First Page
85
Abstract
Justification for including a discussion on exclusive dealing arrangements and on refusal to deal decisions in a symposium devoted to trade practices rests upon the practical consideration that there exists on the part of business management a considerable interest in the two commercial tools.
Business executives find appeal in the prospect of using a contract calling for exclusive dealing.' Those engaged in commerce have for a variety of purposes frequently employed as a lever the refusal to deal.
Possible antitrust implications in the use of the two devices has not always been understood by business. In recent years, however, the volume of litigation and various efforts at education have more and more induced a consciousness of possible antitrust liability and encouraged questions of lawyer advisors to business.
This analysis is intended to give guidance which will assist in answering the questions which may be raised.
Recommended Citation
Reynolds C. Seitz,
Exclusive Arrangements and Refusal to Deal Problems,
11 Vanderbilt Law Review
85
(1957)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol11/iss1/4