detention of “enemy combatants” in the United States absent specific authorization from Congress or the Senate. Moreover, these cases upheld executive branch actions that were consistent with international law.

III. MILITARY DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS DURING THE WAR OF 1812

A. Samuel Stacy

On the 21st of July, 1813, a commissioner of the Supreme Court of New York issued a writ of habeas corpus to Commodore Isaac Chauncey and Major General Morgan Lewis at Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario, directing them to produce the body of Samuel Stacy. Britain and the United States each viewed the Great Lakes as critical to the success of the war. On the American side, although Sackets Harbor was inconveniently located far from Oswego and the interior river systems, it had a deep harbor and excellent topography for a shipyard. Beginning in the fall of 1812, Sackets Harbor became a center of shipbuilding for the Great Lakes and from here
Commodore Chauncey oversaw naval operations for Lakes Ontario and Erie, and Lewis commanded the American troops on the Niagara front.

The capture of Samuel Stacy on July 1, 1813 as a spy and traitor came just over a month after the British landed troops, attacked, and nearly captured Sackets Harbor on May 29. The British attack found the base vulnerable because both Chauncey and Lewis were engaged in an assault on Fort George. Commodore Chauncey laid the blame for the attack on Sackets Harbor at the feet of Samuel Stacy. As Chauncey wrote to Secretary of the Navy William Jones:

I have the most positive information that [Stacy] has been in the habit of conveying information to the Enemy for many Months. He visited this place a few days before the British made the attack on the 29th of May, and I have no doubt but that he is the person that gave them information that most of the Troops had been sent to Niagara.

Commodore Chauncey outlined other evidence against Stacy in his letter to Secretary Jones before concluding that the arrest of Stacy would "at any rate" deprive "the Enemy of the information which [Stacy] would have conveyed to him which is all important at this time." The Commodore closed the letter by hoping to see Stacy hung as a traitor to his country in part as an example to other "base" and "degenerate" Americans who might become spies and informers.

Secretary Jones wrote back immediately, emphasizing the danger to Sackets Harbor ("the moment is critical") and the "vast importance" of Chauncey gaining control of Lake Erie. As to Stacy, Secretary Jones

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87 Id. at 452 n.2.
88 MALCOMSON, supra note 84, at 127-29 (recounting the battle).
89 Id. According to one estimate, the British attack cost the Americans twenty-two lives during combat, with eighty-five wounded, one-hundred fifty taken prisoner, and many naval supplies lost. Id. at 138-39.
90 Letter from Commodore Isaac Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy Jones, July 4, 1813, reprinted in 2 THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 86, at 521; see also Letter from Commodore Isaac Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy Jones, July 3, 1813, reprinted in id. at 499.
91 Letter from Commodore Isaac Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy Jones, July 4, 1813, reprinted in id. at 521.
92 Id. Indeed, as Chauncey suggested, espionage on the northern frontier may have been both relatively widespread and difficult to detect. Id. at 520-21; see also ISAAC MALTBY, A TREATISE ON COURTS MARTIAL AND MILITARY LAW 37 (1813) (describing a January 5, 1813 order from the Colonel commanding West Lake Champlain condemning "members of the community" who were "found so void of all sense of honour or love of country" as to "give intelligence to our enemies"); Letter from Peter Hogeboom to Major General Francis de Rottenburg, British Army, Niagara Falls, July 23, 1813, reprinted in 2 THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 86, at 522-33 (offering to sell intelligence information to the British through a person near Sackets Harbor).
wrote: "You were perfectly correct in arresting Mr. Saml. Stacy, as a spy; and you will hold him, until the President shall direct the course to be pursued with him, which I will ascertain tomorrow. It is indeed time that traitors were brought to punishment."\(^{94}\)

Stacy, however, petitioned the Supreme Court of New York for the writ of habeas corpus that issued on July 21. Stacy submitted affidavits attesting that he was a "natural born citizen of the United States," and on this basis the commissioner issued the writ.\(^{95}\) When served, Lewis refused to produce Stacy, stating instead that Stacy was not in his custody, that he believed Stacy to be guilty of "carrying provisions and giving information to the enemy," and that Stacy should be tried by a court-martial.\(^{96}\)

The Supreme Court of New York did not take kindly to this response from Major Lewis. Concluding that Lewis had intentionally disregarded the writ and committed a contempt of process,\(^{97}\) Chief Judge Kent reasoned that if any case called for "the most prompt interposition of the court to enforce obedience to its process, this is one."\(^{98}\) Stacy, the opinion continued, is held in "closest confinement": by "a military commander" who is "assuming criminal jurisdiction over a private citizen."\(^{99}\) Any "delay would render the remedy alarmingly impotent."\(^{100}\)

Major Lewis's allegation that Stacy was a traitor for giving information to the enemy, Kent reasoned, was "only aggravation of the oppression of the confinement" because the military lacked "any color of authority" to try a citizen for that crime.\(^{101}\) Although not mentioned in the opinion, the military also lacked the authority to try U.S. citizens by court-martial for

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\(^{94}\) *Id.*

\(^{95}\) *In re Stacy*, 10 Johns. at 328, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).

\(^{96}\) *Id.* at 330. Court-martia ling authority is regulated by federal statute and extends to people who actually serve in or alongside the armed forces, although its jurisdiction does include some civilians. *See generally* WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 86 (2d ed. 1920); 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) (defining persons subject to this Chapter of the U.S. Code); 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2000) (defining jurisdiction of the courts-martial in general); 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2000) (extending court-martial jurisdiction to include some charges against people not in the armed forces). Military commissions originally developed to try civilians in occupied territory and certain offenses against the laws of war that could not be tried by court-martial, although now there is some overlapping jurisdiction. *WINTHROP, supra*, at 831–32; *see also* Major General (Ret.) Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., *Military Commissions*, 2002-MAR ARMY LAW. 1. This Article uses "military commission" and "military tribunal" interchangeably.

\(^{97}\) *In re Stacy*, 10 Johns. at 340.

\(^{98}\) *Id.* at 334. The Court considered whether to issue a rule to show cause against Lewis, or a writ of attachment to force Lewis into court. Although an attachment would normally issue only after a rule to show cause, the Court issued an attachment due to these concerns about abuse of military authority and potential delay.

\(^{99}\) *Id.*

\(^{100}\) *Id.*

\(^{101}\) *Id.* at 333; *see also* Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (concluding that U.S. citizens accused of spying and treason could not be tried by court martial); *see also* WINTHROP, *supra* note 96, at 629–30.
spying.\textsuperscript{102} The opinion concludes by ordering the attachment of Generals Lewis unless Stacy was released or brought before the court’s commissioner. Apparently the President reached the same conclusion: on July 26, 1813, Secretary of War Armstrong ordered Stacy released “on the ground that a citizen cannot be considered as a spy.”\textsuperscript{103}

The case of Samuel Stacy bears importantly on today’s military detentions. Commodore Chauncey and Major Lewis were situated at the critically important northern front of a declared war on the very doorstep of U.S. territory. They considered Stacy a spy and a traitor, they believed that his perfidy contributed to a deadly and destructive attack on American soil, and they wanted him detained in part to prevent him from providing more information to the British. Yet apparently both the court and the President reasoned that the military lacked the power to detain him.

\textbf{B. Other Detention Cases 1812–1815}

Other cases confirm that during the War of 1812 the President and the courts agreed that the military lacked the power to detain U.S. citizens, no matter how compelling the military justification for the detentions, at least absent statutory authorization to try them by court-martial. In the case of Elijah Clark, an American citizen living with his wife in Canada, a court-martial in Buffalo found him guilty of spying in August of 1812.\textsuperscript{104} They ordered Clark to be “hung by the neck until he be dead.”\textsuperscript{105} But Major General Hall, at the direction of the President, ordered that, as a citizen, Clark was “not liable to be tried by a court martial as a spy.”\textsuperscript{106} Significantly, Hall’s order also provided that unless Clark “should be arraigned by the

\textsuperscript{102} The American Articles of War (1806) provided “[t]hat in time of war, all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to, the United States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court-martial.” American Articles of War of 1806, art. C.I., § 2, enacted Apr. 10, 1806, \textit{reprinted in WINTHROP, supra} note 96, at 976. The statute thus excluded American citizens from those who might be tried by court-martial for spying. \textit{Id.} at 766 (reading the 1806 enactment law as making citizens “unamenable for the crime of the spy”). An August 21, 1776 Resolution of the Continental Congress also excluded citizens from those triable by court martial as spies. \textit{Id.} at 765. Congress lifted this limitation during the Civil War so that the court martial could try confederate soldiers and sympathizers. The March 3, 1863 Act also made the crime triable by military commission. \textit{Id.} at 766.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{2 THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra} note 86, at 521 n.1. Note that this resolution means that the government did not argue its side of the case before the court. We know from the historical evidence outlined above that the military had a strong interest in detaining Stacy, so the decision not to justify his detention in court appears to have been based on the consensus view that the government lacked such authority. The cases of Clark, Shaw, and others described below confirm that conclusion. \textit{See infra} notes 104–123 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Case of Clark the Spy, in 1 THE MILITARY MONITOR AND AMERICAN REGISTER} 121–22 (Feb. 1, 1813).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id.} at 122.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.}
civil courts for treason" or some other crime under the law of New York, he
"must be discharged."

Moreover, courts held military personnel personally liable for assault,
battery, and false imprisonment if they detained U.S. citizens not triable by
court-martial. Shaw, a naturalized citizen, was held at Sackets Harbor in
January 1814 on allegations of spying, inciting mutiny, and trading with the
enemy. After his release he sued Smith, the officer who kept him in
detention. Smith argued that Shaw, a native of Scotland and only a natural-
ized citizen of the U.S., could be tried by court-martial, or at least the
question of his citizenship could be decided by military authority.
Or, the
defendant submitted, at the very least he had the authority to detain Shaw,
investigate the facts, and turn him over to the civil authorities on the charge
of treason. The defendant justified the measures as "essential to public
safety."

The court rejected all these arguments. None of these offenses, the
court reasoned, were triable by court-martial except for spying, and as a
U.S. citizen, Shaw could not be charged with that offense. He might, the
court reasoned, "be amenable to the civil authority," but not to military au-
thority because the military lacked the power to try him by court-martial
for his offenses. Although the defendant was not "harsh and oppressive,"
the "principle involved" made the case important because "[i]f the defen-
dant was justifi[ed] in doing what he did, every citizen of the United States
would, in time of war, be equally exposed to a like exercise of military
power and authority." The jury awarded Shaw $779.25 for a military de-
tention that seems to have lasted about two

In a similar case against Commander Hampton, a plaintiff won $9000 for five days of con-
finement followed by a trial by court-martial.

The importance of these cases might be discounted on the grounds that
state courts no longer have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to

107 Id. (emphasis supplied).
109 Id. at 260.
110 Counsel for Smith argued, for example, that "it was necessary to detain, until the fact of his be-
ing a spy, or not, could be ascertained. It is impossible for the commanding officer to know whether the
person arrested is a spy without investigation" and "had not the defendant a right to detain the plaintiff,
or order to deliver him over to the civil power, there being a charge of treason against him?" Id. at 260.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 265.
113 Id. at 265.
114 Id. at 258.
115 McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815). The Supreme Court of New
York granted a new trial on the issue of damages, emphasizing the "critical and delicate situation of the
defendant, as a commander-in-chief of an army upon the frontiers," close to enemy forces, guarding
himself from attack. Id. at 238. This situation, the court reasoned, provided no justification for the de-
tention but did make the damages "enormously disproportioned to the case proved." Id. at 237.

1584
federal officials,116 and Congress eradicated the authority to sue federal officials personally for damages in cases like these during the Civil War.117 Cases could not arise today in the same procedural posture. In addition, some states were notably hostile to the war,118 and western New York lacked enthusiasm for a conflict with British forces in Canada.119 But although Connecticut, Rhode Island and Delaware refused to send their citizen soldiers to fight under federal officers,120 New York, on the other hand, provided more militiamen than any other state in 1812—14,866.121 Indeed, some of these very men fought alongside federal troops when the British attacked Sackets Harbor.122 New York courts and juries would, it seems, have had every incentive to favor the detention of alleged spies and traitors who threatened the lives of troops that included large numbers of New York residents. No less a legal heavyweight than Chancellor Kent wrote the Stacy opinion, thereby undermining any argument that inferior jurists issued these decisions.123 Thus, despite the procedural and other differences, the cases from the War of 1812 demonstrate a remarkably consistent view that the military lacked any power to detain U.S. citizens except in anticipation of a trial by a congressionally authorized court-martial.

C. Modern Relevance

These examples from the War of 1812 show the extraordinary caution with which the courts and President Madison viewed the detention of U.S. citizens even in a declared war, and even on evidence that the detainee traveled abroad, met with the enemy, and might divulge future intelligence information. Their modern relevance is three-fold. First, they confirm the Second Circuit's conclusion in Padilla: the executive branch lacks the inherent authority to detain as "enemy combatants" U.S. citizens captured in

119 See Stagg, supra note 84, at 232-43, 251-52 (detailing Western New York's very significant opposition to the war, in part because it would disrupt trade with the Canadian provinces).
120 Mahon, supra note 85, at 31-33, 100-01.
121 Id. at 100 & n.1. Many of these militia groups were poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and under-equipped. See Stagg, supra note 84, at 242-43, 247. Their participation in the war may have engendered even more anti-war sentiment in western New York. Id.
122 Malcomson, supra note 84, at 133-36.
the United States. Second, they suggest that citizenship and congressional authorization serve as the primary means to determine the executive’s power to detain—not whether the detainee is captured on the “battlefield” or in the “zone of combat” or whether the conduct took place abroad (although the War of 1812 cases have less to say on this last point). As Judges Wesley and Luttig point out in their dissenting opinions, the capture-on-the-battlefield distinction, upon which both the Second and Fourth Circuits relied (in part to distinguish the Hamdi and Padilla cases) is a problematic one. Finally, these cases suggest that courts should refuse to infer congressional authorization for the detention of U.S. citizens from a general declaration of war.

First, as to the executive’s inherent power to detain U.S. citizens captured in the United States as enemy combatants, the Padilla case is factually comparable to the War of 1812 cases. Padilla is a U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago and detained based on his alleged ties to the enemy and the danger he poses to the nation. The War of 1812 cases reasoned that U.S. citizens not serving in the military fell outside the scope of the statute authorizing trial by court-martial, and therefore the military lacked the power even to detain the prisoners, no matter their connection to enemy forces or the danger they posed. One might object that the modern detainees qualify as “combatants” in some sense that the War of 1812 detainees did not. The modern cases suggest, for example, that the “law of war” enhance the President’s authority. But spies are the paradigmatic example of “unlawful combatants,” along with guerillas and saboteurs. Thus, whether detention is based on status as “unlawful combatants” or just as “enemy combatants,” the War of 1812 detainees appear to qualify as either.

124 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi IV) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III).
125 See generally Padilla, 352 F.3d at 726 (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hamdi IV, 337 F.3d at 358–59 (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
126 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–39 (1942).
128 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 469 (justifying Hamdi’s detention on the grounds that he is an “enemy combatant” and rejecting the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants for the purposes of detention).
129 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30–39 (reasoning that spies violate the laws of war and are unlawful combatants); see generally Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 22 THE BRITISH Y.B. OF INT’L L. 323 (1951) (disagreeing with Quirin that spies, guerrillas, and saboteurs violate international law, but reasoning that international law provides no protection for such combatants). Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which either Hamdi or Padilla actually became a member of opposing forces, or the extent to which this was important to the Second and Fourth Circuit opinions. Padilla, for example, was allegedly “closely associated with known members and leaders of al Qaeda” and “went to Pakistan to receive training on explosives from al Qaeda operatives,” but the government does not contend that he actually joined al Qaeda. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700–
Second, the War of 1812 cases at least suggest that it is incorrect to place so much importance on whether the capture occurred on the "battlefield" (or the "zone of combat") or on whether the capture took place in the United States or abroad. The Second and Fourth Circuits relied on these designations to distinguish the Padilla case from Hamdi, reasoning in part\textsuperscript{130} that the President has greater authority as Commander in Chief on the battlefield than off the battlefield,\textsuperscript{132} and greater authority abroad than at home.\textsuperscript{133} At times these conclusions seem based on functional reasoning,\textsuperscript{134} elsewhere they seem based on constitutional text.\textsuperscript{135}
The War of 1812 cases did not formally consider these distinctions, but given the attack at Sackets Harbor and the military importance of the region to the war, it seems that the area around Sackets Harbor would qualify as a "combat zone."\(^{136}\) Even coupled with arguments based on necessity, public safety, and the specific fear that a detainee, if released, would provide more harmful information to the enemy,\(^{137}\) the capture within a "zone of combat" was not enough to provide the military with the authority to detain these U.S. citizens. To be sure, none of the men were captured on the battlefield itself, but the Fourth Circuit relied on Hamdi's capture in the "zone of combat," which apparently included all of Afghanistan.

Although the inference is weaker, the War of 1812 cases also suggest that courts may err in relying too heavily on distinctions between domestic and foreign conduct. Stacy, for example, was captured in the United States, and charged by Commodore Chauncey with "an act of high treason against the government of the United States, committed within the territory of the King of Great Britain,"\(^{138}\) but the opinion focuses entirely on the dangers of exercising military jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen not part of the U.S. armed forces, not on any distinctions between domestic and foreign conduct or points of capture.\(^{139}\) These cases suggest that the most important factors in determining the President's authority to detain "enemy combatants" are their citizenship\(^{140}\) and the scope of congressional authorization, not the place of capture.\(^{141}\) This reading would not limit the President's immediate

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\(^{136}\) See supra text accompanying notes 85–96. Two later commentators on these cases suggest, on the other hand, that the conduct may have fallen outside of a narrowly defined combat zone for the purposes of interpreting other sections of the Articles of War which might have otherwise applied. See infra note 147.

\(^{137}\) See supra text accompanying notes 83–103.

\(^{138}\) In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (emphasis added).

\(^{139}\) See generally id. at 328–32.

\(^{140}\) There may be other constitutional considerations that preclude reliance on citizenship. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1298; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002). Moreover, distinctions based on citizenship may function to legitimate the war on terrorism and the oppression and silencing of both "bad citizens" and "bad aliens." See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terrorism, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 59, 86–110 (2004). Full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, but it bears noting that the distinction is very much alive and well in cases that deny rights to non-citizens. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003). It would seem wrong, therefore, to deny protections to citizens on the grounds that citizens and non-citizens must be treated equally.

\(^{141}\) See also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851) (upholding a jury verdict against a U.S. army officer in the Mexican-American war for trespass against American property located in Mexico, and reasoning that army officer's "distance from home, and the duties in which he is engaged, cannot enlarge his power over the property of a citizen, nor give to him, in that respect, any au-
power to actually engage in battle and to capture prisoners in that context, but it does suggest that the legality of a longer-term detention does not depend on whether the initial capture was made in or out of the “zone of combat.”

Third, the War of 1812 cases show that a general authorization for the use of force (i.e. the declaration of war in 1812) did not give the President the power to detain U.S. citizens during the War of 1812, suggesting that the general authorization for the use of force in the Joint Resolution from September 2001 should not be construed as authorizing detentions of U.S. citizens during our modern war on terrorism. Of course, perhaps the intervening 185 or so years has changed the intentions of Congress when it authorizes the use of force generally. Such changes were not, however, brought by Ex parte Quirin, despite the courts’ reliance on that case. Moreover, the modern courts’ reasoning does not depend on any documented modern tradition of detaining U.S. citizens as enemy combatants (Quirin was tried, after all, by a military commission as specifically authorized by Congress); instead it depends on much weaker factors like Congress’s failure to expressly limit its use of force authorization based on citizenship. The War of 1812 cases cannot, of course, provide conclusive evidence as to the intent of Congress in 2001, but they do suggest that courts ought not readily conclude that a general use of force authorization says much at all about the detention of U.S. citizens.

The modern statute 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) makes this point even stronger. So, too, does the fact that immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration requested legislation authorizing the Attorney General to certify for “indefinite detention” any non-citizen suspected of posing a terrorist threat, but Congress refused to include this language in The Patriot Act. This history undermines any claim that Congress intended the Joint Resolution—passed only weeks earlier—to authorize the indefinite detention of aliens, and it seems hard to imagine that

142 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, when considering the question of congressional authorization, that “it has been clear since at least 1942 that ‘citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of [his] belligerency.’ Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942)). “If Congress had intended to override this well-established precedent and provide American belligerents some immunity from capture and detention, it surely would have made its intentions explicit.” Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. The Quirin Court, as we have seen, however, refused to rely on the declaration of war as authorizing the President’s use of military commission; instead it relied on the detailed and explicit statutory provisions authorizing trials for conduct that violated the law of war. See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text.

143 See also Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 383, 429–30 (2004) (providing other reasons to conclude that the Joint Resolution does not authorize indefinite detention).

144 Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 Hast. Const. L.Q. 373, 387–90 (2002) (describing the Bush Administration’s efforts to include this language in the Patriot Act).
Congress intended the Joint Resolution to authorize the detention of citizens but not aliens.\textsuperscript{145} Several potential objections to the modern relevance of the War of 1812 cases merit brief discussion. First, the War of 1812 cases appeared to reason in part that the military lacked the statutory authority to try the detainees by court martial,\textsuperscript{146} and hence also lacked authority to detain them at all. Today the military enjoys more extensive statutory authorization to court-martial and try people by military commission than it did during the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{147} But it is not clear that modern enemy combatants detained in the United States come within such authorization,\textsuperscript{148} and even if the mili-

\textsuperscript{145} See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 266–67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (reasoning that the military officials were trespassers because Shaw was not triable by court-martial); id. at 268–69 (Spencer, J. dissenting) (arguing in part that the Articles of War required Smith to detain Shaw and that Smith lacked the power under those Articles to dismiss Shaw); see also In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (reasoning that holding Stacy while accusing him of treason “without any color of authority in any military tribunal to try a citizen for that crime, is only aggravation of the oppression of the confinement.”).

\textsuperscript{147} Examples include 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 904, 906 (2000). First, 10 U.S.C. § 821 is the current codification of article 15 of the Articles of War, which provided part of the statutory support for the trials by military commission in \textit{Ex parte Quirin}, see supra text accompanying note 55. Second, 10 U.S.C. § 904 provides that “[a]ny person who (1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; or (2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.” This section has obvious antecedents in the 1806 Articles of War which provided that “[w]hoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy” shall “suffer death” or other punishment ordered by the court-martial. American Articles of War of 1806, reprinted in \textit{Winthrop, supra} note 96, at 981 (articles 55 and 56). These sections appear to apply to anyone, including U.S. civilians. \textit{Id.} at 102–03 (reading the sections this way). Some contemporary commentators argued that they could not apply to American civilians because that would make civil authority subject to military power, signaling “a complete military despotism.” \textit{Maltby, supra note 92, at 37–40. The defendants in the War of 1812 cases did not rely on these sections of the Articles of War; one commentator reasoned that the statute applied only in a very narrowly defined “theater of war” and the detentions took place outside that theater. \textit{Winthrop, supra note 96, at 104; see also Edmund Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under the Articles of War, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 79, 97–107 (1920) (reading the statute to include the same limitation). Finally, 10 U.S.C. § 906 provides that “[a]ny person who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general court-martial or by a military commission and on conviction shall be punished by death.”

\textsuperscript{148} The argument that 10 U.S.C. § 821 (article 15) authorizes trials by military commission for the modern enemy combatants detained in the U.S. is difficult for several reasons. First, the President himself has excluded U.S. citizens such as Padilla and Hamdi from his authorization for the use of military tribunals. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). Second, particularly with respect to Padilla and Al-Marri, it is unclear whether the law of war applies at all to their alleged conduct. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 252 n.37 (putting aside the “complicated legal arguments that might support or deny military commission jurisdiction” over those, like Padilla, who were “not responsible for the September 11 at-
The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”

tary does have the statutory authorization to try the enemy combatants, here they are not detained in anticipation of such trials. Second, the military’s practice of trying people by military commission even absent statutory authorization has grown since the War of 1812. However, this practice apparently extends only to occupied territory. Finally, as a third possible distinction, the current detainees are not formally suspected of “spying.” The reasoning from the War of 1812 cases was not limited to spying, however. It depended instead on the military’s lack of authority to try the detainees for any of their conduct, including trading with the enemy and other activity detrimental to the war effort.

In conclusion, the intervening years have created striking differences in

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1. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1287–88 (arguing that article 15 does not apply). The arguments that 10 U.S.C. §§ 904 or 906 would provide the authority to try the modern enemy combatants by court-martial have similar difficulties. Section 906 is limited, for example, to the “time of war,” and it is unclear whether Congress intended to include undeclared wars in that language. Section 906 also applies only to a limited set of places, such as those found “within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces.” It is unclear that when arrested at O’Hare airport, for example, that Padilla was “found” in a place that comes within the language of § 906. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1287–88 (arguing that article 15 does not apply).

2. The World War II cases upheld military trials that were explicitly authorized by federal statute. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (upholding trials by military commissions authorized by federal statute); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (invalidating military trials lacking congressional authorization); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (same); cf. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348, 354–55 (1952) (reasoning that in the absence of limits imposed by Congress, the President can create military commissions in territory “occupied by the Armed Forces of the United States,” but also suggesting that the statutory authorization for military commissions extended to the commissions formed in occupied territory); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1266–93 (arguing that military commissions for citizens and non-citizens alike depend on congressional authorization with the possible exception of trials in occupied territory). But cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 251–54 (maintaining that a “strong argument can be made” that the President has the authority “to establish military commissions to try war crimes violations, even in the absence of affirmative congressional authorization,” based in part on dicta from Quirin and on language from cases involving occupied territory).

3. Stacy was accused of having “connection in some way with the enemy,” and of “treasonable practices, in carrying provisions and giving information to the enemy.” Stacy, 10 Johns. at 328. Shaw was accused of exciting mutiny, engaging in illicit trade with the enemy, spying, and other offenses. Smith, 12 Johns. at 257–58.
the courts’ approach to military detentions of U.S. citizens. The War of 1812 cases reasoned that military necessity did not and could not give the military authority over U.S. citizens where none existed. In the recent cases, on the other hand, the district court in Padilla and the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi cobbled together deference- and function-based arguments resting on military necessity, along with vague references to international law, to justify the modern detentions.

The War of 1812 cases show that the President lacks the power to use military detentions of U.S. citizens on his own authority and that a general authorization for the use of force does not confer such power on the President. The early cases focused in part on the limits of the military’s power to court-martial as limiting its power to detain U.S. citizens. Because the power to court martial was regulated by federal statute, this reasoning at least suggests that specific congressional authorization might have legitimated the detentions, although the declaration of war itself did not. Requiring, as a constitutional minimum, specific authorization by Congress for the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants would be consistent not only with Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in Youngstown over a century later, which emphasized the importance of congressional authorization in determining the scope of the President’s powers, but also with the other major Supreme Court cases from both before and after the War of 1812. For all these reasons, modern courts should refuse to permit the

151 See infra text accompanying notes 235–242.
152 See infra text accompanying notes 156–178.
153 There may be other constitutional problems with military detentions, even if they were authorized by federal statute. The point here is not that all such detentions are constitutional, but instead that these detentions are unconstitutional in part because they lack congressional authorization, and they violate and/or lack sanction from international law.
155 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804) (holding that the President exceeded his statutory authority to make maritime captures); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 121–27 (1814) (holding that the President lacked the power to confiscate certain property absent specific congressional authorization); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1862) (reasoning that because Congress had retroactively blessed the forfeitures, the Court did not have to decide whether such act was “necessary under the circumstances”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (granting habeas relief to petitioner whose trial by military commission during the Civil War violated an Act of Congress); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (invalidating the President’s seizure of property where seizure lacked explicit statutory authorization and violated the law of nations); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (denying habeas relief where trial by military commission was specifically authorized by federal statute); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the conviction of an American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating an Act of Congress that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly disregard restrictions authorized by an Executive Order of the President); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (reasoning that “we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (granting habeas relief to civilians tried by military commissions that exceeded congressional authorization); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (denying habeas relief where trial by military commission was specifically authorized by federal statute).
long-term detention of U.S. citizens, except perhaps with explicit authorization from Congress.

IV. ENEMY COMBATANTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE EMULOUS

The War of 1812 jurisprudence also sheds light on the role that international law can play in constitutional interpretation. The modern enemy combatant cases all rely on international law in evaluating the constitutionality of the detentions, but only as an argument to justify the President's exercise of power. As discussed above, for example, the courts have relied on Quirin's analysis of international law to conclude both that enemy combatants may be detained and that citizenship is irrelevant to such detentions.156 Thus, when Padilla and Hamdi claimed that as U.S. citizens they could not be detained, the courts rejected this distinction in part by relying on international law.157 Two of the opinions use international law to verify the purposes of the detention as military rather than criminal,158 although the Fourth Circuit sometimes appears hesitant to acknowledge its reliance on international law.159 In Hamdi III, this analysis helped the Fourth Circuit reach its conclusion that Hamdi's detention "bears the closest imaginable connection to the President's constitutional responsibilities during the ac-

156 See supra Part II.B. The district court in Padilla relied in part on international law to conclude that no formal declaration of war was necessary to trigger the President's Commander-in-Chief powers. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 593–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court's Padilla opinion also includes a long discussion of the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. Id. at 592–93. Although not entirely clear, the opinion appears to reason that because Padilla is an unlawful combatant, the protections of the Geneva Conventions do not apply to him. Id. at 592–93, 596. This analysis therefore appears to construe a treaty, not the Constitution itself.

157 See supra Part II.B.

158 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592–93; see also In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946).

159 Hamdi III cites two sources for the proposition that detaining enemy combatants serves "vital purposes." 316 F.3d at 465. First, it cites a statement from In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 145, for which the Territo opinion gives no direct authority, although the same paragraph cites to Quirin's interpretation of international law and to several works of international law. Second, Hamdi III quotes from Winthrop, supra note 96, at 788. In the quoted passage, Winthrop discusses the modern law of war. Hamdi III fails to note the language it quotes from Winthrop is itself a direct quote from the writing of Francis Lieber, one of the most important figures in the development of the modern law of war. See Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber's Code and Principles of Humanity, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269, 279–80 (1997). Immediately following the sentence quoted by the Hamdi III court, Winthrop includes a long quotation in French to make the same point. WINTHROP, supra note 96, at 789.
tual conduct of hostilities.” Judge Wesley relied in part on a treaty to help interpret the scope of congressional authorization under the Joint Resolution, while Judge Traxler relied on international law to justify the distinction between American citizens captured at home and those captured in the territory of a hostile country. Judge Wilkinson even offered international law as the lead argument in his most recent defense of the detentions in Hamdi IV: “Hamdi is being held according to the time-honored laws and customs of war.”

But Hamdi’s detention actually violates international law. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this point in Hamdi III, but then dismissed it as irrelevant. Hamdi was, according to the government, captured while fighting for the Taliban and might qualify as a Prisoner of War (“POW”). The U.S. government has acknowledged that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict against Afghanistan in which Hamdi was allegedly en-

160 316 F.3d at 466.
161 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 732 n.11 (Wesley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
163 Id. at 341 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); see also Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 475 (“He is being held as an enemy combatant pursuant to the well-established laws and customs of war.”). The district court opinion in Hamdi discussed international law, but the purpose of that discussion is not clear. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530–32 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi III).
164 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468–69.
165 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 461 (“While serving with the Taliban in the wake of September 11, he was captured when his Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces with which it had been engaged in battle.”). The opinions of the judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc challenged the panel’s characterization of the evidence. Hamdi IV, 337 F.3d at 362–64 (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 371–75 (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
166 See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. The Third Geneva Convention provides extensive protections to prisoners of war, but limits that status to those who meet certain criteria, including those who are “members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4(a), 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. It is disputed whether those who qualify as members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict under article 4(a)(1) must also meet the requirements of article 4(a)(2), including that they carry arms openly and wear a “fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.” Id. at art. 4(a)(2). See Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Military Commissions: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328 (2002) (discussing whether Taliban and al Qaeda detainees are prisoners of war); Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 475 (2002) (same); see generally Yoram Dinstein, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 36, 47–48 (2004) (discussing the requirements of article 4(a)(2) in general and specifically with respect to the conflict in Afghanistan). The Fourth Geneva Convention provides comprehensive protections to detainees who are not prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, but the Fourth Convention excludes persons who are held by their own government. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (applying the Fourth Convention to all persons “who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or the Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”).
gaged.\footnote{The Bush Administration maintains that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict against Afghanistan and the Taliban, but not to "armed conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere between al Qaeda and the United States." See George H. Aldrich, Editorial Comment: The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891, 891-92 (2002) (quoting Special White House Announcement of Feb. 7, 2002). For criticism of this view, see Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=517683.} As Hamdi pointed out to the Fourth Circuit, the Third Geneva Convention\footnote{Third Geneva Convention, supra note 166.} provides for a status determination "by a competent tribunal" "should any doubt arise" as to whether a prisoner qualifies for protected status and further provides that prisoner of war protections apply until such status determination takes place.\footnote{Although it is true that as a POW (if he so qualified) Hamdi could still be detained, the terms of that detention would be regulated by the detailed prescriptions of the Conventions; indeed, to provide such protections to POWs is one point of the Convention. The Fourth Circuit could have reasoned that the U.S. complied with article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention because there is no doubt as to Hamdi's status—but it did not suggest such compliance. Moreover, this conclusion seems implausible. The U.S. armed forces have traditionally construed article 5 broadly, at least when determining the type of conflict to which it applies. See Murphy, supra note 166, at 476-77. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission ("Commission") and the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") have both concluded that all those detained whether affiliated with the Taliban or al Qaeda must be considered prisoners of war until a competent tribunal decides otherwise. See Letter from Juan E. Mendez, President, Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Re: "Detainees In Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Request For Precautionary Measures" (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/unnamed4.html; Murphy, supra note 166, at 479 (quoting ICRC spokesperson and press release); see also Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole," 10-Spg. HUM. RTS. 2 (2003) (characterizing as the "core" of the Commission's ruling the conclusion that the U.S. executive branch is "not entitled to unilateral and unreviewable designation" of detainees as "unlawful combatants under international humanitarian law" and arguing that detainees such as Hamdi and Padilla "must be designated as civilians, combatants, or criminals rather than lumped into a single composite group of unlawful combatants by presidential fiat"); Aldrich, supra note 167, at 894-96 (explaining why the Taliban do not categorically lack entitlement to POW status); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "'Unlawful Combatants' or 'Prisoners of War': The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 67-68, 87-88 (2003) (reasoning that both al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are entitled to such a tribunal); cf. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting the argument that combatant status was a political question but affirming the President deference in the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and concluding that the Taliban did not meet the criteria for lawful combatant immunity).} The government has provided no status determination for Hamdi by a "competent tribunal," and is not treating him as a POW, in violation of the Third Geneva Convention.\footnote{Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. Contra Jordan Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 515-16 (2003) (arguing that Hamdi III erred in concluding that the Third Geneva Convention was not self-executing). One might argue that the Geneva Conventions do not regulate the government's conduct with respect to its own citizens, see}

The Fourth Circuit did not even suggest that the "competent tribunal" requirement of the Third Geneva Convention had been satisfied.\footnote{Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. Contra Jordan Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 515-16 (2003) (arguing that Hamdi III erred in concluding that the Third Geneva Convention was not self-executing). One might argue that the Geneva Conventions do not regulate the government's conduct with respect to its own citizens, see} Instead it reasoned that this aspect of the Convention is not self-executing.\footnote{Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. Contra Jordan Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 515-16 (2003) (arguing that Hamdi III erred in concluding that the Third Geneva Convention was not self-executing). One might argue that the Geneva Conventions do not regulate the government's conduct with respect to its own citizens, see}
self-executing treaties are not domestic law until Congress passes legislation implementing them; self-executing treaties, on the other hand, are the law of the United States even absent implementing legislation.\footnote{173}

The Fourth Circuit probably erred in concluding that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention is not self-executing,\footnote{174} but this Article addresses a somewhat different question. Even assuming that the courts have correctly refused to formally bind the President to the terms of the Geneva Conventions\footnote{175} (either because they are not self-executing, because they do not create a private right of action, or on other grounds), those Conventions are nonetheless potentially relevant to how courts interpret the Constitution and the power it confers on the President.\footnote{176} In other words, this Article explores the use of international law as a tool of constitutional interpretation.

The Hamdi opinions used international law as a source of constitutional interpretation without regard to its formal status as federal law when such reliance supported the government’s exercise of power. So, for example, when Hamdi III reasoned that Hamdi is held “as an enemy combatant pursuant to the well-established laws and customs of wars,” it cited only Quirin,\footnote{177} which relied on a diverse set of international sources, including Great Britain’s Manual of Military Law issued by its War Office, a German military manual from 1902, French scholars, Italian military manuals, and the Rules of Land Warfare issued by the United States Army.\footnote{178} But these

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\footnote{175} \textit{See generally} Jinks & Sloss, \textit{supra} note 167.


\footnote{177} 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003).

\footnote{178} \textit{See Ex parte} Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–35 (1942).
sources are not domestic law in the United States. Why do they serve to strengthen the President’s constitutional authority, while violations of international law, even of treaties signed and ratified by the United States, do not weaken that authority?

A. International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: Brown v. United States

The Supreme Court’s analysis in a property case from the War of 1812 suggests that international law should not have this heads-I-win-tails-you-lose quality with respect to the President’s power under the Constitution.179 During the spring of 1812, a British company chartered The Emulous, an American vessel, to transport cargo out of Savannah, Georgia.180 The Emulous landed in New Bedford where the cargo of pine timber was unloaded and secured in a salt water creek and where the ends of the timber may or may not have “rested on the mud” at low tide.181 After the war began, the cargo was seized by a local U.S. attorney who libeled the property as a prize of war.182 The owners contested the libel.

The key question for the Court was whether the executive branch had the constitutional power to seize this property during a time of war or whether Congress had to specifically authorize such seizures.183 To answer this question, Chief Justice Marshall looked at several factors beginning with a lengthy consideration of international law, apparently including treaties not formally binding on the United States.184 War, the Court finally

179 Cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 280 (2002) (asking, in the context of immigration, occupied territory, and Indian law, whether “if the government’s constitutional authority derives from customary international law, should not the authority likewise be limited by customary international law constraints?” (emphasis in original)).
181 Chief Justice Marshall described the timber as resting on mud at low tide and views it like “other British property found on land.” Id. at 122. Justice Story, however, viewed the property as “afloat” in a U.S. port. Id. at 129 (Story, J., dissenting). Justice Story decided the case when he sat on the Circuit Court and then heard the case again at the Supreme Court. Id. at 147 (Story, J., dissenting). The evidence before the Circuit Court agreed that the timber “had always been afloat on tide waters”; the affidavit to the contrary was submitted only after the Circuit Court proceedings. Id. at 154. (Story, J., dissenting). The law of nations appears to have more readily permitted seizures of enemy property at sea than it did seizures of enemy property already on land in the U.S. when hostilities broke out; some English authorities permitted confiscation of enemy property in ports and harbors at the outset of hostilities. Id. at 112, 113, 119–21, 123; id. at 143–44, 150 (Story, J., dissenting); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711–12 (1899).
182 Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 121.
183 Id. at 122.
184 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned: “The modern rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an enemy and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confiscated; and in almost every commercial treaty an article is inserted stipulating for the right to withdraw such property.” Id. at 125. Although this passage is without citation, Justice Marshall seems to be referring to a set of treaties relied upon by the claimant for the same proposition. The first
concluded based on these sources, "gives the right to confiscate" under international law but does not "of itself vest the property in the belligerent government." The Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall went on, "ought not lightly" be construed "[to give] a declaration of war an effect in this country, it does not possess elsewhere." Chief Justice Marshall also reasoned that the Constitution's grant of some specific war powers to Congress, in addition to the general power to declare war, shows that the declaration of war itself vests only certain rights in the executive branch, while others depend on congressional authorization. Acts of Congress authorizing proceedings against people and property confirmed this reasoning, the opinion continued. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall even relied on acts of Congress dealing with prisoners of war to show that the confiscation of property required specific authorization. In general, Brown seems to affirm the use of international law as one consideration in determining the scope of the President's war powers.

The dissenting opinion by Justice Story agreed with the majority's analysis in a number of key respects. Most significantly, Story also used international law to construe the scope of the President's constitutional power to confiscate the property. Justice Story concurred that the declaration of war did not itself operate to confiscate the property. But, he reasoned, the President has the power to seize the property after Congress declares war, even absent specific congressional authorization:

The act of 18th June, 1812, ch. 102, is in very general terms, declaring war against Great Britain, and authorizing the president to employ the public forces

part of the published opinion reproduces arguments for the claimant, including the following: "Articles for the protection and removal of the property of enemies found in this country at the breaking out of a war, are found in our treaties with France, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Prussia, Morocco, England, and Algiers. It will not be contended, that the provisions of these treaties, especially that with England, can be binding when the treaties themselves are not in force ...." Id. at 115 (argument of claimant).

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185 Id. at 125.
186 Id. See also David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 384 (2003) (reading Brown to show that "the outside limit on the President's authority was given by the law of nations"); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1118 (1985) (discussing Brown as holding that "the scope of the President's constitutional war powers should be construed consistently with the law of nations to require congressional authorization prior to executive seizure of alien property").
187 These include the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal and the power to "make rules concerning captures on land and water." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
188 Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 126.
189 Id. See also Vladeck, supra note 155, at 161.
190 Brown could be read narrowly to justify international law in constitutional interpretation only to the extent that it helps explain what the Framers meant by the text. Part of the opinion supports this reading: "[t]he constitution [sic] of the United States was framed at a time when this rule, introduced by commerce in favor of moderation and humanity, was received throughout the civilized world." Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125.
191 Id. at 149 (Story, J., dissenting).
to carry it into effect. Independent of such express authority, I think that, as
the executive of the nation, he must, as an incident of the office, have a right to
employ all the usual and customary means acknowledged in war, to carry it
into effect. And there being no limitation in the act, it seems to follow that the
executive may authorize the capture of all enemies’ property, wherever, by the
law of nations, it may be lawfully seized.¹⁹²

The majority disagreed that the President could execute the law of war
in this way. International law, Chief Justice Marshall repeated, does not act
automatically to effect the confiscations, so the declaration of war does not
have this effect.¹⁹³ Justice Story apparently based his argument on the “take Care”¹⁹⁴ Clause as well as the President’s war powers.¹⁹⁵

Emphasizing the political importance of the confiscation of enemy
property, the Brown Court concluded that the question is “proper for the
consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.”¹⁹⁶ This
stands modern functional reasoning on its head. In our day the need for
flexibility and concern about international reprisals are advanced to support
the power of the President, not Congress. In Brown, Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s reasoning may have been related to the initiation of the proceedings

¹⁹² Id. at 145 (Story, J., dissenting). As Professor Henkin notes, it is unclear whether Story uses in-
ternational law as a direct limitation on executive authority or whether he construes the scope of con-
gressional authorization as consistent with international law. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 387 n.51 (2d ed. 1996).

¹⁹³ Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128. Chief Justice Marshall specifically considered and rejected
Justice Story’s argument that the President could confiscate property as permitted by the law of nations,
but needed an act of Congress to confiscate property not permitted by the law of nations: “This argu-
ment must assume for its basis the position that modern usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon
the thing itself by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This position is not allowed.
This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will.” Id. What course to take
with respect to enemy property in our country, Chief Justice Marshall concluded, must be decided by
Congress, not the President or the courts. Id. at 128–29. Thus, although Marshall maintains that the po-
litical branches may choose to violate the law of nations (a proposition consistent with the use of inter-
national law as a tool of constitutional interpretation), his opinion nonetheless explores the content of
international law to help determine the relationship between presidential and congressional authority
during war.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. CONST. art II., § 3 (giving the President the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed”).

¹⁹⁵ Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 147 (Story, J., dissenting) (“[a]ll that I contend for is, that a decla-
ration of war gives a right to confiscate enemies’ property and enables the power to whom the execution
of the laws and the prosecution of the war are confided, to enforce [the right to confiscate enemy prop-
erty].”). Professor Glennon correctly notes that Brown is not largely about whether the President could
violate international law, but he reads the case as principally about the President’s power under the “take
Care” clause. Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary Inter-
largely concerns the President’s war powers, particularly the war powers that result from a congressional
declaration of war. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 123, 127; see also id. at 145–47 (Story, J., dissenting); see
also HENKIN, supra note 192, at 104 (stating that what was at “issue was the President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief during war”).

¹⁹⁶ Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 129.
by a federal district attorney and the potential for abuse that this created, but the Attorney General litigated the case through the Supreme Court, and both the dissent and majority reason with respect to executive power as a whole.

**B. Brown: Still Relevant?**

Courts continue to cite *Brown,* but some scholars have questioned the modern relevance of the case, other scholars rely on it, and still others try to relate the case to the question of whether the President is bound by international law. Professor Henkin writes that during the Civil War the Supreme Court “in effect” rejected much of Justice Marshall’s opinion in

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197 See id. at 117.

198 The opinion is confusing in several respects. Justice Story, see *supra* note 181, considered the property “afloat” while Chief Justice Marshall viewed it as “on land.” Compare *Brown,* 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 122, with id. at 129 (Story, J., dissenting); see *supra* note 181. The law of nations at least arguably forbade seizure of enemy property found in the country at the beginning of the war, but apparently permitted seizure of enemy property coming into the country, and at least according to some British precedent, permitted seizure of enemy vessels found in port at the outbreak of war. Because the dissent viewed the property as afloat in port, the dissent concluded that its seizure was therefore permissible under international law. *Id.* at 150 (Story, J., dissenting). The majority did not reason, however, that the seizure was unconstitutional because it violated international law. Instead, it began with the premise that the seizure must be authorized by law and then asked if the declaration itself was such a law. *Id.* at 123. Answering no, in part because the declaration did not have that effect under international law, the Court thus concluded that Congress had to make such a law to effect the seizures. *Id.* at 125–26. Justice Story asked in response, however, why the executive had any power under Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to make any seizures absent congressional authorization. That is, the majority appears to concede the executive had the power to seize enemy property abroad or coming into the country after the outset of war, yet there was no statutory authorization for such seizures. *Id.* at 148, 151–52, 154 (Story, J., dissenting). Justice Story argued that such seizures were within the constitutional power of the President because they comported with the law of war, *id.* at 154 (Story, J. dissenting), a conclusion that Chief Justice Marshall appears to reject, *id.* at 128, but without offering a direct answer to Justice Story’s question. Chief Justice Marshall does insist that acts of Congress frequently authorize the President to take actions with respect to persons or property of the enemy found in the U.S.; perhaps this reasoning means that with respect to other property not in the U.S., the declaration of war by itself acts to confiscate the property.

199 See, e.g., *Campbell v. Clinton,* 203 F.3d 19, 30 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2000); *Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Ship Wrecked Vessel or Vessels,* 47 F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (E.D. Va. 1999).


202 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 n.3 (1986).

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Moreover, Henkin notes, the law of war has changed. Far more property is subject to confiscation under modern international law, and several federal statutes now authorize extensive confiscations by the President during war. Courts would probably not interfere today, Henkin argues, if the President seized alien enemy property even absent specific congressional authorization. But none of this undermines Brown’s use of international law as a tool of constitutional interpretation.

More important, perhaps, are possible claims that cases since Brown call into question the value of international law in modern constitutional interpretation. In a somewhat different context, for example, scholars have argued that courts should not apply customary international law as domestic law after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. By rejecting “general common law,” some argue, Erie prevents courts from applying customary international law as domestic law. Much of that debate is irrelevant here for two reasons. First, the focus here is on international law as an interpretive norm, not as freestanding federal law which preempts state or prior inconsistent federal law, or that has the power to provide federal court jurisdiction. Second, even if some criticisms of customary international law
law might apply to its use in interpretation, the detention of Hamdi violates the Third Geneva Convention, which is not customary international law but instead a treaty. Thus, although application of customary international law by the courts is sometimes criticized as anti-democratic or irrelevant to the U.S. Constitution, the treaty at issue here was signed by the President, and the Senate gave its advice and consent. Moreover, using the treaty provisions as interpretive norms does not make them into freestanding federal law; the fact that the political branches may not have intended the treaties as self-executing thus does not prevent the courts from using them as an interpretive norm.

The continuing vitality of at least some aspects of Brown is also confirmed by the courts’ ongoing, if limited, use of international law in determining the President’s constitutional authority during war. In the Prize Cases, a major victory for President Lincoln at the outset of the Civil War, the Court upheld the President’s power to institute a blockade even without a formal declaration of war by Congress, but ordered property re-

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210 See Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 176, at 520–24 (arguing that changes in the nature of customary international law undermine its traditional usefulness as a tool of statutory interpretation).

211 See Young, supra note 208, at 398–400 (describing this view, based in part on the argument that because customary international law is diffuse and its sources somewhat unclear, judges have a great deal of discretion in applying it, leading to claims that they use it to advance their own preferences).

212 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989) (reasoning with respect to the Eighth Amendment that it is “American conceptions of decency that are dispositive”); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“This Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), noting that “[t]o the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere” including by the European Court of Human Rights and noting also that “[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct”). See also Young, supra note 208, at 398–99.

213 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.

214 Issues of treaty interpretation may complicate this analysis. If the President has “unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret treaties,” see John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 868 (2001) (review essay), then how could courts interpret treaties to counter the President’s exercise of war powers? Professor Yoo makes his argument despite strong precedent to the contrary. See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 167, at *34–35; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1286–94 (2002). Here, however it is important to distinguish between two issues: 1) the substantive content of treaty terms; and 2) the extent to which courts can use that substantive content to construe the President’s war powers. This Article is primarily directed at the second issue, although if the President has the sole power to determine the first issue, that power limits the importance of the second issue. But even if, as Professor Yoo argues, the courts are limited by Article II in their interpretation of treaties, Article III nevertheless empowers courts to consider the constitutionality of President’s detentions, and the question is what deference to afford the President’s interpretation of the Treaty in this context.

linquished that was seized in violation of international law. After the Civil War the Supreme Court relied in part on international law to determine the authority of federal military officials in occupied New Orleans to lease city property for ten years—a period extending far longer than military rule itself. The plurality opinion reasoned that as the “conquering power” the U.S. military had enjoyed all the powers that sovereign nations generally enjoy in conquered territory, limited only by the “laws and usages of war.” Both the concurring and dissenting opinions argued that under the laws of war, lease of property belonging to the conquered state had no

216 Id. at 674–82. The Court carefully evaluated each vessel and its cargo to determine whether its seizure was authorized by the law of war. Id. With respect to certain cargo—thirty tierces of tobacco strips—the Court ordered the property restored to its owner. Id. A tierce is a cask with a capacity usually equal to forty-two gallons of old wine measure. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, vol II, p. 3320 (1982). In one respect, however, the case was not really about constitutional power. The President appears to have agreed with the claimants that the law of war governed the seizures; the April 19, 1861 Proclamation authorizing the blockade did so “in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the law of Nations.” The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 684 (citing and discussing Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Blockade Against Southern Ports, April 19, 1861); see also id. at 650–52 (reproducing parts of the argument for the United States, in which counsel discusses law of prize as applying to the case). The law of war to this extent just supplied the rules that the parties agreed applied to the capture. Nevertheless, the majority and dissent both relied on international law to determine whether the President had the constitutional power to initiate the blockades at all. Id. at 667–70; id. at 687–90 (Nelson, J., dissenting). One could argue that even the constitutional question depended on international law in a way that is not true of other constitutional issues. That is, the only relevant question in a narrow sense was whether a state of war existed that made the blockade permissible under international law. Thus the Court’s resort to international law might be sui generis—or at least confined to cases in which “war,” as understood in international law, are conceded to trigger certain powers of the President cognizable in U.S. courts. But the parties and the Court appear to have also used international law to decide whether the President or Congress had the power to trigger this type of “war.” The dissent, for example, reasoned that war in a “legal” sense, under both the law of nations and the Constitution, is more than “organized hostil[ities],” and that some formal act or announcement was necessary to convert an insurrection into a civil war, in part because of the legal consequences in international law that result from a formal war. Id. at 687–89 (Nelson, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this argument on the grounds that the law of nations “contains no such anomalous doctrine” that “a war levied on the Government by traitors, in order to dismember and destroy it, is not a war because it is an ‘insurrection.’” Id. at 670. See also Golove, supra note 186, at 386–87 (using the Prize Cases to show that the President’s power as Commander in Chief is limited by international law). But cf. David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 273–75 (1985) (noting that Justice Grier’s “unimpressive majority opinion” treats the “problem largely as one of ‘international law,’” and remarking that Justice Grier paid “scant attention to what today would appear to be the real question—the consistency of the President’s act with the Constitution and laws of the United States”).

217 New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wallace) 387, 393–95 (1874); see also Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 202–03 (1854) (using international law to construe the scope of the President’s war powers in occupied territory); cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 581, 584–85 (2001) (discussing Cross and reasoning that “[u]nder universally established principles of international law, the successful occupation entitled the United States to set up a provisional military government in California” and that “the Commander-in-Chief power clearly entails the power to wage war in accordance with governing international norms”).

218 The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. at 394.
validity beyond the occupation itself. During the Spanish-American War, the Court relied on international law to invalidate the government's capture of Cuban fishing vessels. The case raised difficult questions about the scope of presidential and congressional authorizations for the seizures, and the Court relied in part on international law to hold for the claimants.

Finally, in Quirin itself the Court used international law both because the Articles of War incorporated it and as demarcating the outer limits of the federal government's war powers. The Court, as we have seen, first concluded that the charges against the petitioners came within the law of war, meeting the requirements of the statute. But was the statute, so applied, constitutional?

The Court reasoned that the petitioners were charged with violating the law of war and that legislation dating back to the Continental Congress permitted trial by military commissions of "alien spies according to the law and usage of nations." Reading this statutory enactment as a "contemporary construction" of the Constitution, the Court reasoned that under "the original statute authorizing trial of alien spies by military tribunals, the offenders were outside the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because they had violated the laws of war." The Court did not cite any support for this proposition, but went on to hold the trials by military commission, including those of U.S. citizens, constitutional, because they addressed charges that the petitioners violated the law of war. Although the Court apparently did not view the government's au-

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219 Id. at 396-97 (Hunt, J., concurring) (citing Halleck and other international law authorities for the proposition that "contracts or agreements" concluded by the occupying power "continue only so long as he retains control of them"), id. at 402 (Field, J., dissenting) (same). The concurrence concluded that although the military authority lacked the power to make such a lease, the city had ratified the lease after civilian authority was restored. Id. at 400-01 (Hunt, J., concurring).

220 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Although the Paquete Habana is frequently cited in the long-standing debate about whether the President is formally bound by international law, see generally, e.g., Glennon, supra note 195, the issue here is not whether courts should force the executive branch to comply with international law, but is instead whether the courts should use international law to determine the limits of the President's constitutional authority. In the Paquete Habana, Congress had specifically recognized that the people of Cuba were "free and independent" only five days before declaring war, and the claimants appear to have argued that Congress had not contemplated the seizure of Cuban vessels when it authorized war against Spain. The President pointed out that the vessels flew the Spanish flag, while the claimants argued that this was not "determinative." The President also argued that "a constitutionally-based power of the executive was at stake." Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for the United States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 987, 987 n.22, 988 n.24 (1994)

221 317 U.S. 1, 29-37 (1942).

222 Id. at 29, 38-46.

223 Id. at 41 (emphasis added).

224 Id.

225 Id. at 44 (emphasis added).

226 Id. at 41-44. An August 21, 1776 Resolution of the Continental Congress provided that "all persons, not members of, nor owing allegiance to, any of the United States of America . . . who shall be
authority under the war powers to try by military commission as entirely co-extensive with the law of war;\(^\text{227}\) it held the trials in question constitutional in large part because they involved offenses against these laws.\(^\text{228}\)

These cases suggest that international law has some role in interpreting the Constitution’s allocation of war powers,\(^\text{229}\) although they obviously do not fully explain why and how. Some forms of international law might be relevant as a tool for interpreting the scope of a general authorization for the use of force by Congress,\(^\text{230}\) or as a more general tool of constitutional interpretation.\(^\text{231}\) At a minimum, however, if the *Hamdi* opinions were correct to

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rely on compliance with “time-honored laws and customs of war” to bolster the President’s constitutional authority, it seems that violations of those very same laws and customs of war detract from his constitutional authority; at least (as here) where those laws and customs are incorporated into the Geneva Conventions. International law, as the cases above illustrate, serves not just to sanction an expansion of federal authority and not just as general support for the powers inherent in sovereignty, but also as an interpretive device that can limit the President’s constitutional powers during times of war. This reasoning is potentially relevant in a number of other war powers contexts, including the President’s proposal to try some detainees by military commission.

Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1751 (2003) (international law and Indian law); see generally Agora, The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2004). Some have also suggested such a role in the war powers context. Professor Wright wrote in 1969 that in fields “such as seizures of private property and problems dealt with by prize courts and military commissions,” the judiciary has “been able to limit presidential discretion by international law.” Quincy Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (1969). Professors Katyal and Tribe recently noted without much discussion that as Commander in Chief the President has the power to detain enemy combatants “in the theater of war” at least “within the laws of war and other applicable rules of international law.” Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1270; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 217, at 584–85 (noting that “the Commander-in-Chief power clearly entails the power to wage war in accordance with governing international norms”).

Other cases do at times use international law to advance a theory of extra-constitutional powers. In Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901), for example, the Court reasoned the actions of the military prior to ratification of the peace treaty were “fully justified by the laws of war,” and “[w]e therefore do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession.” Id. at 230. The case held that the President as Commander in Chief did not have the power to tax imports from the United States into Puerto Rico after ratification of the peace treaty but before the Foker Act took effect. See generally Cleveland, supra note 179, at 163–250 (discussing congressional and presidential authority over territories, including the role of international law in these cases).

Commentators have argued that the detentions may violate international law in many other ways as well. See generally Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002) (arguing that the detentions may violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other provisions of the Geneva Conventions); Paust, supra note 172, at 505–14 (same).

The government has often suggested that if the criminal trial against Zacarias Moussaoui does not go well for prosecutors, the Bush administration may move the trial from a civilian court to a military tribunal. Dan Eggen, FBI Chief Says Tribunal May Try 9/11 Suspects, Jan. 15, 2004, WASH. POST, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A18261-2004Jan14&notFound=true. If so, questions about the constitutionality of the trial by military commission could depend at least in part on the status of such trials under international law. The scholarship on the proposed military tribunals is already extensive. See, e.g., Turley, Tribunals and Tribunals, supra note 48, at 749–65 (considering proposed tribunals under both the Constitution and international law); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 55, at 249–50 (defending legality of the commissions); Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591 (2002) (offering a limited defense of commissions under the Constitution and international law); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 12, at 1266–1308 (arguing that military commissions

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To summarize briefly, cases from the War of 1812 have helped make several vitally important points about the modern detention of enemy combatants. First, the early cases reasoned that the military simply lacked the authority to detain U.S. citizens like Padilla, and they did so for reasons that find affirmation even in *Ex parte Quirin*, the very case proffered as proof-certain that the detentions are constitutional. Second, the *Brown* case shows international law playing an interpretive role with respect to executive war powers under the Constitution, a point confirmed once again by *Ex parte Quirin* and indeed even in the enemy combatant opinions themselves. Because Hamdi’s current detention violates international law, courts should treat with greater suspicion the claim that his detention comes within the President’s war powers. Finally, these cases show that at least during the War of 1812, deference- and function-based arguments did not prevent judicial review of the President’s war time actions. Part V takes up this issue in the context of General Andrew Jackson’s military rule in New Orleans at the tail end of the war.

V. INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF COURTS

Cases from the War of 1812 also provide a counterpoint to the deference-based reasoning that permeates the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the *Hamdi* case. The court extended deference both to the constitutional question of whether the President has the power to detain U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” and also to the factual question of whether the detainees actually are such combatants. The Fourth Circuit cited both the text of

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the Constitution and functional reasons\textsuperscript{236} to support its conclusion that courts should defer to the President, but the textual analysis is relatively limited.

The \textit{Hamdi} opinions list seriatim the war-related powers conferred on Congress by Article I and on the President by Article II of the Constitution\textsuperscript{237} and then state that these powers include "the authority to detain those captured in armed struggle."\textsuperscript{238} \textit{Hamdi III} further reasons that Article III, which governs the judicial power of United States, contains "nothing analogous" to these Article I and II powers, and therefore the courts must give "great deference" to the "political branches" "in accordance with this constitutional text."\textsuperscript{239} This textual reasoning is strikingly weak. Article III mentions nothing about taxes, bankruptcy, or commerce among the several states, yet the courts are not automatically required to give "great deference" in cases raising these issues.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{236} The term "functional" is used in this Article to mean flexible reasoning based on assessments of the essential function of each of the three branches and relationships among them. See Peter L. Strauss, \textit{Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers-Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?}, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).

\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Hamdi II}, 296 U.S. at 281; \textit{Hamdi III}, 316 F.3d at 462–63.

\textsuperscript{238} 316 F.3d at 463 (citing \textit{Hamdi II}, 296 U.S. at 281–82).

\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Id.} (quoting \textit{Hamdi II}, 296 U.S. at 281). The term "political branches" refers to the executive and legislative branches of government. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{240} In construing the Commerce Clause, the Court recently refused to afford deference to Congress at all, striking down the Violence Against Women Act despite substantial congressional fact-finding in support of the legislation. \textit{United States v. Morrison}, 529 U.S. 598, 628–37 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, if anything, Article III seems to contemplate a substantial role for the federal judiciary in cases that may raise foreign policy questions by explicitly mentioning cases involving ambassadors, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and "foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2. Another difficulty with deference is the courts' tendency to lump different kinds of cases together. \textit{Hamdi II}, for example, cites several cases for the proposition that "in accordance with" constitutional text "great deference" is appropriate with respect to military and foreign affairs. 296 F.3d at 281; \textit{see also Hamdi III}, 316 F.3d at 463. But the string citation in \textit{Hamdi II} fails to distinguish among various kinds of deference. In \textit{United States v. The Three Friends}, 166 U.S. 1 (1897), one of the cases cited by \textit{Hamdi II}, the Court deferred to the President's interpretation of a statute authorizing the forfeiture of certain vessels. \textit{Id.} at 51, 53, 67 (showing that the Court was interpreting a statute and that it adopted the government's view; i.e., the U.S. won); \textit{see also Stewart v. Kahn} 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493 (1870) (construing a federal statute that tolled statutes of limitations during the Civil War). The enemy combatant cases involve deference of a different sort because the courts are not interpreting a statute; instead they are determining the constitutionality of the President's action. See Curtis A. Bradley, \textit{Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs}, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659–67 (2000) (distinguishing among different kinds of deference). In this sense, the cases are closer to \textit{Dames \& Moore v. Regan}, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) in which the Court upheld an executive order nullifying claims pending in federal court against the Iranian government; such claims could be submitted to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal for resolution pursuant to an international agreement concluded by the President with Iran. \textit{See also American Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamendi}, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2393 (2003) (holding that executive agreements with other countries preempted state laws that conflicted with the foreign policy expressed in those agreements). But \textit{Dames \& Moore} considered an executive agreement concluded with Iran that was not directly related to the President's wartime authority, and did not (at least in the Court's view) present a Fifth Amendment or other Bill of Rights issue. 453 U.S. at 688–89; \textit{see also Garamendi}, 123 S. Ct. at 2374 n.9 (reasoning that ex-
Functional reasoning played a more important role in the *Hamdi* cases, both to confine the role of judiciary and to support the President’s authority to designate enemy combatants for military detention. For example, *Hamdi III* reasoned that courts lack the expertise and experience necessary to supervise armed conflict. Similarly, the court’s conclusion that Hamdi’s detention “bears the closest imaginable connection to the President’s constitutional responsibilities” was based largely on the “two vital purposes” served by the detention: preventing detainees from rejoining the enemy and “reliev[ing] the burden on military commanders of litigating the circumstances” of the capture.

These lines of reasoning leave courts in something of a quandary. If indeed courts are ill-suited to make determinations about the conduct of war, how are they to evaluate the claims by the executive about the nature of combat and its “vital purposes?” This functional argument, although intuitively appealing, almost invariably leaves the courts entirely dependent upon the executive’s representations of what warfare involves, or, as another example, the scope of the “battlefield” or “zone of combat.”

An alternative approach would have the courts grant habeas relief in these cases. Courts, as we have seen, might grant relief by applying a relatively bright line rule: detentions of U.S. citizens that violate the Geneva Conventions (or perhaps other international law) or that lack specific congressional authorization exceed the President’s constitutional authority under a general use of force authorization or general declaration of war. This approach would, unlike the Fourth Circuit’s current reasoning, force the political branches to consider and perhaps resolve many issues that the courts must now decide themselves. Requiring specific congressional authorization would enable Congress and the President to take the first cut at executive agreements can preempt state law but only subject to “the Constitution’s guarantees of individual rights”). The *Prize Cases*, as we have seen, held the President to international law, see supra note 216 and accompanying text, and depended in part on retroactive authorization by Congress. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1862). The *Curtiss-Wright* case, also listed in *Hamdi II*’s block citation, involved an explicit and detailed grant of authority by Congress to the President. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 311–13 (1936).

241 316 F.3d at 463, 469–73; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hamdi IV) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he ingredients essential to military success—its planning, tactics, and intelligence—are beyond our ken . . . .”).


243 *Hamdi IV*, 337 F.3d at 343 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

244 See infra Part III.B.

fashioning the standards that govern detentions. Moreover, had the government heeded the Third Geneva Convention and afforded Hamdi a determination of his status by a "competent tribunal" (which could be a military or judicial court), federal courts subsequently reviewing the detention might have much of the information they currently lack—such as where and under what circumstances he was captured. The power of the President and Congress together is not unlimited, so courts would eventually have to review even these detentions. But at least the courts would work initially with parameters set by Congress and international law.

The War of 1812 cases support this reasoning in two ways. First, they show that deference- and function-based reasoning are not an inevitable part of judicial interpretation of the President’s war powers under the Constitution. Both during and after the War of 1812, courts held officers making military command decisions in the field liable for actions that exceeded their authority with no defense for good faith. In other words, they were not protected by official immunity. No lack of “expertise and experi-

246 As an example, California Congressman Adam Schiff introduced The Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, which would explicitly authorize the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants if they are members of al Qaeda or have “willingly cooperated with a terrorist network in the planning of an attack against the United States,” as well as require access to counsel and the right to petition for release. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen “Enemy Combatants,” 112 YALE L.J. 961, 968 (2003) (citing H.R. 5684, 107th Cong. (2002)).


248 See Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations, supra note 48, at 750 n.642 (asserting that “Congress cannot simply create an alternative to Article III courts and thereby strip citizens or covered non-citizens of guaranteed rights”).

249 This approach also partially avoids the potential functional costs of the courts’ current approach, including the government’s incentives to manipulate court proceedings by threatening to turn the defendant over to military authorities. For example, the government switched Al-Marri from the criminal system to military detention as his trial approached and has threatened to transfer Moussaoui to the military justice system if his trial does not go well for the government. Similarly, it is difficult to explain why Hamdi and Padilla are detained as enemy combatants while John Walker Lindh was tried in federal court. See Engle, supra note 140, at 97-98 (questioning the disparity in treatment between Padilla and Hamdi on the one hand and Lindh on the other and noting that Hamdi had Saudi parents, Padilla was of Puerto Rican descent, but that Lindh “came from a white well-off family”).

250 See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854) (considering but not imposing such liability); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804). In Little, Chief Justice Marshall writing for a unanimous Court upheld an award of damages against a U.S. naval captain who acted under instructions to seize a vessel traveling from France. The seizure exceeded the authority conferred by a federal statute, and although Marshall confessed that he first thought that military officers acting under orders ought to be immune from personal liability, he ultimately concluded that the instructions of a superior officer could not “legalize an act that without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.” Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 217, at 591–94.
The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants"

ence" or concern with the "vital purposes" of detention prevented courts and juries from awarding damages against military officers during the War of 1812. Chauncey, as we have seen, unsuccessfully sought to detain Stacy to prevent him from revealing more information to the enemy. Smith argued that military necessity justified the detention of Shaw, at least to investigate the charge of spying, but the court disagreed. Similarly, after the Mexican-American war, a jury considered whether the confiscation of property during hostilities in Mexico was really warranted; the officer unsuccessfully argued for "some discretionary power as to the measures he should adopt." Although deference based on functional grounds should have some role in resolving the scope of the Commander-in-Chief power, these cases show that the broad functional reasoning in some of the enemy combatant cases is neither a textual imperative nor a set of self-evident, immutable principles.

Second, the War of 1812 also supports this approach with a sterling example of judicial resistance to the military power exercised by General Jackson in New Orleans at the close of war. As discussed below, this example shows that the executive branch can act even in the teeth of judicial opinion denying its authority but that the political risks to the executive branch are then far higher. The question thus is not whether the courts should leave these questions up to the President or to the "political branches;" the question is whether the President's action will be given judicial imprimatur, or whether he must seek specific congressional authorization or take the political risk of acting counter to the courts. Observers have maintained that the President is bound more by politics than by law when he takes emergency action during war, but even if this is true it does not

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252 Id. at 465.
253 See supra Part III.A.
256 History provides other examples too, of course, including Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861), Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) from the Civil War, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), and Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp. 992 (1944), from World War II, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952), from the Korean War, and New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), from the Vietnam War. Two of these decisions, Milligan and Duncan, are criticized as largely irrelevant because the courts handed them down only after the end of hostilities. See ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 3, at 34 ("It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the decision in [Milligan] followed the close of the rebellion by a full year, altered not in the slightest degree the extraordinary methods through which that rebellion had been suppressed, and did nothing more than deliver from jail a handful of rascals who in any event would have probably gained their freedom in short order."); REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 224 (noting that a decision made "after hostilities have ceased" is "more likely to favor civil liberty than if made while hostilities continue").
257 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gross, supra note 245, at 1125; Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 253 (1981); cf. REHNQUIST, supra note 3, at 224 ("But at another level, the maxim speaks to the attitude
mean that courts should necessarily sanction the President’s use of such authority. A decision by the courts denying the President the power he seeks remains vitally important because it changes the political stakes and meaning of the President’s actions, and because it prevents constitutional entrenchment of expanding presidential power.

A. The Battle of New Orleans

When Theodore Roosevelt issued the third edition of his definitive work on the Naval War of 1812, he added a final chapter on the battle of New Orleans despite the battle’s lack of naval significance. As the “crowning event of the war,” it was a battle Roosevelt could not resist describing. In Roosevelt’s colorful prose, the city faced a “mighty and cruel foe” in the British anchored just off the coast, but “nothing save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the Crescent City,” for Andrew Jackson, a “master-spirit” was in their midst. Whether one credits Jackson’s “implacable fury” at the British or his upbringing among the “lawless characters” of the Tennessee frontier, Jackson emerged from the January 8, 1815 battle an unmistakable hero. He decisively defeated the British with relatively few American casualties despite being greatly outnumbered by British forces.

General Jackson kept New Orleans under martial law until March 13, 1815, fearing renewed attack from the British. When an unsigned letter in the newspaper challenged his military rule, Jackson compelled the disclosure of the author’s identity and then had the author, a state legislator named Louaillier, arrested as a “spy.” A local judge issued a writ of habeas corpus and Jackson had him arrested for “exciting mutiny” along with a district attorney who sought a writ of habeas corpus to free the judge. In the end the court martial dismissed the charges against Louaillier, and

of wartime presidents such as Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, so well captured in Biddle’s phrase “the Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President.”

But the Fourth Circuit concluded that it must defer to the political branches because “those branches most accountable to the people should be the ones to undertake the ultimate protection and to ask the ultimate sacrifice from them.”

1612

HeinOnline -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1612 2003-2004
Jackson released all three prisoners when he received official word of the Treaty of Ghent.\textsuperscript{266}

After his release, the district attorney immediately brought a contempt proceeding against Jackson before the formerly imprisoned federal judge. General Jackson hired an attorney, appeared in court accompanied by an unruly crowd of supporters, and defended his actions as both a military necessity and a lawful exercise of executive authority under martial law. The judge rejected Jackson's argument and imposed a $1000 fine which Jackson promptly paid.\textsuperscript{267} Jackson made a dramatic speech justifying his actions even if they departed from civil authority and pointed out that since the danger had passed he would "submit cheerfully to the operation of the laws, even when they punished actions which were done to preserve them."\textsuperscript{268}

**B. Modern Relevance**

In one sense the entire Louaillier incident has little to do with the detentions of Hamdi and Padilla. With the exception of the "spying" charge against Louaillier (which was dismissed for lack of evidence), none of General Jackson's detainees even purportedly had ties to the enemy, hence they ill fit the "enemy combatant" category.\textsuperscript{269} One might, however, draw some institutional lessons from the Louaillier incident. President Madison viewed Jackson's actions as justified, but not necessarily lawful.\textsuperscript{270} Madison emphasized that the "law of necessity" should not be confused with "ordinary rules of military service," and that even if justified by necessity, a commander cannot "resort to the established law of the land, for the means of vindication."\textsuperscript{271} And the courts, by issuing the initial writ (and later the sanctions) forced Jackson to defend the necessity of his actions in the face of judicial opinions to the contrary, markedly raising the political stakes of his actions. In one way, the outcome would be the same except for the token $1000 fine. But in another way, the outcome would have been entirely different, for Jackson would not have had to justify his actions to the public, and the next President or General would have had a solid legal basis for such detentions.

These observations about the Louaillier incident are useful in considering the precedent established by the Civil War. President Lincoln arrested and detained many U.S. citizens both for speaking out against his wartime policies (including those who hindered conscription) and for aiding enemy

\textsuperscript{266} Id. at 244.
\textsuperscript{267} Id. at 245–48.
\textsuperscript{268} Id. at 248 (citing CHARLES GAYARRE, 4 HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 420 (1885)).
\textsuperscript{269} Notice that Jackson did not defend the detention of Louaillier based on his purported ties to the enemy.
\textsuperscript{270} Sofaer, supra note 257, at 249.
\textsuperscript{271} Id. (citing 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 211–13 (J. Bassett ed., 1927)).
forces.\textsuperscript{272} But he did so largely without judicial confirmation of his authority from the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{273} In \textit{Ex parte Merryman},\textsuperscript{274} Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of attachment concluding that the President lacked the authority to detain John Merryman, who was accused of aiding the enemy forces by assisting in the destruction of railway bridges in Maryland.\textsuperscript{275} To be sure, Lincoln ignored Taney’s ruling, but at least the judiciary did not give its imprimatur to Lincoln’s actions. In \textit{Ex parte Vallandigham},\textsuperscript{276} the Court declined to set aside the trial by military commission of an outspoken politician who virulently opposed Lincoln but did so on a technical point of appellate jurisdiction\textsuperscript{277} that provided no strong judicial precedent on which future Presidents could rely for similar authority. The Supreme Court said nothing more about the legality of military commissions until after the Civil War when it invalidated the trial of Lambdin Milligan.\textsuperscript{278}

The War of 1812 thus provides two grounds on which to criticize the modern courts’ use of deference-based reasoning. The early cases refused to employ such reasoning undermining the argument that courts must defer as a constitutional or functional imperative. Second, when courts refuse to defer, the President may still seek congressional authorization for his actions or, in extreme situations, defy the courts. This entails greater political risks for the President, to be sure. But it has the advantages of keeping the judicial inquiry to relatively bright line rules, of forcing the President and Congress to engage many questions that the courts have taken for themselves, and it avoids creating precedent that constantly expands the President’s power.\textsuperscript{279} Justice Jackson echoed this point in his justly famous

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\bibitem{note272}See \textsc{Mark E. Neely, Jr.}, \textsc{The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties} 113-38 (1991) (analyzing extensively the different types and numbers of prisoners).
\bibitem{note273}See \textsc{Rossiter \& Longaker}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 5 (noting that Lincoln’s “breath-taking estimate[ of [his] own war powers” has “earned no blessing under the hands of the judiciary”).
\bibitem{note274}17 F.Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861).
\bibitem{note275}See \textsc{Rehnquist, \textit{supra} note 3}, at 26.
\bibitem{note276}68 U.S. (Wallace 1) 243 (1863).
\bibitem{note277}See \textsc{Rossiter \& Longaker, \textit{supra} note 3}, at 29 (describing the Court as beating “a unanimous retreat to the fortress of technicality”).
\bibitem{note278}Id. at 30–34. Perhaps the government’s victory in the \textit{Prize Cases} discouraged other potential litigants from challenging Lincoln’s wartime actions. See id. at 75. In any event, however sweeping Lincoln’s victory was in the \textit{Prize Cases}, the courts still held him to the standards set by international law. \textsc{See also Neely, \textit{supra} note 272}, at 139–59 (describing the Lincoln administration’s efforts to administer the Union blockade in compliance with international law, even when such compliance had no foreign policy benefits).
\bibitem{note279}Professor Peter Margulies offers an alternative approach to constraining executive authority to detain enemy combatants: the Joint Resolution should be read as permitting the courts to tailor the conditions of detention to require an evidentiary hearing, the right to representation by counsel, and limiting the length of the detentions. Margulies, \textit{supra} note 143, at 425–30. Requiring Congress to legislate, he argues, might result in an “overbroad authorization” or, at the other extreme, Congress might be unable to enact legislation at all. \textit{Id.} at 425–26. But giving courts the task of tailoring the conditions of detention involves both of these dangers, as well as others. Courts, too, can give overbroad authorization, as the Fourth Circuit opinions in \textit{Hamdi} illustrate. \textsc{See also Cole, \textit{supra} note 16}, at 4–8, 15–22 (describing
VI. CONCLUSION

One irony of the Fourth Circuit’s opinions in Hamdi is that for all its rhetoric about leaving the conduct of war to the political branches, the court gave itself the task of generating standards to govern military detentions of “enemy combatants.” Those standards have proven difficult to define, a key weakness in relying so heavily on deference-based arguments. The limits of those arguments appear to rest largely on the intuition of judges, a deep irony indeed.

The cases from the War of 1812 suggest an alternative approach. Denying the President the long-term authority to detain U.S. citizens unless Congress specifically authorizes such detentions would create a relatively bright line rule for the courts and really would return part of the question to the political branches. Similarly, where the text of the Constitution and historical practice provide no clear answers, denying the President the authority to detain people in violation of international law provides one relatively well-established, clear way of limiting some detentions in a manner consistent with historical practice and cases. In the end, Mr. Madison’s forgotten war gives us much to contemplate. Let us hope the courts will heed its lessons.

wastime abuses of civil liberties during the Twentieth century, many of which the Court sanctioned or at least failed to halt. Courts could also find themselves unable to agree and, in effect, unable to create coherent or meaningful conditions on detentions. Wartime cases like Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), illustrate the danger. See Alpheus Mason, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone’s Views, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 806, 802–830, 832–37, 838 (1956) (describing the intense conflict on the Court about Quirin and Yamashita, discussing how the opinions were compromised by the Court’s inability to agree on reasoning, and quoting Yamashita’s lawyer as describing that opinion in these terms: “a patchwork of ideas and statements, pieced together to satisfy the divergent views of men who were seeking to find ‘good’ reasons for a politically expedient result”); Note, Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 868 (1957) (describing the “extreme ambiguity” of the Eisentrager decision). Moreover, stare decisis and issues of institutional competence and incentives may make these dangers more acute and serious in the context of judicial opinions than in congressional legislation. Finally, congressional review of judicial decisions is a far less common form of interbranch dialog than judicial review of congressional actions, and would require courts to be very clear about whether the conditions of detention they impose were subject to congressional revision or not.
